In short: News mention ("Stocks I'm Watching"): higher premarket as the AI trade keeps finding strength after a rally that began again last week.
In short: RPK: "certainly looking better," and "probably the number one best company for building out a US manufacturing footprint in semiconductors… they have a fab already created that they need to fill up" — a semi "have" as the group splits into haves and have-nots.
RPK expects chip stocks to split into winners and losers rather than move together. Memory chips are a commodity, and China is adding a lot of capacity, so he thinks their best pricing has passed. Intel is on the other side: it already owns US factories it needs to fill, which makes it the natural company for a push to build chips in America. He notes its chart is improving.
25:46Meanwhile, you look at an Intel — I don't know where it is on the signal right now, but it's certainly looking better, I think — and it sort of remains true that it is probably the number one best company for building out a US manufacturing footprint in semiconductors. They have a fab already created that they need to fill up.
In short: A history lesson, not a call: "Intel at one point had 75% market share in the DRAM industry. The US was the dominant force in that industry… by the early 1980s, Intel was facing bankruptcy and they switched to this thing called microprocessors and Japan took over the DRAM market." It is the template for what he thinks China now does to Korea.
Intel appears purely as history here, and it is the most instructive example in the episode. Most people forget that Intel was a memory company: it once had 75% of the DRAM market, and the US dominated the industry outright.
Then Japan entered with state backing, "several generations behind" — and caught up. By the early 1980s Intel was facing bankruptcy and survived only by abandoning memory entirely for a new product called the microprocessor.
The lesson Niles extracts is not about Intel's stock today. It is that a dominant, technically superior incumbent can lose an entire commodity market to a subsidised latecomer within a decade, and that the only escape was to change businesses. That is the risk he now sees for Korean memory against China.
21:38I think a lot of investors are vastly underestimating what China is doing. And I hear these arguments and I go, this is what people were thinking back in the 1980s when Japan entered the semiconductor industry, and that was state sponsored as well. And some of your listeners may not know, but Intel at one point had 75% market share in the DRAM industry.
In short: One of only two names he calls out individually and unconditionally as basing in the chart sweep: "Intel looks like it's bottoming." Notable because it sits inside the semiconductor complex he reads as topping at the sector level — the base is the exception, not the trend.
Intel designs and manufactures computer chips, and has spent years losing ground to competitors while trying to rebuild itself as a contract manufacturer for other companies' designs.
Dillian is not making a business argument here at all. His method for this segment was to sit down and look at price charts one by one — a habit from his Lehman Brothers trading days — and sort them into "topping" (a long rise that is rolling over) and "bottoming" (a long decline that is flattening out and forming a base). Intel came out of that sweep in the second bucket: "Intel looks like it's bottoming."
What makes it interesting is the contradiction. He reads the semiconductor sector as a whole as topping, yet two chip-adjacent names look like they are turning up. A bottoming chart in a topping sector is usually a stock that already had its crash and has run out of sellers — which is the opposite risk profile to a crowded winner.
9:18Intel looks like it's bottoming. Oracle looks like it's bottoming, but I'm seeing a lot more charts that are rolling over than charts that are basing. — Okay. Yeah, healthcare had been a laggard but has been recently catching a bid. Semis have been on fire for three years.
In short: In the same vulnerable trio, and the one with the least underlying change: "really Intel hadn't gone up much at all until this last run." It is also his own cautionary case — he sold it in spring 1999 after a 400% four-year run, watched it double again, and it then took 26 years to regain that level.
Intel is in the same vulnerable trio, and Oakley flags something specific about it: "really Intel hadn't gone up much at all until this last run." A stock that has been going nowhere and then joins a sector-wide melt-up is, in his reading, being carried by the flow rather than by its own improvement — which makes it more exposed, not less.
It is also his personal cautionary tale, and he tells it against himself. He sold Intel in spring 1999 after a 400% four-year run; it doubled again before peaking in 2000, and it then took twenty-six years to get back to that level. The lesson he draws is not "never sell early" — it is that the pain of selling early is small compared with the twenty-six-year cost of not selling at all.
9:16But any particular stocks in that space, any particular names? — Well, all of the ones in the group itself. If you look at AMD and Intel and Nvidia, all of those have that same characteristic. They've been run up, a lot of money going into them pushed them much higher than they have been, and really Intel hadn't gone up much at all until this last run.
In short: Bought and sold in the same quarter. Intel "made appearances" among the broadened AI top buys (with ALAB, QCOM, NBIS and CRWV) — while Druckenmiller exited INTC outright, alongside AVGO and MU, "showing just how quickly his positioning can change." No consensus among the 20.
In short: Interesting, deliberately not core. A subscriber flagged that CEO Lip-Bu Tan bought 100,000 shares at $95 — "insider buying is always a good signal," with the stock down 50% from local highs right after an equity raise. His verdict: "while I personally do think Intel is interesting after the sell off, I don't think it'll become a core position." The offering was $15B upsized to $20B (~5% dilution) for general corporate purposes and "progress in emerging areas including physical AI, purpose-built silicon, advanced packaging and external wafers" — "the stock actually rebounded after this offering," +0.8% on the week and +178% year to date. Dan Niles calls it "his favorite semi company." Deck page 27.
Two facts pull in opposite directions. Intel's chief executive personally bought 100,000 shares at $95 — "insider buying is always a good signal," and this one came right after the company raised equity, when nobody is obliged to buy. Dan Niles calls Intel his favourite semiconductor company, and the stock is up 178% this year.
Against that, Intel just sold $15 billion of new shares, upsized to $20 billion — diluting existing holders by about 5% — to fund manufacturing. The stock actually rose afterwards, which is unusual and says the market wants Intel to have the money.
Singh's own position is deliberately half-hearted, and that is the useful part: "while I personally do think Intel is interesting after the sell off, I don't think it'll become a core position." An interesting company you are not willing to size is a watch, not a holding, and saying so out loud is more disciplined than manufacturing conviction.
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In short: A named survivor of both tables — ninth at $150.48bn in 2005, fifteenth at $664.44bn in 2026. Also the most awkward member of the six for the argument being made: staying in the top twenty is a low bar, and Intel is the clearest case of a company that survived on the list while losing its industry position. The post does not draw the distinction.
In short: Cited as the dilution datapoint: with hyperscaler free cash flow exhausted, the AI complex is raising debt and equity — "Intel diluted their shareholders by 20 some odd percent." Part of the record-issuance wave he expects to weigh on the whole trade.
Intel is his shorthand for how expensive the AI buildout has become for existing shareholders: it "diluted their shareholders by 20 some odd percent." Dilution means the company issued so many new shares that anyone who already owned it now owns roughly a fifth less of the same company without doing anything wrong.
He isn't analysing Intel's business here — he's counting it as one more entry in a record wave of equity issuance across the AI complex. When the companies that used to shrink their share count start expanding it aggressively, the supply of stock grows faster than the demand, and that weighs on the whole group.
15:18Productivity hasn't improved despite all of this investment. All that we're seeing is Mag 7 hyperscalers exhaust all of their free cash flow and now raise debt and now raise equity like you're seeing Intel diluted their shareholders by 20 some odd percent. Google did that offering and the ducks are quacking so they're going to feed them and in line with that we're seeing record equity issuance. At some point when you keep issuing equity the supply overwhelms demand and I think we're
In short: The share donor. AMD's EPYC-driven "CPU reawakening" — inference and agentic workloads needing large CPU capacity alongside accelerators — gives it "another way to participate in AI infrastructure spending while it continues taking server share from Intel." (Referenced; not a stance call.)
In short: The advanced-packaging swing factor: "Intel supply is a must by 2028" for Google's TPU ramp. EMIB capacity reaches 10-12K/month by end-2026, doubling to 24-25K by end-2027, with a large share of the announced capex increase earmarked for it — "we'll see Intel becoming more positive in capacity expansion, which is positive to the Google supply chain." The unknown is the learning-curve noise on EMIB.
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In short: Named as the live proof that the AI constraint has rotated — an explanatory observation, not a recommendation or a target: "the bottlenecks have switched. You've got CPU bottlenecks now which is why you've seen Intel up over 200% versus an Nvidia that's up like 20% or so." The bullish read is on the bottleneck, and he warns it keeps moving: "the bottlenecks are going to keep switching."
The idea here is worth more than the ticker. In any build-out there is one component in shortest supply — the bottleneck — and whoever supplies it gets the pricing power, because buyers will pay almost anything to get it. For the past two years that was Nvidia's GPUs.
Niles' point is that the bottleneck has moved. The scarcity now sits with CPUs, the general-purpose processors that feed and coordinate the AI chips, and the market has already repriced accordingly: "the bottlenecks have switched. You've got CPU bottlenecks now which is why you've seen Intel up over 200% versus an Nvidia that's up like 20% or so." The share prices are his evidence for where the constraint sits, not his forecast.
Two cautions that come with it. This is an explanation of a move that has already happened — he gives no target and makes no recommendation. And the framework is explicitly temporary: "the bottlenecks are going to keep switching," so the thing being backed is the shortage, not the company. When the constraint rotates to the next component — memory, power, networking, packaging — the same logic points somewhere else.
0:00into infrastructure which goes right back to chips and as you know Sarah pointed out with some of those other charts earlier there's shortages in there that are going to continue for the next couple of years. So I think now the bottlenecks have switched. You've got CPU bottlenecks now which is why you've seen Intel up over 200% versus an Nvidia that's up like 20% or so.
In short: The wrong half of Luria's dislocation: "for Intel to be worth what it is… this cycle has to go through 2030 because their current valuations are not otherwise justified." At 100× earnings it is "trading as if the cycle is continuing for five more years" — against a CPU market he argues is now worse than memory. (Note the contrast with the Jul-24 wrap, where Eisman called Intel's print a blowout.)
Intel is the other end of the same trade. At roughly 100× earnings, Luria says the valuation "is not otherwise justified" unless the AI build-out keeps running at full speed for another five years — a very specific bet most owners probably haven't consciously made.
The business behind it is the CPU market, which he argues is now the weaker of the two chip markets. So you are paying the highest multiple for the part of the cycle he trusts least. Note the deliberate tension with the previous week's wrap, where Eisman called Intel's actual quarter a blowout: the print was great, but a great print at 100× is not the same thing as a good investment.
34:59Intel is trading as at 100 times as if the cycle is continuing for five more years. Okay. So that's where the opportunities are for us. Okay. Then move on to Microsoft versus Salesforce. Who's a good company and who's not a very good company? Well, that's a good question. That's for software. It's the only question, right? Because there's a crowding out of unimportant software.
In short: "The long-awaited turnaround is in progress" — Q3 revenue guidance $15.8-16.8B vs $15.1B expected, with data-center CPU sales up over 59% as Lip-Bu Tan (garbled "Li Puan") positions Intel as a beneficiary of AI data-center spend. Shares +3% pre-market then sold off. "Intel's probably a buy on the dips here… but it's run so much that I don't want to be aggressive in buying it."
Intel's long-awaited turnaround is showing up in the numbers: it guided next-quarter revenue to $15.8-16.8 billion against a $15.1 billion expectation, with data-center processor sales up more than 59%. The reason is that the new wave of "agentic" AI — software agents that run tasks on their own — needs ordinary server CPUs alongside the AI chips, and Intel makes those.
His stance is measured: "probably a buy on the dips here, but it's run so much that I don't want to be aggressive." In other words, own it, add on weakness, don't chase.
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In short: Q2 revenue +25% Y/Y to $16.1B ($1.7B beat), non-GAAP EPS $0.42 ($0.20 beat) vs a $0.10 loss a year ago — CEO Lip-Bu Tan called it the strongest revenue growth in more than fifteen years. A $10.8B paper loss came from Intel's own share price making the free shares promised to the US government far more expensive. INTC has nearly tripled this year but sits ~30% below its June 22 high, caught in a sector-wide rotation out of chip stocks as Wall Street questions AI-hardware spending. Data Center & AI +59% to $6.3B (agentic workloads pulling the stack back toward CPUs); Client Computing +13% to $8.9B (vs $8.0B consensus) with AI PCs two-thirds of the mix; Foundry +31% to $5.8B (accelerating from 16%), adj gross margin 41.8% (~280 bps above guide). CFO Dave Zinsner: rising memory prices will hit PCs, and management expects sub-seasonal 2H PC consumption — yet 2026 CapEx is raised from $18B to >$20B, with 2027 significantly higher. Foundry growth is still almost entirely internal (no external customers named; "early next year" for visible progress). Q3 guide $15.8–16.8B (midpoint ~$1.2B above consensus), EPS $0.38 (vs ~$0.27), GM 42%; 18A yields ahead of plan, 14A to volume in 2028. Watch Client Computing in Q3 as memory costs hit PC pricing. (Recap, not a stance call.)
Intel designs and manufactures computer chips. This was its best growth quarter in more than fifteen years — sales up 25%, and a real profit where a year ago there was a loss. The eye-catching "$10.8 billion loss" on the statement isn't a business problem at all: Intel promised the US government free shares as part of its deal, and because Intel's own stock price rocketed this year, those promised shares became far more expensive to hand over. Accounting rules force it to book that as a loss.
The odd part is the stock. It has nearly tripled this year yet trades about 30% below its June high, because investors have been dumping chip stocks generally while they argue about whether the giant AI hardware spending spree can last. Inside the business, the AI/data-centre unit grew 59% — agentic AI workloads apparently lean back on ordinary processors, Intel's home turf — and its contract-manufacturing arm ("Foundry") grew 31%. The catch: Foundry is essentially selling to Intel itself; the CEO still wouldn't name a single outside customer, and says look again early next year. Meanwhile memory chips are getting expensive, which will raise PC prices later this year, and Intel is raising its own spending anyway (over $20 billion this year, more in 2027). Next quarter's tell is the PC unit. A recap, not a recommendation.
In short: "The results were great" — EPS 42c vs a 10c loss last year "blew away numbers," the best revenue growth in 15 years, data-center sales +59%; stock up after hours. But "Intel's results, I don't think are going to quell AI nervousness. Given CapEx budgets, it would be surprising if Intel did not have a good quarter."
Intel designs and manufactures computer chips. Its quarter was outstanding: a 42-cent profit versus a 10-cent loss a year ago, the fastest revenue growth in 15 years, and data-center chip sales up 59%.
Eisman's caveat is about what it proves, not whether it's good. Intel's customers are the same companies spending record sums on AI data centers, so a strong Intel quarter is the expected consequence of those budgets: "given CapEx budgets, it would be surprising if Intel did not have a good quarter." The market's worry isn't whether the suppliers are getting the money — it's whether the spenders can keep spending it. So the print won't "quell AI nervousness."
16:37The news from Google and Tesla caused Nasdaq to be down more than 2% on Thursday. Finally, Intel reported Thursday night, and the results were great. Earnings per share of 42 cents versus a loss of 10 cents last year blew away numbers. Revenue growth was the best it had been in 15 years. Sales in the data center segment soared 59% versus last year.
In short: Presenting Dan Niles' bull case (reports Thu): more upside at the AI-infrastructure layer than the commoditized LLM layer — (1) agentic AI is driving a surge in server-CPU demand (the new bottleneck), (2) advanced packaging already attracting several hyperscalers, and (3) a US-government-backed foundry improving and winning customers.
Singh relays Dan Niles' bull case on Intel (which reports Thursday). The idea: the money in AI is safer at the "infrastructure" layer than in the fast-commoditizing business of building AI models. Intel wins three ways — the new wave of "agentic" AI needs lots of server CPUs (a bottleneck Intel supplies), its advanced chip-packaging is pulling in big cloud customers, and its US-government-backed factory business keeps improving. It's Niles' view being presented, not Singh's own deep-dive.
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In short: Market color: named with Marvell and Micron as the long-duration semis selling off on the hawkish-Waller headlines — Intel down ~6.5% at the session lows. No individual call.
In short: Named (with Marvell and AMD) among the semis bouncing hard on the day. No individual call.
In short: Named by Talkington (with Micron and AMD) as a growing semi weight lifting the Qs. No individual call.
In short: Even a company "as old as Intel" reprices when it makes AI-relevant products — up 251% YTD / 553% on the year. Cited to show how indiscriminate the AI-winner bid has become.
9:56Investors are looking far and wide for any company that could be included in this basket of AI winners. Even companies as old as Intel, if they're making products that are relevant and exciting in the AI world, their stock price is going to reflect it. Intel is up a staggering 251% year-to-date. Over the past year, it's up 553%.
In short: Up ~150% YTD; cited with Micron/Nvidia as a parabolic chip name outside his price-vs-value discipline — no opinion on the valuation.
Intel, up about 150% this year, is grouped with Micron and Nvidia as a chip stock that has gone "parabolic" (straight up). It falls outside Rule's discipline of buying things cheap relative to a value he can calculate, so he offers no opinion on whether it's worth the price.
0:20Well, there's a lot to discuss, so I want to start by discussing the broader indices. The S&P is still up 8% on the year. The Nasdaq's up 15%, but we've seen weakness in the last few days, much of it driven by chip stocks which have gone parabolic — names like Micron still up 220% on the year, Intel up 150% — and we're only six months in. Are we at or near a top?
In short: "You take lucky over good": CPU demand is so hot Intel got ~200bps of margin selling previously written-off, by-their-own-admission uncompetitive server parts. Balance sheet fixed (government/Nvidia stakes; bought out the dilutive Apollo Ireland-fab deal), 18A/14A yield statements "very carefully worded" (yields still clearly not good), packaging IP a real AI angle — and the unshortable overlay: "Trump wants the stock to go up." Likes Lip-Bu; a lot is priced in, but the narrative is going their way.
Intel's stock has ripped, and Rasgon's verdict is "you take lucky over good." CPU demand is so strong that Intel earned extra margin selling server chips it had already written off as unsellable garbage — by Intel's own admission its products aren't competitive, but right now customers will take anything. Meanwhile the balance sheet got fixed (the US government and Nvidia took stakes), it bought its way out of an expensive private-equity deal with Apollo, and its statements about new manufacturing processes (18A, 14A) sound better — though Rasgon notes they're "very carefully worded" and the margin guidance says yields are still poor.
Why won't he short it, despite making his career being negative on Intel? "Trump wants the stock to go up" — the President took a stake and tweets stock charts; in hindsight the right move was buying that day. He likes new CEO Lip-Bu Tan (underpromise, overdeliver — the opposite of Gelsinger's execution). Lots of wood left to chop, a lot priced in, but "the narrative is going their way."
32:22Number one, the CPU story as well is working for them, — right? — And I think they're getting bailed out a little bit, but look, you take lucky over good. It's fine. Like I said, their products by their own admission are not competitive, but it doesn't matter right now. So, they're selling stuff that ordinarily they probably would not be selling, but that is helping.
In short: Technically "lost some momentum" (with AMD & Broadcom) — a sign the AI rally is narrowing and the balance of risk is turning down.
Intel is a major chipmaker. Woo doesn't dig into the company — he just notes that Intel's stock (along with AMD and Broadcom) has "lost momentum," meaning its price has stopped pushing higher. He reads that as the AI rally narrowing to fewer winners, a warning sign that the broad AI trade is tiring.
10:02This could show up in the earnings and guidance for Q2. I see few positive fundamental catalysts for the AI trade in the near term. And technically, Intel, AMD, and Broadcom all seem to have lost some momentum. What this means is that the AI rally might become even more narrow. I think the balance of risk is starting to favor the downside as the AI trade is getting very crowded.
In short: The third party in the proposed Terafab chip JV (with SpaceX and Tesla) targeting 1 TW of annual compute — SpaceX's bid to vertically integrate its own AI silicon.
In short: One of NVIDIA's large disclosed equity holdings; likely the biggest contributor to the ~$16B of equity-investment gains that flattered Q1 net profit ($58.3B reported).
NVIDIA's reported profit of $58.3 billion looked even bigger than the business actually earned, because it included about $16 billion of paper gains on stakes it owns in other companies — chiefly Intel, CoreWeave, and Coherent (Intel likely the biggest this quarter). These are mark-to-market gains: the value of those shareholdings went up, and accounting rules let NVIDIA book that rise as profit even though it didn't sell anything or earn it from selling chips. The takeaway for a reader: separate the ~$16B investment windfall from the core operating profit to judge how the actual chip business is doing.
In short: A historical reference point: 20+ years ago TSMC staff thought catching Intel was "a beautiful dream… probably for our grandchildren" — and did it in one lifetime. Passing mention, no stance.
10:46And the reason it's going to persist for a long time is Taiwan Semi is run by flinty old men and women in their 70s. Not to say 70s old, it's the new 50. I'm 50, it's the new 30. — [laughter] — But they're the most important people in Taiwan. They are Taiwan. And they view themselves as the guardians of Morris Chang's legacy.
In short: "A company that was dead for years… the foundry business is starting to pick up customers" — cited as evidence for the multi-spender thesis (more foundry spenders → more equipment demand) rather than pitched as a buy.
12:07And Intel is now — this is a company that was dead for years and it's coming in, and the foundry business is starting to pick up customers. So you've got to look at this landscape and you say you've gone from one spender — and by the way, in that environment they probably had all the power in negotiating with semi equipment companies —
In short: Named once, alongside TSMC, as the other end of ASML's customer range. No stance.
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Verbatim excerpts from the public transcripts (auto-pulled at each mention's timestamp, lightly cleaned). Timestamps link into the video; "source page" opens that commentator's full analysis at this row. Click a mention's header line to expand it (one open at a time). For personal study — not investment advice.