In short: Referenced only — held, no new view. Weight ~4.65%. Sheet: EPS 21.85 → 27.67 + 2.9% = 11.09%/yr.
In short: HOLD (portfolio). ER 15.3%; fair value €721.7 vs €415.3 (42.5% under); fwd PE 19.9 vs 24.9 (20.1% under); RDCF 4.6% vs 9.6% — Buy-grade numbers on every model, with the rating unexplained as in prior issues.
In short: TO BE REDUCED — the first explicit statement of the LVMH view in this archive. Named alongside Novo and Dino as having a less clear "path to future growth" than Brookfield, S&P Global and Fairfax, and separately as one of "the least satisfactory growth rates" — a 10% 3-5yr EPS CAGR, third-lowest in the book, on a 20x NTM P/E. The performance is the worst twelve-month figure of any holding after 3i: −41% YTD and −51% over twelve months. Still ~4.9% of the portfolio and the third-largest cash generator (173 shares, $35.93 each, $6,215.60), with a modelled three-year return of 11.09% including a 2.9% dividend. The unexplained HOLD carried through 2 August and 23 August finally gets its reason.
After months of being rated hold with no explanation, LVMH finally gets one: it is on the list of three positions to be reduced, because it has a less clear path to future growth than the businesses being added to. Analysts expect its earnings to grow about 10% a year, third-lowest in the portfolio, and the shares are down 41% this year and 51% over twelve months.
None of that says the luxury group is a bad business — it owns Louis Vuitton, Dior and dozens of other brands, and it still produces the third-largest cash contribution in the portfolio from a 4.9% position. The judgement is comparative: the same money is expected to work harder in Brookfield, S&P Global or Fairfax.
It is worth noticing how differently the firm treats luxury depending on which company it is. In the same fortnight it upgraded Hermès to a buy and made it a Best Buy on the argument that slowing luxury growth is a currency effect — while cutting LVMH for slow growth. Both can be right, but the contrast is not addressed.
In short: HOLD (portfolio) — and the rating that the sheet's own numbers most obviously contradict. Fair value €734.0 against €445.9 is 39.3% undervalued, the forward PE of 19.9 is 20.1% below its 24.9 average, the reverse DCF is positive (+3.9pp) and the expected return is 14.9% — better than several Strong Buys. It is nevertheless rated HOLD, with no reason given here. Compare the same conflict flagged on 2 August.
LVMH owns Louis Vuitton, Dior, Moët and dozens of other luxury brands. On the numbers published in this very issue it looks like a buy: about 39% below the letter's own fair value, a forward multiple 20% below its five-year average, a positive reverse-DCF check, and an expected return of 14.9% — better than several of the seven names rated Strong Buy.
It is nevertheless rated hold, with no reason given anywhere in the issue. The same unexplained gap appeared in the 2 August portfolio update. Whatever is driving it — a view on Chinese luxury demand, on the founder's succession, on the multiple never re-rating — it is not written down, and a reader should not fill it in on the firm's behalf. Ten days later the 1 September letter says it plainly for the first time: LVMH is one of the three names to be reduced.
In short: HOLD — and the odd one out. The valuation sheet shows it 37.7% undervalued (fair value 798.8, price 498.0), a forward PE of 19.9 against a 24.9 five-year average, and an expected return of 14.7% — yet the Advice column says HOLD, not BUY. On the separate fair-value table it is bought 15 Jan 2024 at $549.0 against $859.0 (+56.5%). Down 22.4% YTD with a five-year CAGR of -3.7%. The post gives no explanation for the HOLD; the archive's standing thesis is that it is a coffee-can "own forever" name.
LVMH owns Louis Vuitton, Dior, Moët and dozens of other luxury houses, selling mostly through more than five thousand of its own stores. It has fallen 22% this year and its five-year record is now slightly negative.
The strange thing about this entry is that the numbers and the rating disagree. Every valuation column says it is cheap: 19.9 times forward earnings against a five-year average of 24.9, a fair value roughly 38% above the price on one sheet and 56% above on the other, an expected return of 14.7% a year, and a reverse calculation requiring only 6.2% growth against the 9.6% expected. On its own criteria this should read BUY.
It says HOLD, and the post gives no reason. The most likely explanation is a position-sizing decision rather than a valuation one — the holding may already be at its intended weight — but that is inference, not disclosure. The standing thesis in this archive is that LVMH is a coffee-can name meant to be owned indefinitely, so the HOLD is not a warning about the business.
In short: Rossbach (January pick): the global luxury leader ($277B cap) at 21x forward after a weak first half — underlying demand intact but squeezed consumers and the Mideast conflict delayed the cyclical recovery (thesis "delayed, not derailed"); Asia ex-Japan +7% in Q1. "Louis Vuitton bags never go on sale, but the stock is on sale now."
In short: HOLD on valuation, Strong conviction on quality — for the second month, with every model saying cheap. FV €798.8 vs €498.0 = 37.7% under; ER 14.7%; fwd PE 19.9 against 24.9 (20.1% under); RDCF 6.2% vs 9.6% expected. Cut from the book entirely on 1 September.
In short: HOLD on valuation, Strong conviction on quality — a holding not rated a Buy. FV €778.5 vs €479.1 = 38.5% under and ER 14.8%, with fwd PE 19.9 against 24.9 (20.1% under) and RDCF 8.5% vs 9.6%. Every model reads cheap, and the rating is still Hold — the clearest case in the sheet of a judgement overriding the models. It is cut from the book entirely on 1 September.
LVMH is the opposite anomaly to Games Workshop: every published model says it is cheap — roughly 38% below the fair-value estimate, a multiple a fifth below its own five-year average, and a reverse discounted cash flow that clears comfortably — and the rating is still only Hold.
Nothing in the issue explains why. It is worth noting because it shows the ratings are a judgement that the spreadsheets inform rather than determine, and because the judgement turned out to be the operative one: the position is sold out of the portfolio entirely in the September re-set, while the models still said it was cheap.
In short: Europe's #3 (~$295B luxury) in the Europe-top-5 table — reference.
17:42After ASML is Roche with a market cap of 330 billion which is a pharma company. Then LVMH 295 billion and a consumer discretionary luxury company. Then Novartis at 290 billion and a pharma company. And number five is Nestlé at 260 billion and a consumer staples food company. By contrast, the market cap of the top five stocks in the US range from 2.7 trillion to 5.1 trillion.
In short: HOLD, Strong conviction — despite a 15.0% expected return and a fair value of 753.1 against a 451.4 price = 40.1% undervalued. EPS growth 9.6%, dividend 2.9%, FWD PE 19.9 against a fair exit 24.9. One of only two rated Holds in the book, and the one where the rating and the model disagree most.
In short: Strong conviction. Bernard Arnault's family owns roughly 50% and "just keeps buying more and more of his own stock." Results: revenue €19.12bn against a €19.49bn consensus; the Iran conflict "shaved ~1% off organic growth" via Gulf demand and Middle Eastern tourist spending in Europe; Watches & Jewelry +7% organic (Tiffany, Bvlgari) was the best division; management calls demand "tepid". Long-term case intact at 5-7% organic growth. "Trading near its cheapest valuation level of the past decade." Earnings Growth Model: 10.5% EPS growth + 2.8% dividend + 1.8% multiple expansion = 15.1% expected yearly return — "you double your money every 5 years."
LVMH owns most of the famous luxury names — Louis Vuitton, Dior, Tiffany, Bvlgari and dozens more. It is controlled by Bernard Arnault, whose family owns about half of it and who keeps buying more shares, which is the strongest signal an insider can send.
Business is soft rather than broken. Sales came in a little below what analysts expected, and about one percentage point of growth was lost because the Iran conflict kept Gulf shoppers at home and out of European stores. Management's own word for demand is "tepid". The bright spot was watches and jewellery, led by Tiffany and Bvlgari, which grew 7%.
The reason it is still held: the shares are near their cheapest level in ten years, and the expected return is built from three visible pieces rather than a guess — profits per share growing about 10.5% a year, a dividend of 2.8%, and 1.8% from the valuation recovering. That adds to roughly 15% a year, which doubles your money in five years. Worth noting that the last of those three is a bet on other investors changing their minds, not on the business.
In short: HOLD in the portfolio (listed as "LVMH Moët Hennessy - Louis Vuitton, Société Européenne"). 20.4x forward against a 24.9x five-year average (18.1% under), fair value 740.4 against 473.15, a 14.4% expected return and a +1.1pp reverse-DCF margin — good numbers that still do not clear the Buy bar in a month of much wider discounts.
In short: Worked example, "Basic Human Needs & Desires." "LVMH is built on the fundamental human desire for social status. It doesn't sell purses that hold more, or have better organizational features. It sells exclusivity." The economics follow from that: "Luxury goods are Veblen goods. This means people buy more of it when the price increases. That's exactly why LVMH is such a profitable business." Plus the owner signal — Bernard Arnault "keeps buying more and more of his own company. The Arnault family now owns about 50% (!) of LVMH."
LVMH owns Louis Vuitton, Dior, Moët & Chandon and dozens of other luxury names. What it actually sells is not a better handbag — as the post says, it "doesn't sell purses that hold more, or have better organizational features. It sells exclusivity." That distinction is what makes the pricing work.
Economists call these Veblen goods: things people want more as the price rises, because the price is part of the product. A business that can raise prices without losing customers is close to the definition of a good business, and it is not something software can imitate. The second half of the case is ownership — Bernard Arnault keeps buying more of his own company, and the family now holds roughly half of it, so the people running it are exposed to the same outcome as the shareholders.
In short: The second-largest position at ~7.8%, carrying a modest unrealised loss (roughly −$6,500). Disclosed by weight only; rated Hold on the 5 February sheet and not discussed in this issue.
In short: HOLD on the portfolio sheet — 27.4x forward against a 24.9x average (10.0% over), only 8.7% under on the Earnings Growth Model (€623.3 against €569.3), a 10.8% expected return, and a reverse DCF asking 11.5% against 9.6% expected. The second-largest position in the book and rated on neither side.
In short: HOLD. Weight 8.2% (second-largest), performance +7.0%. Five temporary problems named: weaker Wines & Spirits, weaker Asia, "post-pandemic correction in luxury demand", US tariff uncertainty, and "a potential 'ultra rich tax' in France: a proposed 2% annual wealth tax on individuals or households with assets exceeding €100 million." Those "led the stock to decline by more than 40% last year. But Bernard Arnault was buying shares the entire time, showing his conviction." October vindicated him: fashion and leather goods improved in Asia, Wines & Spirits returned to growth, and the group returned to organic revenue growth in Q3. "The key lesson? Always focus on the long term as an investor" — with Buffett's "the stock market is a device for transferring money from the impatient to the patient." Valuation is why it is not a Buy: 25.7x forward against a 24.9x average ❌, Earnings Growth Model 9.2% ❌ (below the 10% hurdle), reverse DCF needing 13.2% against a 2.5% long-term estimate. "The valuation looks quite 'luxury' today."
LVMH owns the largest collection of luxury brands in the world — Louis Vuitton, Dior, Moët, Hennessy — sold mostly through its own stores, so it sets its own prices and never discounts.
2025 was ugly: weak spirits, weak Asia, the hangover after the post-pandemic luxury boom, American tariff uncertainty, and a proposed French wealth tax of 2% a year on fortunes above €100 million. The shares fell more than 40%.
The part worth remembering is what Bernard Arnault did about it: he bought shares throughout. By the October results he was vindicated — Asian demand for fashion and leather recovered, spirits returned to growth, and the group grew organically again. Slegers' summary is Buffett's line that the market transfers money from the impatient to the patient.
And it is still only a Hold, which is the honest ending. Being right about the business and right about the founder does not make the shares cheap: at nearly 26 times earnings his own model produces a 9.2% expected return, below his threshold. As he puts it, the valuation "looks quite 'luxury' today."
In short: HOLD — bought 15 January 2024 and the second-largest position at 8.8%, about +$15,000 of profit.
LVMH owns the largest collection of luxury brands in the world — Louis Vuitton, Dior, Moët, Hennessy and dozens more — sold mostly through stores it owns itself, so it controls the price and never has to discount.
It is the second-largest position at 8.8% and modestly profitable, and it carries a Hold. The reason is the same as for the other Holds in this sheet: the business is not in question, the entry price is. Nothing new is argued here; the name is simply confirmed as owned and fully valued going into 2026.
In short: Cited only to illustrate valuation method #1 (forward PE vs 10-yr average): LVMH is a name "today" trading at "the cheapest valuation over the past 10 years" — an interesting signal. No full thesis or stated position given.
LVMH is the French luxury-goods giant (Louis Vuitton, Dior and others). Slegers mentions it only to demonstrate his simplest valuation check — comparing a stock's current forward price-to-earnings multiple to its own 10-year average. LVMH, he notes, is currently at its cheapest valuation on that measure in a decade, which he flags as an interesting signal. He does not lay out a full thesis or say he owns it.
40:40First one is just very naive. Compare the current forward PE of the company with a 10-year average. It tells you a bit and it tells you how the company is valued compared to its own historical average but it doesn't take into account the current outlook, what's going on in the business and so on. But it's very naive, but when I for example see that it's significantly cheaper or trades at the cheapest valuation over the past 10 years, that tells you something interesting, that for example today is the case for LVMH, the French
In short: #7 (written "$MC" in the post). The global luxury producer and distributor, 5,000+ stores, then the second-largest company in Europe after Novo Nordisk. "Luxury never goes out of fashion. LVMH will benefit from the growing middle class in Asia. Excellent business with a shareholder-oriented mindset."
LVMH owns the biggest collection of luxury brands in the world — Louis Vuitton, Dior, Moët, Hennessy and dozens more — and sells them through more than 5,000 of its own stores. Owning the brand and the shop means it sets its own prices and never has to discount to a retailer.
The 50-year case is that desire for status goods does not expire: "luxury never goes out of fashion." Add the growing Asian middle class as new buyers, and a controlling family that Slegers describes as shareholder-oriented, and you get a business whose relevance is unusually easy to project forward. The row uses the US ADR (LVMUY); the post writes the Paris ticker as "$MC".
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Verbatim excerpts from the public transcripts (auto-pulled at each mention's timestamp, lightly cleaned). Timestamps link into the video; "source page" opens that commentator's full analysis at this row. Click a mention's header line to expand it (one open at a time). For personal study — not investment advice.