| Account | Shares | Price | Value | % of acct | Cost/sh | Gain $ | Gain % | Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 401K | 120 | $94.00 | $11,280 | 0.46% | $61.53 | $3,897 | +52.8% | — |
In short: Passing mention — "BHP around," one of the majors in the belt.
33:34map right in the middle of a camp like the Domes region, what does that create? It creates the perfect storm for M&A. And you don't only have Barrick, First Quantum, Ivanhoe. Think about all the groups that are there. China Molybdenum sits just above us with Tenke Fungurume, another amazing deposit, but you have Freeport-McMoRan working there, you have Rio Tinto working there, you have Anglo American working there, you have BHP around, Glencore around. Every major copper producer on the planet is in this region, and most of those groups
In short: The comparison: why consider Hudbay "over a BHP" — Hudbay has "very solid growth and the low-risk jurisdiction profile," plus low cost.
18:19the company looks fairly priced, even cheap, with high leverage to copper prices, significant production growth ahead and factoring in the tier one jurisdiction exposure. So I think that is not getting enough credit here. Why would I even consider this company over a BHP is that this company has very solid growth and the low-risk jurisdiction profile.
In short: Peer: produces more copper than Anglo Teck but is "not, per se, that much copper" as a share of the mix; among the majors that were "just enjoying the cash cow of iron ore, buybacks, dividends" before copper capex.
6:43Actually, they started this copper CapEx much earlier than the others. If you look at Rio Tinto, Vale, Glencore, these guys really started in '24 onwards to spend heavy on CapEx in copper. Before years, they were just enjoying iron ore, especially Rio, BHP, and Vale. They were just enjoying the cash cow of iron ore, buybacks, dividends, whatnot.
In short: BHP had an M&A representative on the floor. It has been staking land in the southwestern Athabasca Basin, "but they seem to be after something bigger… people should expect them to be more active." A watch item for sector M&A.
12:52Let's see what else is there. We had BHP that had an M&A representative on the floor. — Mhm. — And I spoke to a few people about that. They were staking some land in the southwestern Aabaska basin, but they seem to be after something bigger. I can't really provide many more details on that front.
In short: Named with Freeport and Rio as a major that will be forced to acquire copper juniors with size and grade.
32:57There's about four or five of them that we're aware of that are not owned by majors. So the majors have no choice, whether it's your Freeport, your Rio, your BHP, whoever you are, you're going to have no choice but to buy some juniors. You have to buy them. So buy assets. Again, I love grade and I love size.
In short: Raised by the interviewer: BHP stays out of uranium because the sector is too small to move its balance sheet. Sheriff agrees — "that's right" — and extends it to big oil, which he thinks will return.
11:44— You raised a very interesting point because we've heard this from BHP, because the uranium sector is so small that's why they're not getting involved, because it doesn't have an impact on their balance sheet. — That's right. If you look at the big oil companies, which incidentally, I believe will be back.
In short: Spotted a BHP M&A representative on the WNA floor; per "one very plugged in contact" its uranium land staking was "something of a 'minor diversion'" because BHP is "interested in something bigger in this space" and sees "where the puck is going." "They weren't at the WNA just to drink some coffee." Watch item for sector M&A.
Full passage: premium transcript (PDF).
In short: The host's bear case: extra pounds from "somebody like BHP at Olympic Dam," producing 8 Mlb/yr and maybe 10–12. Melbye's reply: new supply "used to worry me in an oversupplied market"; now "the market needs those pounds… I don't worry about overproducing."
13:19— Scott, you are one of the most bullish people I know for uranium. And as everyone here at the conference, everybody I speak to, they're super bullish. — Yeah. — But, if I want to play devil's advocate here and take the other side of that argument, if there was one concern you had about the sector, what would it be? I mean, let's just say because one thing we always wonder is where are these extra pounds coming from? Maybe it's somebody like BHP at Olympic Dam.
In short: "BHP is my number one" on quality — tier-one assets, strong seven-year profitability, single-A credit, 54% copper EBITDA, dividend focus. But "the only drawback… why I'm not a buyer today is the valuation. It's just damn too expensive"; waiting for a pullback or recession to "load the truck."
BHP is an Australian mining giant; about half its profit now comes from copper, the rest mainly from iron ore used to make steel. Lukacs ranks it the best of the five big copper names on quality: its mines are among the world's best and cheapest to run, it has been very profitable for years, and credit agencies rate its debt in the safe "single-A" band. It returns cash mostly through dividends rather than share buybacks.
He isn't buying because the price already reflects all that — "damn too expensive." His plan is to wait for a big market drop or recession, when mining stocks usually fall hard, and then buy heavily ("load the truck").
10:36This is how I'm thinking about this. I used to be more valuation focused but I realized that I have to just focus much more on quality. So because of that BHP is my number one. So best overall package you have tier one assets strong profitability over the years credit quality is very high with 54% copper EBITDA exposure and qualitatively I would like to also add that the company has a strong dividend focus.
In short: Its Jansen potash project is the first example he gives of the Saskatchewan resource build-out that keeps the provincial labour market tight — a reference, not a view.
3:46So we have projects like BHP's Jansen project in the province of Saskatchewan, Al Dorado's got the former for copper project in the region and Kamico's active in the region as well as Orano. Look, the province is not big. It's 1 and a.5 million people in Saskatchewan when you're being generous. And so there is generally a tight labor market in the province.
In short: Dean: with Rio, the biggest Pilbara operator; part of the four-company oligopoly behind a "remarkably stable," deliberately rising iron ore price.
5:14How does iron ore fit into the picture alongside other metals that investors are familiar with? Anybody can take this question. — [Dean] I can kick it off and I'm sure Frank will add to it. Iron ore is a remarkably stable commodity, largely because some 60 to 70% of global seaborne supply comes from essentially four companies, and they're the majors, we're talking about the BHPs or Rio Tintos or Vale and more recently the Fortescues. And if you are a student of the iron ore price it has been very, very
In short: Mentioned once, as the counterparty in the same rumour: "some interesting news rumors around NexGen and BHP in the last couple weeks." No view on the company is offered — it is cited as evidence that major diversified miners are circling development-stage uranium while new mine supply stays years away.
42:5250 a pound. Obviously in real dollars it's still below the '08 highs, but it broke by 50 cents the '08 highs in nominal terms. And that's because the market remains very, very tight. There's been some interesting news rumors around NexGen and BHP in the last couple weeks that there might be something going on there.
In short: The seller side of the Antamina stream, and the worked example of why streams win: "If you're like BHP and you're pointing out that the market price of your company is at a substantial discount to the value of the sum of the parts, equity — which is to say raising equity to build mines — is extremely expensive… You're raising equity capital at a price that substantially undervalues the free cash flows that the company will exhibit over 10 years… Debt might cover 65 or 70% of the cost of the mine. So you got to find that other 30 or 40 while minimizing equity dilution." Hence offtakes, royalties and streams. He also expects a taxpayer subsidy and dislikes it: "the mining industry loves dumb money and there's no money in the world as dumb as government… to the extent that BHP can find a way to steal from the taxpayers, I'm sure they're going to do it."
BHP is on the other side of the Wheaton trade — it sold the silver stream on its Antamina copper mine. Rick uses it to explain why a giant, profitable miner would do that, and the answer is a lesson in how mines actually get financed.
When a company's shares trade for less than the sum of its parts, issuing new shares is the most expensive money available: you are selling a claim on ten years of future cash flow at a price that undervalues it. Bank debt is cheaper but tops out around 65–70% of a mine's cost. So there is a 30–40% hole to fill "while minimising equity dilution," and that is what offtakes, royalties and streams do. Selling by-product silver — which the market was valuing as if it were copper anyway — is the cheapest possible way to fill it.
He expects governments to fund part of the stack too, and dislikes it: "the mining industry loves dumb money and there's no money in the world as dumb as government… my hope is that mostly they have to rely on the streamers as opposed to relying on me." He offers no view on BHP's share price here; the interest is in the financing logic, which he expects the whole copper industry to repeat.
38:17You're raising equity capital at a price that substantially undervalues the free cash flows that the company will exhibit over 10 years. So equity is very expensive. Debt might cover 65 or 70% of the cost of the mine. So you got to find that other 30 or 40 while minimizing equity dilution. So things like offtakes where commodity producers pay an upfront price to market the copper that comes off the deposit or royalties or streams will become an increasingly important part of that capital stack.
In short: Named in the same breath as Rio as the Western major whose board won't sign off on eastern-DRC risk — the demonstration that the marginal copper project has no Western sponsor. Set against "we have to mine as much copper as we've mined in the history of the world in the next 20 years… I don't see the investment." No view expressed on the equity itself.
BHP is the world's largest diversified miner and, like Rio, appears here purely as the second half of that jurisdiction test — the other major whose board would decline an eastern-DRC copper project.
The point is a supply-side one and it cuts against the usual assumption that high prices call forth new mines. Prices are high; the mines still aren't being funded, because the geology has moved to places the credible funders won't go and the developers who will go there are a narrow, politically-connected set. Polomny's summary — "where is all the money going to come from for the new copper? I don't see the investment" — is why he treats a bust-driven copper crash as a buying opportunity rather than a thesis break: the demand can pause, but the missing supply doesn't come back any faster afterwards.
22:44But, if you're Rio or BHP, do you want to go into these places? Selling that to your board is difficult. So, where is all the money going to come from for the new copper? We have to mine as much copper as we've mined in the history of the world in the next 20 years.
In short: One of "the biggest of the multi-commodity mining companies" (with Rio Tinto and Glencore) that an investor building a resource portfolio from scratch could buy and "over the next 5 to 7 years become very, very happy."
These are the giant "multi-commodity" miners — they dig copper, iron ore and other metals at enormous scale. Rule's pitch is simple: an investor building a resource portfolio from scratch can buy the biggest and best of them, do nothing for 5–7 years, and "become very, very happy" as decades of industry under-investment collide with rising demand. They're the low-effort way to own the base-metals side of his bull thesis (copper especially), the counterpart to owning Franco/Wheaton/Agnico on the precious-metals side.
10:30Similarly, if that same investor constructing a natural resource portfolio, bought the biggest of the multi-commodity mining companies, the BHPs, the Rio Tintos, the Glencores, they would over the next 5 to 7 years become very, very happy. And similarly, should they buy as an example Exxon Mobil, well, they might not be happy in 2026, maybe 2027, they'd probably be ecstatic by 2029 or 2030.
In short: "You should own the BHPs, the Rio Tintos" — big copper/diversified miners that become a bigger part of the S&P as the index migrates from ~50% tech toward hard assets.
BHP is the world's largest diversified miner (copper, iron ore and more). "You should own the BHPs, the Rio Tintos" — he expects these hard-asset giants to take a far bigger slice of the S&P 500 over the next 5–10 years as the index migrates away from being half technology. A cheap, asset-rich way to own the copper and metals the AI/grid buildout consumes.
17:42why I think get out of these tech stocks. And you should own the First Quantums. You should own the BHPs, the Rio Tintos. So you're still all in on copper stocks? Copper stocks, any stocks like aluminum or Alcoa. We've lightened it a little bit. We've had it for three years. But aluminum is going to be a bedrock of the data centers, right, and of the power grid rebuild.
In short: Ranks it a 5 and owns "a lot of it" — would be a 4 if it were purely copper, but most of its free cash flow comes from iron ore, and he expects global iron quotes to fall as the new Simandou mine (Guinea) ramps and China jawbones Australian prices down.
BHP is a mining giant Rule owns a lot of and grades a 5. His key insight is to look past the headline: people think of it as a copper play, but most of the actual cash it earns comes from iron ore, not copper. And he expects iron-ore prices to fall as a huge new mine in Guinea (Simandou) comes online and China uses new ore sources to push Australian prices down. So if it were purely copper he'd grade it a 4 — the iron exposure is what dings it.
36:20I need to say that if it were solely a copper company, I would have it as a four. In fact, most of BHP's free cash flow comes from the iron business. And I think that iron quotes on a global basis will decline as a consequence of the introduction of a massive new iron mine, Simandou, in Guinea, and the ability of the Chinese to jawbone down Australian prices as a consequence of access to new sources of ore.
In short: Named as one of the "majors" — the large global miners that buy future copper supply when they can't find or drill it fast enough, the natural acquirer behind the junior's upside.
In short: The biggest miner is racing to lock up future copper — paid ~C$4.1B (with Lundin) for Filo Corp; aggressive M&A is the smart-money confirmation of the scarcity thesis.
BHP is the world's largest miner. Together with Lundin it paid ~C$4.1 billion for Filo Corp, a copper-gold developer. Prins uses this as the clearest "smart money" signal: the biggest, best-informed player in the industry is racing to lock up future copper supply now, which only makes sense if it expects copper to get much tighter and more valuable.
In short: A copper large-cap (up 35% YTD) for his "absolute no-brainer over 5 years" thesis — 30 years of underinvestment + very long lead times. Caveat: the next ~6 months could be rough (rates raise carry costs, China speculators forced to sell, recession risk).
BHP is one of the world's largest copper miners. Rule calls copper "an absolute no-brainer over five years" because the world has under-invested in finding and building copper mines for 30 years, and new mines take well over a decade to bring online — so a shortage is essentially locked in.
His caveat is timing: the next six months could be rough. Higher interest rates make it more expensive to hold (finance) copper inventory, Chinese speculators are being forced to sell, and expensive oil acts like a tax that could tip the world into recession. So he's a huge bull long-term but cautious near-term, especially since everyone is already bullish and has already bought.
35:31One more: copper. Up 12% on the year; BHP up 35%, Freeport up 25%. What's your view? Over 5 years, it's an absolute no-brainer — we've underinvested in copper for 30 years and it's a very long-lead-time item. In the near term I'm concerned: higher rates make it more expensive to carry copper inventories and speculators (particularly in China) are being forced to sell. Higher oil prices act like a tax, taking liquidity out of the economy and possibly tipping the world into recession. So while I'm an incredible bull over 5 years, the next 6 months could be more challenging than people think — the market is overwhelmingly bullish, and that buying has already occurred (Goldman won't publish a bullish copper report if they're not long).
In short: One of the most efficient copper producers; also a big iron-ore miner, so recession-sensitive — may take 4–5 years to pay off, then "pays off in a very big way."
BHP is one of the world's biggest and most efficient copper miners. The catch: it's also a huge iron-ore producer, and iron ore is very sensitive to the economy, so if there's a recession the payoff could take four or five years. But Rule's view is that when copper finally gets "rationed by price" — meaning supply is so short that only the highest bidders get it — BHP "pays off in a very big way."
28:03there's a recession. The most efficient copper producers are companies like Glenor, BHP, and Rio, which are also large iron ore producers. Uh iron ore is particularly economically sensitive. So to the extent that we have a recession, uh it may be four or five years before these companies pay off in a big way, but then they pay off in a very big way.
In short: Lundin's JV partner on the Argentine copper project — even this "big one" is ~2037 and small, underscoring the supply gap.
BHP is the giant miner partnering with Lundin on that Argentine copper project. Same point: even when the world's largest miners team up, the new supply is years away (~2037) and small relative to need — underscoring the copper shortage.
41:00And demand grows at least 3% a year, which basically means that we need to find a million tons of copper every year. That's the size of four world-class mines. And, you know, you can look at what's in the pipeline. You know, the Lundins, who I have an incredible amount of respect for. I love those guys. Uh they're building a project in Argentina, joint venturing with BHP.
In short: "BHP is destroying the Mag 7" — core hard-asset holding in the commodity rotation.
BHP is one of the largest miners in the world (iron ore, copper and more) — another core hard-asset position.
"BHP is destroying the Mag 7." Same theme as Rio: in a world of sticky inflation and rotation away from tech, owning the physical commodities has been the winning trade, and he sees it persisting.
12:50Did you move more into hard assets, maybe even some cash and you're waiting for the markets to do their thing? — I think there's going to be like a crash in technology. In other words, but to make room for these IPOs. I don't think the whole market's protected. I think that hard if you go into an elevated inflation regime, we're going to have a huge inflation spike.
In short: Core hard-asset / global-value name for the new commodity regime — "companies that control assets."
BHP is one of the world's largest mining companies (iron ore, copper, more). It's a core "controls real assets" holding in his commodity-regime basket — exactly the kind of name he argues you want instead of bonds and tech as inflation persists.
29:40Um if you look at to that 1968 to '81 portfolio, it's an entirely new basket. It's your BHPs, it's your it's your Chevrons, you know, it's your Schlumbergers. These are going to be the companies that are going to be very large percentages of the S&P 5, you know, fund 5 years from now. — Again, I'll I'll I'll break down how exactly you should structure your portfolio, but before we get into that, uh again focusing on what Warsh said, uh he said that the interest rates tool, and I'm quoting him now, is fair.
In short: Core hard-asset / global-value name in the great-migration basket.
BHP is one of the world's largest miners, producing iron ore, copper and more — a core "owns real stuff in the ground" holding.
It's a centerpiece of his "great migration" basket: as money leaves paper assets (stocks and bonds) for hard assets, global value miners like BHP are where he expects it to land.
16:48Companies — your Glencores, your BHP's, your Freeport-McMoRan, your companies that own lots of assets. Cuz in that stagflationary world, those types of stocks outperform. — Yeah, those types of stocks outperform like the Mag 7 or just growth stocks. — Okay, back to the Mag 7.
In short: Named as the kind of global value play that "owns assets in the ground" — preferable to a ~50%-tech S&P as an inflation hedge.
BHP is one of the world's biggest mining companies — it digs real, physical stuff out of the ground (iron ore, copper, and more) and sells it. McDonald calls these "companies that own assets in the ground."
His logic: when prices are rising (inflation), the value of physical commodities tends to rise too, so a company that owns mines is a natural shield against inflation. He contrasts this with buying the S&P 500 index, which is now roughly half technology stocks — he doesn't think a tech-heavy index protects you from inflation, but a miner that owns the actual ore does.
27:44Look at your BHPs, your Rio Tintos, your valet. — Okay. Uh let's turn now to investment opportunities. Your newsletter is called the bear traps report. So how does one identify a bear trap? What what does that mean? What's the process there? — Well, bear traps. So say you're in a bull market and you get a move down and all of a sudden bears some of the bears will lean into that move down and then all of a sudden you get a a big move back up and the bear is trapped.
In short: The seller — monetized its 33.75% of Antamina's silver to Wheaton for $4.3B; cited as the counterparty in the record streaming deal, not as a rated name.
In short: Cited as the authority for his structural copper-deficit thesis: BHP projects global copper demand to rise ~1 million tons annually until 2035 (double the past 15 years' growth), and by 70% to ~50M tons by 2050 on electrification + decarbonization. Copper ~$4.60 "on the verge of breaking out" — higher over time as the world electrifies and investment hasn't happened.
Polomny doesn't pitch BHP as a stock so much as cite it as the credible authority for his copper thesis: one of the world's biggest miners is on record saying global copper demand will keep rising about 1 million tons every year through 2035 — twice the pace of the prior 15 years — and grow ~70% to roughly 50 million tons a year by 2050, driven by electrification and decarbonization. The simple point: the whole world (especially emerging markets) needs vastly more copper for grids, transformers, buildings and EVs, but the mining industry hasn't invested to supply it — so the copper price has to go higher over time. Copper was around $4.60/lb and, in his view, "on the verge of breaking out."
19:47Same thing in other commodities, underinvestment. BHP, which is one of the largest mining companies in the world, projects copper demand to rise by 1 million tons annually until 2035. This is an article. I'll put a link to it in the show notes. BHP projects that global copper consumption will increase by an additional 1 million ton annually on average until 2035.
In short: The copper-shortage thesis in action: "I can't see how 10 years from now the demand for copper isn't substantially larger than our ability to produce it." Rather than start a new mine, miners buy each other — BHP's bid for Anglo American was "not efficiencies, synergies… it's, I want to own more copper, so I buy a big copper producer." A long-dated structural bet.
BHP is one of the world's biggest mining companies. Robotti uses its attempt to buy Anglo American to make a simple point about copper: electrifying everything (EVs, wind turbines, the grid) needs vastly more copper than the world currently mines, and after a decade of under-investment that gap can't be closed quickly — new mines take many years and are increasingly expensive and politically fraught.
So instead of digging a new mine, the giants buy each other to get copper today. BHP's bid for Anglo "wasn't about efficiencies or synergies — it's, I want to own more copper." For Robotti, the fact that the people closest to the industry are racing to buy reserves is the clearest signal of a long-dated, structural shortage — and a reason to own the producers.
1:23:41and so in the meantime I want to buy the guy who has the copper, so I supplement it. So BHP is bidding to buy Anglo — it was not efficiencies, synergies, or anything else, it's like, I want to own more copper, how do I do that, I buy a big copper producer. So we
Nothing matches this filter.
Verbatim excerpts from the public transcripts (auto-pulled at each mention's timestamp, lightly cleaned). Timestamps link into the video; "source page" opens that commentator's full analysis at this row. Click a mention's header line to expand it (one open at a time). For personal study — not investment advice.