In short: Passing mention — Trump openly calling on Chevron or Exxon to cut prices is one more cap on how far oil and crack spreads can run; no view on the company.
32:58can limit yourself and we also saw something that maybe we don't really see here in Canada, but in the US, you're seeing Trump openly call on platforms, I want Chevron or Exxon to drop prices. So sometimes he's pretty conviction and he can be pressurized. So maybe it could have an impact on it. — Okay.
In short: Cited as evidence, not a stance — CEO Mike Wirth told a conference the oil market's "buffers" are running out, leaving buyers vulnerable to price spikes. No view on the stock.
In short: Lebenthal: same call as Exxon. "Say the same thing about Chevron. This is just obvious here." Inventory refill after the conflict keeps the majors earning "for a long time."
In short: Brown best-stocks energy name (integrated major). "Chevron's on the list" — part of the energy block Brown calls "probably the most untold story" of the market over three to five years.
In short: "Chevron, I think, has the ear of the president," lobbying with Burgum and Wright against an export ban ("just don't interfere in the market"). Also his hypothetical acquirer of ConocoPhillips. No view on the stock.
18:44I haven't checked it in the last couple of minutes, but the stock was trading off earlier on the idea that there would be an export ban. So we'll see. — Is there going to be an export ban? I think that Burgum and Wright oppose it and I think that the refiners are honest. Chevron, I think, has the ear of the president as well and I think that they're doing a pretty good job of telling him, look, just don't interfere in the market.
In short: The one U.S. company in the bypass build-out: "Chevron, which is considering adding oil-drilling sites in Iraq, may help build pipelines, too" — alongside Iraq's mooted route through Syria to the Mediterranean. A passing, doubly conditional mention ("considering," "may"), and the article's own closing line cuts against the premise: "if the pipelines are vulnerable, too, Iran could retain its power."
Chevron appears in one sentence: it is "considering adding oil-drilling sites in Iraq" and "may help build pipelines, too" — part of a wave of projects to move Gulf oil out without passing through the Strait of Hormuz, including an Iraqi route through Syria to the Mediterranean.
In plain terms that is an option, not a business line: Chevron might drill in Iraq, and might help build the pipes to get that oil out. The article's own ending undercuts how valuable such pipes are — if a Saudi pipeline can be hit from Iraq, a new Iraqi pipeline running through Syria is hardly out of reach. So the mention is a sign Chevron is positioning for a rerouted Middle East, not evidence the bet will pay.
In short: No stock view — named only as the other half of what the large-cap energy ETF is: XLE is "mostly just Exxon and Chevron."
2:18And then also to try to get the exposure to oil versus gas, upstream versus midstream etc., to try to outperform versus ETFs, whether it's XOP, the large cap oil and gas producer ETF here in the US, or PSE, the small cap producer ETF, or even XLE, the large cap, the largest, which is mostly just Exxon and Chevron.
In short: The Venezuela franchise, stated as a durable competitive position rather than a trade. "Chevron is finalizing a deal that will significantly expand its Venezuela footprint. It's adding two giant oil fields in the Orinoco belt to its operations. It has a first mover advantage. And we think Chevron will continue to be the biggest player in Venezuela going forward." The policy backdrop he reads alongside it: the White House published the terms of the US-Venezuela oil deal, under which "the US government received a 35% equity stake at zero cost to taxpayers with the right to purchase 20% of all current and future production at cost, and a first right of refusal on the remaining 80%" — a state-backed structure that favours the incumbent operator already on the ground.
Chevron is one of the few Western oil companies that never fully left Venezuela, and it is now finalising a deal to add two very large fields in the Orinoco belt — one of the biggest heavy-oil deposits on earth — to what it already operates there.
Being first back matters more than usual here. Venezuela's oil industry needs partners with the equipment, the technical staff and the licences to operate, and those relationships take years to build. The company that is already on the ground when a country reopens tends to get the best acreage and the best terms, and everyone who arrives later negotiates against an incumbent. That is what Singh means by "first mover advantage," and why he expects Chevron to remain "the biggest player in Venezuela going forward."
The political structure around it is unusual and worth noting: under the deal the White House published, the US government took a 35% stake in the parent company at no cost to taxpayers, plus the right to buy a fifth of all production at cost and first refusal on the rest — an arrangement that ties American policy to keeping the fields producing, which indirectly protects the operator running them.
Full passage: premium transcript (PDF).
In short: Simpson owns it and prefers it to Exxon, on two operating numbers rather than a theme: "Chevron's production was up 20% last quarter. They've captured about $1.5 billion of Hess's synergy. I like Exxon and I like Chevron a little bit better." It is the third name in the Morgan Stanley energy-value note that opens the segment.
Chevron is the other US integrated major, and Simpson prefers it to Exxon on two operating numbers rather than a story: production up 20% in the latest quarter, and about $1.5 billion of cost savings already captured from its Hess acquisition.
"Synergies" is the word companies use when promising that a takeover will produce savings; most of the time it is a forecast. The reason this one carries weight is the verb — captured, not targeted. It has already shown up.
In short: Named alongside ExxonMobil as one of the majors that ran the same low-price-era discipline — the strategy "pursued by Lucio Noto of Mobil and Ken Derr of Chevron and all the major companies." One of the dozen integrateds he picked up at Goldman in 1999.
21:16be capital disciplined, best exemplified by Lee Raymond's ExxonMobil strategy, pursued by Lucio Noto of Mobil and Ken Derr of Chevron and all the major companies. And by the time you got to my joining Goldman Sachs, everybody knew that oil will forever be $15 to $20 a barrel and that the 70s super cycle was just a geopolitical aberration and that it could never go up again.
In short: Named only in the quoted Venezuela report he ran under the New Stratus update — Chevron "has operated in Venezuela throughout Maduro's reign" and is still extracting and exporting oil to the US.
In short: Named as the near-certain corporate beneficiary of the Venezuela reopening: "if you think Chevron is just going to sit there and watch Venezuela get turned into a Guyana and not do something about it, of course they're going to jump on the bandwagon because once the billions start flowing, it's in everybody's interest to keep this going." A read on where the barrels and the capital go, not a price call — and the one operator already inside the country.
Chevron is one of the two big American oil majors, and it is the one that never fully left Venezuela — it has kept a licensed presence there through the sanctions years. That matters because of what Doomberg thinks is about to happen to the country.
Venezuela is not a speculative oil story. It used to pump four million barrels a day and, in Doomberg's words, "could easily do that again" — production collapsed to about half a million barrels, but it is already back to 1.1 million as of July. The reason for the collapse was politics, not geology: "the only difference between Venezuela and Alberta is governance." The oil itself is heavy, sulphurous and hard to move, but there is a cheap fix — the ultra-light oil gushing out of the Permian basin in Texas can be blended in to thin it enough to process and ship, and "that's exactly what's happening."
The part Doomberg says everyone is missing is who pays. Rather than Congress appropriating money, the Pentagon is taking a 35% passive (non-controlling) equity stake in a private Venezuelan businessman's company, and that company becomes the pipe through which hundreds of billions of dollars of foreign sovereign-wealth money — Singapore, Qatar, Saudi Arabia — can flow in. The US taxpayer contributes nothing and Washington gets privileged access to roughly a fifth of the barrels. If it works, everyone in the structure is financially motivated to keep it working.
The conclusion for Chevron is behavioural rather than numerical: an incumbent operator will not stand by while a country in its own hemisphere is turned into "a Guyana" — the reference is Exxon's enormously profitable Guyana discovery — so "of course they're going to jump on the bandwagon." This is a call on where the capital and the barrels go, not a price target, and the risk is the mirror image of the thesis: the whole structure depends on a political arrangement holding.
23:40And as we said in the article, if you think Chevron is just going to sit there and watch Venezuela get turned into a Guyana and not do something about it, of course they're going to jump on the bandwagon because once the billions start flowing, it's in everybody's interest to keep this going. And this is the gambit that Trump has made with Venezuela.
In short: The subject and the credible track. On the verge of signing a new deal "this week" to expand Venezuelan production, adding Orinoco-belt heavy-oil operations. Already ~280,000 b/d via PdVSA joint ventures — about a quarter of national output — and has said it can grow that another 50% over two years, with the new deal possibly allowing more. The only large U.S. producer in the country. A veteran energy analyst: "Whatever Chevron says that they can do with their production, plus a few others, I think is credible."
Venezuela sits on one of the world's biggest oil resources, but years of neglect wrecked its output. It is now being re-opened to foreign companies, and Chevron is the only large American oil company actually pumping there. It already produces about 280,000 barrels a day through partnerships with PdVSA, the state oil company — roughly a quarter of everything Venezuela produces — and it is about to sign a new deal adding fields in the Orinoco belt, the country's vast heavy-oil region.
The key point is that Chevron's growth is incremental and already proven: it has said it can lift its own Venezuelan output by another 50% within two years, and the new deal could take it higher. It is not promising a transformation; it is restarting and expanding fields it already operates, with its own money and its own crews.
That's why the analysts in the piece separate Chevron from everything else happening in Venezuela. One veteran energy analyst says Chevron's stated plans are "credible" — and that he wouldn't count on a single extra barrel from any of the other, splashier arrangements. In a story full of huge numbers, Chevron is the part you can actually underwrite.
In short: Enters the top-10 earnings-growth contributors at roughly #9/#10 with Exxon — the ten together are two-thirds of all S&P earnings growth. Cited as evidence the concentration is now an earnings problem, not only a market-cap one.
Chevron shows up not as an oil call but as a name on a list. When she extends the earnings-growth ranking from the top two to the top ten contributors, Chevron enters at roughly ninth or tenth — and those ten companies together supply two-thirds of the S&P 500's expected 2026 earnings growth.
The useful detail is that the list is not all AI. Two oil majors sitting in the top ten is what makes energy the year's best-performing sector even though it is a tiny slice of the index by market value.
33:14They represent two thirds of S&P earnings growth. So yeah, you have some sort of high-profile miss, not just what that does in terms of the psychology of the market, but mathematically you would see a ratcheting down of estimates. Now there's another somewhat positive side of this and that is that the big surge in earnings and in turn forward expectations that occurred throughout second quarter reporting season 10 out of the 11 sectors have seen an improving earnings profile.
In short: Ranked second behind Valero among refiners of Venezuelan crude by TPH, so a direct beneficiary of a wider heavy-barrel discount on the Gulf Coast. A one-line ranking mention rather than an argued case — and note Chevron is the U.S. major with the longest-running Venezuelan operating history, which the article does not draw out.
In short: Named with Exxon as the defendable, "real market cap" half of the old Standard Oil empire — and singled out for work: "we're doing a deep dive on Chevron for this month's Doomberg Zoom, our first single-company deep dive since Doomberg was a thing."
Chevron is the other big American oil major, and gets exactly the same treatment as Exxon: a piece of the broken-up Standard Oil empire that has quietly rebuilt itself into something with a market value Doomberg calls "real" and "defendable" — backed by barrels in the ground and cash coming out of them, not by a story about the future.
There's also a practical tell worth noting. Doomberg says Chevron is the subject of this month's "Doomberg Zoom" — their first-ever deep dive on a single company in the outfit's history. When a shop that almost never writes about individual stocks picks one company to spend its first single-name deep dive on, that choice is itself a signal about where they think the durable value in American industry sits.
6:08And we're doing a deep dive on Chevron for this month's Doomberg Zoom, our first single-company deep dive since Doomberg was a thing, so that's kind of exciting. So, that is a strong basis. Look, the US has a lot of foundations of power to be a highly competitive multipolar player.
In short: Harrington's worked example of the energy exposure she would leave, and the only stock in the show given an explicit arithmetic sell case: "Chevron started the year at like 165, is trading at 200 now — and that is purely driven by the fact that oil went from $58 a barrel to $86 a barrel, in a straight line." Her forward view is that the move doesn't hold: "what we've been hearing is that the US government is guiding a ton of oil out through the Straits of Hormuz… every day I hear different things about workarounds. I don't think that $86 is sustainable," and "I don't think oil goes from 86 to 106." Conclusion: "the ones that I think have really direct exposure to oil price, I might start to walk away from those" — rotating the energy weight into midstream cash flow instead. (Sechan's overweight is in Suncor/CNQ/Devon, not Chevron.)
Chevron is the worked example in Jenny Harrington's argument for leaving part of the energy trade, and the arithmetic is the whole case. The stock began the year around 165 and trades near 200 — and over the same period the price of oil went from $58 a barrel to $86. In her reading, essentially all of the share price move is the commodity.
That is only a problem if you doubt the oil price, and she does. She says the US government is helping move large volumes of oil out through the Strait of Hormuz, and that new workarounds keep appearing — so she does not think $86 is sustainable, and certainly does not expect $106.
Her conclusion is a rotation rather than an exit from energy: step away from names whose value is directly the oil price, and stay in the pipeline businesses that get paid fees on volume and generate cash today. Worth noting the other side — Rob Sechan is overweight energy and refuses to trim, though his holdings are Suncor, Canadian Natural and Devon rather than Chevron.
In short: Named once, alongside Shell, as an incumbent already inside the re-opening: "BP now joins Shell and Chevron in the reopening of the Venezuelan energy sector." Chevron is the major that never fully left Venezuela through the sanctions years, so its continued presence is the baseline against which BP's new license is read as an acceleration. No stance on the stock.
In short: "We own the whole group. On the producing side for example, we own Chevron, we own Exxon." The economics behind it: "the energy companies can make a lot of money at $75. A lot of money… they don't need a $100 oil to do that."
Chevron is one of the world's biggest integrated oil companies — it drills, ships, refines and sells. It anchors the large-cap producer end of an energy book Oakley deliberately spreads across every link in the chain rather than betting on one segment.
The argument in this conversation is about profitability at a lower oil price than the headlines suggest is necessary. He expects crude to settle between $65 and $85, and insists "the energy companies can make a lot of money at $75. A lot of money… they don't need a $100 oil to do that." Because many investors assume the opposite — that a fall from $105 to the low $80s ends the story — the shares just get cheaper while the cash keeps coming.
42:00They think, well, if the price has gone from 105 back down to 82 or 81, whatever, that just means it's all over. Well, not really. They make a lot of money down at this level, and I think they'll continue to do it, and that just makes the companies cheaper when you get right down to it. — So, you see opportunities in the energy companies like what, the big ones? What are some of the — We own a lot, we own the whole group. On the producing side for example, we own Chevron, we own Exxon, just like
In short: A one-line passing reference inside the supply-led scaling argument — Uber needs fuelling infrastructure and doesn't pay for it: "You need gas stations. You need fueling centers. That's also covered. The city doesn't pay for that, but gas companies do. Chevron does." No stance on the company.
In short: Owned as the large-cap producer leg of "the whole spectrum" — "on the producing side, we own big producers like Chevron." Energy names generally sit at seven-to-eight times earnings with good dividends while "a lot of people just don't want to buy fossil fuel."
Chevron is one of the world's biggest integrated oil companies — it pumps oil, ships it, refines it and sells it. Oakley owns it as the "big producer" anchor of an energy allocation that deliberately spans every part of the industry rather than betting on one slice.
The reason he's comfortable at $83 oil: the whole group is priced as though oil is going back to $50. Companies like this trade around seven to eight times their annual profits with solid, growing dividends, while the S&P 500 as a whole trades near 25 times. A lot of institutions still refuse to buy fossil-fuel companies on principle — that boycott, he thinks, is precisely why the shares are cheap.
5:54— Would you be particularly favorable to the refiners or the producers or the explorers right now? Which segment within the oil and gas space do you think is the is most positioned to gain from this current situation? — That's a good question, David. I think you have to own the whole spectrum. — Mhm. — Like for us on the producing side, we own big producers like Chevron and we own Matador on the midsize, but then we own the pipelines, on the midstream.
In short: Named alongside SLB: Venezuela, "trying to come back online," will need SLB and Chevron to bring its oil back — part of his overweight-energy case. (No holding stated.)
Chevron is one of the big US oil companies and the one with a long history in Venezuela. D'Agnes's point is that Venezuela wants to bring its oil back on and will need Chevron (and SLB) to do it — part of his wider case that energy is cheap and still important. He didn't say whether Hamlin owns it.
19:53.5% sort of yield right now. It's going to be a very important company going forward for countries all over the world including countries in the Middle East where they do a lot of business, or, you know, Venezuela who's trying to come back online and they're going to need SLB and Chevron to bring their oil back on.
In short: #11. Founded 1879, IPO 1921 — the oldest name in Part I and the archive's first energy major. "They're vertically integrated, meaning they control the entire chain from the wellhead to the gas station… Its vertical integration and huge scale keep it profitable through commodity cycles. Chevron's infrastructure would be almost impossible to recreate today." Total return 4,000% since 1990. Descended from Pacific Coast Oil via Standard Oil of California. Notable as the only cyclical commodity producer on a list otherwise built from tolls, brands and distribution networks.
Chevron finds oil and gas, pumps it, refines it and sells the fuel — it owns every step from the well to the petrol pump. Being present at every stage is what lets it stay profitable when the oil price falls, because a low crude price that hurts the production business helps the refining business.
The Lindy argument is that the world will need energy indefinitely and that Chevron's physical infrastructure — pipelines, refineries, terminals, built over 145 years — could not realistically be rebuilt today at any price. Shareholders have made 4,000% since 1990. It is worth noting this is the only genuinely cyclical business on the list, and the only one whose profits depend on a commodity price it does not control, which sits awkwardly with a filter designed to select for predictability.
In short: The only named security, and it appears twice — as the marginal supplier walking away and as the earnings beneficiary being punished for it. On supply: "Ominously, Chevron is vectoring to close its last two California refineries" — the capstone of a state that has already lost Los Angeles and Benicia since last fall and now imports "almost 20% of its gasoline consumption." On earnings: with the U.S. complex "running flat out" and "the spike in refinery profit margins to what are essentially tied for the highest of the 21st century," that is "a key reason why profits at companies like Chevron have exploded, incurring the wrath of President Trump." Hay's stance is on Chevron's side of that fight — "no matter which party is in the White House, the oil industry continues to be a recurring scapegoat, despite that oil prices have barely risen over the last 20 years (and, adjusted for inflation, are down by roughly 50%)." A margin-windfall read on the integrated business, consistent with the standing preference for oil-producer equities over the barrel (Jul-30, Jul-26); no price, rating or portfolio action is attached.
Chevron is one of the two big American integrated oil companies: it pumps crude, ships it, and also runs refineries that turn it into gasoline, diesel and jet fuel. This post is really about that second half of the business, and about a squeeze that has made it unusually profitable.
Here's the squeeze. A refinery is a fixed piece of equipment: choosing to make more diesel and jet fuel necessarily means making less gasoline. Because the world is short of diesel and jet fuel, refiners have tilted their output that way — and since there is no spare refining capacity anywhere to make up the difference, gasoline stockpiles are now draining hard too. With every plant running at maximum, the profit a refiner earns for turning a barrel of crude into fuel has spiked to roughly the highest level of this century. That is why Chevron's profits, in Hay's words, "have exploded."
The second thread is California, and it points the other way. Two large refineries there (Los Angeles and Benicia) shut last autumn, so the state now ships in about a fifth of the gasoline it burns — and Chevron is preparing to close its last two California plants as well. Hay's worry is who fills the gap: the Asian refiners California buys from are short of capacity themselves and may well stop exporting, which he thinks could produce 1970s-style queues at the pump unless Washington forces American fuel exports to be redirected home (which would wreck America's standing as a dependable supplier).
His stance on the company is sympathetic rather than a formal recommendation. Chevron is earning a windfall because it is doing the scarce thing, and it is being attacked by the White House for it — a pattern Hay says repeats "no matter which party is in the White House." His retort is the price record: oil today costs barely more than it did twenty years ago, and after adjusting for inflation it is roughly half as expensive. Read this as another reinforcement of his standing preference for owning the companies that produce and process energy rather than the barrel itself — not as a fresh buy call with a target attached.
In short: Named as the relative-valuation benchmark: "Exxon trades at a premium to Chevron based on its cash flow, even though some analysts think the two stocks now have similar prospects" — i.e. the pair spread, not Chevron's own fundamentals, is the point.
Chevron shows up here only as the yardstick. Measured against the cash they generate, Exxon's shares cost more than Chevron's — yet, the article notes, some analysts now think the two companies' futures look about the same. That's a quiet argument that the gap between them is wider than the fundamentals justify: if the two really do have similar prospects, the cheaper one is the better-value way to own the same exposure.
No claim is made about Chevron's own quarter or strategy in this piece, so treat this as a relative-valuation flag to check rather than a call.
In short: Cited as corroboration, not a rating: on the inevitability of SPR "day zero" it "wasn't just Jeff [Currie], it was also Mike Worth, the CEO of Chevron" saying the same thing.
16:14know, there was it wasn't just Jeff, it was also Mike Worth, the CEO of Chevron and one of the senior Exxon executives as well that was saying the same thing. It's just a reality. We've been I think the quip that I had which we'll see on the slides was at the end of June was oil going to hit a bottom before the tanks oil storage tanks did and now it's pretty obvious the oil hit the bottom first and the tanks are still going to shrink or the level of in those tanks.
In short: "If you want to take a little more risk, great — buy Chevron." Also the big Venezuela winner: it "stuck it out and didn't leave" (either courage or no common sense), so it's positioned huge if Venezuelan production is revitalized.
Chevron is the second US oil major — Rick's choice "if you want to take a little more risk" than Exxon. It's also the standout Venezuela play: while other Western companies fled, Chevron "stuck it out and didn't leave," so if Venezuela's badly-run oil fields get revitalized, Chevron is best placed to profit from that recovery.
43:00the beta which I would describe as the extent to which the oil market outperforms the broad market I think will be extremely pleasant and the de-risked way to play that is Exxon the finest company in the space. if you want to take a little more risk, great, buy Chevron. if you're willing to take some balance sheet risk, buy accidental petroleum. Buffett had the courage to buy it, maybe you do too. — are we still at a point where you can buy into accidental petroleum at a buy-in price lower than Buffett's average
In short: Reference — fought Exxon over the Hess/Guyana asset, illustrating how the supermajors chase long-life offshore barrels rather than scaling in Canada.
36:27those long-life assets. — Mhm. — Now, why not Canada? Why not more in Canada? And Conoco has assets here, but it doesn't seem that they're trying to go out and scale more deeply here like others like Cenovus or Strathcona have been doing here more recently. — Mhm. — So, why? I don't know.
In short: Harrington's opening example of the broadening: Chevron announced it's partnering with Microsoft to bring energy directly to its data-center "belts," leveraging its fossil-fuel access and existing GE Vernova / Caterpillar turbine relationships. The tell — Microsoft −26% YTD, Chevron +12%: "well, that makes sense." A second-derivative AI play.
This is the "second-derivative" AI idea: instead of buying the tech giants spending on AI, buy the companies that supply what AI needs — here, power. Chevron is partnering with Microsoft to deliver energy straight to its data centers, using gas Chevron already produces and turbine relationships it already has (with GE Vernova and Caterpillar). Harrington's tell: Microsoft is down 26% this year while Chevron is up 12% — the spender is being punished, the supplier rewarded.
Her wider point from the energy conference is that AI is reshaping the entire oil-and-gas business, not just powering data centers: one company described using AI to decide where and how to drill, cutting a 20-month process to 15 days with higher accuracy and far fewer engineers; another cut royalty payments from a months-long, 15-person task to a few days and a few people. Cheaper, faster operations across a sector the market had under-invested in.
In short: The counterparty on the West Texas power deal — Chevron signed the 20-year PPA with Microsoft (a majority of the generation coming from GEV's turbines). Referenced as the deal party, not rated.
5:15on Monday. Chevron announced that it has signed a 20-year power purchase agreement with Microsoft to develop a power facility in West Texas that will supply electricity to a Microsoft data center. A majority of the facility's power generation will come from GEV's turbines and electrical infrastructure. This deal is another example of GEV's bundled offering of turbines and electrification equipment.
In short: The subject: signed a 20-year deal to sell 2.67 GW (>1M homes' worth) to Microsoft from new off-grid West Texas gas plants. Turns weak/stranded regional gas into steady cash flows at ~mid-teens annual returns, insulating it from oil/gas boom-and-bust and giving it an AI-power foothold. Stock barely moved (+0.1%), "but it arguably should." Power by 2028; FID not yet final but "all but certain."
Chevron sits on huge amounts of natural gas in West Texas — but so much that there aren't enough pipelines to ship it out, so the local price has at times gone negative (producers literally pay to have it hauled away). Instead of dumping that gas onto a glutted market, Chevron is going to burn it on-site in brand-new power plants and sell the electricity straight to Microsoft's neighboring AI data centers under a 20-year contract — 2.67 gigawatts, enough to power more than a million homes.
Why that's a good deal for Chevron: it converts cheap, stranded gas into two decades of steady, predictable income, earning an estimated mid-teens annual return. That's far more dependable than its usual business, where profits swing wildly with oil prices (its return on capital was just 6% last year). It also plants Chevron firmly in the hottest corner of energy — powering the AI boom. The plants run off-grid, so there's no waiting in line for a grid connection. The stock barely budged on the news, which is exactly Salzman's point: the market may be underrating how meaningful a 20-year, locked-in cash stream is. The fine print: the project isn't formally green-lit yet and still needs permits, with power not flowing until 2028.
In short: Chevron CEO Mike Wirth echoes Exxon — "the buffers are out."
11:10months and basically the CEO of Chevron Mike Worth is saying pretty much the same thing the buffers are out you I think have you ever had Adam Rosenway on your show by the way. — Rosen swag. — Have you ever had [clears throat] Adam Rosenwag on your show from Garing and Rosenwag? — Oh, I have not. No. No. — He'd be a great guest.
In short: Cited as evidence, not a stance: the Chevron CEO's Bloomberg comments are offered alongside Exxon's as the producer/merchant "commercials buying like crazy" tell behind the CoT shift.
In short: An extremely well-run major (mid-teens ROCE, untouchable ~3% dividend paid through COVID) "along the same vein" as Exxon — but he currently prefers Exxon's more-downstream, defensive tilt.
Chevron is a top-tier major oil company, cut from the same cloth as Exxon — excellently run, earning a strong return on its capital, and paying a rock-solid roughly 3% dividend it kept up even through the COVID oil crash when prices briefly went negative.
He has nothing negative to say about it; he simply prefers Exxon right now because Exxon leans more on refining, which makes it a bit steadier and more defensive in a falling-oil environment.
58:56So, like, what's the average return that an Exxon or a Chevron generates over a cycle? Returns on capital employed are mid-teens. And how do you buy them? The other thing they do is they deliver cash back to shareholders at the scale of, call it 3%ish dividends. The other way you know that they're well-run is those dividends are untouchable. They will pay those dividends no matter what.
In short: Non-OPEC major benefiting from the rerouted, premium-priced crude market — extraction outside the Middle East turning into "gold mines."
Chevron, like Exxon, is a major non-Middle-East oil producer. As the world scrambles for crude that doesn't have to pass through the blocked strait, Chevron's barrels command a premium. Prins groups it with the other big oil majors benefiting from the supply disruption.
In short: Part of the "1968–81" control-the-assets portfolio ("your BHPs, your Chevrons, your Schlumbergers") that should be a large % of the S&P in 5 years.
Chevron is a major oil producer. He puts it in his "1968–81 portfolio" — a basket of companies that physically control real assets (oil, metals), modeled on the last high-inflation era. His view: with inflation sticky and the dollar weak, companies that own hard assets should become a much bigger slice of the market over the next five years.
29:40Um if you look at to that 1968 to '81 portfolio, it's an entirely new basket. It's your BHPs, it's your it's your Chevrons, you know, it's your Schlumbergers. These are going to be the companies that are going to be very large percentages of the S&P 5, you know, fund 5 years from now. — Again, I'll I'll I'll break down how exactly you should structure your portfolio, but before we get into that, uh again focusing on what Warsh said, uh he said that the interest rates tool, and I'm quoting him now, is fair.
In short: Where the ~$4T leaving the Nasdaq-100 is going ("your Chevrons, your Exxons") — the great migration into hard assets.
Chevron is one of the biggest oil & gas companies. He names it (with Exxon) as a destination for the roughly $4 trillion that has been flowing out of the Nasdaq-100 tech names.
He calls this "the great migration" — money leaving expensive tech and moving into companies that own real, physical assets like oil and gas, which do well in an inflationary, stagflation-leaning world.
15:47Now it's about 30 trillion. So 4 trillion left. Wow. And went into your Chevrons, your Exxons, your all kinds of oil and gas plays, all kinds of copper, hard asset companies. So the bottom line is the point we make in the book is what we call the great migration. And I think we're in only the third inning of this where industrials, materials, and energy — those three groups in the 1968 to '81 period, they were like 50% of the S&P's composition, 50.
In short: Up ~20% since the war began, near all-time highs at ~31× earnings — the "obvious trade at the top of the obvious time," with Mideast exposure and refinery complexity adding risk to the upside.
Chevron is the crowd's go-to "buy oil during a war" stock, and Prins is warning against it. It's already jumped ~20% since the war started, sits near record highs, is expensive (about 31× earnings), and is directly exposed to the Middle East. You'd be paying a premium after the easy money has been made — the opposite of getting in early.
In short: The "obvious trade" she's steering away from — at ~30× earnings, near multi-year highs, with meaningful Middle East exposure, you're "no longer getting in early," you're paying a premium for a stock that already priced in the good news.
Chevron is the knee-jerk "buy oil during a war" pick, and Prins is deliberately steering away from it. Her point: the stock has already shot up, it's expensive (about 30 times its earnings), and it has real exposure to the Middle East — the exact region creating the risk. Buying now means paying top dollar after the easy gains are gone. She'd rather own a cheaper producer that was already in the right place before the war started.
In short: Sold ~1/3 last week as a counter-trend trim (extended), but "you want to be long energy" — buy the dips for the next 3–4 years.
Chevron is one of the biggest oil & gas companies in the world. McDonald sold about a third of his position last week — but only because the stock had run up too far, too fast and he wanted to lock in some gains ("counter-trend" trimming). That's a timing move, not a change of heart.
His core view stays bullish: "you want to be long energy." He thinks oil and gas have years of upside ahead as money rotates into hard assets, so he plans to buy back on dips over the next three to four years.
6:23Because right now the XLE ETF, all the stocks combined are only worth about two trillion bucks. And then if you look at the FCG ETF, the OIH, and the XOP — those are the four big energy ETFs. It's maybe three trillion dollars in all of the energy stocks combined, whereas the NASDAQ 100 is about 31 trillion. So we're in the early stages of this multi-generational bull market for energy equities.
In short: Bill — reference. Attempted Anadarko in 2019 (outbid by Oxy); with Exxon, cautious on Venezuela after being "fleeced." Illustrates the US-major consolidation backdrop.
57:17business in a country that fleeced us out of tens of billions of dollars, right? They Venezuela, they confiscated their their So, so anyway, so it it it wouldn't take that much of if you stay around $70 a barrel, there's going to be a lot of consolidation. — Yeah. — Um I just want a point of clarification because you kept mentioning United Health.
In short: Cited as a potential counter-bidder — Coterra's pursuit of DVN "could prompt a megaproducer, such as Chevron, to make an offer of its own." A scenario reference (the kind of buyer DVN's quality attracts), not a call on CVX.
In short: Reference — already produces in Venezuela; "everybody with a cell phone could have told you" it might pump more there, so the Monday pop faded fast. Also fought Hess over Guyana — the offshore-long-life prize.
32:19So, let's just So, obviously, Chevron already produces in Venezuela. Kico used to produce there up until they had their operations taken away from them. Okay. And so, um, if I am a degenerate retail trader out on Reddit or X and I'm like, cool, that's going to be really beneficial for Chevron or KICO. I'm just going to yolo my little bet in today because you know what? I got bored with Bitcoin overnight, okay? And I'm going to go make that bet.
In short: Same — prefers Schlumberger to the majors this cycle.
Chevron is another oil major. Same view as Exxon: acceptable, but he'd rather own Schlumberger and the service companies than the majors right now.
35:49Oil majors or shale independents? Well, Trump wants an extra million barrels a day offshore. The Schlumbergers of the world — I would rather own Schlumberger than Exxon or Chevron. You can buy Schlumberger right now below that 250-week moving average. The oil service companies are what's going to service all those wells in the Gulf. That's why the Trump team renamed it the Gulf of America — they want offshore drilling in a big way. So Schlumberger and Weatherford are your big winners.
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