| Account | Shares | Price | Value | % of acct | Cost/sh | Gain $ | Gain % | Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 401K | 54 | $82.23 | $4,440 | 0.18% | $96.08 | $-748 | -14.4% | — |
In short: Wells Fargo downgrades to Sell; both owners (Snipe, Sechan) hold (14:50–16:22). Snipe: down ~20% since the Paramount deal fell through, YouTube and short-form pull engagement, "even though I believe Netflix is the streaming winner" — sports and a doubling of ad revenue ahead. Sechan: "you've been able to add to the name after it's re-rated"; "it's about the eyeballs… you can always monetize that." Down ~24% YTD.
Wells Fargo told clients to sell Netflix, which is down about a quarter this year as YouTube and short videos compete for viewers' time. Both committee members who own it disagree: Snipe still sees Netflix as the streaming leader with room to grow in sports and advertising, and Sechan sees the lower price as a chance to buy a dominant subscriber base more cheaply.
In short: "Very insulated from agentic technology." A general assistant recommending what to watch across services may weaken Netflix's home-screen discovery edge, but Netflix owns and licenses its own entertainment — "the agent can point to a show. It cannot legally stream the catalog."
An agent might tell you what to watch across all streaming services, which could weaken Netflix's own recommendation screen. But Netflix owns or licenses the shows themselves — the agent can point at a show, but it can't legally stream it without Netflix. So he sees Netflix as very insulated.
40:34But Netflix owns and licenses its own entertainment. The agent can point to a show. It cannot legally stream the catalog without a commercial relationship. I find that Netflix is very insulated from agentic technology. A restaurant agent can reserve a table, compare weight times, and suggest dishes. It cannot cook the steak, create the service culture, or reproduce the atmosphere.
In short: Brown bought more — "just too cheap." "Netflix is 38% below its 52 week, its all time highs. I think the stock is just too cheap. Mark Mahaney came out yesterday, $110 price target, says the market is missing all of the positives. I agree." A second committee buyer in two sessions (Weiss bought it back on Sep 14).
In short: The winner-take-most base rate again, alongside Amazon (e-commerce), Google (search) and Facebook (social): "What about streaming? Well, you really only have one, and that's Netflix. So, do you think you're going to have five plus models that everybody uses? I don't think so." No stock view.
15:11You have Amazon. Well, what about search? — Well, you have really one. That's Google. What about social? Well, you kind of have one. That's Facebook. What about streaming? Well, you really only have one, and that's Netflix. So, do you think you're going to have five plus models that everybody uses? — I don't think so.
In short: The clean-story example: "it's just getting better" — no legacy business in decline alongside streaming, unlike Disney's cable-to-Disney+ transition.
In short: Weiss quietly bought it back — a downside call, not an upside one. Evercore raises its target to $110 from $100; the stock is an S&P leader after being lumped in "that AI disruption basket." Weiss: "I bought it back not far from here actually, because I do have a lot of cash. I thought this was a safe one. I'm not so sure about the upside on it, but I think the downside's been taken out as you see other streaming services raised prices. They actually are close to the value player on the street… I'm not sure it gets to 100 anytime soon."
Netflix had been lumped in with companies that AI might disrupt, and fell hard. Weiss, who had sold it, bought back in — not because he expects a big rally, but because he thinks the worst is priced in.
His reasoning: rival streamers keep raising prices, which makes Netflix look like the good-value option by comparison and protects its subscriber base. He is sitting on a lot of cash and wanted somewhere "safe" to put some of it. It is a "limited downside" trade, and he says so openly.
In short: The first half of the same drawdown pair, again with no business view: "Netflix has had a couple of 75% drawdowns." It is evidence for "drawdowns are the enemy," offered against Munger's "if you can't stomach 50% declines… you will get the mediocre returns you deserve."
Netflix is the streaming service, and it is the other half of the same one-line exhibit.
Both names are used to show that "own the great companies and never sell" is advice that has to survive some genuinely brutal intervals. Netflix, like Nvidia, has twice fallen roughly three-quarters from a high — while still ending up as one of the era's great investments.
No stance on the business is expressed anywhere in the conversation. The takeaway is his conclusion, not a rating: "drawdowns are the enemy," which is why he would rather hold five uncorrelated sleeves than a concentrated position in a winner he might abandon at the bottom.
19:39I'm okay with 20% in stocks. I use the quote in the book, 80% of chicken inspectors no longer eat chicken, right? Once you see how the sausage is made, it's frightening. So, yeah, I don't think you have to look, Netflix has had a couple of 75% drawdowns.
In short: ~7% / $104k (+$32k). 16% growth × 25× = 15.77%, above his 15% hurdle. Ad tier doubling in 2026, video podcasts poaching YouTube creators (YouTube "is actually panicking"), a possible streaming hub; $11B TTM FCF with negligible SBC — "one of the most financially strong companies in the world." $1,500 (15%).
Netflix clears his 15% target (about 15.8% a year) assuming 16% growth. Its cheaper ad-supported plan is growing fast, it is signing video podcasters away from YouTube, and it might become a hub that sells other streaming services inside its app. It generates about $11 billion a year of free cash with almost no stock-based pay, which he says makes it one of the financially strongest companies anywhere — not the weak streaming business many assume.
In short: The third winner-take-most exhibit — "what about in streaming? Well, you really only have Netflix and a bunch of smaller players" — and one of the businesses "built on the back of all that cheap bandwidth" left behind by the dot-com bust. No stock view.
19:48Well, what about in social? Well, you only really have Meta and then you have a bunch of smaller players. What about in streaming? Well, you really only have Netflix and a bunch of smaller players. So, do you think you're going to have 10 models that are all thriving? Anything is possible, but the history of technology tells you that's probably not likely.
In short: His one-line rebuttal to the "tech is deflationary" claim, with no view on the stock: "so many people in tech… always say that tech is so deflationary. It's like I don't know. Have you paid your Netflix bill? It's not that deflationary."
Netflix is the streaming service — and here it is standing in for an entire argument about inflation.
The claim Dillian is attacking is that technology is inherently deflationary, so an AI boom should push prices and therefore bond yields down. His rebuttal is a household bill: "Have you paid your Netflix bill? It's not that deflationary." Tech companies that win a market raise prices like anyone else; the falling-cost story describes the inputs, not what consumers actually pay.
The broader point is a race between two forces — the demand for capital to fund AI capital spending, which pushes borrowing costs and prices up, versus productivity gains, which push them down. He thinks the first is the bigger force, and he doubts the second is even measured honestly.
7:07It's like I don't know. Have you paid your Netflix bill? It's not that deflationary. And also I think that the demand for capex — demand for capital from capex is going to be so much more of an inflationary force than the deflationary force of increasing productivity. — I also think productivity is kind of fake.
In short: "Very bullish" — at a ~23 PE "you're getting a great company… for a relatively low price." The upside he wants priced: Netflix as a streaming hub that sells Peacock/Paramount/Fox subscriptions inside its app for a cut — "earn money on the work of other businesses," like Visa/Mastercard — provided it doesn't clutter the interface. Live events are low hours but high-value viewing, so watch-time is the wrong engagement metric.
Netflix today grows by making or licensing its own shows. Carlson's bigger idea is that it becomes a "hub": you could sign up for Peacock, Paramount+ or Fox inside the Netflix app and watch their shows there, with Netflix keeping a slice of each subscription. Smaller streamers would happily pay, because those are customers they might never have reached — the same way a hotel is glad to fill a room that would otherwise sit empty.
That would let Netflix earn money from other companies' content without spending billions on it, similar to how Visa earns more whenever people spend more. The risk is ruining Netflix's clean interface with a clutter of paid add-ons. On engagement worries, he argues a live event watched by millions is worth more than its small share of viewing hours suggests. At about 23 times earnings he calls it a great company at a not-expensive price.
In short: Buy target $60 from ~$80 post-split (holding seven, +$34k of gains). One of the likelier triggers, on the stock's own history of violent repricing: "investors have generally been enthused about Netflix… but recently you can see that it's in a downtrend. If investors get really soured on Netflix with their next earnings report for whatever reason, we could see the stock drop rapidly. We've seen it before with Netflix." On a deliberately low 16% EPS assumption ("this is on the low end of where I think it's actually going to grow") and a 24 multiple, $60 produces a 19.9% CAGR — "one of the highest projected forward compounded growth rates of any stock in my portfolio."
Netflix trades around $80 after its split and he wants it at $60. What makes that plausible isn't a fundamental worry — it's the stock's temperament. Investors have generally liked Netflix, "but recently you can see that it's in a downtrend," and this is a name with a long history of falling hard and fast on a single disappointing quarter: "we've seen it before with Netflix."
The projected payoff is the highest in the portfolio. He assumes 16% earnings growth, which he explicitly calls the low end of what he expects, and a 24 multiple appropriate for the margins, growth and market size. Buying at $60 on those inputs compounds at 19.9% a year — "a 20% CAGR would be incredible… one of the highest projected forward compounded growth rates of any stock in my portfolio."
14:14So, I believe with these assumptions, at $1,200, the stock would essentially double over the next 5 years. Now, next up, we get to Netflix. This is holding number seven. It's a $16,000 position, $34,000 in gains. Netflix currently trades at $80 per share. The buy-in target I'm setting for this company is $60.
In short: Raised only as the desk's standing "dead money" reference — and Simpson pushes back on it while applying the label elsewhere: "if we talk about dead money, which we do often with Netflix, and I disagree with that comment, I think Home Depot might be more dead money." No fresh stance on Netflix.
In short: The quarter's most-narrated single position. Netflix headlines Pershing Square's six new positions — Ackman's "biggest portfolio overhaul in years" — and "most notable is Netflix, which Ackman famously exited in 2022 at a roughly $400 million loss." A public re-entry into a name a manager was burned by is an unusually loud signal of changed conviction. Netflix also appears in the selective non-AI growth cluster of top buys.
Netflix is the streaming business that graduated from growth-at-all-costs to profitability, ads and password-sharing crackdowns.
It is the headline of Bill Ackman's six new positions — the biggest overhaul of Pershing Square's portfolio in years — and notable for a specific human reason: Ackman exited Netflix in 2022 at a roughly $400 million loss, and has now bought it back publicly.
Re-entering a stock that cost you a very public $400 million requires overcoming the discomfort of admitting the exit was wrong, so it is a louder signal of changed conviction than an ordinary new position. It says nothing about whether he is right this time.
In short: The worked example of unscaled scalability, the criterion Heyndrikx singles out of his fifteen: "Everyone has their own recommendations (unscaled) but Netflix can easily do this for all customers without much extra costs (scaled)." Cited as an illustration of the test, not as a recommendation; also one of Gardner's hundred-baggers.
Netflix is used to explain a screening criterion rather than pitched as an investment. The criterion is "unscaled scalability", taken from Hemant Taneja's book Unscaled: the best modern businesses give every customer something tailored to them, but do it in a way that costs almost nothing extra as the customer count grows.
Netflix is the clean example. Every subscriber sees a different set of recommendations — that is the personalised half — and producing those recommendations for one more subscriber costs Netflix essentially nothing — that is the scale half. Businesses that personalise the expensive way, by making genuinely different products for different people, fail the test, because the customisation eats the margin.
In short: "I bought a little bit of Netflix and Uber" — grouped with the recent longer-term buys he is "not sure they're going to rally anytime soon."
A small position bought recently alongside Uber, and grouped with it as something he doesn't expect to move quickly. The common thread is buying quality that has been left behind while money chased AI.
41:34And there's some names we recently bought, which are longer term, where I'm not sure they're going to rally anytime soon. Like I bought Uber, and I bought a little bit of Netflix and Uber. Uber, I bought at 68, it's 75, so it didn't rally with the rest of the market, but I thought Uber was very cheap, it trades at 12 times forward.
In short: Ackman's largest new position at "almost a 5% share." Carlson confirms he's on the same side and still adding: "Netflix right now is 50% off of its highs. There is a lot of fears baked in that I don't believe are accurate, and I still hold this one as a huge position. I haven't sold any Netflix, and in fact, I've added $5,000 to it this year."
Netflix is Ackman's biggest new buy at nearly 5% of the fund. It's trading about 50% below its highs on worries about engagement and competition that Carlson has argued at length are misread.
His own behaviour is the disclosure that matters here: it remains one of his largest positions, he hasn't sold a share through the entire drawdown, and he has put another $5,000 in this year. "There is a lot of fears baked in that I don't believe are accurate."
16:24So, big stake back into Netflix. Netflix right now is 50% off of its highs. There is a lot of fears baked in that I don't believe are accurate, and I still hold this one as a huge position. I haven't sold any Netflix, and in fact, I've added $5,000 to it this year. So, I continue to add to my position in Netflix as well. He also bought big into S&P Global, 5.4%.
In short: Reported as a positioning tell rather than a house view: "Bill Ackman is back in Netflix. He first bought in 2022 at 350 a share, invested about 1.1 billion before selling a few months later at a 40% loss. He redeployed capital into Google, which worked, but Netflix went on to rise about 650% from its lows. Now with the stock down roughly 50%, Ackman's back, he thinks it's very cheap." Ackman also added Visa, Mastercard, ICE, Alcon and S&P Global — "so he's been following some of our picks."
Full passage: premium transcript (PDF).
In short: Named as an aggregator archetype in the closing argument — "Netflix is an aggregator, and YouTube's an aggregator, Booking Holdings is an aggregator, the App Store from Apple and the Google Play Store" — the class of business that captures the value when supply commoditizes.
In short: The archetypal winning upstart — bought the incumbents' old shows, then "went into direct competition with the big producers and created their own shows," and now carries a market cap "of over 300 billion." But the verdict is two-sided: "not all is great at Netflix anymore. The company is very profitable, but growth is slowing and growth investors don't like investing in companies where growth is deteriorating. The upstart has grown old and that's why the stock is down 21% year to date."
Netflix is the hero of Eisman's case study and the warning at the end of it. It started as a low-margin middleman mailing other studios' DVDs, then used streaming to buy the incumbents' old shows, build an audience on them, and finally produce its own — at which point it competed directly with the companies that had sold it the content. Today it is worth over $300 billion versus Disney's $178 billion.
But he refuses to leave it there: growth is now slowing, and investors who buy a company for growth exit when the growth fades, regardless of how profitable it is. "The upstart has grown old" — which is why the stock is down 21% this year despite winning the war. Winning the industry and being a good stock are separate questions.
19:56Paramount is at a lowly 10 billion. Warner Brothers is at 69 billion. Yet not all is great at Netflix anymore. The company is very profitable, but growth is slowing and growth investors don't like investing in companies where growth is deteriorating. The upstart has grown old and that's why the stock is down 21% year to date. Finding a therapist is hard enough, but finding one who actually takes your insurance, that's where most online therapy platforms fall short.
In short: A $102,000 position, $30,000 in the green, held straight through the 2022 collapse he was "uniquely bullish" into. Ackman's re-entry near $74 validates his own case: engagement is not watch time (live programming is a tiny share of hours but "instrumental in driving sign ups and retention"), the per-user decline is a geographic mix shift into markets that watch less TV, and short-form video has taken share from linear and weak streamers, not Netflix — "combined with a robust buyback program, we estimate earnings should compound at close to 20% annually."
Carlson has owned Netflix straight through, including the 2022 crash when the stock fell about 75% and, in his words, people were making videos celebrating its downfall. He kept buying and wrote publicly at a price-adjusted $30 that the market had it wrong. Ackman bought that first dip, watched it get much worse, and sold near the bottom at a $400 million loss — and has now bought back in around $74 a share.
The current worry is an "engagement problem": the average subscriber's watch time is falling. There are two answers. First, hours are not all the same product — a live event or a series someone is invested in drives sign-ups and retention far more than the raw hour count suggests, so counting minutes the way you'd count social-media scrolling misreads the business. Second, and more mechanical: Netflix's growth now comes from countries that simply watch less television than the US, Canada and Europe. Adding those subscribers pulls the average hours per person down even while total viewing and total subscribers rise. That's a mix effect, not a deteriorating business.
The bear worry that short-form video is eating Netflix also fails the evidence test: short-form has grown fastest over exactly the two years Netflix kept growing revenue and subscribers. Ackman's model has earnings compounding near 20% a year with heavy buybacks, at a price he considers a substantial discount. Carlson's position is $102,000 and $30,000 in profit, and his view is unchanged.
12:35So, I think that's another good point to highlight. Combined with a robust buyback program, we estimate earnings should compound at close to 20% annually. We believe the company's current valuation represents a substantial discount for a business with such a strong growth profile and dominant market position." So, that's his case with Netflix, and obviously I agree with it.
In short: The interview's central anecdote about selling too early: "I know someone who invested about $1,500 in Netflix when he got out of college. He was thrilled when he could sell at a 40% profit the next year… But had he simply held his Netflix shares, that small position would be worth around $1.5 million today, and that's with Netflix down almost 50% from its top right now." The "down almost 50%" is the only current market observation in the piece. No view on the shares.
In short: Context only — one of "the big names… that a lot of people have owned for a long long time" with "really really low cost bases," used to make the take-your-cost-out point.
34:12— Yeah. — I'm going to give you two instances where like if you look today at the big companies, Amazon, Apple, Microsoft, you look at the big names, Netflix, that a lot of people have owned for a long long time. And they have really really low cost bases. And their argument is I don't want to pay the tax, so I don't want to sell any of it, which we don't think is a smart move.
In short: Pick #3 — down 37% over the past year "because of a narrative, a bear case, that I disagree with": the claim that engagement per subscriber is falling. He answers it metric by metric — the CEO says the season-1→season-2 drop-off has improved, subscribers grew last quarter, and total engagement rose 2% year-over-year. Per-user watch time is down only because the saturated high-TV markets (US, Canada, Europe) are already penetrated and new growth is in regions that watch less TV — "that's not a concern intrinsically about the company." He also rejects the like-for-like comparison: an hour of a series you're invested in is not the same object as an hour of scrolling Instagram reels. Underneath, "the company fundamentally is growing quickly, margins are moving up, their free cash flow is enormous, they're doing lots of buybacks" — "another one that offers a unique value in a market where most things are overvalued."
Netflix has fallen 37% over the past year on a single story: that people are watching less of it per subscriber, so the product must be losing its grip. Carlson thinks the story is wrong on its own terms and contradicted by the company's numbers.
His first objection is that "watch time" isn't one thing. An hour spent inside a series you're genuinely invested in is not the same as an hour scrolling short clips while eating lunch — the two produce different levels of attachment, so counting them in the same unit misleads.
The second objection is factual, claim by claim. The idea that viewers abandon shows after season one: the CEO says the drop-off from season 1 to season 2 has actually improved. The idea that subscribers are leaving: they grew last quarter. The idea that engagement is falling: total engagement rose 2% year-over-year. Watch time per user has slipped, but for a mundane reason — the countries that watch the most television (the US, Canada, Europe) are already saturated, so new subscribers increasingly come from places that watch less TV overall. That lowers the average without saying anything bad about the business.
Behind the narrative the company is growing quickly, margins are rising, free cash flow is large and being used for buybacks, and churn looks healthy — which is why he counts it among the few genuinely undervalued things left "in a market where most things are overvalued."
18:04Last company is Netflix. Netflix is one that's been on my list for a long period of time. Recently, the stock has gone down dramatically because of a narrative, a bear case, that I disagree with. The reason the stock is down 37% over the past year can largely be attributed to this entire narrative that there is an engagement issue with Netflix, that their watch time and their engagement per subscriber is going down.
In short: Called a buy today at Rothschild & Redburn, with the shares having de-rated from 47× forward to 19× over the course of a year. Link: "I don't think you need that kind of multiple expansion for the stock to recover. We actually added to it last week in our growth portfolio, sub-20× forward. I think the stock is cheap, we love the story. It's now about content — their content has lagged and they need to improve, they need to pick it up, and I think they will. I totally agree with the call and I think we'll see the stock back there in the not too distant future." Talkington's final trade: Netflix — "I think you can drift higher to about the mid-80s by year end."
Netflix has fallen from 47 times forward earnings to 19 times over the past year — an enormous de-rating — and Rothschild & Redburn called it a buy. Stephanie Link added to it last week below 20 times, and her point is that you don't need the old multiple back for the stock to work: "I don't think you need that kind of multiple expansion for the stock to recover. I think the stock is cheap, we love the story."
What has to improve is the product itself: "it's now about content — theirs has lagged and they need to pick it up, and I think they will." Bryn Talkington made Netflix her final trade, seeing it drifting up to the mid-80s by year end.
In short: The comparison that closed Ethridge's case for selling Spotify: "looking at a company like this at 34 times forward earnings when you could own something like a Netflix that's trading below the market at this point — and they kind of operate in the same space — it's a tough sell." Baruch notes he bought Spotify during the tariff selloff "along with Netflix" as a non-correlated play. No fresh Netflix stance.
In short: Brought into the Disney debate by Lebenthal — "I'm going to bring Netflix in, not because I want to make myself feel better, but because I think we have to look at the industry, streaming and broadcast overall, and say that maybe there's going to be more M&A. Maybe that's what's holding this stock back." No fresh stance on Netflix itself.
In short: Ives' analogy for a moat that only looks like one in hindsight: "Netflix was first. They built it. They spent a ton of money. At first investors didn't recognize and now where do you go? Netflix basically owns content." His claim is that hyperscalers are "step by step building their moat in front of us" the same way.
10:39They spent a ton of money. At first investors didn't recognize and now where do you go? Netflix basically owns content that speaks to their opportunity and their install base. That's like my own way of viewing it in terms of going back to Vegas strip. See, but let me press you for a second.
In short: −12.5% Fri (most in four years) on slowing earnings despite heavy content spend + expansion into podcasts/gaming/short-form — "trying to do too much." Time-spent grew only 2% in Q1. Not adding, but "I think it'll be a buy again" this year.
Netflix fell 12.5% on Friday — its worst day in four years — on slowing growth, even though it's spending more on content and pushing into podcasts, games and short videos. Singh thinks it's "trying to do too much," which is why growth in time spent was only 2%. He's not buying yet, but says it'll "be a buy again" this year — a wait-and-watch.
Full passage: premium transcript (PDF).
In short: The main story, and a cautious one. Q2 FY26 revenue +13% Y/Y to $12.6B (a $20M miss), EPS +11% to $0.80 ($0.01 beat), operating margin 33% (−1pp Y/Y on front-loaded content amortization); FY26 guidance was only narrowed (revenue +13–14% to ~$51.2B, margin 31.5%) rather than raised, and Q3's implied 12% revenue growth would be the slowest since 2023 — shares fell ~8% after hours, already down >40% in a year. Positives: ad revenue on track to roughly double to ~$3B with programmatic expanding to Pause Ads and live inventory; 97B hours watched in H1 (+2%, accelerating from 1.5% in 2025); live programming takes just over 5% of content spend and ~1% of view hours yet accounts for six of the ten largest new-member sign-up days in five years; GenAI touched ~300 titles in post-production; a record $4.7B of buybacks ($27.1B capacity left); FY26 FCF target held at ~$12.5B despite Q2 FCF falling to $1.5B on Warner-termination cash taxes. The flags: the What We Watched report goes annual from 2027 and is decoupled from earnings (churn still undisclosed) — "reducing disclosure makes it harder to independently judge what is driving performance"; US TV-time share 7.8% in April vs a 9.0% December peak while YouTube, Prime Video and Tubi all set records; and the bundle it is rebuilding (ads, live sport, TF1 channels, podcasts, games, vertical video) may not cohere. Bottom line: "Netflix risks becoming more complex without becoming more valuable." A disclosed author holding. (Analysis, not a stance call.)
Netflix has already won the argument that streaming can make money. The question now is whether a grown-up streaming company can keep growing. This quarter was fine — sales up 13%, profit slightly ahead — but management only narrowed its full-year forecast instead of raising it, and the growth rate it expects next quarter would be the slowest since 2023. In a market that expects beat-and-raise, "fine" cost the stock another 8%, on top of a 40%-plus fall over the past year.
The growth plan has three legs. Advertising: the cheaper ad-supported plan now has more than 250 million monthly viewers and should bring in roughly $3 billion this year, doubling. Live events: Netflix deliberately buys one-off spectacles (a few NFL games, baseball's Home Run Derby, a big boxing match) rather than whole seasons — these eat only about 5% of the content budget and produce barely 1% of viewing hours, but six of the ten biggest sign-up days in five years came from them. So Netflix is using live to buy new customers, not watch time. And variety: podcasts, short clips, games, even a French broadcaster's live channels bolted into the app — anything that gets you opening Netflix daily rather than bingeing once a month.
Two things to keep an eye on. First, the competition for eyeballs is getting worse, not better: YouTube just hit a record 13.4% of US TV time, roughly 1.7 times Netflix's 7.8%, and even free services like Tubi are setting records. Second — and this is the article's sharpest point — Netflix is quietly turning off the scoreboard. It already stopped reporting subscriber numbers; from 2027 its viewing-hours report drops to once a year and is detached from earnings; and it has never disclosed how many customers cancel. When a company keeps removing the numbers that let outsiders check its story, that itself is information. The closing worry: Netflix is bolting on ads, sport, podcasts and games and may end up "more complex without becoming more valuable" — recreating the very cable bundle it replaced. The author owns the stock, and this is analysis, not a recommendation.
In short: The committee move, split. Weiss sold out (sold it down): streaming has "gotten more competitive" (Paramount, Warner Bros., Apple), and reselling other subscriptions / M&A chatter (Warner Bros., Lionsgate) signals "growth slowing down" — "not expensive, but the growth's not going to be there" (his earnings range 68–70 down / 85 up). Sechan owns it, bought the latest dip: ~$15B FCF this year, "the lowest content spend per subscriber," sports optionality, 300M+ users and real pricing power — "willing to be patient." Net: one out, one holding.
Netflix splits the committee. Steve Weiss sold out of it: streaming is getting more crowded (Paramount, Warner Bros., Apple), and Netflix's moves to find new growth — chasing a Warner Bros. acquisition, Lionsgate rumors, even reselling rivals' subscriptions — signal to him that growth is slowing. It's not expensive, he says, but "the growth's not going to be there."
Rob Sechan owns it and bought the recent dip. His bull case: Netflix should generate about $15 billion in free cash flow this year and spends the least on content per subscriber, which gives it room to move into live sports for more growth; it has 300 million-plus users and genuine pricing power (it raises prices without hurting the stock). Net across the two: a neutral, one-in-one-out standoff.
In short: An illustration of the domestic-to-international transition, not a view: "$1,000 in Netflix 7 years ago… you would have $21.000 today… But what if you invested in Netflix before it became the leading streaming company? A $1,000 investment would have turned into over $1 million (!)." The lesson drawn: "The jump from dominating one country to serving the world can create enormous value for shareholders."
In short: Referenced by Sethi in the streaming discussion — "look at Netflix, look at what Comcast is doing with NBC" — on how much streamers can really charge ("funflation"). Context for the Disney/streaming-consolidation debate; no fresh stance.
In short: The featured deep dive (reports Thursday) — down ~50% from ~$140 to ~$74, "could go into the 60 range" on a media narrative of declining engagement, season-two abandonment and "desperate" pivots. Carlson calls it "a very advantaged company": adding content (podcasts, live channels, bundles) is its lifelong playbook, the cable-style-channel idea is 5+ years old, the engagement dip is real but "addressing issues is what Netflix does" (325M subs, low churn). "If Netflix drops from the 70s into the 60s, I'll be once again increasing my stake."
Netflix has fallen roughly 50% from about $140 to about $74, and the press says it's in trouble: people are watching less, quitting shows after the first season, and the company is "getting desperate" — talking about always-on channels (like cable) and bundling other services. Carlson thinks the scary story is overblown. His key point is that "adding new kinds of content" isn't panic — it's literally what Netflix has always done, from licensing old sitcoms, to making its own hit shows, to documentaries, stand-up, Korean dramas, live events, and now podcasts. Each expansion looked desperate at the time and each one made the subscription more valuable.
On the "turning into cable" fear: Netflix has quietly tested always-on channels for five-plus years as a way to help indecisive viewers — and it would only ever play Netflix's own shows, not outside cable content. He agrees the engagement dip is real, but "fixing problems is what Netflix does" — it reversed a subscriber slide back in 2022 and added 70 million subscribers since, and today has 325 million subscribers, very low cancellations, and a fast-moving, data-driven management. So he treats the sell-off as a media-driven story, not a broken business: "if Netflix drops from the 70s into the 60s, I'll be once again increasing my stake."
5:24And then we have Netflix which looks desperate by constantly changing their business model and expanding what type of things they're doing. But I believe overall as we look at this that this portrays Netflix in a far more desperate and I believe weak position than they're actually in. I think the situation that Netflix is in is actually very advantageous, a very advantaged company right now.
In short: Starting to look cheap, but the pre-earnings WSJ leak that management is exploring live-TV bundles / Peacock aggregation to fight declining engagement is a bad signal. Not adding ahead of the print; would buy aggressively only on a clear miss.
Netflix is finally getting cheap enough to interest him, but there's a red flag. Right before earnings, the Wall Street Journal reported management is exploring live-TV bundles and packaging in rivals' services to fight declining viewer engagement. Announcing "fixes" for a soft spot just before you report is rarely a good sign, so Singh is deliberately waiting: he won't buy ahead of the print, but if the numbers miss and the stock gets flushed, he'll buy aggressively.
Full passage: premium transcript (PDF).
In short: Passing reference — an Assassin's Creed show tie-up with Netflix is expected "in the coming months," which would make a strong Black Flag Resynced launch well-timed to remind the market the IP still works. (Recap, not a stance call.)
In short: Down to $75.83 (−15% YTD, ~−40% off highs), ~20 PE on 2027 (he thinks estimates are low, so really below 20). Grants a real problem — no big hit in a while, and Bloomberg's data that Netflix viewers abandon shows after season one (long gaps + cancelled cliffhangers vs Apple, which finishes every series) — but "this has never been a good company to bet against," and it's being sold indiscriminately (its chart trades in lock step with Spotify).
Netflix has fallen to about $75.83, down roughly 40% from its highs, and now trades around 20× earnings — cheap for it (and Carlson thinks the earnings estimates are too low, making it even cheaper). He's unusually honest about the bear case: Netflix hasn't had a breakout hit in a while, and — per Bloomberg's data — viewers keep quitting its shows after the first season (One Piece, Beef, The Night Agent and Avatar all lost big chunks of their audience in later seasons).
His explanation is that Netflix waits too long between seasons and cancels shows on cliffhangers, so people lose the thread or stop trusting it — while Apple, by contrast, finishes every series it starts. But he thinks Netflix learns fast and will fix this, and crucially "this has never been a good company to bet against." The clincher: Netflix's stock chart moves in near-lockstep with Spotify's, even though Spotify has none of these content problems — proof to him that the drop is money rotating out of everything to chase chips, not a real deterioration in the business.
17:54The next one that I would mention is Netflix. Netflix is trading down again today. It's down to $75.83 per share. It's actually given up a lot of gains recently. It's down 15% this year. And then if we look over the long term, if we zoom out a bit, Netflix is down around 40% from its highs. The stock now trades at valuations that are relatively tame.
In short: Weiss (lowest since Oct '24): traded down into the 80s on rumors it will acquire Lions Gate — and "don't forget they went after Warner" — signaling it "needs more content," not a good look. But it trades quarter-to-quarter and down here it's "too cheap to sell"; wait for the quarter.
Netflix is at its lowest since October 2024. The pressure came from rumors it wants to buy Lions Gate (a film/TV studio) — and the reminder that it had already pursued Warner Bros. Weiss's worry mirrors the market's: if the dominant streamer suddenly feels it needs to buy more content, maybe it isn't as self-sufficient as assumed — "not a good look."
But he won't sell down here — "it's too cheap to sell." Netflix is a stock that "trades quarter to quarter" (it moves sharply on each earnings report), so his plan is simply to wait for the next quarter and see whether the numbers justify the worry before doing anything.
In short: He owns it (a top Story Fund position) at a 52-wk low (~$71, −44% YoY). Rebuts all three bear cases (desperate-for-M&A, no hits, decelerating) and argues at a 21 PE, 14% growth, $12B FCF and big buybacks it's "in a strong position." The fall is flows/rotation, not fundamentals — proven by its chart being identical to Spotify's.
Netflix has crashed to a 52-week low, down 44% over the year and roughly half its peak, and Carlson — who owns a big position — argues the market has it wrong. He walks through the three popular reasons people give for the drop and knocks each one down: that Netflix is "desperate" to buy another company (in reality, evaluating studios and libraries is literally its everyday business, and the rumored bids for Roku and Lionsgate were overstated or denied); that it hasn't had a mega-hit lately (true, but no single show is even 1% of viewing — it's diversified like YouTube, so it doesn't need blockbusters); and that growth is slowing (true, to ~14%, but that's already priced into a cheap 21x earnings, with $12 billion of cash profit and heavy buybacks).
His real explanation is simpler: the stock is falling because of money flows, not fundamentals. The clincher is a chart showing Netflix and Spotify moving almost identically — Spotify has none of Netflix's supposed problems, yet fell just as hard (more, actually). When two unrelated companies drop in lockstep, the cause isn't either company; it's big funds pulling money out of these sectors to chase AI names. He sees Netflix as fundamentally strong and still growing.
14:44Netflix is at a 21 PE ratio, expected to grow 14% revenue and increase operating margins. They're printing $12 billion of free cash flow. They're doing massive amounts of buybacks. The numbers back up a company trading at a low PE ratio. So, I don't believe they're in quite as desperate of a position as people make them out to be.
In short: "In the gutter right now," ~11.7% revenue growth with EPS muted by a front-loaded content year (he thinks the 7% EPS estimate works toward 10%+). Moat stronger than a year ago — more subscribers, more global scale/efficiency, ads growing ~100% YoY toward $3B+. "Just a matter of time until investors get the magic back."
Netflix's stock is "in the gutter," but Carlson thinks the business is healthier than ever — more subscribers, more global scale (it spreads content costs over more viewers), and an ads business growing about 100% a year toward $3 billion-plus. Earnings look muted this year mainly because Netflix front-loads a big content budget, and he expects the 7% estimate to push toward 10%+. He's confident "it's just a matter of time until investors get the magic back in this stock."
In short: "Seems to have completely lost its mojo," down 25% in Q2 — "Netflix's growth story no longer seems that powerful." The big drag inside otherwise-positive communication services.
13:18In consulting, Gartner and Accenture were down 18% and 35% respectively. In communication services, the sector was up 7% for the quarter, but much of that performance was just from Google being up 20%. There were quite a few losers. Netflix seems to have completely lost its mojo, down 25%. I suppose Netflix's growth story no longer seems that powerful.
In short: Mixed: 52-wk low, −23% YTD, technically "completely broken" after losing the Warner Bros M&A battle. Brown bought the dip and holds, would add — still thinks it's the dominant streamer (football the pricing-power offset). Link sold earlier this week on rising competition.
Netflix is having a rough year — a 52-week low, down 23%, and what Brown calls "completely broken" on the charts (heavy, persistent selling). The trigger was losing a bid to buy Warner Bros, which made investors ask a new question: if the most dominant streamer suddenly felt it needed a big acquisition, maybe it isn't as dominant as everyone assumed.
The committee is split. Brown still thinks Netflix is the best streamer, bought the dip, holds it, and would add more — and points to live football as proof it can keep raising prices and keep subscribers from canceling. Link sold this week, worried competition has intensified and the content lineup isn't as strong. Terranova notes Spotify's chart looks identical: both peaked a year ago and slid as they pushed prices up — a warning that pricing power has limits.
In short: Passing reference — named (with Amazon) as scaling advertising, part of the competitive pressure on Roku's ad-supported CTV thesis. A disclosed author holding.
In short: Culture-FUD analogy — Sept 2022 layoffs and "culture problems" headlines hit at the ~$20 bottom; up 300%+ since and nobody questions the culture now.
13:37We had layoffs at Netflix and some staffers questioning the company strategy and culture, culture problems at Netflix. In, let's take a look at the time, April of 2022. This is when Netflix was like $20 a share. It is up over 300% since this culture problem at Netflix. We had more and more articles very similarly. April 28th, 2022, during the exact bottom of Netflix's stock price.
In short: Title analogy ("like Netflix 15 years ago") and a peer example of a digital app the market wrongly claimed had no moat.
1:02And so what we're going to see with Duolingo stock in my opinion is a violent re-rating. It turns out so far I have been correct on my thesis. I said many months ago now that there was precisely a 1% chance, a trivial chance — there's a greater chance that an asteroid hits you on the head than Duolingo being disrupted by AI. Why do I say that? People seem to believe that digital applications like Spotify, like Duolingo, like Netflix, like Instagram for instance have no moat, and that argument people apply it especially to Duolingo.
In short: Down 38% from its peak; P/E ~26, mid-teens growth, gaining subscribers; fell back to ~$82 "without any reason" after the cancelled Warner deal (it kept a $2.8B breakup fee). Buy.
Netflix is the video-streaming service, down a steep 38% from its recent peak. The backstory: Netflix had agreed to buy Warner Bros. Discovery, the deal fell through, and Netflix walked away with a $2.8 billion cash breakup fee. The stock jumped above $100, then drifted back down to about $82 "without any reason at all," in his view.
At roughly 26× earnings, growing in the mid-teens and still adding subscribers, he thinks it's "firing on all cylinders" and unfairly cheap — a buy.
13:13So, I rate this one a buy. We have Netflix. This one has traded down a lot from the highs recently. It's down 38% from its recent peak. It's at the very low end of its 52- week range. It is undervalued based on its historical price to earnings and historical price to free cash flow. Remember what happened with Netflix? The company said it was going to buy Warner Brothers Discovery.
In short: Hybrid rebuttal example — much of its value is licensed (commodity) content, but the app makes the value: better discovery, recommendations, profiles. People pay because it "works well," not because content is exclusive.
Netflix is the video-streaming service, cited as another example rather than a pick. A lot of what it shows is licensed from others (i.e. not exclusive), but people still pay because the app simply works well — easy discovery, good recommendations, always something fresh to watch. They're paying to be entertained, not for content nobody else has. Same lesson: the product can be ordinary while the service around it is the moat.
14:30the distribution, the algorithms, the rankings, the social networking within the app itself, the user interface, all of that is important to the experience of accessing that commodity. Netflix is another hybrid example of this. Some of the stuff that Netflix creates are not commodities because they're creating original content.
In short: Named as a prior deep-dive subject ("I've done so with Netflix, with Google") and a growth benchmark — Mastercard's Value-Added Services are growing "faster than Netflix." Passing mention.
37:40It's faster growth than Google. It's faster than Netflix. This is a huge massive fast growing business. And that's because of this business overall shift from just being the payment company to battling for the new networks now being the trust layer in between. Now, there's other pressures on Mastercard.
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