| Account | Shares | Price | Value | % of acct | Cost/sh | Gain $ | Gain % | Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 401K | 42 | $57.41 | $2,411 | 0.10% | $54.24 | $133 | +5.8% | — |
In short: Brown best-stocks energy name (oil services). "Schlumberger's on the list" — one of 15 energy names "breaking out… almost no one owns them."
In short: Asked what he's optimistic about: "we've been max long, we're still long the Schlumberger… the oil service stocks. The picture the next five years is still phenomenal." Still a core holding.
Schlumberger is the biggest oil-services company — it does not own the oil, it supplies the technology, data and equipment that oil producers need to find and pump it.
Asked what makes him optimistic, this is the first thing he names: "we've been max long, we're still long the Schlumberger… the oil service stocks. The picture the next five years is still phenomenal." It stays a core hard-asset holding, consistent with his view since June that oil services own irreplaceable subsurface data.
The nuance in this appearance is that the position is now a large gain he wants to defend — hence the hedges elsewhere in the book rather than selling the winners.
38:30That's really not, nobody's really talking about that. — Anything that you're positive on on the optimistic side? — Well we've been max long, we're still long and we're long the Schlumberger. I mean, the spin and water [as spoken - garbled; oil-service names] are big holdings. I mean, Schlumberger, the oil service stocks. You're just, you're long, picture the next five years is still phenomenal. The coal names.
In short: Stephanie Link's final trade — and the one entry on this page whose ticker is inferred rather than stated. The Spotify auto-transcript renders her answer as "Selby, I really like this acquisition they did yesterday, 8.5 times EBITDA," with no company named. Read as SLB on three grounds: the phonetics of the spelled-out symbol; the acquisition announced the previous session (2026-AUG-31, covered on the prior day's page — SLB buying a thermal-management unit to get into the data-center build-out); and Wapner's immediate pivot in reply — "that's another story we're obviously watching today, too. That move higher in oil" — which fits an oilfield-services name. Treat the identification as probable, not certain. The substance of her call is the multiple: an acquisition done at 8.5× EBITDA, i.e. cheap enough that the buyer, not the seller, captures the value.
Stephanie Link's final trade, with one caveat that should stay attached to it: the company name is garbled in the audio (rendered "Selby") and is inferred here rather than stated. The reasons for reading it as SLB are the phonetics, the acquisition SLB announced the previous session, and Wapner's immediate pivot to oil in reply.
Her substance is a valuation point about that acquisition: it was done at 8.5 times EBITDA — roughly 8.5 years of the target's pre-tax operating cash flow. In a market where large deals routinely cost twelve to fifteen times, paying under nine means the buyer, rather than the seller, keeps most of the value the deal creates. That is the whole argument: she likes the company because she likes the price it paid.
In short: Named first among the services winners — "SLB and Halliburton, which are oil services companies with operations in Venezuela, could also win more business" — and "likely to benefit too if oil-drilling picks up in Venezuela," per Demichelis. The differentiator he adds is political, not technical: "because they're American companies, they might get preferential treatment to operate on U.S.-controlled land."
SLB is a contractor, not an owner. Oil companies hire it to drill wells, log the rock and keep old fields producing; it gets paid for activity, not for the price of the barrel. Venezuela's fields are decades old and badly under-maintained, which is precisely the kind of work that pays a services company well — and SLB already has people and equipment in the country.
The extra argument here is unusual, and worth understanding because it isn't about capability at all. If Washington controls the fields, Washington influences who gets the contracts, and Jefferies' analyst thinks American firms "might get preferential treatment to operate on U.S.-controlled land." That's a moat made of politics: valuable while it lasts, and revocable by an election on either side of the border. And none of it starts until someone commits the "tens of billions" of investment the article says no one has yet volunteered.
In short: Deal three, and the one Terranova finds most strategically interesting: "Schlumberger — it's actually a thermal management unit that they're buying. This is getting them into the data center build out itself." An oilfield-services company buying its way into cooling for AI infrastructure.
In short: Constructive, but this issue's action is a TRIM — moved back to the Holds/Trims table rated H/T (highlighted; $59.47 against the 09/23/2024 lot at $42.00, +41.60%), reversing the Jul-20 promotion to the Buy List. The company case is unchanged and strong: "originally founded in France in the 1920s," now Houston-headquartered, "it may be the most international of all global oil service companies" — offered as the reason "it has performed considerably better than HAL this year, possibly because investors feel it can better capitalize on the Mid-East rebuild" ("up a roaring 52% in 2025 versus a still very respectable 30% for HAL; take that, S&P 500!"), plus "a thriving digital division, with some asserting it is increasingly a software company in drag." Technically the strongest it has looked in years: the share price "has broken above shorter-term resistance and may be in the process of taking out the ceiling going back almost three years. It's also not far from making a new five-year high. If so, that would be a highly bullish development in our book." Valuation is relative, not absolute: "SLB's not nearly as inexpensive as is HAL. Yet, relative to its own history, it is underpriced, particularly on a P/E basis. For many years, SLB traded at a significant premium to the S&P 500. Presently, it's at a slight discount." The trim is justified by a published fourteen-year record of trading the same name's swings — "this newsletter has played those swings quite well": bullish on the group and SLB at $36 (Aug 2022) → "we advised some profit-taking" at ~$50 (Oct 2022) → "gain-harvesting" (Jul 2023) → "once more in early September, 2023, at even higher prices" → down to $32½ (Apr 2025), "as cheap as it had ever been at a sub-10 P/E," risk/reward "highly favorable" → reinforced at $37 (Dec) → $50 (Jan) → $57 (mid-May) → "sold off hard, sliding quickly to $45" → "its latest run-up to nearly $60." Hence: "at this point, harvesting some of the latest appreciation might make sense, and an obvious redeployment candidate is HAL. However, we wouldn't, by any means, suggest exiting SLB in full. Breaking above $60 could, and should, happen, likely leading to additional gains. At this point, though, we suspect there's more near-term upside with HAL." Same destination as HAL: "poised to experience that happy combination of rising earnings and expanding P/E ratios."
Schlumberger is Halliburton's larger, more global rival — the same business of drilling, measuring and completing oil wells for the companies that own them, but spread across more countries than anyone else in the industry. Founded in France in the 1920s and now run from Houston, it is, as Haymaker puts it, "the most international of all global oil service companies." It also has a substantial software and data business attached, to the point that "some asserting it is increasingly a software company in drag."
That international reach is the offered explanation for why it has beaten its rival this year — investors think it is better placed to win the work of repairing the Middle East's damaged oil facilities. The scoreboard: SLB up 52% in 2025 against 30% for Halliburton, both well ahead of the broad US market.
Nothing about the business case has soured. The chart is arguably the stronger of the two: the shares have pushed through near-term resistance and may be about to clear a ceiling that has capped them for almost three years, with a five-year high not far above — which he says "would be a highly bullish development in our book." On valuation it is not cheap the way Halliburton is cheap, but it is cheap against its own past: for years Schlumberger commanded a meaningful premium to the wider US market, and today it trades at a slight discount.
So why trim it? Because the position has done its job, and because this is a name Haymaker has deliberately traded in swings rather than simply held. He publishes the whole record as the justification, which is unusually checkable: liking the group and SLB at $36 in August 2022, advising profit-taking at about $50 that October, harvesting gains again in July 2023 and once more that September at higher prices; then, when the shares had fallen all the way to $32.50 in April 2025 — "as cheap as it had ever been," on a price-to-earnings ratio under 10 — calling the risk/reward "highly favorable," reinforcing that at $37 in December, and watching it run to $50 in January, $57 by mid-May, back down hard to $45, and now up to nearly $60. That is the pattern being repeated: buy the trough multiple, sell into strength, keep a core.
The instruction is therefore a partial one, and the limits are stated as clearly as the action. "Harvesting some of the latest appreciation might make sense, and an obvious redeployment candidate is HAL" — but "we wouldn't, by any means, suggest exiting SLB in full," because "breaking above $60 could, and should, happen, likely leading to additional gains." In other words this is not a negative call on Schlumberger at all; it is a judgement that the cheaper, more-lagged sibling has more room over the next few months. Both, he expects, will get the same double benefit of rising profits and a higher multiple paid for them. On the published portfolio tables the name moves back from the Buy List to Holds/Trims, rated Hold/Trim, against a September 2024 cost of $42 and a current $59.47 — a 41.6% gain being partly banked, not abandoned.
In short: Cited as the observable evidence that the Venezuelan re-opening is already physical rather than rhetorical: "Schlumberger and Halliburton and these guys are already moving back in there. They're bringing rigs back in. This is going to happen." A confirmation datapoint, not a recommendation.
54:32I mean, Schlumberger and Halliburton and these guys are already moving back in there. They're bringing rigs back in. This is going to happen. People can, I've already commented, well, the terms aren't fair. They're being ripped, Venezuelans are being ripped off. It's still going to happen. Okay. And so, is there a way to play it? I think I found a way.
In short: The research anchor, not pitched as a stock: operates a "massive" DLE facility in Clayton Valley, Nevada; acquired technologies to produce lithium commercially from brine (95% less water, far less energy, 10% of the hard-rock footprint, refined hydroxide or carbonate at site). Works with Rio Tinto, TechMet and Lithium Bank — "coming to page one soon."
0:59silver, copper, AI, Nvidia, all these things that is talked about all day, every day. In my view, the most mispriced opportunity right now is not just lithium, but direct lithium extraction. And I want to focus everyone's attention to the world's largest oil and gas service provider. I'm talking about Schlumberger.
In short: Named alongside Seadrill as an offshore-services beneficiary that "should benefit" as operators turn back to offshore projects to replace flattening U.S. shale growth. The largest, most diversified of the two — which cuts both ways given the managers' own stated preference for concentrated exposure.
SLB is the largest oilfield-services company in the world — it supplies the technology and crews that find, drill and complete wells, and it earns money from activity levels rather than from the oil price directly. It is named with Seadrill as a beneficiary if operators shift spending back offshore.
There is a tension worth flagging. These managers explicitly avoid diversified companies when they want exposure to one variable, and SLB is diversified — many product lines, many geographies, onshore as well as offshore. It should be steadier and lower-risk than Seadrill, and for the same reason it will capture less of an offshore boom. Consider it the quality-and-liquidity leg of the same trade rather than the high-torque one.
In short: "We own a little bit on the service side. We own Schlumberger, a little bit of Noble drilling and Transocean, so we're a full-line mix on energy." Deliberately a small weight.
Schlumberger is the world's largest oilfield services company — it doesn't own oil, it sells the drilling, measurement and completion work that producers buy. Its revenue therefore tracks how much drilling activity is happening, which makes it more cyclical than a producer.
Oakley deliberately keeps the whole services leg small — "a little bit on the service side" — but insists on having it, because a full-spectrum energy allocation without the service companies is missing a link that outperforms sharply when activity picks up.
43:18We own Schlumberger, a little bit of Noble drilling and Transocean, so we're a full-line mix on energy. — And obviously energy is also dependent on a strong economy, you need energy demand to maintain that. What would you say is the biggest risk to the macroeconomy that perhaps investors are missing or overlooking? — Well, it's just like you said Michelle, if you go into a major recession, you don't use as much.
In short: The services/driller leg: "We own drillers. We own Schlumberger, we own Transocean… you have to own the service companies, you have to own the producers, and you have to own the midstream."
Schlumberger is the world's largest oilfield-services company — it doesn't own the oil, it provides the technology, equipment and crews that get it out of the ground. When producers spend more, SLB gets paid regardless of where the oil price finally settles.
Oakley's rule is that you can't pick the winning slice of energy in advance, so you own all of it: producers, midstream pipelines, gas and services. Services are the leg most people skip, and the leg most levered to the drilling activity a tight oil market forces.
6:27And then we own get natural gas companies like Antero, Apache or APA, the APA now. And we own drillers. We own Schlumberger, we own Transocean. In other words, you have to own the service companies, you have to own the producers, and you have to own the midstream. And we're not as big on the refiners, but you can probably own those as well.
In short: The named energy idea: ~2.5% yield, "going to be a very important company" as countries rebuild drawn-down reserves, stop relying on US shale, and the Middle East and Venezuela bring oil back on. Hamlin is overweight energy, still the cheapest sector (~13× earnings).
SLB is the world's largest oilfield-services company: it doesn't own oil fields, it sells the drilling technology, equipment and engineering that oil producers and national oil companies use to find and pump oil and gas. When countries spend more on finding oil, SLB gets paid.
D'Agnes thinks the market is wrongly assuming oil falls back to $50–60 once the war ends. Emergency reserves and inventories have been drawn down, and countries want their own supplies rather than relying on US shale, so spending on oil and gas should stay high. SLB yields about 2.5% and energy is the cheapest sector, at about 13 times earnings; Hamlin is overweight energy.
19:35They can't rely on US shale anymore, and they're going to need their own reserves, and they don't want to rely on other countries as much just given some of the geopolitical risks. You know, that could be very interesting for the energy sector. It could be interesting for a company like SLB — the old slumberge, right, 2 and a
In short: Held alongside Halliburton and Transocean on the same deferred-sustaining-capital catch-up — "there's going to be catch-up really all across the industry" for the next five or six years.
SLB is the largest oilfield-services company in the world, and the third leg of Rick's deferred-capital trade alongside Halliburton and Transocean.
The logic is the same and worth restating because it is the opposite of a commodity-price bet: he doesn't need the oil price to rise. He needs producers to resume the maintenance spending they have postponed — which they must do to keep production flat, whatever the price does.
32:59I don't have much faith in them. I own RIG just like I own Halliburton and Schlumberger because I think that the industry has deferred a tremendous amount of sustaining capital investment and new project investment and they're going to have to play catch-up in that investment for the next five or six years. And there's going to be catch-up really all across the industry.
In short: One of "the big three oil service companies" — a way to play Venezuela and the whole world resuming new-project + deferred-sustaining-capital investing. The largest US oil-field-services names "offer the best juxtaposition between risk and reward in the space."
Schlumberger is one of the "big three" oil-services companies — the contractors that do the actual drilling, completion and field work for oil producers. Rick's thesis: after years of the whole industry skimping on maintenance spending, everyone eventually has to catch up and spend, and Venezuela alone will need a fortune of it. The service majors capture that spending wave — "might not be the best stock performers, but offer the best risk/reward in the space."
49:19But there are a few groups, one of them US connected, actually with good connections to the Trump family, that are on the smaller side that are going into Venezuela. A different way to play Venezuela would be simply to buy Schlumbumber, Hallebertton, and RIG. — The big three oil service companies. And this isn't just a Venezuela play, — right? — The whole world is going to have to resume new project investing and deferred sustaining capital investing.
In short: "Oil service entities like SLB and Halliburton look to be particularly underpriced." A one-step-removed way to play the energy re-rating, with a structural kicker: "rebuilding the Middle East's energy infrastructure will be exceedingly costly and take several years to accomplish."
SLB (formerly Schlumberger) is the world's largest oil-services company — it doesn't own the oil, it sells the drilling, measurement and completion work that producers pay for when they go looking for and pump more oil. That makes it a leveraged, one-step-removed way to play a rising oil price: when crude is high and producers want to drill more, services companies get more contracts at better prices. Hay calls SLB "particularly underpriced" here, meaning the stock hasn't kept up with the improving backdrop. He adds a longer-run reason to like it: the Middle East's damaged energy infrastructure will have to be rebuilt, which is "exceedingly costly" and takes years — a multi-year stream of exactly the kind of work SLB does.
In short: Named alongside Halliburton (and "the rigs") as the best-of-the-best service companies his portfolio is concentrated in. Sustaining-capital deferral means a lot of catch-up drilling ahead, which favors the large diversified service majors; he just doesn't try to find the smaller, higher-optionality service names.
Schlumberger (ticker SLB) is the other big oilfield-services major Rule holds — the largest and most diversified of them. Same thesis as Halliburton: years of under-spending on field maintenance means a lot of deferred drilling has to be made up, and the service companies are paid to do it. Rule deliberately owns the established giants rather than hunting the smaller, more nimble service firms with better technology upside, because he says understanding process and technology isn't his strength.
17:50But our capital reinvestment pre war was not sufficient. We'll see what happens over the next year. — Yeah, definitely. Great point. And so I imagine you think that the service companies as well providing drilling facilities for them could also benefit from this. — I wish I understood the service business better because what you say is true.
In short: Core-portfolio pro pick, +40% in 2026 (Nasdaq +13) and barely dented by oil's 30% drop — "the Google of oil services": offshore-drilling intelligence + ocean-floor reserve data is "a sleepy, sexy AI play." Near its 200-week MA = start of a bull market.
Schlumberger (now "SLB") is the world's biggest oil-services company — it does the drilling and well work for oil producers. It's in his core portfolio and up ~40% in 2026 (vs the Nasdaq +13%), barely scratched even though oil fell 30% from its April peak. Why so resilient? There's less than $3 trillion of oil-and-gas stock versus $41 trillion in the NASDAQ-100, so even a trickle of money rotating out of tech overwhelms it.
The kicker is AI: he calls SLB "the Google of oil services" because it sits on enormous offshore-drilling and ocean-floor reserve data that AI can monetize — "a sleepy, sexy AI play." Trading near its 200-week moving average signals, to him, the start of a multi-year bull market.
1:01:28Schlumberger is your third idea. Okay, so I'm nervous about this one because you cage-matched me, but because it's been in our core portfolio, we love it for the next five years. It's gone up a lot. I mean, the oil service names are destroying the NASDAQ. I mean, every producer on CNN or CNBC or Fox, they want to talk about tech stocks and chips.
In short: "The artificial intelligence potential of SLB is literally one of the most exciting trades or investments I can think of in the market today" — oil services control valuable assets and are outperforming the S&P.
Schlumberger is the world's biggest oil-services company — the firms that do the drilling and well work for oil producers. His point is that AI's winners won't all be chipmakers: SLB sits on enormous amounts of subsurface and drilling data, and applying AI to that is "literally one of the most exciting trades or investments I can think of in the market today." The sector is full of cheap value names already outperforming the S&P while everyone crowds into semiconductors.
31:40Big outperformance this year. A lot of value names in there — the Weatherfords of the world, the slumberes. They control a lot of valuable assets. The artificial intelligence potential of slumberge or SLB is literally one of the most exciting trades or investments I can think of in the market today.
In short: "The best artificial-intelligence play in the world" — AI-driven offshore drilling / oil services. The US must ramp offshore to fill the Mideast supply gap; ripping vs the Nasdaq.
Schlumberger is the world's largest oil-services firm — the company hired to find, drill and service oil wells for everyone else. He calls it "the best artificial-intelligence play in the world" because it uses AI heavily in offshore drilling. The bigger driver: with Mideast oil flows disrupted, the U.S. must ramp up offshore drilling to fill the gap, and that means lots of work for Schlumberger. He notes it's "ripping" — strongly outperforming the tech-heavy Nasdaq.
20:34When I When I say hard assets, I just mean commodities, but the natural gas equities, the FCG, have done really well. But, the oil and gas companies, especially the the Schlumbergers, I still we still I think Schlumberger is like the best artificial intelligence play in the world because of their artificial intelligence capabilities around offshore drilling and oil services.
In short: Tax-loss-package recap — the package's big winner ("thank you, SLB!"), staying on the list but Haymaker suggests "another trim on SLB after its muscular rally," a "highly volatile name, as are most oil-service companies." A trim after the win, not an exit.
Schlumberger is the biggest oilfield-services company — the firms that drill and service wells for oil and gas producers. It was the standout winner of Haymaker's December "tax-loss" basket (beaten-down stocks bought near year-end). After a strong rally Haymaker says to take some money off the table ("another trim"), because oil-service stocks are very volatile and swing hard. This is a trim to lock in gains, not a call that the company is in trouble.
In short: Referenced as the funding source for the swap — back on June 30 Haymaker sold ½ of SLB at a loss of ~$6/share ($42 → $36, ~14%) and rotated the proceeds into H&P. Cited here only to recount that reduced position, not a fresh buy.
Schlumberger is the world's largest oilfield-services company. It comes up here only as the source of cash for last summer's swap: Haymaker had sold half the position at about a 14% loss ($42 to $36) and moved the money into Helmerich & Payne — which then doubled. So in this post SLB is the reduced, funding-side leg of that trade, not a fresh recommendation.
In short: "Rather own Schlumberger than Exxon or Chevron" — below its 250-week MA; services the offshore "Gulf of America" drilling push.
Schlumberger is the largest oil-services firm. He'd "rather own Schlumberger than Exxon or Chevron" — he prefers the company that services the wells over the majors that own the oil. It's trading below its long-run average price trend (its "250-week moving average"), and it's positioned for the U.S. offshore-drilling push he expects.
35:49Oil majors or shale independents? Well, Trump wants an extra million barrels a day offshore. The Schlumbergers of the world — I would rather own Schlumberger than Exxon or Chevron. You can buy Schlumberger right now below that 250-week moving average. The oil service companies are what's going to service all those wells in the Gulf. That's why the Trump team renamed it the Gulf of America — they want offshore drilling in a big way. So Schlumberger and Weatherford are your big winners.
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Verbatim excerpts from the public transcripts (auto-pulled at each mention's timestamp, lightly cleaned). Timestamps link into the video; "source page" opens that commentator's full analysis at this row. Click a mention's header line to expand it (one open at a time). For personal study — not investment advice.