Scoring a business on fifteen fixed metrics so the weak one cannot hide, valuing a three-part financial by its parts, and reading consolidated debt that is not the parent's.
1. Score every candidate on the same fifteen metrics, and publish the worst one
The repeatable method
- Fix the metric list in advance — business model, management, moat, industry, risks, balance sheet, capital intensity, capital allocation, profitability, dilution, historical growth, outlook, valuation, owner's earnings, value creation.
- Score each out of ten with a one-line justification, and take the simple average. No weighting, so a single bad score cannot be diluted away by adding good ones.
- Read the lowest score first — it is the shape of the risk you are underwriting.
- State whether you are accepting that weakness, and why. If the reason is "everyone does it," say so explicitly so it can be challenged.
Here: KKR scores
8.3/10. Balance sheet, capital allocation and valuation each score 9.5; risk scores 7 ("highly cyclical"); and
stock-based compensation scores 4/10 at 20.3% of adjusted net income — "SBCs are a cost for shareholders and should be treated accordingly… But unfortunately this is an industry wide practice." Compare
Arista at 7.9/10 and
HEICO at 7.8/10, where the same framework produced a pass on price.
Watch for
- An unweighted average hiding a veto-level flaw: 4/10 on dilution costs only 0.4 points of the total.
- "Industry practice" as a defence. It explains why the number is high; it does not mean the shareholder is not paying it.
2. Value a multi-part financial by its parts, not by a group multiple
The repeatable method
- Split the business into segments that earn differently — here fee income, insurance, and balance-sheet holdings.
- Value each on the measure appropriate to it (a multiple of fee-related earnings, a book-value or spread-based measure for insurance, a mark for the holdings).
- Sum them, subtract corporate debt, and express the result as a per-share fair value.
- Cross-check with the group's own multiple history — agreement between two unrelated methods is the point.
- Say which segment the discount is concentrated in, because that is what has to re-rate.
Here: "A sum-of-the-parts analysis puts fair value at $133 per share" against a $97 price — a 28.3% discount — cross-checked against a forward PE of 14.9x versus an 18.0x five-year and 16.0x ten-year average, and "below every major peer" (Blackstone, Carlyle, Bain Capital). The segment split — insurance 56.7%, asset management 38.2% — is where the sum-of-the-parts does its work.
Watch for
- Sum-of-the-parts as a permanent explanation for a permanent discount. A conglomerate discount that never closes is a valuation, not an error.
- Which segment's multiple is doing the lifting; insurance and fee streams should not be capitalised at the same rate.
3. Ask where the capital comes from and whether it can be withdrawn
The repeatable method
- For any manager or financial, separate the capital that has a maturity from the capital that does not.
- Permanent or long-dated capital changes behaviour: it removes the obligation to invest and exit on a calendar.
- Quantify it, as a share of total assets, and track whether it is growing.
- Check the cost: insurance float is only free if the underwriting roughly breaks even — the spread earned versus paid is the number to find.
Here: "$219 billion in permanent capital through Global Atlantic… unlike most competitors who raise fixed ten-year funds and return the money." The Quality Score gives the cost side in passing — "insurance spreads: 1.8%" — which is the figure that decides whether this capital is cheap. The same test the archive applies to
Fairfax's float and to Berkshire.
Watch for
- Permanent capital that carries a guaranteed crediting rate — annuity liabilities are cheap funding only while the spread holds.
- Regulatory capital requirements at the insurer limiting how much of that money can actually be moved into illiquid assets.
4. Read consolidated leverage down to who can be sued
The repeatable method
- Take the headline debt figure and split it into recourse (the parent must repay) and non-recourse (only the fund or asset backs it).
- Non-recourse debt inside consolidated funds is not the manager's obligation; exclude it from the parent's leverage.
- Then look at direct corporate debt against cash and fee-related earnings — that is the real balance sheet.
- Note what remains at risk anyway: reputation, seed capital, and the fee stream if the funds fail.
Here: "The headline debt figure is mostly non-recourse debt sitting inside separate funds, meaning lenders have no claim on KKR itself. Direct corporate debt is manageable, cash is healthy, and book value has compounded at a strong rate since 2015." The balance sheet scores 9.5/10 on that reading, against a screen that would have flagged the consolidated figure.
Watch for
- Reputational recourse: a manager that lets a fund fail may face no legal claim and still lose the next fundraise.
- Ratios that become meaningless on consolidation — the onepager's ROIC of 0.2% and FCF yield of 0.4% are artefacts, not findings.
5. Require named, countable growth engines rather than a market forecast
The repeatable method
- Ask which specific new pool of customers or capital produces the forecast growth, and how big it is today.
- Prefer engines already visibly working to those still described as opportunities.
- Check management's target against the analyst estimate; a gap either way is information.
- Set a checkpoint: what number, in which quarter, would confirm the engine is still running?
Here: two are named — the retail K-Series funds "more than doubled in AUM in 2025 alone, opening up an entirely new pool of individual investor capital", and the Arctos acquisition for sports investing, "bringing KKR closer to $1 trillion in AUM." Management wants to "double earnings in five years" (≈15%/yr) against a published long-term EPS growth estimate of 21.1% — the estimate is the more aggressive of the two, which is unusual.
Watch for
- Retail distribution as a growth engine that also changes the liability: individual investors redeem in ways institutions cannot.
- Acquisitions counted as AUM growth. Assets bought are not assets raised, and they are not equally profitable.
6. Publish the case before the trade, and the conclusion for those who will not read it
The repeatable method
- Write the full case first, then a one-page conclusion that stands alone, then the transaction.
- The conclusion must contain the decision, the price, the size and the limit — everything needed to act or to disagree.
- Set the limit deliberately relative to the quote and note which you are optimising for: certainty of fill, or price.
- Record how long the name sat on the shortlist before being bought.
Here: "$50,000… limit price of $98… 520 shares," with the quote at $97 — a limit set $1
above the market, i.e. for certainty of execution, the same choice made later on
Fairfax and the opposite of the
28 June below-market limits. KKR had been ranked on the
March,
April,
May and
June Best Buys lists first — four months from shortlist to purchase.
Watch for
- A conclusion written after the decision was made; the tell is a case with no disconfirming section.
- Subscriber front-running: an alert published before the manager's own execution moves thin names — less of an issue here, at $595m average daily volume.
Methods distilled from the archived Compounding Quality post for personal study. Not investment advice.