In short: Referenced only — held, no new view. Weight ~5.5% (10th). Sheet: EPS 594.9 → 666.93 + 2.8% = 6.68%/yr, the lowest expected return in the book. It is still sized larger than eight other holdings, including the Fairfax add before it settles.
In short: HOLD (portfolio) — the only holding overvalued on all three models: 176.5 vs 120.2 fair value (46.8% over), fwd PE 33.1 vs 23.0 (43.9% over), RDCF 15.5% vs 7.0%. ER 6.7%, the lowest in the book.
In short: "Games Workshop: 84.9%" on ROIC — fifth on the sort (ROCE 79.7%, FCF margin 36.0%, revenue 12.3%, EPS 10.9%). The only portfolio holding named in the post, and it is not identified as one; the 1 September letter called it the book's most expensive position at 33x NTM P/E. Listed only.
In short: The most expensive holding in the book at 33x NTM P/E on only a 12% EPS CAGR — "Games Workshop and Medpace are the two most expensive companies in Our Portfolio" — and the lowest modelled three-year return at 6.68%. ~5.3% of the portfolio, 400 shares yielding $4,088.66; −13% YTD, −31% over twelve months. Rated HOLD and shown 51.1% overvalued a week earlier. Conspicuously not named among the three to be reduced, even though it is the clearest failure of the new "stricter selection criteria" on the letter's own numbers.
Games Workshop makes Warhammer miniatures and owns the fictional world they live in — a genuinely rare asset, and a business with pricing power over a devoted customer base.
It is nonetheless the awkward holding in an issue about raising standards. It carries the highest valuation in the portfolio at 33 times next year's earnings, on expected growth of only 12%, giving the lowest modelled three-year return of any position: 6.68% a year. A week earlier the firm's own sheet had it rated hold and 51% above its estimated fair value.
And yet it is not on the list of positions to be reduced, while three cheaper names with better modelled returns are. If the new rule is a stricter quality-and-value bar, this is the holding that most obviously fails it, and the letter does not say why it stays.
In short: HOLD (portfolio) — the only holding the sheet shows as expensive on every measure. Fair value £123.1 against a £186.0 price, i.e. 51.1% overvalued; forward PE 33.1 against a 23.0 five-year average (43.9% over); the reverse DCF requires 16.4% growth against 7.0% expected (−9.4pp); expected return 6.4%, the lowest in the book. Held anyway, consistent with the standing rule never to sell on valuation.
Games Workshop makes and sells Warhammer miniatures. It is the one holding in the portfolio that the letter's own spreadsheet shows as expensive on every single measure: the shares trade about 51% above the estimated fair value, at 33 times forward earnings against a five-year average of 23, and the price implies 16.4% annual growth against 7% expected. The expected return is 6.4% a year, the lowest in the book.
It is rated hold and kept, which is consistent with the house rule that valuation is never a reason to sell. Whether that rule is wisdom or an excuse is exactly the question this row poses — especially in an issue that puts a different company on a sell list for the same offence.
In short: HOLD — the only holding the model says is genuinely expensive. Bought 19 Feb 2024; price $277.5 against a $167.7 fair value — -39.6%, i.e. 40% above fair value, and -54.0% on the valuation sheet (price 214.8, fair value 139.5). Forward PE 33.1 against a 23.0 five-year average, expected return just 6.3%, and a reverse DCF requiring 10.9% growth against 7.0% expected — a negative 3.9-point difference, the only one in the book. Also the strongest ten-year compounder listed at +46.9% a year, and up 16.5% YTD. Held rather than sold.
Games Workshop makes Warhammer — the miniatures, the rules, the shops and now the Amazon television rights. It has been the portfolio's best long-term investment by a distance, compounding at nearly 47% a year over ten years, and it is up 16.5% this year while almost everything else has fallen.
Which is precisely the problem, and the reason it is the only holding rated HOLD on business grounds. It trades at 33 times forward earnings against a five-year average of 23, and the model's fair value is roughly 40% below the market price. The expected return over the next three years is 6.3% — below the 10% threshold that defines fair value here — and the reverse calculation says the price requires 10.9% annual growth against the 7.0% expected. That negative gap is unique in the portfolio.
What is instructive is the response: it is held, not sold. The archive's stated policy is that a good business becoming expensive is not automatically a sale — only two positions have been sold since 2023 — and this is that policy being applied to the clearest case for selling that the numbers have produced.
In short: HOLD — Very Strong conviction, most expensive name in the book. FV £139.5 against £214.8 = 54.0% overvalued (worse than June's 51.1%); fwd PE 33.1 against a 23.0 average (43.9% over); RDCF requires 10.9% against 7.0% expected. ER 6.2%, the lowest of the nineteen.
In short: HOLD — Very Strong conviction on quality and the most expensive name in the book. FV £125.6 against £189.8 = 51.1% overvalued; fwd PE 33.1 against a 23.0 five-year average (43.9% over); RDCF requires 14.3% growth against 7.0% expected (−7.3pp), the worst gap of the eighteen. Held on quality alone; the archive's cleanest example of "wonderful company, wrong price."
Games Workshop is the clearest illustration in this issue of separating a business from its share price. On quality it holds the firm's highest rating: a company they would happily own forever. On price, all three of their valuation methods say the same thing — it is expensive. The shares trade at about 33 times expected profits against a five-year average of 23, the fair-value model puts it roughly 50% above what it is worth, and working backwards from the price implies the company must grow profits at over 14% a year when the realistic expectation is 7%.
So the rating is Hold: keep what you own, buy nothing more. It is the mirror image of the portfolio's Strong Buys, where the business is unchanged and the price has fallen.
In short: HOLD, and the only overvalued name in the entire portfolio: Very Strong conviction but EPS growth 7.0%, dividend 2.5%, FWD PE 33.1 against a fair exit of 23, expected return just 6.4%, and a fair value of 124.5 against a 189.5 price = -51.1%, i.e. 51% overvalued. A useful demonstration that the conviction and valuation axes are genuinely independent.
Games Workshop is the best illustration in this issue of why the portfolio is rated on two separate axes.
On quality it is a Very Strong conviction — the top tier, the Warhammer maker with its own shops, its own manufacturing, a devoted community and the ability to raise prices every year without losing customers.
On price it is the only holding in the entire portfolio that is overvalued, and by a long way. The shares cost 33 times next year's profits against a "fair" 23, the expected return is just 6.4% a year — below every one of the 49 names on the buy list — and the model puts fair value at 124.5 against a market price of 189.5, so it is trading about 51% above what it is judged to be worth.
Hence the Hold: a wonderful business, currently at a price that does not offer a sensible return. Nothing is being sold; nothing is being added either.
In short: Listed Very Strong on the conviction slide; covered in Part I. No new view here.
In short: Very Strong conviction. "Games Workshop is the perfect example of an amazing compounder. The stock is up +14,300% (143x) since 1994." Two things work massively in its favour: "the most loyal clients in the world and a lot of pricing power. Every year, they raise the price of their products by 4-5% and players just keep buying more." Plus optionality from Amazon's exclusive rights to adapt the Warhammer 40,000 universe into films and TV series.
Games Workshop makes Warhammer — the miniature plastic soldiers and monsters that hobbyists buy, assemble, paint and use to play tabletop battles. It sounds like a niche toy business; it has returned about 143 times your money since 1994.
The reason is a combination that almost never occurs together: customers who are genuinely devoted to the hobby, and a company that can therefore raise prices 4-5% every single year without losing them. Price rises that stick, compounded over decades, are what turn a small manufacturer into a compounding machine. On top of that there is a free option nobody paid for in the share price: Amazon holds exclusive rights to turn the Warhammer 40,000 universe into films and television, which could bring a wave of new hobbyists into a business whose economics already work.
In short: HOLD — the only holding the sheet marks as outright expensive. 28.7x forward against a 23.0x five-year average is 24.8% over; fair value 137.1 against a 174.5 price (−27.3%); the lowest expected return in the portfolio at 7.8%; and the worst reverse-DCF deficit anywhere in the issue at −7.3pp (14.3% growth required against 7.0% expected). Consistent with it being the book's best performer at +100.8%.
In short: Best holding in the book: +100.8%. Disclosed as a performance data point rather than re-rated — "While some companies are doing well: Games Workshop ($GAW.L): +100.8%." Used to make the sizing argument: "A few big winners (or losers) can make or break your return."
In short: Disclosed holding, category "Basic Human Needs & Desires." The rationale given is social rather than commercial: "Physical games give people an offline hobby and community."
In short: The second-largest gain (~+$42,000) on a ~6.8% weight, and the second of the three "doing really well right now." Also the one holding the February sheet marks 61.4% overvalued — the likely candidate for "every company except for 1 is undervalued in Our Portfolio today."
In short: HOLD, and the most expensive row on the whole sheet. 35.7x forward against a 23.0x five-year average — 55.2% over — a £112.1 fair value against a £181 price (61.4% overvalued), the lowest expected return anywhere in the issue at 6.0%, and a reverse DCF demanding 15.1% growth against 7.0% expected. Held anyway, on the pricing-power case made elsewhere in the archive.
Games Workshop makes Warhammer — the miniatures, paints and rulebooks — and sells them mostly through its own shops and website to a community that has been buying for decades. It has been one of the portfolio's best investments, and this sheet is the price of that success.
On every measure the issue uses, it is now expensive: 35.7 times forward earnings against a 23 times five-year average, a fair value of £112 against a £181 share price, the lowest expected return in the entire issue at 6.0%, and a price that requires 15.1% annual growth when 7.0% is expected. It is rated Hold and kept. That is worth noting for what it is — a case where the model says one thing and the position stays, on a business-quality judgement made elsewhere in the archive rather than in the spreadsheet.
In short: HOLD. Weight 6.8%, performance +100.7%. "One of the best boring companies in the world," on two characteristics: "the most loyal clients in the world" and "a lot of pricing power — every year, they raise the price of their products by 4-5%, and the players just keep buying more." Runway named as the US and Asia plus "licensing deals like the one for a Warhammer 40,000 adaptation by Amazon Studios", against a record of "more than 13,000% since its IPO." Two of three valuation tests fail: 31.3x forward against a 23.8x five-year average ❌ and an Earnings Growth Model return of 9.4% ❌, with a reverse DCF requiring 16.4% against a ten-year FCF CAGR of 31.5%. "The only thing we dislike is the current valuation level."
Games Workshop makes Warhammer — plastic miniatures that hobbyists buy, assemble, paint and play with — and has returned more than 13,000% since it floated.
The reason is a rare combination: customers who are genuinely devoted, and therefore a company that can raise prices 4-5% every year without losing them. There is also a free option on top, in Amazon's rights to make Warhammer 40,000 films and television, plus room to grow in America and Asia.
None of that is in question. The rating is Hold purely because the shares have doubled: they now cost 31 times earnings against a five-year average of 24, and Slegers' own return model gets to 9.4% a year — under his 10% minimum. This is the discipline working on a name he likes: the business earns top marks and the entry price does not, so he neither adds nor sells.
In short: HOLD — bought 19 February 2024, 7.0% of the portfolio and the third-biggest profit contributor (about +$52,000). Named with Medpace and Kelly Partners as the trio that "drove the majority of returns."
In short: #5. Designs and sells miniatures, games and accessories to hobbyists, selling direct through its own stores and website and keeping tight control of the brand and community. "A clear market leader in a niche. Never have I met a company with such a great shareholder culture."
Games Workshop makes and sells the Warhammer miniatures — small model figures that hobbyists buy, assemble, paint and play with — almost entirely through its own shops and website rather than through retailers. Selling direct means it keeps the full margin and, more importantly, keeps control of the brand and of the community that forms around it.
The moat is intellectual property plus habit: a customer who has spent years building an army has no interest in starting over with someone else's rules and figures. Slegers calls it a clear market leader in a niche with an exceptional shareholder culture, and says it would be very hard for a competitor to dislodge. The row uses the London ticker (GAW.L); its US over-the-counter line is GMWKF.
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Verbatim excerpts from the public transcripts (auto-pulled at each mention's timestamp, lightly cleaned). Timestamps link into the video; "source page" opens that commentator's full analysis at this row. Click a mention's header line to expand it (one open at a time). For personal study — not investment advice.