| Account | Shares | Price | Value | % of acct | Cost/sh | Gain $ | Gain % | Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 401K | 58 | $270.66 | $15,698 | 0.64% | $240.75 | $1,735 | +12.4% | — |
| HSA | 8 | $259.71 | $2,078 | 1.92% | $234.88 | $199 | +10.6% | — |
| Total | 66 | $17,776 | 0.40% | $1,933 | +12.2% | — |
In short: The template: Uranium Royalty "was patterned and launched in 2017 to become the Franco-Nevada, Wheaton Precious Metals, Sandstorm Royal Gold company in the uranium space." A business-model analogue, not a view.
11:47And it was patterned and launched in 2017 to become the Franco-Nevada, Wheaton Precious Metals, Sandstorm Royal Gold company in the uranium space. Quite simply, it's a capital provider to new mines in development that are around the world, not just in North America, that are going to help fill this gap of production deficit.
In short: His elevator pitch for gold: the first and largest gold streamer, now a mature story but with visible decade-long production growth, a long tail of non-producing assets sell-side NAVs ignore (option value kicks in if gold holds the $4,000s), and a special situation — ~20% of NAV was Cobre Panama, "almost certainly going to be restarted." Gold exposure without a decaying futures roll, static bullion or a cost-chasing mining CEO.
Franco-Nevada is a "streaming and royalty" company: it pays miners cash upfront for the right to a share of their future gold at a low fixed cost. It gets gold-price upside without running mines, so it avoids the cost overruns and empire-building mining bosses are prone to.
He likes three things: production growth that's already visible for the next decade; lots of not-yet-producing deposits that analysts give no value today but become valuable if gold stays above $4,000; and Cobre Panama, a big copper mine (about a fifth of Franco's value) that Panama shut two years ago and that he expects to reopen — which would re-accelerate Franco's growth.
41:49Today it's a much more mature scaled story but we still like a couple of aspects about Franco-Nevada. One, there is a very visible growth in their production over the next decade. Number two, there's a long tail of what are non-producing assets. So today the cash flow and the growth and the NAVs that the sell side put out, that's basically only on what's producing.
In short: Pierre Lassonde's royalty model as the way to own mining optionality: "the best place to find another mine is right next to a discovered mine… you own a royalty… and you work it into the royalty contract that you have exposure to any kind of additional finds around the mine. And that has worked out very well." Illustration, no stance on the stock.
44:21optionality as Pierre Lassonde has said many times, who is the former CEO, I think he's chairman emeritus now of Franco-Nevada, the best place to find another mine is right next to a discovered mine and we've seen that over and over, that's been the model for like Franco-Nevada right, you own a royalty on a company for a mine and then you work it into the royalty contract that you have the ability to
In short: Named — with Wheaton — as one of "the royalty names" in the portfolio of the deep-value (not mining) fund manager who approached him at a birthday party: gold miners now screen well on absolute valuation and especially relative to the hot sectors Wall Street talks about.
Franco-Nevada is a royalty company: instead of digging mines itself, it pays miners cash up front in exchange for a permanent cut of what those mines produce. That means it gets gold-price upside without the cost blowouts, strikes and permitting fights that plague actual miners.
Stöferle doesn't argue a case for it here — he mentions it as one of the names a deep-value generalist investor had bought, which is the point he's making: gold equities are now cheap enough to show up on ordinary value screens rather than only in specialist gold funds.
1:22:51And he said, "Yeah, my portfolio is full with Agnico, with some royalty names, Franco, Wheaton. I've got a couple of smaller producers and developers." And so I said, "Well, you're actually also running a mining fund." And he said, "No, I'm running a deep value fund." And I thought that that was really interesting.
In short: Owned only in his retirement accounts as one of "the bigger" royalty names — a passing reference before he pivots to the small-cap royalty he actually speculates in (Empress).
18:24So on the royalty front again I only own I mean when I say I only own I have retirement accounts that own some of the bigger like Franco Neadas and Wheatens or whatever it's called now. But the smaller company I have that I've been impressed with I actually came into the financing about four years ago when Rick did it and he did most of it himself is a company called Empress Royalty — run by Alexandra Wood Chiron.
In short: Named only inside his one stated regret, and the advice is reaffirmed for other people rather than for himself: "Perhaps I spent too long in my buy the best trade. You'll recall that a couple of years ago in our interviews, I said that for most people if they bought Franco-Nevada and Agnico, and spent the time that they would have studying the juniors with their children or grandchildren or gardening, that they'd be ahead. I also said that those people who were willing to work and take risk would do better coming down the value chain. I am one of those who is willing to work and I probably should have shifted my focus down market to the speculations sooner than I did." No current rating is given.
45:55I'm pretty tolerant of my own mistakes now, having made a lot of them. — Mhm. — Perhaps I spent too long in my buy the best trade. You'll recall that a couple of years ago in our interviews, I said that for most people if they bought Franco-Nevada and Agnico, and spent the time that they would have studying the juniors with their children or grandchildren or gardening, — Yeah.
In short: Completes the royalty trio — "Royal Gold… Wheaton… Franco-Nevada." Still held after being the first vehicle he re-entered gold through when the miners corrected.
Franco-Nevada is the largest of the gold royalty companies — it owns rights to production across scores of mines it doesn't operate. In his previous appearance it was the vehicle he used to re-enter gold first, precisely because a royalty holder is the least fragile way back into a sector that had just fallen 35–40%.
Here it simply remains in place, the third of the royalty trio he names. Together the three give him diversified exposure to gold's price without owning any single mine's problems.
29:08And then in between we have a lot, we have all of the — not all of them but most of the big royalty companies. We have Royal Gold. We have Wheaton. Wheaton is in there. Franco-Nevada. And then we own the biggest silver company is Hecla that we own, a miner there.
In short: He answers the standard bear case head-on: "One of the most frequent criticisms I see… when they talk about my Franco thesis and my Wheaton thesis is that the great big transactions that built those companies 20 or 30 years ago are a thing of the past — and that's exactly wrong." The copper development boom "will require vast amounts of capital and a substantial portion of it is going to come from streaming agreements"; "there are very few companies in the world that are large enough to allocate capital to the major miner in three and four and 5 billion chunks. Franco and Wheaton are two of those." Because the need exceeds even their capacity, the facilities get syndicated — "the principal beneficiaries will be Franco and Wheaton, who will be the architects of these very very large facilities. This is a very important trend that most people aren't paying attention to at all." He already owns "a lot of Franco."
Franco-Nevada is the other giant of the same business — royalties and streams. A royalty is a permanent slice off the top of a mine's revenue; a stream is the right to buy a share of its metal at a fixed low price. Either way you own a piece of the output without owning the costs, so inflation in diesel, labour and steel hits the miner, not you.
The common criticism of both Franco and Wheaton is that they are yesterday's story: the huge foundational deals were done twenty or thirty years ago, and there's nothing that size left to do. Rick's answer is that this is "exactly wrong," and the reason is copper. The world's biggest copper miners need roughly $250 billion over the next decade just to hold production flat, and they do not have it. Share issuance is punishingly expensive when a miner's stock trades below the sum of its parts, and bank debt tops out around 65–70% of a mine's cost. The 30–40% gap has to come from somewhere else — offtakes, royalties, and above all streams.
That is a market measured in tens of billions, and almost nobody can serve it. Writing a single $3–5 billion cheque to a major miner is something "very few companies in the world" can do; Franco-Nevada and Wheaton are two of them. When a deal is bigger than either can swallow, they will assemble and lead a syndicate — bringing in Triple Flag, Osisko, Royal Gold, even hedge funds — and take the best piece for themselves. Rick's word for this role is architect: whoever structures the facility keeps the economics, and the smaller participants take what's handed to them.
He already owns "a lot of Franco," calls this "a very important trend that most people aren't paying attention to at all," and is blunt about why it's mispriced: it plays out over four, five, ten years, and "most people don't do any work. They want to feel, not think."
34:25The copper development boom that we absolutely have to see in the next 10 years will require vast amounts of capital and a substantial portion of it is going to come from streaming agreements. There are very few companies in the world that are large enough to allocate capital to the major miner in three and four and 5 billion chunks.
In short: Bought back over the last six weeks after the miners corrected 35–40%: "on the minor side we went back in the royalty companies, Franco-Nevada."
Franco-Nevada is a royalty and streaming company, not a miner. It pays cash up front to help build somebody else's mine, and in return takes a permanent slice of that mine's future production or revenue. Because it has no crews, no diesel bill and no cost overruns, it captures a rising gold price without the operating risk that sinks ordinary miners.
It was the first thing Oxbow bought back after the mining sector fell 35–40% — "on the miner side we went back in the royalty companies, Franco-Nevada" — which is characteristic: re-enter through the lowest-risk vehicle first.
37:03It went 3950 or whatever and it came back to 4,000 two or three times. I think you can still buy it 4300. I think gold is going to do well in the last half of the year, but on the minor side we went back in the royalty companies, Franco-Nevada. We added Hecla like I say on the silver minor side.
In short: The royalty leg of the "crushed = gift from God" trio. He closes the oil discussion the same way: "I hope that this conversation steers your listeners towards the Exxons and the Franco-Nevadas of the world."
Franco-Nevada is a gold royalty company: instead of digging mines itself, it pays cash up front for the right to a slice of a mine's future output. That means it collects the upside of a higher gold price without carrying the operating costs, cost overruns or capital spending of an actual miner — the low-risk way to own the sector.
It's the royalty leg of his "crushed = a gift from God" trio. He returns to it at the end of the interview when summing up the whole conversation: he hopes it steers listeners "towards the Exxons and the Franco-Nevadas of the world" — i.e. towards the best-run, most durable business in each sector rather than the speculative fringe.
12:54which I think for most investors is a gift from God. I think the beta that we will enjoy in
12:59the gold sector over the 5 to 10 year time frame is so big that you don't need to chase alpha.
In short: The other named leading royalty company reduced or sold on valuation. Same argument: premium multiples (~2x NAV) now embed the higher gold price exactly as depressed 2015 prices were embedded as discounts, and multiple compression "overwhelms the gradual accumulation of compounded growth." The firm still concedes the business model's merits — no operating or capital costs, exploration optionality, life-of-mine contracts — but notes royalty companies are price takers with no discretion over mine operations, and that historical returns should not be assumed to repeat.
The other leading gold royalty company, and it is being reduced for the same reason as Wheaton. Their quality is exactly what creates the problem: because they are the best, they get the highest multiples, which gives them the cheapest cost of capital, which lets them win the best deals — a virtuous cycle that the market has already priced at roughly twice net asset value.
Two limits get stated plainly. These companies have no say in how a mine is run, and no pricing power over the metal — their revenue is whatever gold happens to fetch, so they are price takers. Ten years ago the depressed gold price was baked into their share prices as a discount; today's $4,100 gold is baked in as a premium. Horizon Kinetics still likes the model and concedes gold has structural support (new mine supply has grown just 0.36% a year since 2018 while central banks keep buying), but it is not willing to assume the last decade's returns repeat from here.
Full passage: premium transcript (PDF).
In short: One of the "best of the best" precious-metals beta names (with Wheaton and Agnico) that "could form all by itself a portfolio" a hands-off investor buys and holds 5–10 years to "be very, very, very happy." People who don't own them "should definitely buy them."
Franco-Nevada and Wheaton are "royalty and streaming" companies — they don't dig mines themselves; they hand miners cash up front in exchange for a slice of future production (a royalty) or the right to buy metal later at a fixed low price (a stream). That makes them lower-risk ways to own gold and silver: they get the upside if metal prices rise without the cost blowouts of actually operating mines.
Rule calls these the "best of the best" and uses "beta" to mean the extra return a good resource sector delivers over the broad stock market. His point: if you won't do the hard homework of picking junior miners, just owning these top-quality names and holding them 5–10 years is enough to profit from the multi-year resource bull — "buy them and go watch baseball."
9:56If I'm right, the beta, and I would define beta as the outperformance of a sector relative to the broad market, the beta in the best of the best precious metals stocks, the aforementioned Franco-Nevada, Wheaton Precious and Agnico Eagle, could form all by itself a portfolio that somebody could buy and 5 years from now, 7 years from now, 10 years from now, having paid no more attention to it, having watched baseball, played with their kids, read books, they would be very, very, very happy.
In short: Hold, $259 target (+18.1% from $219.26) — the premium streamer: 1.8× P/NAV, 27.9× 2026E P/E, unlevered implied gold $9,749; quality fully priced.
In short: Used as the illustration that royalties outperform gold over time (FNV ÷ gold turning up). Caveat: its long-term chart is broken into two pieces by a buyout/spin-out, so for the cleanest long history he points to Royal Gold or Wheaton instead.
Franco-Nevada is the largest gold royalty company. Rusche uses its price divided by the gold price to show that royalty companies tend to beat gold itself over time. He notes its long-term chart is split into two pieces by a past buyout and re-listing, so for the cleanest long history he points to Royal Gold or Wheaton instead.
6:43Going back to your point — I just pulled up Franco Nevada here and divided it by gold. So when the Franco Nevada chart is going up, the royalty company is outperforming gold. When it's going down, gold is actually outperforming the royalty company. It looks like we're just starting the next hike up.
In short: Ranks it a 4 (could become a 3 if it keeps falling) — "the finest gold-oriented company on the planet." Always looks expensive on conventional metrics because it's valued on NPV; lowest G&A-to-revenue in the industry. He thinks the next round of big streaming deals (driven by copper miners selling gold/silver streams to fund the $250B capex) is ahead, not behind, Franco and Wheaton.
Franco-Nevada doesn't dig mines — it's a "royalty" company that puts up money upfront in exchange for a permanent cut of a mine's future production, so it gets the upside without the operating costs or risk. Rule calls it the finest gold-oriented company on earth (a 4, maybe a 3 if it falls more). It always looks expensive because of how analysts value future cash: a standard "net present value" calculation treats money you'll receive 10+ years out as nearly worthless today, yet Franco's mines keep producing for 30–40 years, so five years from now the math still shows the same huge value — the "over-valuation" is an illusion of the method. The contrarian bet: everyone thinks Franco's giant deals are done, but Rule expects a wave of new ones as cash-strapped copper miners sell off slices of their gold/silver output to fund the enormous spending copper requires.
11:57sits today, I see it as a five. — All right. Next one, Franco-Nevada. Franco-Nevada — Go ahead. — I believe Franco-Nevada is the finest gold-oriented company on the planet. I have Franco-Nevada as a four. If the price continues to fall, I may be able to award it a three. The company always, by conventional metrics, seems overpriced because it's valued on a net present value basis, and the company enjoys 30- or 40-year long assets.
In short: Named as the royalty peer he compares Wheaton's silver beta against; he prefers Wheaton for more precious/silver exposure.
33:01And so, it's more of a working capital monetization for the miner. And so, if you kind of look at the overall performance and beta of Wheaton Precious versus say one of its peers in Franco-Nevada, I think you get enough of the precious Excuse me, enough of the silver exposure to make it worth your while even though they're diversifying more and more into gold without taking kind of outsized mining um and business model risk.
In short: The gold-royalty name he'd also love to buy at half price — one of the financial-services/resource names he wants to accumulate on weakness.
Franco-Nevada is a gold "royalty" company — rather than running mines, it owns rights to a cut of the gold that many different mines produce, giving it gold exposure without operating risk. Rule lists it among the high-quality names he'd happily buy if the price fell by half. Another patient "buy it cheap and wait" target.
37:32I wonder what these IPOs — SpaceX, Anthropic, OpenAI — will do to liquidity, sucking capital from other names. The beginning of the end? I certainly hope so. There are a lot of names in conventional financial services and natural resources I'd like to own much more of — I'd be delighted to see Exxon Mobil, Agnico Eagle or Franco-Nevada fall by half. The only way I've found to become profoundly materially richer is to buy undervalued assets and wait until they return to value. So my hope is that higher oil prices and IPO-driven illiquidity lead to materially worse equity markets, particularly in financial services and natural resources — the markets I know best.
In short: Cautionary benchmark — its ~$1B Cobre Panama copper stake took a brutal loss when that mine closed; Wheaton's $4.3B deal is 4× that size, underscoring the added risk in chasing growth via streaming.
Franco-Nevada is a rival streaming/royalty company. It's mentioned as a warning: it had a roughly $1 billion deal tied to the Cobre Panama copper mine, and when that mine shut down, it lost a lot. Since Wheaton's new deal is four times bigger and concentrated in one mine, Rubino uses Franco-Nevada's experience to remind investors that bigger streaming bets also carry bigger risks if anything goes wrong with that single asset.
In short: The model that worked — ~$1B in 2008, now ~$49B. Royalty/streamers returned ~2,000% (~4x gold) since 2008 by collecting fixed-price cuts of production. Still a good business, but now too big to move on small deals — the explosive-compounding phase is behind it.
Franco-Nevada is a "royalty" company: instead of digging mines itself, it gives miners money up front in exchange for the right to buy a slice of their gold cheaply forever — like owning a tollbooth on the gold road. That model has been wildly profitable; since 2008 royalty companies like this returned about 2,000%, roughly four times what gold itself did. Prins uses Franco-Nevada to show how powerful the model is — but also to make the point that it's now huge ($49B), so the explosive-growth days are behind it.
In short: Gold royalty/streamer flagged after a Rick Rule podcast (Dec-9 MHM): Rule's fondness for its "capital-lite business model" and the fact it had "corrected hard" on adverse Panama news. Regardless of how Panama plays out, "it's had a more than respectable rally." A standout among the "nearly always despised" gold miners.
Franco-Nevada is a gold "royalty/streamer" — instead of digging mines itself, it puts up cash up front and then collects a slice of the gold (or the revenue) from mines other companies operate. That's the "capital-lite business model" Hay and Rick Rule praise: low costs, no expensive mine to run, and exposure to a rising gold price without most of the operational risk.
The stock had fallen hard on bad news out of Panama (where one of the mines it has an interest in was caught in a political fight), and Hay's view — echoing a Rick Rule podcast — is that the sell-off was overdone; it has since had "a more than respectable rally." A higher-quality way to own the gold-miner rebound.
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Verbatim excerpts from the public transcripts (auto-pulled at each mention's timestamp, lightly cleaned). Timestamps link into the video; "source page" opens that commentator's full analysis at this row. Click a mention's header line to expand it (one open at a time). For personal study — not investment advice.