In short: Referenced only — held, no new view. Weight ~7.95% (3rd). Sheet: EPS 5.24 → 6.71, 8.59%/yr expected and no dividend, the second-lowest in the book, although it is the third-largest position.
In short: BUY (portfolio). ER 14.3% incl. a 5.0% yield; fwd PE 11 vs 15 (26.7% under); fair value SEK 1,283.3 vs 875.2. The reverse DCF shows 74.6% required vs 5.7% expected (−68.9pp) — a figure that looks mechanically broken against August's 1.5%. YTD +40.2%, tenth-best in the universe.
In short: The second-largest position at ~7.7%, and the single biggest cash generator in the book: 1,670 shares producing $12,000.44 a year — more than 11% of the portfolio's entire look-through free cash flow. 11x NTM P/E on a 12% EPS CAGR, and one of the four names called out as most attractively valued. The only holding positive on both measures: +15% YTD and +13% over twelve months. Modelled three-year return 8.59%.
Evolution runs live-dealer casino games — real croupiers, streamed from studios, licensed to online gambling operators. It supplies the technology and takes a share of the revenue, which makes it a picks-and-shovels business rather than a gambling operator.
Two things stand out in this letter's tables. It is the single biggest cash contributor in the portfolio: 1,670 shares producing $12,000 a year of look-through free cash flow, more than a ninth of the total from a 7.7% position. And it is the only holding that is up on both measures shown — 15% this year and 13% over twelve months — after being one of the market's most disliked names.
At 11 times next year's earnings it is also named as one of the four most attractively valued holdings. Notably, being cheap does not earn it an increased weight — the upweighting this month is explicitly about quality, not price.
In short: BUY (portfolio). ER 14.34%, of which a 5.0% dividend yield is the largest single component in the book; fwd PE 11.0 against a 15.0 average (26.7% under); RDCF 1.5% required vs 5.7% expected. Fair value SEK 1,162.2 vs 792.6. YTD +27.0% against a −8.9% five-year CAGR.
In short: BUY. New to this archive, and the buyback story of the month. Bought 29 Oct 2023; $73.9 against a $97.1 fair value (+31.4%). "Evolution AB published results that were worse than we hoped. On a constant currency basis, Evolution still grew 2.4% in Q2 (but that's half the growth in Q1)." The offset is the share count: CFO Joakim Andersson "confirmed that they are fully utilizing its buyback program, purchasing up to 25% of daily trading volume… At the current stock price, buying back shares for 2 million EUR equals 16% of all outstanding shares. Investors are currently sitting on a shareholder yield of 8-10% per year. The week of 20 July, Evolution bought back 1 million (!) shares." Modest growth assumptions — 5.7% EPS growth, the lowest in the book after Zoetis and Games Workshop — with a 5.0% dividend yield on the valuation sheet; the only holding up meaningfully YTD (+8.6%) despite a -12.2% five-year CAGR.
Evolution runs live-dealer casino games — real croupiers filmed in studios, streamed into online casinos which license the games rather than build them. It is the dominant supplier, and its first appearance in this archive is an unflattering one: second-quarter growth of 2.4% in constant currency, half the first quarter's rate, described as "worse than we hoped."
What makes the position interesting is what the company is doing with the low price. The finance chief has confirmed they are buying back shares as fast as the rules allow — up to a quarter of all daily trading volume in the stock. Because the shares have fallen so far, the arithmetic is extreme: the sum they are spending retires roughly 16% of the entire company in a year, and combined with the dividend that gives owners an 8-10% annual return before the business grows at all. In a single week in July they retired a million shares.
This is the "cannibal stock" idea in its purest form. When a company is shrinking its own share count that quickly, each remaining owner's slice of the profits grows even if total profits merely hold steady. The growth assumption in the portfolio model is correspondingly modest — 5.7% a year, among the lowest of any holding — because the return is not supposed to come from growth. Notably, it is one of the few holdings actually up this year.
In short: BUY, Medium conviction. FV SEK 993.8 vs 677.8 = 31.8% under; ER 14.3%; fwd PE 11.0 vs 15.0; RDCF −3.0% required against 5.7% expected — the price still implies the business shrinks. YTD +8.6%.
In short: BUY, but only Medium conviction — one of two holdings in the lowest quality tier. FV SEK 1,022.9 vs 697.6 = 31.8% under; ER 14.3%; fwd PE 11.0 vs 15.0 (26.7% under); RDCF −2.9% required against 5.7% expected — the price implies shrinkage. YTD +11.8% after a −13.0% five-year CAGR.
In short: BUY on valuation despite a Medium conviction and a "Not sure" on the ten-year test. The highest dividend yield on the list at 5.0%: EPS growth 5.7%, FWD PE 11.0 against a fair exit 15.0, expected return 14.3%, fair value 941.9 against 642.4 = 31.8% undervalued.
In short: Answered "Not sure" on the ten-year test — the only one of the three where the doubt is about governance rather than the business. Explicitly not for sale near-term: "I don't think we'll sell Novo Nordisk or Evolution AB in the near future."
Evolution runs live online casino games for gambling websites. On the ten-year test — would you happily own this if you could not sell for a decade — it is one of only three holdings that gets "not sure" rather than "yes".
The doubt here is different from the others. With Judges Scientific the worry is that customers have stopped buying; with Novo Nordisk it is competition. With Evolution the business still generates a great deal of cash and the shares are strikingly cheap. The worry is about the people running it — an unexplained dividend suspension, a large shareholder building a stake, and management that does not talk to minority investors.
The conclusion is to sit still: "I don't think we'll sell Novo Nordisk or Evolution AB in the near future."
In short: Medium conviction — the tier defined as "should we consider selling these stocks?" Growth "grew explosively from 2006 until 2023, but this growth has stalled": most online-casino players already onboarded, remaining markets closed by regulation, and prediction markets and crypto schemes taking share. The real objection is governance: "the way management doesn't communicate with investors like us. I truly ask myself whether they are miscommunicating on purpose or whether it's a case of incapability." The dividend was stopped with "next steps would follow shortly" — four candidate explanations given (Dart's withholding-tax preference, a takeover in progress, an acquisition such as HackSaw AB, or cash reserved against a legal setback). Valuation: 10.9x earnings, a 10.0% Free Cash Flow yield. Magnus Andersson's thesis quoted at length: Dart bought 29% "at a rapid pace, suspend the dividend, and then just sit back and do nothing" as pressure on the founders. The worry: "the takeover premium wouldn't be very high."
Evolution runs live online casino games — real dealers, filmed in studios, streamed to gambling websites that pay Evolution a cut. For years it was one of the most profitable businesses in Europe. It has stopped growing.
Three reasons are given: nearly everyone who wants to play online already does; the countries that are left are shut by regulators; and newer forms of betting, including prediction markets and crypto gambling, are pulling players away.
But the stated objection is not the numbers — it is the management. Evolution abruptly stopped paying its dividend and said only that "next steps would follow shortly", with no explanation. Four possible reasons are floated, of which the most developed is that Kenneth Dart, who has built a 29% stake, is squeezing the founders into selling him the whole company. The shares are genuinely cheap — under 11 times earnings, with free cash flow equal to 10% of the share price — but the fear is that if a takeover does come, minority holders will be bought out at a price barely above today's, and the cheapness will have been captured by someone else.
In short: BUY. The cheapest multiple in the portfolio at 9.8x forward against a 15.0x five-year average (34.7% under), on a 5.4% dividend yield, a 16.4% expected return and the widest reverse-DCF margin among the holdings at +9.5pp — the price implies −3.8% growth against 5.7% expected.
In short: Among the strugglers: −26.9%. Disclosed with no defence and no thesis review in this issue — the post's argument is about the portfolio's aggregate economics rather than any single position.
In short: Disclosed holding, category "Basic Human Needs & Desires": B2B live-dealer casino games, justified with the archive's bluntest durability line — "Gambling has been around for thousands of years."
In short: The book's largest loss by a wide margin — roughly −$44,000 on a ~7.2% weight, more than twice the next-worst position. Rated Buy on the 5 February sheet at the lowest forward PE of any name (10.3x against a 15.0x average) but not among the seven Strong Buys, and not discussed here.
In short: BUY, a portfolio holding, and the only name in the top fifteen of every screen it qualifies for. The lowest forward PE of any Buy at 10.3x against a 15.0x average (31.3% under), a 15.3% expected return built mostly from a 5.0% dividend yield on just 5.7% EPS growth, and a reverse DCF implying negative 2.8% growth against 5.7% expected. A SEK 921.7 fair value against SEK 588.6.
In short: BUY — and explicitly capped below Strong Buy. Weight 7.6%, performance −21.7%. "Evolution AB has been through a perfect storm": regulatory risks, strikes in Malta, a short report, cybercrime in Asia — "as a result, the stock price is down more than 60% from its all-time highs." The October report gave three positives: "Europe returned to quarter-on-quarter growth"; "North America grew 14.5% year-on-year"; and a second studio planned in Michigan. The case rests on capital return: "high margins… they generate a lot of free cash flow, and management has been using it to heavily buy back shares. At these low valuation levels, that should create a lot of shareholder value… Evolution AB's shareholder yield currently equals 10%." Valuation: 9.9x forward against a 22.5x average ✅ (the cheapest name in the book), Earnings Growth Model 15.3% ✅ (the highest), and a reverse DCF implying −2.2% growth ✅. The rating is nonetheless held back: "It's a 'Buy' and not a 'Strong Buy' because there are also serious risks involved with the company."
Evolution films real dealers running blackjack, roulette and baccarat in studios and streams the games into online casinos that license them.
Almost everything that could go wrong has: tighter gambling regulation, strikes at its Maltese operations, a published short-seller attack, and organised cyber-crime targeting its Asian business. The shares are down more than 60% from their peak.
Some of it is turning. Europe grew again quarter on quarter, North America grew 14.5% year on year, and a second American studio is planned in Michigan. But the real argument is arithmetic: at under 10 times earnings, the dividend plus the buyback hands shareholders about 10% of the share price back every year, and the price now implies the company's cash flow shrinks slightly forever. If it merely holds flat, that is a good outcome.
What is worth copying here is the rating discipline. The numbers are the best in the entire portfolio and it is deliberately rated only Buy — "not a 'Strong Buy' because there are also serious risks involved." The valuation and the risk are scored separately rather than netted into one number.
In short: #4 pick, and the archive's clearest "returns without growth" case. The damage is conceded without hedging: "Evolution AB is in a perfect storm right now. The company is struggling, mainly due to issues with cybercrime. Revenue is declining for the first time ever." The case is then rebuilt on capital return alone: "the company could deliver excellent returns to shareholders. Even without growth. The current shareholder yield is over 10% (dividends + share buybacks)." Table: 50.6% net margin, 27.0% ROIC, 10.5x forward — by far the cheapest and most profitable row on the page.
Evolution films real dealers running casino games and streams them into online gambling sites, which license the games rather than build them. It is the market leader and extraordinarily profitable — half of every euro of revenue reaches the bottom line.
The business is in trouble and the write-up says so: revenue is falling for the first time in the company's history, largely because of criminal attacks on its Asian operations. What makes this entry worth reading is that the case does not depend on fixing that. At ten times earnings, the company can hand shareholders more than 10% of the share price back every year in dividends and share buybacks. If the business merely stops shrinking, buying back a tenth of the company annually does the work on its own.
The catch is stated in half a sentence — "especially since we expect Evolution AB to keep growing its intrinsic value." A buyback at a low price only creates value if the underlying earnings hold. That is the assumption to test, and by the summer it is the only leg of the case still standing.
In short: #1 most-picked and the year's worst answer: −28.5%. "It got nearly three times as many votes as the second pick, MercadoLibre. However, it was a terrible year for Evolution." Causes named: growth slowed, and "Asia remains a weak spot: revenue from that region declined due to ongoing issues with cyber-attacks." The defence is a re-classification rather than a rebuttal — "The company went from a high-growth stock to a value play. At this price, the company looks really cheap. I think a lot of bad news is already priced in" — with the stock "trading at its lowest valuation level ever."
Evolution films real croupiers running blackjack, roulette and baccarat tables in studios and streams those games into online casinos, which pay to license them. It was the most popular pick among readers for 2025 by a wide margin — three times as many votes as second place — and it fell 28.5%.
Slegers does not defend the year. He reclassifies the investment: "the company went from a high-growth stock to a value play." Growth slowed, and Asia — where cyber-attacks on the studios have been a recurring problem — went backwards. What he argues is that the price now assumes those problems continue forever, which is what "trading at its lowest valuation level ever" means in practice.
That is a legitimate argument and also a convenient one, because it lets a disappointing growth holding stay in the portfolio under a new label. The honest way to track it is to watch whether the cash actually comes back to shareholders: by mid-2026 the case rests almost entirely on the buyback retiring a large share of the company each year rather than on the business growing.
In short: BUY — bought 29 October 2023, 7.6% of the portfolio (the third-largest weight) and the single worst position by dollars, about −$31,000. A large weight, a large loss and a maintained Buy — the combination that makes the January book worth revisiting.
Evolution runs live-dealer casino games — real croupiers filmed in a studio, streamed into online gambling sites that license the games rather than build them. It is the market leader and extremely profitable.
What makes it the most interesting row in this sheet is the combination. It is the third-largest position at 7.6%, it is the worst position in the book by money lost (about $31,000), and the rating is still Buy. In other words the price has fallen a long way and Slegers reads that as cheapness rather than as a broken case. Whether that is conviction or anchoring is exactly the question the rest of 2026 answers — by the summer the position is being defended on its buyback rather than its growth.
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Verbatim excerpts from the public transcripts (auto-pulled at each mention's timestamp, lightly cleaned). Timestamps link into the video; "source page" opens that commentator's full analysis at this row. Click a mention's header line to expand it (one open at a time). For personal study — not investment advice.