| Account | Shares | Price | Value | % of acct | Cost/sh | Gain $ | Gain % | Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 401K | 153 | $14.35 | $2,196 | 0.09% | $19.99 | $-863 | -28.2% | — |
In short: The supply-side exception: "Energy Fuels has been a great example of how you can deliver, but that is an exception and not a rule." Also his trading case study: after the 2024 WNA, with the sector "getting killed," Codex bought Energy Fuels call options and sold them "way too early for a little over 1,000%" (they went to 2,955%). Buying the washout is as much a timing call as selling euphoria.
Energy Fuels is a US uranium miner (it also processes rare earths). Mart's point is that most uranium projects promised production they haven't delivered; Energy Fuels is the rare one that has, which matters now that utilities care more about whether a supplier can actually ship uranium than about the exact price.
It is also his example of trading around a long-term view: when the sector was at its most hated after the 2024 industry conference, Codex bought call options — bets that pay off if the stock rises — on Energy Fuels and made more than ten times the money, even though it sold far too early.
32:58So after the WNA conference in 2024, we were getting killed on some Cameco and Energy Fuels... call options. Those did exceptionally well last year due to the tariff tantrums and due to uranium just being weak in general. We were getting killed. We bought some Energy Fuels call options.
In short: Sold "a bunch of Energy Fuels" into the January spike and had used call options last year "just to ride that wave." Now a buyer again. The US-origin RFI (~4m lb/yr against 2.12m lb of total 2025 US output) competes directly with US utilities for domestic pounds, the setup behind the report's rebuild to a full position.
Energy Fuels is the main US uranium producer. The US government wants to buy about 4 million pounds a year of American-mined uranium, roughly double what the whole country produced last year. It is competing with US power utilities for the same pounds, so an existing US producer becomes more valuable.
Mart sold some shares into January's spike and had used call options (bets that pay off if the stock rises by a set date) to trade the swings. Now he is a buyer again.
16:55what I said before as well is that it is very important to make sure that you are flexible in this sector. Right. At the start of the year, we also run a portfolio at the Codex. We sold a bunch of Dennis and we sold a bunch of Energy Fuels. We sold a bunch of gold and silver miners as well into that run.
In short: Buying back to a full position after trimming in Q1 in the mid-$20s: still the largest US uranium producer (guiding 2–2.5m lb this year, ~all of 2025's 2.1m lb US output) with the only fully licensed conventional mill (White Mesa), so in light of the NNSA's domestic-uranium RFI "that status of a US uranium producer will be worth a lot." His bet to fill a 4m lb/yr government order over UEC — if Roca Honda, Bullfrog, Nichols Ranch/Whirlwind and Sheep Mountain get built as Pinyon Plain runs out. Plus a speculative bolt-on: Jan-27 $15 calls at $1.30 — "This is risky… size it accordingly (if at all)."
Energy Fuels mines uranium in the US and owns White Mesa in Utah, the only fully licensed conventional uranium mill in the country. It is also building a rare-earth business, but the reason for this buy is uranium.
The US nuclear weapons agency (NNSA) asked for about 4 million pounds a year of American-mined uranium for a decade — roughly double what the whole country produced in 2025, most of it from Energy Fuels. Being the one proven US producer makes it the natural candidate, provided it can bring its other mines online as its current high-grade mine runs out. Mart is rebuilding to a full position and adding a small, high-risk bet through call options (contracts that pay off only if the stock rises well above $15 by January 2027, and can expire worthless).
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In short: Historical example from the 2005–2008 bull market of juniors that went from pennies to multi-dollar takeouts — "like Energy Fuels. I mean the list goes on and on." No current view.
7:40then you're going to see, in that sort of environment, the sort of opportunities to make money, as was the case with the Eurin big rally which was 2005 through 2008, like Energy Fuels. I mean the list goes on and on where you had one year a uranium stock trading at 5 cents and, like us, 18 months later it was being taken out at $4 either for cash or for shares of a bigger company.
In short: Closed the ~$299m all-stock Australian Strategic Materials acquisition (98% holder vote, Federal Court sign-off, an ASX listing under EF2 picked up along the way), bringing the Ochang Korean Metals Plant — 1,300 t/yr of NdFeB alloy today, expanding to 3,600 t with commissioning as early as year-end — plus NdPr metallization and developing Dy/Tb capability. "Ochang closes that gap in one move, and pairs with the pending VAC acquisition, which supplies the magnet itself… three links of a four-link chain assembled while the rest of the West is still writing white papers." Caveat: the plant is in South Korea and the promised American Metals Plant "is an aspiration with no capital attached." Astron also secured Commonwealth approval to export Donald REE concentrate to the US, which Energy Fuels can buy 100% of. Cost basis $1.47, 90% allocated.
Rare-earth magnets are made in four steps: dig the ore, separate it into oxides, turn oxide into metal and then alloy, and finally press the alloy into a magnet. Energy Fuels had spent years building only the second step (its White Mesa mill in Utah), which meant every tonne it separated had to be sold to somebody who owned the next step — and almost all of those buyers are Chinese.
This issue is about that gap closing. The company completed a ~$299m all-stock takeover of Australian Strategic Materials, which came with an operating alloy plant in Ochang, South Korea (1,300 tonnes a year, expanding to 3,600), and a separate pending purchase of the German magnet maker VAC supplies the final step. Mart's line is that three of the four links are now assembled "while the rest of the West is still writing white papers about doing it."
The honest caveats he attaches: the alloy plant is in Korea, not America, and the promised US version "is an aspiration with no capital attached." Separately, the Australian Donald project — whose rare-earth concentrate Energy Fuels has the right to buy 100% of — just got export approval to ship to the US, but its final investment decision is due within weeks and most of the funding is not committed yet.
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In short: Has closed the Australian Strategic Materials acquisition "and with it bought something a uranium miner has no obvious business owning" — a working Korean plant making 1,300 t/yr of NdFeB alloy expanding to 3,600 t/yr ("enough magnet alloy for more than 1 million electric vehicles annually"), plus the Dubbo project, ahead of a pending Vacuumschmelze deal. "The strategic logic is sound and the Western supply chain argument is real because the metals and alloy stage is where Chinese dominance is most complete." But White Mesa — "the only operating conventional uranium mill in the United States" — is having its infrastructure and capital pointed "towards a commodity where the pricing is better and the government support is louder": "when a producer cannot monetize $96 uranium, it looks for revenue somewhere it can." Watch the Korean commissioning and the Vacuumschmelze close, "but watch White Mesa's uranium throughput more closely."
Energy Fuels has just closed its takeover of Australian Strategic Materials, and what it bought is not a uranium asset at all: a working plant in South Korea that turns rare-earth material into neodymium-iron-boron alloy — the metal that permanent magnets are made from — currently 1,300 tonnes a year, expanding to 3,600, which is enough magnet alloy for over a million electric vehicles a year. It also picked up the Dubbo rare-earth project in Australia, and it has a further deal pending for Vacuumschmelze, the biggest permanent-magnet maker in North America and Europe.
The industrial case for this is genuinely strong, and Frostad says so. China's grip on the rare-earth chain is weakest at the mining end and strongest at the metal and alloy stage — the step where ore becomes something a magnet factory can use — and almost no Western alternative exists there. Energy Fuels is buying every link of that middle section and anchoring it on the White Mesa Mill in Utah, which happens to be the only operating conventional uranium mill in the United States.
The question a uranium investor should ask is what the purchase reveals. White Mesa was built to process uranium ore, and its owner is now pointing that plant and its capital at a commodity "where the pricing is better and the government support is louder." Read alongside the Cameco and Kazatomprom numbers, the message is blunt: "when a producer cannot monetize $96 uranium, it looks for revenue somewhere it can." So the deal is simultaneously a sensible rare-earth business and a bearish datapoint about how real today's uranium price is for the people mining it. Frostad's scorecard: watch the Korean commissioning schedule and the Vacuumschmelze close for the rare-earth story, "but watch White Mesa's uranium throughput more closely" — "the rare earth business will be judged on tons of alloy. The uranium thesis will be judged on whether the pounds still get made."
7:05The work now is watching the award data rather than the calendar because the signal will show up there first. — Energy Fuels has closed its acquisition of Australian Strategic Materials and with it bought something a uranium miner has no obvious business owning. A working metals plant in South Korea producing 1,300 tons a year of neodymium iron boron alloy with an expansion to 3600 tons due to commission as early as the end of this year.
In short: Management pitching its own stock. "The largest producer of uranium in the United States" — ~1 Mlb U3O8 in 2025 going to ~2 Mlb in 2026 — now vertically integrating "from mines all the way down to magnets": White Mesa Mill (the only conventional US uranium mill, ~$0.5B to replace, 10-15 years to licence), Pinyon Plain at ~$20-23/lb, and two pending acquisitions (a Korean metallization/alloying plant, and German magnet maker Vacuumschmelze). Claims the market gives it too little credit — largest US uranium producer without the largest market cap — and that the assembled chain "unlocks potentially billions of dollars per year of cash flow" by 2030-31. Caveats he volunteers: Pinyon Plain depletes ~2030, the rest of the uranium book is $60-80/lb, and a 2031 convertible converts around $31.
Whose view this is: this is Energy Fuels' own marketing and corporate-development executive making the bull case for Energy Fuels on a friendly channel whose host says he has owned the stock "in and out" and would like to own it again. Treat it as a well-informed company pitch — good for understanding the assets, not a substitute for outside analysis.
What the company actually is today: the biggest uranium miner in the United States — about a million pounds of uranium in 2025, roughly two million expected in 2026 — built around one asset that would be almost impossible to recreate: the White Mesa Mill in Utah, the only conventional uranium mill in the country. Management says it would cost about half a billion dollars and take 10 to 15 years of permitting to build another one.
The clever bit — why a uranium mill can do rare earths: rare-earth ores are all mildly radioactive. Once you start processing them, the radioactive material concentrates in your waste, which means you need a licence most chemical plants will never get. Energy Fuels already holds that licence. So it can process monazite — the richest rare-earth ore, and the one most competitors avoid because it is hot. China spotted the same thing years ago: it bought up the monazite that titanium sand miners were throwing away as waste, and management estimates that discarded material now feeds 10-15% of China's entire rare-earth industry.
What it is buying: to control its own supply of that ore, Energy Fuels has bought titanium-sand projects in Australia (Donald, with an investment decision due within a month or two), Madagascar (Toliara, described as the largest undeveloped project of its kind in the world) and Brazil. At the other end of the chain it is buying a metallization plant in South Korea — one of only two outside Chinese control — and Vacuumschmelze, a German magnet maker with a $600 million plant in South Carolina and one of only four magnet producers in the world outside China. The reasoning is blunt: magnet-making is too hard to learn from scratch, so buy the few companies that already do it.
The honest weak spots he admits: the great uranium mine, Pinyon Plain, produces at roughly $20-23 a pound but runs out around 2030; everything else costs $60-80 a pound, "kind of like everybody else" in the US, and he concedes American uranium simply cannot beat Kazakhstan on cost. The company also cannot state its own share count on camera, which matters because acquisitions of this size are usually paid for with stock, and there is a convertible bond maturing in 2031 that turns into shares around $31.
What to watch instead of the story: two things. First, whether heavy rare earths (terbium and dysprosium) actually get produced — "that's where the game is at," because China is currently the only source; light rare earths alone would be a much weaker business. Second, whether the Korean and German deals actually close (August 2026 and early 2027) and on what terms. The "billions of dollars per year of cash flow by 2030-31" headline is a management projection five years out, resting entirely on execution across four countries and three separate industries.
2:05So as you say, we are primarily a uranium company. In fact, we're the largest producer of uranium in the United States. We did about a million pounds of U3O8 last year. We're going to do about 2 million pounds this year. But over the last several years, we've started to get into the rare earth industry, which is of course another critical sector.
In short: A US producer on the producer rung — one of "no more than a small handful" of producers, "directly impacted by the price of uranium."
8:41There's not a lot of us out there. So when you're looking at producers, they're going to be the most immediately impacted by the price of uranium rising and those would be the likes of a Cameco, Kazatomprom, which trades in London, Energy Fuels down in the US, Uranium Energy Corp. So there are a number of producers but no more than a small handful and they're of course going to be directly impacted by the price of uranium.
In short: Allocation lifted to 90%; the acquisition + government-backing news was covered in the late-June deep dive. One of this week's cash-deployment adds (see the Jul-09 note).
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In short: Adding here: the CEO is buying shares, recent news flow is positive, it is building a rare-earth "giant," and the stock is down ~50% from its highs — a primary target for the fresh cash he is deploying.
Energy Fuels is a US uranium producer that is also building the first non-Chinese "mine-to-magnet" rare-earth chain — mining the ore, processing it at its White Mesa mill, and (via the ~$1.9bn Vacuumschmelze acquisition) turning it into the permanent magnets that go into EV motors, wind turbines and defense hardware. Rare earths matter here because China controls most of the supply and has been adding US names to export-control lists, so a domestic alternative carries strategic value the market rewards in fits and starts.
Mart is adding on this drawdown for a simple checklist of reasons: the CEO is personally buying shares (insiders rarely buy a broken stock), the recent news flow has been positive, the rare-earth build-out is progressing, and the stock is down roughly 50% from its highs. That combination — improving fundamentals against a halved price — is exactly the setup he wants when deploying fresh cash.
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In short: No company-specific news this issue; covered in depth in the Jun-24 deep dive; cost basis $1.47, 80% allocated, held in the Codex portfolio.
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In short: Cornerstone holding doubling down on 'mine-to-magnet': a ~$1.9bn definitive deal for German magnet maker VAC (the Sumter, SC plant) plus a conditional $725m 20-yr Department of War loan; the right deal in the right sector, but a multi-year execution gamble with real dilution.
Energy Fuels wants to be the only company in the Western world that can pick up a rock, pull rare-earth elements out of it, refine them into the right metals, and then press those metals into the finished magnets that go into electric-car motors, fighter-jet guidance systems and data-center hardware — all without ever touching a Chinese facility. Until this week they had almost every piece of that chain except the last one: the factory that turns the refined material into finished magnets. VAC is that factory. It is a 100-year-old German company with a plant in South Carolina and a long list of defense customers who cannot just switch to a cheaper supplier — they need specific grades only VAC makes in the West.
The backdrop could hardly be more favorable. China controls around 60% of rare-earth mining, 91% of refining and close to 90% of global magnet production, and Beijing has been tightening the tap for the past year. Western carmakers were forced to idle plants. Prices outside China shot to six times what they cost inside. This week China went further and added the two most prominent American rare-earth companies to its own export-control blacklist — a direct signal that non-Chinese supply commands an ever-widening strategic premium, and that Energy Fuels is in the right sector at the right moment. The $725m government loan (20 years, senior secured) funds a big chunk of the upstream buildout without printing yet more shares, and a government putting its name behind the loan tends to grease the wheels with other lenders and customers.
The catch — and Mart is clear-eyed about this — is that the company is already running a remarkable number of simultaneous projects: a $410m mill upgrade in Utah, a Korean metals plant acquisition, an Australian mining project not producing until 2028, sands projects on two continents, and now a German acquisition with plants spread across three continents. All of that on roughly 1,000 employees while posting a net loss. The VAC deal costs close to $2bn including assumed debt, pays around 60 times last year's earnings, and dilutes existing shareholders by roughly 20%. The DoW loan helps but it is a loan to pay back — not a price guarantee and purchase contract like a competitor already has in place. Mart stays a shareholder because he backs them to pull it off, but he is candid: the execution mountain is real, and every new plate they add is one more plate that could fall.
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In short: Ranks it a 5 and owns it, but "a less committed shareholder" — has sold enough to take his basis out and pocket profit. Doesn't have UEC's franchise but shares some of the same benefit: a permitted mill and tailings facility. "Bullish on the whole uranium sector over time."
Energy Fuels is another US uranium name Rule owns and grades a 5, but he's upfront that he's "a less committed shareholder" — he's sold enough to take all his original money out plus a profit, so he has less skin in the game. It doesn't have UEC's strength of franchise, but it owns something valuable and hard to replicate: a permitted uranium mill and tailings facility. He stays broadly bullish on the whole uranium sector over time.
47:34That's an amazing transformation. — All right. And finally, last one here in uranium land, it is Energy Fuels, UUUU. — I own Energy Fuels. I don't think they have the franchise, as an example, that UEC has, but I think they have some of the same benefit, in particular, a permitted mill and tailings facility.
In short: White Mesa on track for ~1.6Mlb finished uranium by June 30 at historic-low milling costs of $9–$12/lb — rare on-time, on-budget delivery from the sub-major supply side; Phase 1 heavy-REE circuit modifications (Sm, Eu, Gd, Tb, Dy) commence July, operational late 2027–early 2028.
Energy Fuels runs the White Mesa Mill in Utah — the only operating conventional uranium mill in the United States. By June 30 they expect to have produced roughly 1.6 million pounds of finished uranium in six months, which puts them inside their full-year guidance range already. That sounds unremarkable, but it is actually unusual: almost every other producer below the very top tier is running late or over budget right now. White Mesa is hitting its targets at historic-low milling costs of $9–$12 per pound.
The second story is rare earths. Starting in July, Energy Fuels is modifying the mill circuits to add the ability to process "heavy" rare earth elements — samarium, europium, gadolinium, terbium, and dysprosium — the ones that go into permanent magnets, motors, wind turbines, and defence applications. Those circuits are expected to be operational by late 2027 or early 2028. This is a company quietly becoming a dual-commodity processor (uranium plus rare earths) at a single licensed facility in the United States, in a sector where building new processing capacity from scratch takes a decade and hundreds of millions of dollars. The price action hasn't caught up yet, but the operational execution keeps quietly ticking forward.
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In short: No company-specific news this issue; held in the Codex portfolio.
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In short: #9, +156.0% — US uranium and rare earths. "Uranium and rare earth materials are becoming increasingly important due to nuclear power and new technologies." The most commodity-exposed name on the list and the clearest instance of the conclusion's warning about "commodity prices, capital cycles… regulatory changes."
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Verbatim excerpts from the public transcripts (auto-pulled at each mention's timestamp, lightly cleaned). Timestamps link into the video; "source page" opens that commentator's full analysis at this row. Click a mention's header line to expand it (one open at a time). For personal study — not investment advice.