| Account | Shares | Price | Value | % of acct | Cost/sh | Gain $ | Gain % | Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 401K | 245 | $68.39 | $16,756 | 0.68% | $39.85 | $6,993 | +71.6% | — |
In short: The low-risk way in: "if your risk tolerance is low then buy the Suncors and the CNQs" — large, liquid integrated names; higher-risk investors can go to cheaper billion-dollar mid-caps.
Suncor is one of Canada's largest energy companies: it mines oil sands, refines the oil and sells fuel at its own gas stations. For investors who want energy exposure without much risk, Schachter's advice is to buy the big, liquid names like Suncor and Canadian Natural rather than the small producers. With crack spreads (the profit from turning crude into diesel and jet fuel) near record levels, a company that owns refineries also benefits from that margin.
29:14So I think we're looking at a lot of opportunities for investors here and you want to have some of those names in your portfolio. So sit down with your investment advisor, discuss how much weighting you have in resources, what is appropriate given your age and risk tolerance, but have some exposure and if your risk tolerance is low then buy the Suncors and the CNQs and soes; if your risk tolerance is a little more then there's a lot of very very attractive
In short: Named in the Morgan Stanley energy-value note, praised by its owner, and flagged for trimming in the same breath. Sechan: "energy has been the bright spot. Suncor has been particularly the bright spot, once again proving that owning in this space is a hedge against rising rates. There's been an incredible correlation there." Then the disclosure that flips the net stance: "I would personally be inclined to start to take some chips off the table here because I think we've run quite a bit." A rare thing on the show — the reason to trim is the size of the gain, not a change in the thesis.
Suncor is a Canadian integrated oil producer, and Sechan makes an unusually specific claim for why it belongs in a portfolio right now: it has been a hedge against rising interest rates. Most equities fall when yields rise; energy has been going the other way, so the position offsets something else he owns rather than just adding to it.
Then he says he is inclined to take chips off the table — not because the reasoning changed, but because the position has run. That is a rebalancing decision rather than a change of view, and it is the reason the net stance here is neutral despite the compliments.
In short: Named first among the losers: "the potential losers include Canadian oil companies like Suncor and Canadian Natural Resources, which produce heavier crude that competes against Venezuelan resources." "Canadian oil producers are among the most vulnerable" — if the heavy-crude market "gets flooded with new supplies, it could weigh on profits." Note this is the same asset that was the reason to own it five days earlier on the Aug 26 page.
Suncor digs heavy oil out of Alberta's oil sands and sells it, mostly into the United States. Because its barrels are thick and sour, they already sell at a discount to light crude — the same discount that makes them attractive to a Gulf Coast refiner is what caps Suncor's realised price. If Venezuela adds heavy barrels to the same market, that discount gets wider and Suncor is paid less for oil it is producing at the same cost.
Note the reversal inside this archive. Five days earlier Goehring & Rozencwajg picked Suncor precisely because oil-sands reserves last decades while shale wells deplete fast. Both things are true, because they are answers to different questions: long reserve life protects you against running out of barrels, and does nothing at all to protect the price differential those barrels fetch. A producer can win the volume argument and lose the discount argument at the same time.
In short: The second named Canadian producer in the same oil-sands bet. Same logic — long-lived, slow-decline reserves against a shale base that "deplete[s] quickly" and whose growth Goehring expects to go negative "in the coming months." The pair is the concentrated way to own a multi-year price move rather than a quarter of it.
Suncor is the second Canadian producer in the same bet, and the reasoning is identical: long-lived oil-sands reserves that keep producing while U.S. shale wells deplete. The managers are not picking it for a clever company-specific reason; they are picking a category — durable barrels — to express a view about the oil price several years out.
That is worth noticing as a method. When your forecast is about a commodity over five years, company selection collapses into one question: which producer's output survives long enough to sell into the price you are forecasting. Fast-declining assets deliver a good quarter; slow-declining assets deliver the thesis.
In short: One of Sechan's two named Canadian energy holdings, up better than 50% year to date per Wapner. His case is a portfolio one rather than an oil call: "we've been overweight energy all year. It's been one of our best performers. It's a hedge to higher interest rates and inflation. I own Suncor, I own CNQ — these are stocks that are up 55, 53, 48… a combination of earnings momentum, high total yields and reasonable valuations still. So why not maintain that exposure? Just because they moved does not mean they're not going to continue to move." Harrington also names it approvingly as a name without much direct oil-price beta (she calls it "midstream," which the auto-transcript may be garbling).
Suncor is a large Canadian oil producer, up more than 50% this year. Rob Sechan owns it and has been overweight energy for the whole year, which he describes as one of his best-performing decisions.
His reason for holding is not a forecast for the oil price. He owns energy as a hedge: if inflation runs hotter and interest rates stay high, energy tends to do well, which offsets the damage those same conditions do to the rest of a portfolio. That is why he keeps it even after a big move.
The three things he says make the position attractive on its own merits are earnings that are still improving, high total shareholder yields — dividends plus buybacks — and valuations that remain reasonable despite the run. His closing line is the discipline point worth remembering: "just because they moved does not mean they're not going to continue to move."
In short: Named with Cenovus as the Canadian oil-sands names he's "backing" — bullish oil, and specifically bullish on companies with refining capability, which is exactly the integrated oil-sands profile. Same reasoning: long-life reserves outside the Persian Gulf risk premium.
Suncor is the other big Canadian integrated named in the same breath — oil-sands production plus its own refineries and retail fuel network. Polomny's case is identical to Cenovus's: he wants oil exposure, he particularly wants refining exposure, and he wants the reserves located somewhere that isn't hostage to the Strait of Hormuz. Long-life Canadian barrels tick all three.
40:168 billion barrels. To put this into context, if the Strait of Hormuz was to open today, it would take up to 18 months at an average rate of 2.1 million barrels per day to replenish depleted inventories on top of demand. And so, again, I'm bullish on oil companies. I'm bullish on companies that have refining capability. I've said I'm backing the companies like Cenovus, Suncor. I like the Canadian oil sands, okay? I'll mention another one, Athabasca Oil. I recently bought. This is the cash machine. I just recently was at a conference, participated in a conference, and I've owned this company off and on, and the case was made to me that this is a long-term, basically, cash cow, following the same model that I like, repaying debt, excess cash flow now, long-life asset in a
In short: Not owned. Trades a higher multiple than Cenovus but "doesn't have that technical issue." Named as a possible Canadian supermajor consolidator (with CNQ/Cenovus) if it can reach 2M bbl/d over time.
26:04Suncor, who we don't own, they trade at a higher multiple than Cenovus, but they don't have that technical issue going on. So I think that's unique to Imperial. That being said, what would I do if I was Imperial? I'd be buying other people's businesses all stock cuz I'm getting this big premium.
In short: Not owned; new CEO (Rich Kruger) "did a great job," benefited from the refining crack-spread blowout. "Would have been nice to own," but prefers CNQ's low-cost profile — buying a full position here is "buying a parabolic."
36:52Suncor has done amazing. It would have been nice to own that as well. I think, but again you're, so new CEO did a great job. I
37:01think there were some legacy issues internally that he was able to sort of clean up a little bit. Obviously they were benefiting from
In short: Not owned. Central to the wild Cenovus theory: Elliott (already involved) + Suncor take out Cenovus all-stock and spin the US refineries; Suncor's lone US (Denver) refinery pairs with Cenovus's US refining. Would be Suncor's largest deal ever. Rich Kruger runs it.
53:41We will take the refinery, US refinary assets and spin those out into a US listing. Elliot's doing all this. Elliot in combination with Suncor. Okay. Okay. Um, now this would be the largest deal ever for Suncor if they did this. Correct. But if you're like the the Carne government, you're going to be in the pipeline business.
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Verbatim excerpts from the public transcripts (auto-pulled at each mention's timestamp, lightly cleaned). Timestamps link into the video; "source page" opens that commentator's full analysis at this row. Click a mention's header line to expand it (one open at a time). For personal study — not investment advice.