In short: Named as the neighbour and scale comparable, not a stance: Lumwana, bought for $7.3B 20 years ago, struggled until geologist Kevin Bonel (now Midnight Sun's) turned it into 1.6 Bt of ore, ~9 Mt contained copper and a 62-year mine life; a $2B "Super Pit" expansion is under way next door.
12:31Barrick buys Lumwana as part of a larger package deal. They buy it from Equinox 20 years ago for $7.3 billion. 900 million ton deposit, .5% copper, and copper is like $1.80 a pound. — Okay, — that's a pretty big purchase. Sure, some may say they overpaid. — Probably a good argument to be made. So they come in, they purchase this asset, they work on it for 15, 18 years, and they don't manage to get it to work.
In short: His former employer (the Peter Munk era), used as the contrast case rather than a pick: "Barrick's approach is more the global mining. We're going to go anywhere in the world to build a mine… nothing wrong with that… just a different strategy." The host notes Barrick has "almost completely walked away from Canada." He credits Newmont and Barrick with doing "a pretty good job in Nevada."
Barrick, where Al-Joundi used to work, is the other giant gold miner, and he uses it to explain Agnico by contrast. Barrick goes "anywhere in the world to build a mine." Agnico sticks to a few stable regions it knows deeply. He is careful to call this a different strategy, not a worse one, and credits Barrick (with Newmont) for its work in Nevada. The host adds that Barrick has almost completely left Canada. This is not a call on Barrick's stock.
26:45Barrick's approach is more the global mining: we're going to go anywhere in the world to build a mine. And honestly, there's nothing wrong with that, Amber. It's just a different strategy than we have. I know the people at Barrick, they're still friends of mine. They are responsible good miners as well.
In short: Cautionary example: "jurisdiction matters much more" now — "look at Barrick… how they underperformed everybody else with a better jurisdiction"; other company-specific issues too, but jurisdiction is "core to the argument."
Barrick (formerly Barrick Gold, now Barrick Mining) is one of the world's largest gold and copper miners. Lukacs uses it as a warning: much of its production sits in riskier countries, and he says it has underperformed rivals whose mines are in safer places. His point is not a detailed call on Barrick but that in today's world, where a mine is located matters much more to investors than it did 20 years ago.
13:38So that is I think one of the key selling points of Hudbay is their safety from a jurisdiction point of view. I think we are in a different world than 20 years ago. Now jurisdiction matters much more. And if you don't believe me look at Barrick Gold, how they, I mean not Barrick Gold anymore, Barrick Mining, how they underperformed everybody else with a better jurisdiction.
In short: Raised by the host as one of the three names a generalist would default to. Rule's answer is a ranking, not a recommendation: "if you look at the capital allocation decisions among Barrick, Newmont, and Agnico over the last 30 years, first, second, and third all belong to Agnico. They've done such a better job that there's no comparison." He then argues Barrick and Newmont carry an unearned premium for geography — "investors like Canadian investors are ethnocentric and so you get a tremendous bonus for being involved in northern Nevada in the Carlin," while the Abitibi is not, in his view, "geologically or in terms of infrastructure… inferior to northern Nevada." No stance on Barrick itself is offered in this appearance.
1:01:31And I'm curious about the choice of Agnico, right? Because those tend to be the three. If you're going to be a generalist, you want gold, they just buy Newmont. — If you look at the capital allocation decisions among Barrick, Newmont, and Agnico over the last 30 years, first, second, and third all belong to Agnico.
In short: Not owned, and the "building" half of the show's comparison: $1.19bn of capital spend, $654m of it into projects rather than maintaining existing mines, against $515m of free cash flow (only $141m attributable). Asked whether that is a strategy difference or worse execution, he is direct: "I think Barrick is executing worse. We don't own a position in Barrick." He still allows it is "cheap on the longer term chart, no question" and later names it with Newmont as a value stock the coming rotation flows into — he owns it only through GDX, where it is the third weight.
Barrick is the other giant gold miner, and the show opens by contrasting it with Newmont over the same three months in the same gold market. Barrick spent $1.19bn of capital, $654m of it on building new projects rather than sustaining the mines it already runs, and produced $515m of free cash flow — of which only $141m actually belongs to Barrick's shareholders, because it owns some mines jointly with partners.
Asked whether that gap is just a different strategy — building for the future rather than harvesting today — Feneck does not take the diplomatic option: "I think Barrick is executing worse. We don't own a position in Barrick."
He is careful not to turn that into a short. He allows the stock is "cheap on the longer term chart, no question", he owns it indirectly as the third-largest weight in GDX, and he names it alongside Newmont as a value stock that benefits when money rotates out of technology. So: no position, a real criticism of management execution, and an acknowledgement that the price already reflects a lot of it.
7:45Newmont's sustaining capital was 438 million. Newmont generated that 2.2 billion in free cash flow I showed. Barrick 515. So is that the difference? One company building and one harvesting or is Barrick simply executing worse here? — I think Barrick is executing worse. We don't own a position in Barrick. It is cheap on the longer term chart, no question.
In short: Third of the majors quoted on the cash-flow case — roughly $4 billion of free cash flow last year, part of a sector whose current ratio, net-debt-to-EBIT and total-debt-to-EV are all "significantly more attractive" than the S&P 500's.
Barrick is the third of the majors in his cash-flow argument — roughly $4 billion of free cash flow last year, part of a group whose profits rose more than 200%.
His broader point using these three: on every balance-sheet measure investors normally care about (how easily they can pay short-term bills, how much debt they carry against profits, how much debt against company value), the gold miners now look materially safer than the average S&P 500 company — while trading at half the valuation.
1:13:03And it seems that finally generalists are realizing that there's an enormous amount of value on the balance sheets. I mean the free cash flow of Newmont last year was 7.3 billion. Agnico was 4.5 billion. Barrick was roughly 4 billion. Up more than 200%. First quarter was excellent. Second quarter was excellent.
In short: "We're also long Barrick, which reported" — held alongside AGI, Kinross and Agnico in the gold-miner sleeve added on the real-rates-have-peaked call.
The senior producer in his gold sleeve, held through its recent results. Same thesis as the rest of the basket — this is an interest-rate trade expressed through mining shares rather than a call on any one company's operations.
4:18So, that's AGI. We're also long Kinross Gold. We're also long Barrick, which reported. I think we timed AGI almost perfectly at the bottom. We're also long Barrick and we're also long Agnico Eagle, along with physical gold and silver, PHYS, etc. We've also been long the REITs during the index rebalancing from the small cap index when there was big selling in Redwood because of a fear of interest rates as well. We loaded up on Redwood.
In short: Depletion hangs on one asset: "assuming that Barrick and Newmont can work out their differences and Fourmile gets added back into the Northern Nevada pipeline, that for 5 years eliminates the challenges in front of Newmont and Barrick. If it doesn't, they have a depletion challenge." Also cited as the precedent for paying up for early-stage quality — "when Barrick bought Arequipa, there were only 11 drill holes in that deposit, and it sold for a billion dollars."
Barrick is one of the two biggest gold miners, and Rick's view of it here rests entirely on one unresolved dispute. If Barrick and Newmont settle their differences and the Fourmile deposit is folded back into the Nevada joint venture, "that for 5 years eliminates the challenges in front of Newmont and Barrick." If not, "they have a depletion challenge" — meaning not enough approved ore to sustain production, which eventually forces expensive acquisitions.
He also uses Barrick's own history to make a separate point about buying early-stage assets: when Barrick acquired Arequipa there were "only 11 drill holes in that deposit. And it sold for a billion dollars." A deposit whose geology is exceptional enough doesn't need to be fully drilled out to command a full price.
26:16If it doesn't they have a depletion challenge. — Yeah. Okay. All right. So, a couple other companies, Contango and Dolly, how are you viewing that recent, I think it was a merger, right? — Yeah. — I think it was an intelligent merger. I also thought it was instructive that Shawn Khunkhun, who I think did a great job shepherding Dolly over six or seven years, recognized two things in the market.
In short: "Barrick Gold, where we own a position, ticker B, is reporting pre-market on Monday" — a core portfolio long into earnings, alongside the gold adds in Alamos and Kinross as Chinese gold-backed ETFs turn to inflows. (Earlier SSR calls used the old GOLD symbol for the same company.)
Barrick is one of the world's largest gold miners and a core long in the book, reporting Monday before the open. It sits alongside the two gold names he was actively adding to during the week — Alamos and Kinross — on the view that Chinese buying of gold has turned back on and central banks keep accumulating.
Full passage: premium transcript (PDF).
In short: Grouped with Agnico and Newmont as the quality gold miners that buy back stock and don't dilute — "the total opposite" of the dilutive junior miners.
Barrick is one of the world's largest gold miners. He names it with Agnico and Newmont as a quality operator that returns cash to shareholders instead of diluting them — his answer to a viewer worried about insider selling and dilution across the gold-mining sector: stick to the quality names, avoid the juniors.
59:12The problem with Canadian, and it's not just Canada, but it's all around the world. It's in uranium. It's in silver, gold. When you have junior miners, right, they need financing. And unfortunately, there's some really bad management teams in all of mining, whether it be uranium or gold, silver, and they typically will do financing that is very dilutive sometimes.
In short: Ranks it a 5 "as it sits today," but could easily raise it to a 4 if the future plan clarifies: spin off the North American assets (possibly combined with Newmont's into "the most valuable gold mining company on the planet"), merge the African assets with Endeavour's, and sell Reko Diq (Pakistan porphyry), likely to Zijin.
Barrick (which trades under the single-letter ticker "B") is a 5 today, but Rule says it could quickly become a 4 once management spells out its breakup plan. The idea: carve out the North American mines (possibly merging them with Newmont's to create the most valuable gold company alive), combine the African mines with rival Endeavour's, and sell its giant Pakistani copper-gold deposit, Reko Diq, most likely to China's Zijin. The grade is on hold mainly because shareholders don't yet know which of these will actually happen.
11:24— I have Barrick as a five. I could easily raise it to a four. If their plans for their future become more apparent to shareholders. The idea that they're going to spin off their North American assets, I think is a good one. The question is what becomes with the rest of the company. To the extent that their African assets then get merged with Endeavour's African assets, and Reko Diq, their massive porphyry in Pakistan, gets sold, and if it gets sold, likely to Zijin, I would raise Barrick to a four. As it
In short: His April-2025 thesis (unlock value by spinning out Nevada Gold Mines) played out "pretty much exactly." Next step: merge Nevada Gold Mines with Newmont's into a pure-play Nevada champion that gets a sector-high multiple → "you get the rest of Barrick for free."
Barrick is a major gold miner. A year ago he argued it could unlock value by separating out its Nevada gold operations, and that played out "pretty much exactly."
His next step: merge Barrick's Nevada mines with Newmont's into a single pure-play Nevada gold company. He thinks that combined entity would earn the sector's highest valuation on its own — meaning investors effectively "get the rest of Barrick for free."
35:38Spinning out those assets, and thus get a higher valuation. And then, lo and behold, that's exactly what they're doing now. Barrick shares um have rallied, and there's still some details that that they're figuring out what portion are they going to keep of this um new entity, but um talk to us about what happened relative to your expectations.
In short: Cited as a Canada example — named (with Agnico Eagle) extending mature-mine life in the Abitibi Greenstone Belt; an illustration of the Canadian gold theme, not a rated pick.
Barrick is one of the largest gold miners on earth. Like Agnico Eagle, it's named as an example of a major operator extending the life of mature Canadian mines in the Abitibi belt — an illustration of why Prins flags Canada as a 2026 mining hotspot, not a specific buy recommendation.
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Verbatim excerpts from the public transcripts (auto-pulled at each mention's timestamp, lightly cleaned). Timestamps link into the video; "source page" opens that commentator's full analysis at this row. Click a mention's header line to expand it (one open at a time). For personal study — not investment advice.