UBER · Uber Technologies $70.38 -0.49 (-0.69%) 2026-SEP-18 12:49 EST

Uber runs ride-hailing and food delivery. Singh has called it cheap at $60-70 a share for some time. In the first two weeks of September its chief executive, Dara Khosrowshahi, and its president, Andrew Macdonald, bought about $15 million of shares with their own money on the open market, with the stock near its lows of the year.

He is careful not to over-read it: insider buying "doesn't necessarily mean that it's a buy." But executives deliberately adding personal money at today's price is a meaningful signal from the people who know the business best, and he says that if they keep buying, he may add more himself.

An agent could compare Uber with Lyft, Waymo and Tesla every time you need a ride. But it will pick the most reliable, fastest and safest option at a fair price, and Uber's huge number of drivers usually makes it that option. The agent can talk to Uber's app, but it can't replace Uber's network.

The fear is that robotaxis from Waymo or Tesla will make Uber obsolete. Carlson thinks the market overrates how fast that happens and underrates Uber's size: in one week Uber completes as many paid trips as Waymo does in about 13 minutes, and the gap is growing. When you open a ride app you want a car anywhere, including places robotaxis can't go and at rush hour when there aren't enough of them — an app offering both human drivers and robotaxis serves that best.

He compares it with Google a few years ago, when fear about ChatGPT pushed the stock so low that its other businesses alone justified the price. Heavy insider buying by Uber's executives, which Peter Lynch treated as a strong signal, adds to his confidence.

Uber runs ride-hailing and food delivery. Singh has said on earlier calls that it has become cheap. This week two of its most senior executives bought shares with their own money on the open market: the chief operating officer about $5.3 million, and the chief executive, Dara Khosrowshahi, about $10 million at around $71 a share.

Executives receive shares as pay all the time, and they sell for all sorts of personal reasons. Buying on the open market is different — it is a deliberate decision to put more personal money into the company at today's price, by the people with the best view of its prospects. The last time Khosrowshahi did this, in May 2022, he paid $26.73 a share, and the stock has nearly tripled since. That is why Singh says the market was "quite excited" about the two purchases.

After Tesla's Cybertruck robotaxi event, a lot of investors concluded Uber is finished — Ross Gerber said on camera that "Uber's cooked." Carlson disagrees, and his argument is one nobody else in that debate is making.

Demand for rides is not steady through the day. It is concentrated in a couple of rush-hour spikes with long quiet stretches either side. That creates an unavoidable problem for anyone who owns the cars: buy enough vehicles to cover the peak, and most of them sit idle and unprofitable for the rest of the day; buy enough for the average, and you cannot serve the rush hour at all, which is when people most need a ride. Every car is a capital cost that has to earn its keep.

Uber never faced that trade-off, because it does not own the fleet. Its supply expands exactly when demand does: people leave the house, open the app, and put the car already sitting in their garage to work for two hours. The peak is covered by assets Uber never had to buy.

So his conclusion is that the winning shape is a hybrid — a set of self-driving vehicles handling the predictable baseline plus human drivers absorbing the spikes — and Uber already has both halves. It has all the drivers, it already runs driverless cars on the network, and it keeps adding partnerships, while Tesla has 40 vehicles on the road in one Texas neighbourhood. A robotaxi fleet, in this reading, is something Uber plugs in rather than something that replaces it.

His only trade last month was a small $1,000 Uber purchase that happened to land on the low. With his assumptions — 16% yearly earnings growth and a 24× multiple — he calculates about a 17.5% annual return, one of the best in his portfolio, because fear about robotaxis is holding the price down.

He contrasts two strategies. Uber doesn't build self-driving cars or delivery drones itself; it signs up the companies that do (Wayve in London, thousands of robotaxis in Europe, Zipline drones) and plugs them into its app, the way it plugs in human drivers. DoorDash is building its own drones and delivery robots. He likes both businesses, but thinks Uber is the better buy today because DoorDash's stock has already run up.

A member asked whether Waymo could eventually get dense enough in a city to break Carlson's Uber thesis, which rests on Uber having so many drivers nearby that a ride is always minutes away. His answer: Waymo is the only robotaxi company that has really proven itself, and it will take some business in big cities. But even in Los Angeles, where Waymo operates best, Uber is still doing well.

He sees Uber as having plenty of other places to grow and as a platform that will host many companies' self-driving cars alongside human drivers. Transportation is a huge market, so Waymo and Uber can both win, like Visa and Mastercard. The scenario that would hurt Uber is Waymo expanding everywhere with no other self-driving suppliers — he doesn't think that's likely within ten years.

Uber is his smallest position and, by his own numbers, the best bargain on the board if it dips. He wants it at $60 — only about 23% below where it trades, the gentlest discount he asks of any of his fourteen holdings, and a price the stock actually saw in late 2024. Run his conservative assumptions (earnings growing 16% a year, the stock eventually valued at 22 times earnings) and buying at $60 works out to about a 20.9% annual return over five years. He is careful to note that a small position is not a small conviction: he has actually put more money into Uber than into DoorDash; DoorDash is bigger only because it has gone up more.

The bulk of the episode's Uber content is a defence against two viral documentaries — one from the activist group More Perfect Union, one from Business Insider — that accuse Uber of "personalized pricing": using what it knows about you personally (income, spending habits) to charge you the most you'll tolerate. Both films run the same demonstration: seven or eleven people in one room order the identical ride at the identical moment and get different prices.

Carlson's answer turns on a distinction the films never make. Personalized pricing is about the person. Dynamic pricing is about the situation — the same reason concert tickets cost more when demand spikes. When a group of people all tap the button in the same few seconds, the nearest drivers get taken first; the later requests get matched to drivers further away, which really is a longer, more expensive trip. Uber's published (and audited) response says this explicitly, and states flatly that it does not price on protected characteristics, phone model, or battery level.

His actual charge is about method rather than conclusion. Both documentaries acknowledge Uber's rebuttal in a single clause — "Uber said we got it wrong" — and then never show it, leaving an audience that is "completely blind to the argument of the group they're even accusing." The investing lesson he draws is simple and portable: before you accept an activist exposé about a company you own, go read what the company actually said back.

Uber has gone from burning billions a year to generating about $10 billion of genuine spare cash on a $150 billion market value — and he expects $13 billion by 2027 and $15 billion by 2028. At 12 times next year's earnings, down from $100 to the 68 he paid, "it's never traded like that."

The reason it's cheap is the fear that self-driving cars (Waymo) make Uber redundant. His answer is that Uber becomes the demand network those fleets plug into — it signs contracts with them rather than competing head-on. He is explicit that this is a longer-term holding he does not expect to rally soon.

Uber is the name where the professionals converged this quarter. Bill Ackman didn't just own it — he made it his single largest position at 12.72% of the fund, and Pat Dorsey bought it too. Carlson treats position size as the honest signal in a 13F: when a concentrated manager puts his biggest weight somewhere, that is the name he'd tell you to buy today on "business quality, growth, and valuation."

Carlson already owns it and reads the filings as confirmation rather than instruction. His own reasoning, argued at length elsewhere, is that Uber's advantage is per-city driver density rather than technology, so the self-driving fear that keeps the stock cheap is overpriced. Here he adds the portfolio logic: he sold Booking Holdings — an excellent but mature aggregator that has "already won the game" — to fund Uber and DoorDash, which sit earlier in the same arc.

His summary of the whole 13F season is one line: if Ackman were to name two buys, they'd be Uber and Meta, "which I agree with both. I've been buying both of these companies."

The bear case is simple: self-driving cars will make Uber's drivers obsolete, so Uber is a ticking time bomb. Carlson's answer is that this misidentifies what Uber owns. Uber never built anything — the roads existed, the gas stations existed, the drivers existed, and above all the cars existed, sitting unused in people's garages roughly 95% of the time. What Uber built was the system that makes all of that talk to each other: dispatching, pricing, driver incentives, ratings, surge prediction. He calls it a "physical asset allocator" rather than a ride-sharing company. That's why it could open in dozens of countries at once without spending capital.

The asset that matters is density — not being in many cities, but having enough drivers inside one city that any rider gets a car within a few minutes. Density is what makes riders loyal (you never plan ahead, a car is always around the corner) and what makes driving worth doing (less time driving empty, more time with a paying passenger). Uber has it nearly everywhere it operates. Lyft doesn't, which is why he says Lyft is "out of it" regardless of price.

Now the part that flips the AV story. Ride demand isn't steady — it spikes, hardest on Friday, by something like six times. A fleet of robot cars has to choose: buy enough vehicles for the peak and leave 90% of them idle and depreciating the rest of the day, or buy for the average and turn away exactly the customers who need a ride most. Human drivers solve this for free, because they own the cars and park them at home when they're not driving; Uber just sends a notification an hour before the rush. That means a network mixing humans and robots beats a pure-robot network permanently — not just during the transition.

And because Uber already has density, it can bolt self-driving cars onto its network whenever they're ready and have them fully busy from the first day, while Waymo has to spend years building demand in each new city from zero. So "Uber can be late and still be first." The one way he loses is if Uber takes a full decade to integrate any AVs at all — he puts the real deadline at five to seven years, and thinks the market is pricing something far more urgent than that.

Uber is one of only two names Carlson bought after Ackman (Chipotle was the other), and he says he agrees with the thesis. The stock is held down by fear of self-driving cars, made worse this quarter by what Ackman describes as an increasingly strained relationship with Waymo. Meanwhile the business is compounding: earnings on pace to grow about 35% this year, at 19 times earnings — close to the cheapest the stock has ever been. Ackman's phrase is that the valuation is "increasingly disconnected from the fundamentals."

Carlson's own addition is the point he expands into a full deep dive two days later: Uber already owns the hard side of the problem — the demand. And a network that mixes human drivers with self-driving cars beats a pure robot fleet, because humans can be called in for the rush hour and stay home the rest of the day, while a robot fleet either buys too many cars that sit idle or turns away the busiest hours. Even in the cities where Waymo is doing well, Uber keeps growing.

Uber runs the app that matches people who want rides with drivers who have cars. The market has decided that self-driving cars — mainly Google's Waymo — will eventually take that business away, and the share price reflects that fear: the stock trades at 24 times earnings while revenue grows about 20% a year and profit per share grows in the high teens, and it throws off roughly 4% of its market value in cash each year once you adjust for insurance money it holds temporarily. That is a cheap price for a fast-growing business.

Carlson's argument is that the fear is out of proportion. Uber never had to buy the expensive parts of its own business: the roads were paid for by taxpayers, the fuel stations by oil companies, the cars by the drivers themselves. Uber only supplied the layer that connects them, which is why it could spread across the world so quickly. A robotaxi company has the opposite problem — it must buy and physically place enough cars in every single city before anyone in that city gets a usable service. Waymo currently does about 500,000 rides a week; Uber does that many every 17 minutes, "600 times bigger," and the gap is widening rather than closing.

That asymmetry is what makes the timing risk survivable. Because Uber already has enough riders and drivers everywhere ("network density"), it can simply add self-driving cars into its existing app whenever they become good and cheap — "Uber can be late to the game with AVs and still be in the lead," even by four years. He has bought $24,000 so far, sees the stock at $150–160 in three or four years from around $70, and is blunt that he could be wrong: "Maybe the stock goes to zero. And that's why we invest in more than one company."

The argument is about cash, not growth stories. Uber currently produces about $10 billion a year of spare cash after all its bills, and analysts expect that to reach $15 billion by 2028. Against a $139 billion company, that is a jump from roughly 7% to 11% of the price returned as cash each year — unusually high for a business still growing revenue 10-15% annually. It also just got upgraded to investment grade and is buying back $20 billion of its own stock.

Two engines drive it. Uber One, the subscription, has passed 50 million members who spend about three times more than non-members, which lowers what Uber has to spend to win each customer. And the advertising business inside the app is now running at $2 billion a year at high margins — the same playbook Amazon used.

The standard objection is robotaxis: if Waymo, Tesla or Zoox make human drivers unnecessary, Uber's network loses its value. Singh doesn't dismiss it, he just thinks the timeline is much longer than the share price implies — "that's going to take many years."

Uber's headline sales figure looked like a small disappointment — $14.2 billion, about $70 million under what analysts expected. But that is an accounting illusion. In the UK, Uber changed how it books ride revenue: instead of recording the whole fare and then the driver's cut as a cost ("merchant" model), it now records only its own commission ("agency" model). Same cash, smaller reported number — the switch alone knocked 8 percentage points off the growth rate.

The number that isn't distorted is Gross Bookings — the total value of everything ordered through the app. That grew 24% to a record $58.0 billion, the fourth quarter in a row above 20%. Trips rose 18% to 3.9 billion. The only place growth slowed was Brazil, and for an unusual reason: rivals were bidding for motorbike drivers, so Uber couldn't get enough supply. Demand wasn't the problem. In the US, ride growth actually sped up, because savings on insurance let Uber cut fares — and the cities where fares fell most (San Francisco, Los Angeles) grew the fastest.

Profit is now following volume rather than being sacrificed for it. Core operating profit rose 33% to $2.8 billion, and cash actually generated over the past twelve months passed $10 billion for the first time. That is the money that pays for buybacks, acquisitions and self-driving investment without borrowing.

The argument that decides the share price is robotaxis. The bear case is simple: if cars drive themselves, why does anyone need Uber? Uber's answer is that the hard part isn't the driving software — it's having tens of millions of riders already opening your app, plus the machinery of dispatching cars, cleaning and charging fleets, buying insurance and dealing with regulators in every city. Its evidence: in the cities where robotaxis are furthest along — San Francisco, Los Angeles, Phoenix — Uber's share of the overall ride category is higher than a year ago, not lower.

The market isn't convinced. At about ten times its expected 2027 operating profit, Uber is priced like a business with a problem, not one compounding above 20%. The newsletter's read is that the fear is already in the price and the business keeps improving; the open question is simply how much of today's economics survives when robotaxis are everywhere. The author owns it; analysis, not a recommendation.

Josh Brown thought Uber's quarter was "incredible" and warned beforehand that it wouldn't matter — the stock has fallen after six of the last seven reports regardless of the numbers. His explanation is that one belief dominates everything: investors do not think Uber's driverless-car strategy can compete with Waymo and Tesla's Cybercab. That single doubt is why the stock trades at 15 times earnings; "if anybody believed… the stock would be $120 a share."

So the re-rating won't come from an earnings report. It comes from three visible developments: Uber launching with Nvidia, ten more carmakers producing self-driving-ready vehicles, and — the one he emphasises — private-equity and private-credit firms buying fleets of driverless cars and putting them on Uber's app. The economics work because each robotaxi already does 15–20 rides a day, and removing the human driver removes a 20–30% cut of every fare. "When those things start to become real and not just things talked about on the conference call, this stock could be re-rated overnight. I just can't tell you when."

Uber fell 7% on weaker-than-expected bookings — revenue grew about 12% against expectations of 14%, with profit in line. Truist argued demand for rides and delivery is still healthy and driverless-car rollouts will accelerate.

The desk's problem isn't the business, it's the absence of a trigger. Jason Snipe notes $10 billion of free cash flow and continued investment in autonomous vehicles but "no real catalyst to move this stock forward" — a wait-and-see, with the stock down 17% on the year. Joe Terranova is blunter and turns it into a rule: he believes in the long-term model and still owns none of it, because "it hasn't proven itself, and if you're focused on price, you're going to be out."

Uber is one half of a "split buy" he made a month ago — an equal dollar amount into Uber and DoorDash at the same moment, treating them as a paired bet on delivery and mobility networks. It is down about 2% so far and reports this week.

He concedes Uber loses US food delivery to DoorDash, but thinks it can dominate European delivery through acquisitions, and that ride-hailing itself is a far bigger prize. On the robotaxi fear, his argument is by analogy: nobody says Visa is doomed because Mastercard, Amex, PayPal and Venmo exist — a dominant network doesn't need 100% of a market to be enormously profitable. And if self-driving cars work, Uber can simply buy or license them and run them in its own fleet rather than being displaced.

He is explicit that this is higher risk than his core holdings — regulation, competition, and a bumpy path. Into earnings he is watching rides and Uber One membership growth, not profits: the company is still in land-grab mode.

Uber is spending $15 billion — its biggest deal ever — to buy Delivery Hero, a Berlin company that owns the leading food-delivery apps across much of Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and parts of Europe. Uber already owned about a quarter of it; with a big shareholder (Prosus) agreeing to sell, Uber will control roughly half before other investors even decide.

Why buy rather than build? Food delivery is a density business: the more orders in a neighbourhood, the shorter each trip and the better the economics — which is almost impossible to bootstrap country by country against an entrenched local app. This deal takes Uber from 79 to 99 countries and nearly doubles the number of places where it runs both rides and food. That matters because a customer who uses both services generates roughly three times the bookings and profit of a single-service customer, and converting an existing rider into a food customer costs less than half of buying a new one through advertising.

Is the price sensible? At about 14 times profits (before cost savings) it looks expensive for a low-margin business. Uber's finance chief says moving Delivery Hero onto Uber's own technology will save $1.2 billion a year within 18 months, which would bring the effective price down to roughly 8 times 2027 profits — a very different picture, if it lands. Uber also pre-sold 14 countries where the two overlap for about $1.6 billion, a deliberate move to make European regulators say yes; the fact that the deal isn't expected to close until late 2027 tells you Brussels will take its time. There's also a quiet defensive motive: if self-driving cars eventually squeeze the profitability of ride-hailing, a much bigger delivery network gives Uber another way to keep customers. The author owns the stock; analysis, not a recommendation.

Uber is a recent buy. Carlson calls it "the ride-sharing king" — a giant network that aggregates enormous demand, which is its main defense against competitors. He passed when the stock ran up to $100, but bought once it fell back to about $70.

The big fear is self-driving cars (Waymo, Tesla, Zoox) replacing Uber. He puts the threat in perspective: Waymo does about 500,000 trips a week, while Uber does 3.64 billion trips a quarter — Uber does more than 570 times the volume. Rivals can chip away, but he considers that lead effectively insurmountable, so he views the AV worry as overblown relative to how far the stock fell.

Uber is Talkington's final-trade pick — a short, chart-based call. The stock found support and bounced off $70, and she sees the next move up to about $87. No deep fundamental thesis here; it's a momentum/technical idea on a name that has stopped going down.

Uber is his other new buy — "really cheap on the surface" by its P/E while growing earnings ~33%. The same network logic applies: the sheer volume of rides and deliveries keeps widening its moat as it adds members and improves the apps. The big long-term risk is self-driving cars (Waymo), but Carlson thinks Uber's ride volume is far too large for autonomous players to displace it any time soon.

Uber runs the biggest US ride-hailing network and a large food-delivery business. Carlson just started buying it — $10,000 to begin, planning to build the position to $30–40,000 over the coming months — because it's exactly the kind of high-quality, non-AI company the market has forgotten: the stock is down about 30% from its highs while semiconductor stocks ran up 156%. Underneath, the business is thriving: roughly 70% of US rideshare, 14 billion-plus trips a year (still growing ~15%), revenue compounding in the mid-20s, and — crucially — it has crossed the point where scale turns into real cash profit ("operating leverage"), so it now generates strong free cash flow.

He also likes that Uber is a membership business: 50 million people pay for "Uber One," much like a Costco membership, which lowers their fees, keeps them loyal, and quietly drives a lot of the profit. The big worry is self-driving cars (robotaxis) — companies like Waymo could bypass Uber entirely, which is why the stock looks cheap. But Carlson argues that risk is already in the price and that Uber is defusing it by partnering with everyone: its new Houston robotaxi service uses Lucid's cars and Nuro's self-driving software, and Uber is spending over $10 billion to become the place you hail any robotaxi. Given its huge head start, he thinks the share-loss risk is small.

Uber is the ride-hailing and delivery company. He doesn't own it, but it's a "top consideration" on his watch list and he calls it a buy. It's 31% off its high.

Its price-to-earnings ratio looks high at a glance, but you have to compare it to its own history — Uber's P/E has ranged from about 12× to 18×, so it's actually near the cheap end while earnings grow quickly. Analyst Mark Mahaney has a price target roughly double today's level.

Everyone's afraid self-driving cars (robotaxis like Waymo) will put Uber out of business. Hay argues the opposite, and the key is one fact: a robotaxi only makes money while it's carrying a paying rider — an idle car earns nothing. Uber already has the riders — 202 million monthly users opening the app, 40 million trips a day. So a Waymo car that takes jobs from Uber's app stays busy about 30% more of the time than one waiting for fares in Waymo's own app. That makes Uber the most valuable thing to a robotaxi operator: the demand. So instead of competing with the AV companies, Uber signs deals with all of them — 14-plus partners (Waymo, WeRide, Pony.ai, Baidu and others) — and takes a cut of every autonomous ride. That's the "toll booth": Uber doesn't need to pick the winning robotaxi maker, it gets paid no matter who wins.

There's a second twist that actually makes Uber more profitable as robotaxis spread. Today, when you pay for an Uber, roughly 70% of the fare goes to the human driver and Uber keeps ~28% ("take rate"). Remove the driver and that 70% is up for grabs — Uber can keep far more of each fare. On Uber's ~$193B of annual bookings, shifting even 20% of trips to robotaxis could add roughly $20 billion of new revenue. So the thing the market fears (AVs) is actually the thing that could fatten Uber's margins.

Meanwhile the business is already humming — revenue up 20%, free cash flow up 42%, the subscription (Uber One) and advertising businesses growing fast — yet the stock has fallen from ~$84 to ~$70, which is only about 18x its cash flow and cheap relative to its growth (PEG 0.64). Hay's read: the market has misjudged the AV story, which is exactly why the stock is cheap, and that's why he's keeping his Buy. Almost every analyst (45 of 46) agrees it's a Buy, with fair-value estimates of $110–130.

Uber is the ride-hailing and delivery app, mentioned only as evidence that AI is suddenly getting expensive. Its CEO said the company burned through its entire annual AI budget in a single quarter and is now capping how much each engineer can spend on AI. Companies being cautious about AI bills was "unheard of a month ago," and that abrupt about-face is part of what rattled the market.

Same idea as Amazon, different example. Uber reportedly burned through its entire yearly AI budget in just four months and had to rein it in. Dowd says a lot of companies are finding it's actually cheaper to use people than AI right now — evidence that the "AI saves money" story is running ahead of reality.

Uber appears as a real-world example of AI spending hitting a budget wall. "Tokens" are the units companies pay for when they use AI models — the more you use, the more you pay. Uber's CEO said the company burned through its entire yearly AI budget in just four months and is now capping usage.

Woo's point: companies are shifting from "throw money at AI and experiment" to "watch the bill carefully." If that's widespread, the AI providers' explosive growth could slow — a crack in the AI trade he's worried about.

Uber appears here purely as a lesson in how a reasonable-sounding pay rule produces unreasonable behaviour. In the 2010s drivers were paid per ride completed. That sounds like paying for productivity — but read it as a driver would, and it is paying for speed, for aggressive lane changes, and for not wasting time cleaning the car between passengers. Customer complaints about safety followed, and they were a symptom of the metric, not of the drivers.

The fix required no new technology and no policing: rewards were re-based on customer ratings and safety, and the behaviour changed. Slegers offers no view on the shares. The transferable point is that when a company's staff behave badly at scale, the first place to look is the compensation scheme rather than the culture deck.

This is the interview's best story, and it is a story about being wrong. For roughly two years after Uber went public, Dennis dismissed it out loud as "a ZIRP phenomenon" — a business that only looked viable because interest rates were near zero and venture investors were subsidising cheap rides — with "terrible unit economics".

What changed his mind was two operating numbers rather than any narrative. Total trips on the platform were tripling. At the same time the take rate — the share of each fare Uber keeps rather than passing to the driver — doubled. Those two usually fight each other: raise your cut and customers use you less. Getting both at once is the rare signal that a company has genuine pricing power and genuine demand, and it told him profitability was arriving. "Oh wow, this company's actually about to get really profitable." He became a shareholder while "the consensus on the street was that Uber's never going to make a dollar."

He is equally explicit about how he would leave. The same trips metric is where a robotaxi threat would show up first. And there is a second, subtler trigger: if Uber simply stopped publishing the number, he treats that as the sell signal — "I would be very much so looking for the exit before other people are." A company that quietly discontinues its own headline KPI is usually not doing so because it flatters them.

Uber is the ride-hailing-and-delivery app that became so common its name is now a verb ("to Uber"). For most of its life it lost money and asked investors to trust a far-off profit. Hay's argument is that the profit has arrived: in 2025 Uber threw off roughly $9 billion of real spare cash (free cash flow) — about a 5% yield, the kind of number you'd expect from a mature, boring company, not a fast grower — and its profit margins are still climbing. The bigger idea behind the pick is that "mobility" (moving people and packages around cities) is quietly turning into essential infrastructure, like cloud computing or electricity, with AI quietly making the matching, routing, and pricing more profitable. Uber runs four of these businesses — rides, food delivery, freight, and a fast-growing advertising arm — all on one app, which is rare and hard to copy.

Despite all that, the stock trades cheaply for a company like this — about 21 times next year's earnings and 3.4 times sales, versus the 4.5 times sales it has often commanded; getting back there would put it around $135, well above today's price. The main worry is self-driving cars (Waymo, Tesla) eventually undercutting Uber's drivers, but Hay thinks Uber is more likely to benefit from robotaxis than be killed by them, and may start using them itself this year. He frames it as "growth at a reasonable price" — a profitable, dominant platform the market is still pricing as if it were burning cash.