In short: Passing mention — a "What I'm Reading" link: Disney is defying a summer slump in the theme-park industry with more promotions and package deals.
In short: Lebenthal owns it and keeps it after the CTO hire (13:31–14:12). CEO Josh D'Amaro hires Character.AI CEO Karandeep Anand as its first CTO. Lebenthal: too new to judge, but Disney must "co-opt AI" (an OpenAI partnership "really didn't go anywhere") — "this is still a very cheap stock… I think it's worth hanging on to."
Disney hired the head of Character.AI, a chatbot company, as its first chief technology officer, signalling it wants to use AI in its streaming service and its characters. Lebenthal says it is too early to judge the move, but the stock is cheap enough that he is holding while the company works out its AI plan.
In short: Named only as an example — with Netflix, "exclusive entertainment" in the low-friction, high-scarcity resilient bucket.
10:23We also have credit ratings. companies like SMB Global and Moody's exclusive entertainment. We have Netflix and Disney. We have procurement scale. We have restaurants, live events, and physical experiences. So, you have Cheesecake Factory and Texas Roadhouse. These are companies with already very low friction and very high scarcity.
In short: The analogy for AI-era software: Disney+ grew fast while cable declined, forcing investors to net one against the other — the "messy game" he avoids.
In short: Rothschild trims its target to $125 from $160; Lebenthal holds on valuation. "I'd be happy at 125. I mean, let me start there. The stock has had a little bit of a rally since they reported earnings in early August… up 10-ish percent. Obviously, the market's been flat to down in that period… We've seen Marriott roll over just as Disney is coming up. When I get to the end of the analysis here, what I look at is a stock that's trading at 14 times forward earnings for a well known brand, one that does have consumer appeal. And I'm going to stick with this for now."
Disney makes money from theme parks, cruises, films and its streaming services. An analyst cut his price target to $125 — which, Lebenthal points out, would still be a gain from where the stock trades.
His case is simply price for quality: at about 14 times next year's expected earnings, you are paying a modest price for one of the best-known brands in the world. The stock has risen about 10% since its August earnings while the market went sideways, and he is staying put.
In short: Niles uses it as the archetype of the heirloom stock that failed: "Disney was another name, right? People were like, 'oh, you got to put it away for your grandkids.' Well, that hasn't worked out. And so I completely disagree with that. I think you want to have a very flexible open mind, and as the facts change, you want to change too."
Disney is the archetype of what Niles calls the heirloom stock — the name people bought to "put away for your grandkids" on the assumption that a beloved brand with a century of history could not go wrong.
His verdict is one sentence long: "well, that hasn't worked out." He offers no target and no catalyst; the company appears purely as evidence that brand durability is not the same thing as shareholder return, and that a stock inherited on sentiment deserves the same review as one bought on a spreadsheet.
29:22I don't think the oil situation has helped it. Obviously other brands have come in. They had years of mismanagement. We'll see what happens. Disney was another name, right? People were like, "Oh, you got to put it away for your grandkids." Well, that hasn't worked out. And so I completely disagree with that.
In short: The companion cautionary tale to Nike, aimed squarely at the heirloom-stock instinct: "Like Disney was another name, right? People were like, 'Oh, you've got to put it away for your grandkids.' Well, that hasn't worked out so well."
Disney appears as the companion cautionary tale to Nike, and it is aimed at a specific investor instinct — the heirloom stock, the one you "put away for your grandkids" because the brand feels permanent.
His verdict is one line: "that hasn't worked out so well." No thesis on the business is offered and none is intended; the name is there because it is the archetype of a company whose cultural durability was mistaken for financial durability.
The general rule behind both Nike and Disney is his answer to what most investors get wrong — there is not enough emphasis on downside protection, because in advance you cannot tell whether you own the next Google or the next Yahoo.
57:11It used to be a market share leader. I don't think the oil situation has helped it. Obviously other brands have come in. They had years of mismanagement. We'll see what happens. Like Disney was another name, right? People were like, "Oh, you've got to put it away for your grandkids." Well, that hasn't worked out so well.
In short: The largest survivor of the incumbents who "sold the rope" — but the scoreboard is the point: "Today, Netflix has a market cap of over 300 billion. The next biggest entertainment company market cap is Disney at 178 billion." One of the managements who "chose margin over growth and it cost them everything."
Disney is the largest of the entertainment incumbents who, in Eisman's telling, handed Netflix the weapon. Selling old shows that weren't in syndication was "found money with 100% margins" — pure profit that made quarterly numbers, and executives bragged about it on earnings calls.
The reason they did it is structural, and it is the transferable lesson: CEOs are paid annually on results that drive the stock, so a deal that boosts this year's profit gets done even when it arms a future competitor. They also knew streaming would be lower-margin than their existing business and chose to protect the margin — "they chose margin over growth and it cost them everything." Disney survives; the scoreboard ($178B against Netflix's $300B+) shows what it cost.
19:35Streaming is a lower margin business. They chose margin over growth and it cost them everything. To preserve their margins, they sold their souls and eventually lost their businesses. Today, Netflix has a market cap of over 300 billion. The next biggest entertainment company market cap is Disney at 178 billion.
In short: A casualty of the streaming war, cited in passing — "many other streamers like Paramount and Disney were throwing tens of billions of dollars at streaming, most of them gave up the fight… pulled back on their budgets and conceded the battle to Netflix."
7:36Netflix is still profitable and growing despite all their competitors spending tens of billions of dollars on streaming to chase Netflix. Now since then, over the following years, Netflix's stock price quickly sailed upwards, going up around 600% from the lows. And while many other streamers like Paramount and Disney were throwing tens of billions of dollars at streaming, most of them gave up the fight.
In short: His offensive-consumer pick: new CEO Josh D'Amaro comes from the experiences business, which has had the highest ROIC for years and is where capital is now going (new cruise ships, park investment). Streaming has flipped from drag to FCF-positive and growing, ESPN is being re-valued, box office is crushing it; Euro Disney was packed. "This happens every 15, 20 years — the stock sells off 50%, everyone says it's over, then they realize they have the greatest IP library in the history of mankind."
Disney is his "offensive" consumer bet — the one that wins if the American consumer keeps spending rather than the one that survives if they don't. The core of the argument is where the company now puts its money. New CEO Josh D'Amaro came up through the "experiences" side (parks, cruises, resorts), which has earned the highest return on invested capital in the company for years — meaning every dollar spent there produces more profit than a dollar spent anywhere else. Now that's the segment getting the capital: new cruise ships, new park investment.
The rest of the business has quietly flipped from problem to asset. Streaming, which burned enormous cash for years, is now free-cash-flow positive and growing. ESPN, which everyone had written off, is being re-valued as live sports rights get scarce. The box office is doing well. He watched Euro Disney in France come off a redeye and found it packed, with a brand-new Frozen land — while US parks are still selling Space Mountain.
His pattern recognition: "this happens every 15, 20 years — the stock sells off 50%, everyone says it's over, and then they realize they have the greatest IP library in the history of mankind" and find a new way to monetize it (theaters to VHS in the 80s, DVD to streaming now). One sanity check he liked: everyone assumed Disney's earnings would be bad because Universal's parks were weak, and Disney was up anyway.
51:11Everything was great. And the good news is the new CEO Josh Dearo comes from the experiences side of the business in Disney which had the highest return on invested capital for many many years and that's where they're allocating all their resources moving forward. So streaming had been a drag now it's free cash flow positive growing.
In short: Parks answer the doubters. Fiscal Q3 FY26 (June quarter): revenue +7% Y/Y to $25.2B (a $0.2B miss) but adjusted EPS +28% to $2.06 (a $0.21 beat) and total segment operating income +21% to $5.6B, ahead of expectations; FY26 outlook for ~12% adjusted EPS growth maintained and the buyback target raised again to at least $9B. Streaming keeps compounding its inflection — Disney+/Hulu revenue +11% to $5.5B with SVOD operating margin at 13%, on track for double-digit streaming margins in FY26 though "international monetization still has room to improve." Entertainment operating income surged 64%, helped by streaming profitability and Toy Story 5 crossing $1B at the global box office — a hit that also lifted merchandise and Disney+ engagement, "showing how a successful franchise can reverberate across the company." The doubt that got answered was Experiences: revenue +10% to a record $10.0B with operating income +20% to $3.0B, domestic attendance +3% and per-guest spending +4% (Walt Disney World particularly strong); international visitation is soft but forward bookings are healthy. The one drag is ESPN — Sports revenue ~$4.5B with operating income −17% to $858M on shorter NBA playoff series and rights timing. Forward hook: CEO Josh D'Amaro will begin expanding Disney+ beyond video in spring 2027 — games, merchandise and experiences "designed to lower churn and increase lifetime fan value" — with free ad-supported offerings under consideration as Disney+ becomes the company's digital hub. Bottom Line: "Streaming profitability is becoming repeatable, while Experiences just delivered the quarter investors feared it couldn't."
Disney had been carrying two worries: that its streaming service would never make real money, and that its theme parks were about to slow down. This quarter pushed back on both.
On streaming, Disney+ and Hulu together earned a 13% operating margin — meaning 13 cents of profit for every dollar of subscription revenue. A year or two ago that number was negative; the whole industry was spending to buy subscribers. Disney says double-digit margins should hold for the full year, and that the biggest remaining improvement is overseas, where it still charges and earns less per viewer than in the US.
On the parks — reported as "Experiences" — revenue hit a record $10.0 billion, up 10%, with profit up 20%. Importantly, that came from more people (attendance +3%) as well as each of them spending more (+4%). If it had been only spending per guest, you would suspect price increases were papering over thinner crowds. It wasn't.
The film side shows why Disney is structurally different from a pure streamer. Toy Story 5 passed $1 billion at the box office — and then also sold toys and pulled people back into Disney+. One hit pays Disney three or four times. Entertainment profit jumped 64%.
The weak spot is ESPN, where profit fell 17% because the NBA playoffs ran fewer games and sports-rights costs land unevenly across quarters. Sports is the one segment whose economics are getting harder, not easier.
Looking forward, the CEO plans to turn Disney+ into more than a video app from spring 2027 — adding games, merchandise and experiences. The goal he states is telling: not more subscribers, but fewer people cancelling and more revenue per fan over their lifetime. That is the same shift the whole issue is about. Analysis, not a recommendation.
In short: #18. Founded 1923, IPO 1957 — and the one entry that admits a poor recent record. "It owns the IP rights to iconic characters and stories like Mickey Mouse, Cinderella, and Star Wars." Lindy case: "The human desire for great stories will never go away," with brand and cultural importance giving pricing power across the businesses. But: "Disney's stock has been relatively flat over the past decade. But since 1990, it's up more than 1,300%" — the weakest ten-year record on the list and a useful check on the thesis, since survival plainly did not prevent a lost decade.
Disney owns stories and characters — Mickey Mouse, Cinderella, Star Wars — and sells them repeatedly through films, television, streaming, merchandise and theme parks. The same asset gets monetised many times over decades, which is why the intellectual property, not the studio, is the business.
This is also the entry that undercuts its own thesis most usefully. The post admits the shares have gone essentially nowhere for ten years, even though the total return since 1990 is above 1,300%. Surviving and prospering are not the same thing: Disney has clearly done the first, and the last decade shows what that is worth on its own. Read it as the honest control case in the list.
In short: A frustrated hold. Lebenthal (owner): the operating results "are pretty darn good" across entertainment, theme parks and streaming, with "great potential in the studios" as the box office recovers (Spider-Man), and the stock trades ~14× forward — "and yet what are we up, 2%?" His question about himself: "how much of a mistake am I making here? Am I being patient or am I being stubborn? Now I'm not selling it today, but… I don't love it, because I don't love what the share price is doing." Terranova reads the muted reaction as a signal: "this is a market that wants to get behind the underdog… look at what happened in Microsoft, look at what happened in Palantir. Now you see Disney today and it's only up 1.9%. The stock is down double digits on the year, double digits over the last 52 weeks… so where are all the buyers rushing in to buy the underperformance? It tells you everything you need to know." Lebenthal's own hypothesis: M&A overhang — the market may fear Disney enters the cable-spinoff scrum and overpays as it did with Fox.
Disney reported good results — entertainment, theme parks and streaming all solid, with the studios improving as the box office recovers — and the stock rose less than 2%. It trades at about 14 times earnings and is down double digits both this year and over the past twelve months.
Jim Lebenthal owns it and is openly conflicted: "the company itself is doing really well, but the stock just isn't… am I being patient or am I being stubborn?" He isn't selling. Joe Terranova uses the non-reaction as evidence about the market rather than about Disney: this is a tape that rewards beaten-down names (Microsoft and Palantir both surged), so if buyers won't chase Disney's underperformance after a good quarter, "that tells you everything you need to know." Lebenthal's guess at the overhang is merger risk — with cable networks being spun off, investors may fear Disney buys one and overpays, as many think it did with Fox.
In short: Context: Wapner references "the call" from yesterday asking "whether Disney should get out of the streaming business all together" — the point being that maybe nobody can compete with what Netflix has built (pricing power without stock-price penalty). No fresh committee stance this episode.
In short: Split, on the Wells Fargo "should Disney exit streaming?" call (PT cut 146→125, sees ~40% upside). Lebenthal (owns it): something bold is needed, but streaming is now a "crown jewel" (money-loser → ~$2B/yr) — blames geopolitics/theme-park price fatigue + weak studio releases (Wapner pushes back hard, citing Marriott/airlines). Terranova (bought ~$103 end of April, "not happy"): an "identity crisis," balance sheet worse than five years ago, activism the only historical catalyst. Sethi: cash-rich assets under-utilized, needs a catalyst, consolidation possible. Both agree ESPN is under-leveraged. Owned but frustrated — waiting on a catalyst.
A Wells Fargo analyst argued Disney should exit streaming and refocus on producing content, theme parks and franchises — a bold call that (despite cutting the price target to $125 from $146) claims up to 40% upside. The committee, which owns the stock, is split and frustrated. Jim Lebenthal thinks streaming is now a "crown jewel" (it went from losing money to earning ~$2 billion a year), and blames the stagnant stock on geopolitics, theme-park prices getting too high, and weak movie releases — though host Scott Wapner pushes back hard (Marriott and airlines are doing fine, so why not Disney?).
Joe Terranova, who bought in around $103 and isn't happy, says Disney has an "identity crisis" and a worse balance sheet than five years ago, with shareholder activism the only thing that's ever moved the stock. Sarat Sethi sees cash-rich assets that aren't being used well and wants a catalyst — possibly a merger. Both note ESPN is under-leveraged. Net: a frustrated hold waiting for a catalyst.
In short: Owns it; framed via the media-M&A discussion. On Comcast's NBCU spin: "I think it's takeover bait." M&A is "clearly vibrant" (Warner Bros + Paramount, Roku adjacent to Fox), and "in this industry size and scale matter" — the lens through which he holds Disney. No fresh buy/sell on the name itself.
Lebenthal owns Disney and discussed it through the lens of media dealmaking. Comcast just announced it will spin off its NBCUniversal media arm into a separate company; he thinks that newly-independent business is "takeover bait" — i.e. set up to be bought. His reasoning is that mergers and acquisitions in media are very active right now (Warner Bros pairing with Paramount, Roku tied to Fox), and in this industry "size and scale matter," so big players keep buying to bulk up.
The relevance to Disney: as one of the largest, most scaled media companies, Disney sits on the right side of that "scale wins" dynamic — either as a consolidator or simply as a survivor whose assets get more valuable as rivals combine. He didn't issue a new buy or sell on Disney; he's holding it within that consolidation thesis.
In short: Passing reference — "Disney bundling" cited among the competitive pressures on the streaming/living-room land grab.
In short: #10 on the two-quarter aggregate Top Buys table. Structural data point only.
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Verbatim excerpts from the public transcripts (auto-pulled at each mention's timestamp, lightly cleaned). Timestamps link into the video; "source page" opens that commentator's full analysis at this row. Click a mention's header line to expand it (one open at a time). For personal study — not investment advice.