In short: Passing mention — "the ultimate great story," cited as the contrast with the hard, boring work of actually valuing a company. No stance.
8:03And that's frankly the hard part and in a way the boring part. It's so much easier just to tell a great story. And SpaceX is the ultimate great story. The actual research on SpaceX and trying to figure out what the valuation should be, that would be very hard and very boring work to do.
In short: Santoli's marker for the Q2 risk-appetite peak (8:28, 15:17) — "the SpaceX IPO right at the end of the second quarter" capped a run of crowding into momentum and semis, and has been "payback in bits and pieces since."
In short: "SpaceX went at $2 trillion": private investors are already 10x+ on marks that are "marked to whatever the hell they want," and they want liquidity "to get the hell out." His evidence that private money for AI-era valuations is tapped out.
7:35And I think that the private money is out. The valuation is there. SpaceX went at $2 trillion. They're already like 10x plus in this private investment. But, as you know, marked to whatever the hell they want as a private is different than marked to market. And you want liquidity to get the hell out.
In short: The contrast case: six weeks before the SpaceX IPO "nobody was selling" in the private secondary market because everyone was sure they would make money — unlike Anthropic today.
SpaceX is his comparison point. Before a company lists, early shareholders can sometimes sell privately. In the six weeks before SpaceX's stock-market debut, nobody wanted to sell because everyone expected a big pop. Anthropic insiders are selling well below the planned listing price, and Woo reads that difference as a warning sign.
35:413 trillion, which means that there are insiders who could potentially hold it for 6 weeks and cash out at 2 trillion. They're selling at 1.3. Believe me, this was not the situation 6 weeks before the SpaceX IPO. 6 weeks before the SpaceX IPO, nobody was selling because everybody was sure they were going to make a lot of money.
In short: Nathan uses it to explain Tesla's fade rather than to express a view on SpaceX: "the only thing I find interesting about this… is that SpaceX really did take a lot of air out of the Tesla story, and I think it's easy to see how Elon would be more focused there, especially out of the gate." The point is founder attention as a transferable asset — the same scarcity that lifts one entity is what is being withdrawn from the other.
SpaceX is private, so there is nothing to buy — it appears because of what its rise does to a public company.
Nathan's point is about a resource that does not show up on any balance sheet: founder attention. SpaceX has "taken a lot of air out of the Tesla story," both in the sense of absorbing the investor excitement that once attached to Tesla, and in the sense that Musk himself is plainly more focused there.
The generalisable version, worth carrying to any founder-led company: when the same person controls several ventures, the newer and more exciting one is a claim on the older one's scarcest input. That is a risk to the older company even when nothing about its own business has changed.
24:31There was a lot of optimism into this cyber cab event. So, this is the robo-taxi. It's a two-passenger sort of thing. They basically was invite-only down in Austin. They're talking about other rollouts and stuff. Whatever. Stock's down today 6%. Now, the only thing I find interesting about this guy is that SpaceX really did take a lot of air out of the Tesla story, and I think it's easy to see how Elon would be more focused there, especially out of the gate. But this
In short: Options Action, with Oliver Renick at Cboe — a volatility argument, not a direction call. The setup: "it looks a bit like a caged animal right now. Hundreds of thousands of options contracts are trading on a daily basis with hundreds of millions of dollars at stake. But the stock's been trapped in a 10 point range for almost a month, compressing options prices down to what we see in stocks like Apple… I'm not convinced that's right. When SpaceX breaks out of its range, it will likely do so with noise." The skew and where the hole is: "there's 11 put contracts open for every 10 calls, and working in bears' favour is that there's not a lot of hedging below $142, which means if it slips through that level, it could get ugly fast. But almost all the puts out there are for strikes below 150, which is right where we're at — that means bears need to sell off faster than bulls need a rally." On the desk, Simpson owns it in the growth portfolio and declines the trade: "I think it's too much too soon. I think this is a great investment long term… we love the Starlink, the Starship, even the AI component… but this is something we're looking years into the future, not weeks or hours." Sechan has held it privately for a long time "and now publicly," is "taking advantage of the price move… when we have episodic windows to get liquidity," and thinks "the stock's going through price discovery… there's an evangelical level of support for this stock… incremental positive news is going to generate huge price movement." Lebenthal supplies the counterweight: "that evangelical support at times withers — and look at Tesla over the last week or so."
Renick's segment is about the options market rather than the company, and the insight is a mismatch. Options are contracts giving the right to buy or sell later at a fixed price, and their cost rises with how much movement traders expect. Enormous volumes are trading in SpaceX, but because the stock has sat in a ten-point range for a month, the options have been priced for a sleepy stock. He thinks that is wrong: a share this contested does not stay quiet, and when it moves it will move hard.
The positioning detail tells you which way the pain runs. There are slightly more puts (bets on a fall) than calls outstanding, but nearly all of them are struck below the current price, and almost nobody has bought protection below $142. So the downside beneath that level is unhedged — if it breaks, there is nothing there to slow it. Sellers, in Renick's phrase, need to move faster than buyers do.
On the desk, both owners decline the trade. Simpson holds it in a growth portfolio and says the timeframe is years, "not weeks or hours." Sechan has owned it privately for a long time and now publicly too, selling into strength when liquidity windows open, and describes the shareholder base as "evangelical" — devoted enough that good news produces outsized moves. Lebenthal's rejoinder is the one to keep: devotion is not a floor. "That evangelical support at times withers — and look at Tesla over the last week or so."
In short: Frames the issuance question (the mention is the host's): "there's been a lot of talk in the wake of SpaceX that the market just can't absorb all this supply. Anthropic is coming, OpenAI is coming." Niles' answer is about credit, not SpaceX: "credit is the lifeblood of the economy… the 30-year is up at the highest level since 2007, that's a problem."
39:13— How do you think about all the issuance we're seeing? There's been a lot of talk in the wake of SpaceX that the market just can't absorb all this supply. Anthropic is coming, OpenAI is coming, some of the other companies are issuing. Do you think that's a big deal for the market that all these companies are issuing, or do you think relative to a huge market, it's not that big of a deal? — Well, it's a big deal in the sense that I am a big believer that credit is the lifeblood of
In short: The capital-vacuum precedent — the moment people could buy SpaceX they sold the space also-rans to fund it. He isn't very worried about a repeat for AI: equity issuance into real businesses at realistic prices "is less capital sucking than we need to put $10 billion into Nikola." "I would certainly quibble with the SpaceX valuation." Also counted in the ~$500B the labs + SpaceX + Google raised year-to-date, which markets absorbed.
1:00:11Now, I would certainly quibble with the SpaceX valuation, but in general, these are not dollars going into — I'm trying to think of some of the highlights from SPACs or whatever it is. So I think that equity issuance into realistic businesses at realistic prices is less capital sucking than we need to put $10 billion into Nikola or whatever we were doing back in 2021.
In short: Cited purely as issuance supply, not as a business: with Anthropic and a couple of others, these listings would be "bigger than all the IPOs from the '90s combined" — "not just that, it's all post-World War II combined." He had sized it at $4T of new issuance; "it's going to be more like 5.5 trillion, which makes the top of my head pop off."
SpaceX is discussed strictly as supply of stock, with no view on the rockets or the business.
The point is the sheer size. If SpaceX, Anthropic and a couple of peers go public, those listings alone would raise more than every US IPO since World War II combined — his estimate went from $4 trillion to "more like 5.5 trillion."
Why an investor in something else should care: the buyers of those shares are the same large funds that already own the market. They have to sell existing positions to raise the cash, and they start months in advance. The mega-IPO is therefore a market-wide event, not a single-name one.
22:56companies go public — SpaceX, Anthropic — they're going to be bigger than all the IPOs from the '90s combined. — Well, not just that, it's all post-World War II combined [laughter]. So it's staggering, right? — It's staggering. And I looked at that and I had to sit with that for a while, because for me, we talk a lot about supply and dilution and funding and IPOs in companies.
In short: Cited as the archetype of the mega-private-valuation machine, not as a pick: "the total invested capital in the SpaceX was something like 13 trillion and it came out of a two-trillion market cap. That's an awful lot of capital gains for the US government to harvest." One of the "fantasy trillion-dollar unicorns… or gigacorns" whose function, on his read, is fiscal — a capital-gains base — rather than industrial.
SpaceX is Elon Musk's private rocket and satellite-internet company. It isn't listed, so ordinary investors can't buy it — it appears here as an example, not an idea.
The example is about what enormous private valuations are for. Doomberg's claim is that the US government now leans heavily on capital-gains tax — the tax you pay when you sell an investment for more than you paid. So each time a company is floated at a trillion dollars, roughly $150 billion of potential capital-gains tax is created for the Treasury to eventually collect, on gains that were, in their phrase, conjured "out of whole cloth." SpaceX is the illustration: money put in at a far lower valuation, now marked at a vastly higher one, with a large tax harvest waiting at the exit. Note the number he uses for invested capital ("13 trillion") is garbled in the recording and is almost certainly $13 billion; the argument is about the ratio, not the figure. Their summary line is the whole stance: "what is the purpose of a system is what it does."
4:24And every trillion-dollar IPO that happens is 150 billion in capital gains tax potentially collected by the US to close its fiscal gap, to monetize its debt. It serves two functions. It enriches rich people and creates taxable income for the government to collect out of nothing, out of whole cloth, like the total invested capital in the SpaceX was something like 13 trillion and it came out of a two-trillion market cap.
In short: Cited twice: Google is buying compute from SpaceX "for a super super high amount of money," and orbital compute raises a lending question nobody has priced — "how are you going to do maintenance? How are you going to replace chips that burnt out?" Also one of the private stakes being marked up inside hyperscaler earnings.
12:56And Google is buying compute from SpaceX for a super super high amount of money. And on the depreciation argument, like the Michael Burry argument, basically every single data point of the past nine months has not supported the Michael Burry depreciation point, like depreciation favorable rates.
In short: Back above the $135 offering level yesterday, below it again now; reiterated overweight at Morgan Stanley. Sechan owns it — "we own the name because we're locked up. We own it from the private side, so we haven't bought any since the IPO." His view: "we're very happy with the business," and what moves it up is "Starlink growth, higher connectivity margins and a disciplined CapEx commentary. If you don't get a disciplined CapEx commentary… everybody knows this company can build rockets. They want to make sure they're spending in a way that they can return some profitability back on that spend, get a good ROI." He also uses it as the template for the coming AI listings: "these companies have had so much demand, however the price traction has been you get a big buy-up and then they re-rate. Meta did that, SpaceX did that… large engineered IPOs with lockups that are unique, and markets take time to find price discovery."
SpaceX briefly regained its $135 IPO price yesterday and slipped back below it today; Morgan Stanley reiterated an overweight rating. Rob Sechan owns it from before the IPO and is still locked up, so he hasn't bought any since.
His checklist for what actually makes the stock work is worth keeping: Starlink subscriber growth, wider margins in the connectivity business, and — most importantly — "disciplined CapEx commentary." His point is that nobody doubts SpaceX can build rockets; the open question is whether management can show it is spending in a way that earns a return.
He also uses SpaceX as the pattern for the AI listings coming behind it: these heavily engineered IPOs with unusual lock-up structures get an enormous initial buy-up and then re-rate lower, because it takes the market time to find a real price. "Meta did that, SpaceX did that."
In short: Best week since going public, with the lock-up expirations having begun yesterday, and upgraded today at Argus to buy from hold, target 160. Link bought more: "my first buy point was a lot higher — the stock's down 40% — but I wanted to have a toe in the water, a piece of this, and it is a very long-term position. The decline to me is just too tempting, especially after the earnings report, which I thought was excellent: all segments beat on the sales line, EBITDA was up so much, total revenue +92%." On the spending that scared the Street: "they said the payback of that spend is going to be in the AI segment, and it's going to be within a year. I wasn't happy about the spend short term, but long term this is what they have to do." Meanwhile "the connectivity big piece just blew it away and they're doubling subscribers. Margins were really good… all the story is intact, I just wanted to be a little bit bigger on the decline." Asked whether she accepts the spend can only go higher because they are a hyperscaler now: "you have to be — I'm OK with that for the long term, because it's going to yield returns eventually. They're barely even spending now and they're producing the growth that they are. They had $14 billion in cloud service agreements this quarter alone. They're going to do 60 billion probably per year in these kinds of agreements over time. That's your real upside."
SpaceX had its best week since listing, even though the first lock-up expiry — when insiders can start selling — happened yesterday, and Argus upgraded it to buy with a $160 target. Stephanie Link bought more, having started with a deliberately small "toe in the water" position at a much higher price; the stock is down 40%.
Her reading of the report that knocked it down: revenue grew 92%, every segment beat on sales, and profits before interest and depreciation rose sharply. The market disliked the spending — but management said the payback on that spending, in the AI segment, arrives within a year. Meanwhile the profitable part, satellite connectivity (Starlink), "just blew it away" with subscribers doubling and good margins.
Asked whether she accepts that spending can now only rise, since SpaceX is effectively another hyperscaler, she does: "it's going to yield returns eventually… they're barely even spending now and they're producing the growth that they are." Her single most concrete upside number: $14 billion of cloud service agreements signed in this quarter alone, potentially $60 billion a year over time.
In short: Lock-up day, and the desk splits three ways. Morgan Brennan's numbers: available share count up more than 140% today to over 1.5 billion (from 629 million at the IPO); billions more unlock into 2027, with 50% of shares in free float by January per Bernstein; many long-time holders plan to hold and Ark has been buying the selloff; and because some indexes changed methodology to enable faster inclusion, "a bigger float will mean a bigger weighting, which in turn could mean more forced buying" — the Nasdaq-100's next quarterly float adjustment is early September. Plus the day's announcement: a Texas mega-fab, Terrafab, with Tesla — a $16.8B joint investment for the initial phase, with combined SpaceX/Tesla chip demand expected to exceed "1 terawatt of compute, significantly larger than the current global supply." Baruch owns it, bought over the past week, "one of the things I just want to put away and forget about… the compute side is really where I think this is" (the Cursor acquisition/partnership where they train their Colossus models). Brown: "at the very least this one goes in the too-hard pile. I don't understand what the opportunity is even here after the share price has been cut in half" — they raised $86B in the IPO, "the largest IPO raise anybody's ever seen," and "already spent like a fifth of it in a quarter, so they're going to need to raise capital again"; float going 5%→12% means "if you didn't like it with only 5% of the shares available to trade, you're going to love it at 12%." Ethridge, the pre-IPO skeptic: "I don't know that I want to buy a $2 trillion market cap on 5 billion in revenue and wait for that 5 billion to get to 100 billion and still have it overvalued… I like it under 100, depending on why it's under 100." He doesn't own it personally or in portfolio. Brown's structural point: the IPO "was engineered to perfection — immediate index inclusion, a 5% float, insiders locked up," so today's unlock is the first real price discovery, and "it's up today after it unlocked" only because the market knew it was coming.
Today the first block of SpaceX shares came unlocked, and the number of shares that can be traded jumped more than 140% — from 629 million at the IPO to over 1.5 billion, on the way to roughly half the company being freely tradeable by January. The counterweight is index buying: because index providers changed their rules to include SpaceX quickly, a bigger tradeable float mechanically means a bigger index weight, which forces index funds to buy, with the Nasdaq-100's next adjustment due in early September. SpaceX also announced Terrafab, a $16.8 billion Texas chip plant with Tesla, to supply what the companies say will be over a terawatt of combined compute demand.
The desk lands in three different places. Bill Baruch owns it and wants to "put it away and forget about it," most interested in the compute side — the Cursor acquisition, where the Colossus models are trained. Josh Brown puts it "in the too-hard pile": SpaceX raised $86 billion at the IPO and spent about a fifth of it in a single quarter, so more capital raising is coming — and on the unlock, "if you didn't like it with only 5% of the shares available to trade, you're going to love it at 12%." Malcolm Ethridge, the pre-IPO sceptic, simply wants a price: "I'd love to buy it under 100 — depending on why it's under 100."
Brown's most useful observation is structural: the IPO was "engineered to perfection" — instant index inclusion, a tiny 5% float, insiders locked up — so today is the first moment the market can actually set a price with real supply available.
In short: Down ~9% (was −10%) on its inaugural report as a public company, with the first lock-up tranche hitting tomorrow and a "stair step" of supply after that; several target raises and cuts the same day. The numbers: revenue +92% to $7.8B, Starlink revenue up 66 (the transcript garbles the unit), AI revenue +247% — "but it's that $18.4 billion of CapEx that causes the problem for the Street." Kevin Simpson (shareholder, by phone): "just looking at the operating report, I thought it was fantastic… my enthusiasm for this business hasn't waned at all, but it's far different than my enthusiasm in the stock," because of the lock-up. Like every hyperscaler, "if you're going to spend this kind of money you need to show the shareholder there's some path to a return on investment" — not a next-quarter story, but "if you're 2, 3, 4 years into the future, this is an incredible business. We're going to own it." He put a half-percent position in his growth ETF at 160 and has deliberately not added: "just because a stock pulls back doesn't mean you need to add to it… I want to see how it trades with these new shares as part of the marketplace." He doubts a big lock-up selloff — the stock is already down ~50% from the highs (low 200s to low 100s), so "a lot of this is embedded into this price action."
SpaceX delivered its first earnings report as a public company and the stock fell about 9%. The business results were strong — revenue up 92% to $7.8 billion, AI revenue up 247% — but the company spent $18.4 billion on capital projects, and that is what unsettled investors. It has become, in effect, another hyperscaler: spending enormous sums today for returns years out.
Kevin Simpson, a shareholder, splits the two cleanly: "my enthusiasm for this business hasn't waned at all, but it's far different from my enthusiasm in the stock." The reason is the lock-up — the date when early investors and employees are first allowed to sell — which begins tomorrow and is followed by further tranches. He holds a small half-percent position bought at $160 and deliberately has not added: "just because a stock pulls back doesn't mean you need to add to it." He wants to watch how the market absorbs the new shares first. He does doubt a crash, since the stock is already down roughly 50% from its highs, so the supply is largely anticipated.
In short: Split verdict: "the SpaceX business is phenomenal" and the odds it does well are "almost a no-brainer" — Elon "is not human," interviewed the first 3,000 hires himself, killed the rocket industry knowing nothing about rockets. Never short him ("do not short a superhuman"). "But SpaceX as an investment is a very different question. That goes in the too hard pile" — asteroid mining and intergalactic adventures may come about, "but I don't need to make that bet." Kaspi over SpaceX every time.
Asked about SpaceX's blockbuster listing, Pabrai splits the question in two — and the split is the whole point of the segment. On the business, he could not be more admiring: Elon Musk is "not human," knew nothing about rockets and destroyed the entire rocket industry, lands two boosters backwards simultaneously, personally interviewed the first 3,000 hires, and runs five companies at once. The odds that SpaceX as a business succeeds are "almost a no-brainer," and quoting Munger — "never underestimate someone who overestimates themselves" — his firm rule is never to bet against him: "do not short a superhuman."
On the investment, the answer is a flat pass: "SpaceX as an investment is a very different question. That goes in the too hard pile." The offering documents promise asteroid mining and intergalactic ventures, and with Musk involved some of it may even happen — "but I don't need to make that bet."
The comparison he draws is the useful part: given a choice between SpaceX and Kaspi he takes Kaspi, "because it's easier to understand. If I lose the money, I know how I lost it." A great company is not the same thing as a knowable investment. (Note this is a softer, more admiring framing than the June 2026 appearance, where SpaceX was cited purely as the crowd's next "shiny object.")
35:23So, I think that the odds that SpaceX as a business does well, to me almost a no-brainer. But SpaceX as an investment is a very different question. That becomes harder, that goes in the too hard pile. — A lot of use of Warren's too hard pile today. I like it. — [laughter] — Yeah. We need to put a lot of stuff in there.
In short: Part of the capital-markets tailwind for the banks: "can it get any better than you get to take a multi-trillion-dollar IPO in SpaceX?" Fee-pipeline reference, no view on the company.
19:18Can it get any better than you get to take a multi-t trillion dollar IPO in SpaceX? Can it get better than that? Well, we'll see. Here comes Anthropic and maybe Ben and I. We'll see. — This week, David Rosenberg said he always bubble spotting said Canadian banks are in a bubble. Time to take profits.
In short: Didn't buy it. On Musk's "worth more than the entire Earth" pitch: a Buffett "too-hard pile." Jim Chanos surfaced a bullish sell-side report whose own analyst expects no free cash flow until at least 2035 — a disqualifier for a FCF-focused buyer. Down ~16% from its first-day close.
SpaceX is Musk's rocket/satellite company. Asked how he analyzes Musk's claim that it could be "worth more than the entire Earth," Finucane invokes Warren Buffett's "too-hard pile" — some things are simply outside your ability to value, so you skip them.
Concretely: short-seller Jim Chanos highlighted a bullish Wall Street report whose own author admitted SpaceX won't generate free cash flow (real spare cash after spending) until at least 2035. Oxbow only wants businesses that produce free cash flow and return it via dividends or interest, so SpaceX isn't a fit. It's also already down about 16% from its first-day close.
23:58to do with SpaceX. Okay, when you see a statement like this, how does your investor brain work? How do you analyze these kinds of forward guidances, so to speak? — Yeah, you could, like Warren Buffett would say, you put it in the too hard pile. It's not something that we think we have any edge in. I saw Jim Chanos, who's a legendary short seller in the business.
In short: A $75B IPO chased "almost immediately" by $25B of debt; valued "on promises"; its stock was used to buy xAI at a $250B mark — emblematic of the issuance torrent that starts a top.
SpaceX did a $75B IPO and then raised $25B of debt almost immediately — and its stock was even used as currency to buy xAI at a $250B valuation. Chanos points to it as a prime example of the "issuance torrent": companies flooding the market with new stock and debt.
He also lumps it with Tesla as valued "on promises." A wave of huge new supply like this, he notes, has historically marked the late stage of a bull market.
7:12When you think about issuance, right? So SpaceX does a $75 billion IPO, and then they follow on with $25 billion in debt almost immediately. This is a week after Google, and I know you've had a lot to say about that, raised what was that number? 80 billion, and then it was upsized to 85, right? And then we know that Meta, and the list goes on and on.
In short: Avoid — opening first-day price ~58× next year's revenue (79× trailing sales); the most IPO excitement Ted's seen in his career. Already down ~12% from its first-day close; mega-IPOs usually halve within year one.
SpaceX is Elon Musk's rocket and satellite company; it recently went (or is going) public. On its first trading day it was valued at about 79 times its past year's sales — or 58 times next year's expected revenue even giving it credit for growth. For comparison, Google IPO'd at 8.5 times revenue.
Oxbow's rule: pay at most ~10× revenue for a genuinely great grower. At 20–70×, every optimistic assumption is already priced in. It's already down ~12% from its first-day close, and history says hot mega-IPOs usually halve within their first year — so there's no rush, just watch and wait.
31:41This is, I thought initially this was a price-to-earnings chart, but it's not. It's a price-to-sales chart. So you've got SpaceX here. Was that the price that IPO'd at or is that its price at the time that you actually published this? But anyways, it's at the 79 times sales valuation.
In short: (Now public.) Traded below its $135 set IPO price for the first time (priced with no range, +20% opening day). Terranova: the appreciation "was built upon scarcity in the equity market" while "the debt market has been the adult in the room" — a weak secondary debt offering with wide spreads presaged the equity collapse; he has no position. Sechan (a former private investor, "even in the LBO"): advised clients "there's likely to be an opportunity to be a better buyer" — it just came faster than expected, ahead of index inclusion and lock-up/SPV supply; caught in the momentum unwind. Weiss: "a faith stock… tremendous business, but you can't value it" — spending heavily with no visibility on profitability. No one a buyer here.
SpaceX recently went public at a fixed IPO price of $135, popped 20% on day one, and has now fallen below that $135 price for the first time. Joe Terranova's explanation: the stock's earlier rise was built on scarcity (few shares available), while the bond market was "the adult in the room" — a weak debt sale with wide spreads warned trouble before the shares collapsed. He owns no position.
Rob Sechan, who invested privately before the IPO, always told clients there'd be "an opportunity to be a better buyer" later — it just arrived faster than he expected, before more shares unlock from lock-ups. Steve Weiss is blunt: SpaceX is "a faith stock" — a tremendous business, but "you can't value it" because it spends heavily with no clear path to profits. Nobody on the desk is a buyer at this moment, so the net read is neutral.
In short: Its $85B IPO at a ~$2.2T valuation — the largest ever — is a top signal: no earnings, "all story," well-timed selling into the froth as the market shifts from buybacks to massive equity issuance.
SpaceX's IPO — $85 billion raised at roughly a $2.2 trillion valuation, the largest ever — is Exhibit A of his "top signal." It makes no earnings; it's "all story." When the market shifts from companies buying back their own shares to insiders selling huge new share offerings at sky-high valuations, that's the kind of well-timed selling into froth that tends to mark the end of a bubble.
29:59We no longer have those buybacks. We have massive equity issues now. So we had SpaceX, right, with, it was the largest IPO ever. Two point two trillion dollar, was an $85 billion IPO. That's huge. We had SK Hynix just come last week, $27 billion of equity. We've had almost $200 billion of debt from the hyperscalers.
In short: (Private.) Cited by Lebenthal as a driver of the debt-market indigestion pressuring Oracle: its recent ~$25B offering (with Amazon's) pushed spreads "wider, wider, wider" — yield-to-worst over 7% on one of the longer-dated issues. Also in the Musk–Altman feud color. No committee stance.
In short: Surfaces via the Musk–Altman feud — Altman jabs Musk for "selling public market investors on short-term space data centers." Carlson relays Altman's skepticism that orbital/space data centers will "matter at scale this decade" (launch-cost math, un-fixable GPUs in space); no investment call, SpaceX is private.
26:18We have Sam Altman responding to Elon Musk's criticism, saying, "Homeboy, you're the one selling public market investors on short-term space data centers." So, he's taking a jab at Elon Musk SpaceX and their plans to put data centers in space. Sam Altman calls him homeboy. That's real. He called him homeboy.
In short: Named as one of the big pending IPOs distracting the market, and grouped with OpenAI and Anthropic as businesses that "lose money every single month." No view on the company itself.
In short: (Private.) Now public and trading below its first-trade price (~$148, −3% on the day) since the recent IPO. Simpson owns a small position (down on it) — bull case is Falcon/Starlink near-monopoly + the "Elon premium," would "double down for sure" closer to $100; sees under-the-surface Tesla synergy without a formal merger. Baruch on-radar (avoids just-public names in model portfolios) but excited by the story — Colossus supercomputer + the Cursor acquisition training the models, scalable to 1 terawatt — while warning these names "sell off 50 to 70%." Musk postponed the Boorstin interview.
SpaceX, Elon Musk's rocket-and-satellite company, recently went public and is already trading below its very first trade (around $148). Kevin Simpson owns a small, losing position and would "double down" only if it fell closer to $100 — the bull case being the near-monopoly of its Falcon rockets and Starlink internet, plus a premium for Musk himself. He deliberately also owns Tesla, betting the two effectively merge "under the surface" through shared AI even without a formal deal.
Bill Baruch doesn't own it (he avoids just-public stocks in his model portfolios) but is excited by the technology — its Colossus supercomputer and a "Cursor" acquisition are training its AI models, with room to scale enormously. His caution: newly public high-flyers routinely fall 50–70%, so he'd wait a few months. Net: an interesting story, but nobody's a confident buyer at today's price — hence Neutral.
In short: Passing reference — the SpaceX IPO "taking up a lot of oxygen," multiples "all the way out to the moon… Mars actually," contrasted with Enbridge's overlooked multiple.
44:17And I mean maybe that's the pitch to investors on why investors should own Enbridge. You know we got
44:23the SpaceX IPO like taking up a lot of oxygen like when you talk about multiples like all the way out to the moon.
In short: Named as a warning, not a pick — "the next shiny object." The crowd that dumped Bitcoin for AI will dump AI for SpaceX's coming mega-IPO. "Please don't buy shiny objects… please buy what is hated and unloved."
SpaceX is Elon Musk's rocket company, still privately held but with a much-hyped stock-market listing (IPO) expected to be one of the biggest ever. Pabrai brings it up as the opposite of a recommendation — the next "shiny object."
His observation about crowd behaviour: money chases whatever is most loved. People dumped Bitcoin to buy AI when AI became the hot thing (Bitcoin fell from ~$100k to ~$70k); next, he predicts, they'll sell AI to buy the SpaceX IPO. His advice is to do the reverse — avoid whatever is loved and hyped, and buy what is "hated and unloved" instead.
42:36— So they will sell all their AI. So, first they sold all the Bitcoin and they bought the AI. — Now they're going to sell Skhinx and they're going to buy SpaceX. — SpaceX. — That's the next. — You're saying you we shouldn't be doing that. — Please don't buy shiny objects. — Okay. — Please don't buy what is loved.
In short: "Wouldn't touch it with a 10-ft pole" — wildly overvalued, $25B of debt absurdly rated triple-B before cash-flow positive, weak AI vs Anthropic/OpenAI, the Mars rocket hasn't reached orbit; Musk a brilliant promoter spread too thin.
SpaceX is Elon Musk's private rocket-and-satellite company, which recently let investors buy in. Harris "wouldn't touch it with a 10-foot pole": he thinks it's wildly overvalued, and he's stunned that it raised $25 billion of debt yet got a solid investment-grade (triple-B) credit rating before it even makes consistent cash — something Netflix and Amazon had to wait years for.
His point is that bond investors only care "can I get my money back?", not Mars dreams. He concedes the satellite business is genuinely valuable (which is why he'd rather own MDA), but rates the AI part as weak and the headline rocket-to-Mars story as unproven — classic late-cycle bubble behavior.
9:12No, I wouldn't touch that thing with a 10-ft pole until when? But you have to acknowledge the space race is real. Oh, well I don't know. Is it real? I mean, they've they they've got a business that's the satellite business is worth $300 billion perhaps. The rocket business is well, uh, his AI
In short: "This is not investing." The coming IPO/lockups make retail the "exit liquidity" — VCs/insiders bought in low, and forced index-inclusion buying offloads stock into retail 401ks. Starlink is "a step behind 5G on Earth" with a fixed launch TAM; the Mars / "data centers in space" pitch in the S-1 is "dumb" hype — "overpromises and underdelivers."
SpaceX is Elon Musk's private rocket-and-satellite company, expected to sell shares to the public (an IPO). Polomny would not buy it. His reasoning is about who already owns it cheaply and who gets stuck holding it. Early backers — venture capitalists and insiders — bought in at very low prices. When the company goes public, that's their chance to sell ("exit liquidity"), and the buyers are ordinary retail investors. Worse, because index funds are forced to buy whatever gets added to the major indexes, regular people's 401k money gets steered into it automatically ("forced buying"), regardless of price.
A "lockup" is the period after an IPO when insiders are barred from selling; when it expires, a wave of insider selling can hit the stock. On the business itself: Starlink (the satellite-internet arm) is "a step behind 5G on Earth" and can only serve so many users per satellite, so its market is capped; and the flashy pitches — going to Mars, "data centers in space" — he calls hype from a great marketer who "overpromises and underdelivers." Verdict: "this is not investing."
46:17I was looking at the lockup schedule for the SpaceX stock. I live down here in South Texas, fairly close to Boca Chica where the SpaceX facility is. And they had in the papers here how many millionaires were made. Yes, on paper. They had an article about janitors and this welder that's been working out there since there was just a construction tent. He said, "I didn't even know what they did out here, but they got stock and now I'm worth $800,000." Yeah, on paper. Wait till the lockups come.
In short: (Private.) IPO reportedly pushed toward 2027 (NYT) on volatility; at its lowest close since going public. Talkington sold a fund-held position — up ~6× since Dec '24 (a $350B tender then) vs +33% revenue; warns first-year IPOs are dicey (Facebook/Uber/Airbnb had ~50% drawdowns) and VC lock-ups will bring selling. Watching Starlink (now reportedly launching a consumer mobile service, 10M+ subs).
In short: Rounds out the margined-mega-cap trio (NVDA/AAPL/SpaceX). A forced de-leveraging there is the channel by which an AI crash could briefly drag gold lower before it reverts.
SpaceX is Elon Musk's private rocket company — not publicly traded, but a popular holding among wealthy investors. Schectman lumps it with NVIDIA and Apple as one of the crowded, leveraged bets whose forced unwinding is the mechanism by which an AI/tech bust could temporarily drag gold lower. The takeaway is the same: a metals sell-off driven by margin calls reverses, because it has nothing to do with gold's actual supply-and-demand story.
53:53for precious metals beyond what they've already fallen so far? Well, I think that's what we're supposed to believe, that they throw out the baby with the bathwater. To me, it's always been MOPE, management of perception economics, as Jim Sinclair used to say. In reality, how many of the people that are on margin with NVIDIA and Apple and SpaceX have a whole big position in gold that they have to sell in order to come up with margin liquidity? When the market collapsed in 2020, yes, gold sold off, but it came right back up.
In short: Explicitly no view — "I can't say that SpaceX is undervalued or overvalued because I don't understand the net present value of settling Mars." He confines himself to subjects where he believes he has an opinion as to value.
29:26Somebody was asking me the other day, what I thought of Nvidia's valuation. And I said, I can barely pronounce it. So, the idea that I could opine on the relationship between price and value is a non-starter. I can't say that SpaceX is undervalued or overvalued because I don't understand the net present value of settling Mars.
In short: The frame of the whole issue, and the archive's most detailed negative case yet. Listed at $135, opened at $150, "today SpaceX is trading at $191 per share… Mr. Market values SpaceX at $2.5 trillion," above the $1.75trn IPO valuation and above JP Morgan, Visa and Walmart. At the IPO price that is 90x revenue — "higher than Palantir (75x revenue), higher than Nvidia (20x), higher than Tesla (16x)." The business: 2025 revenue $18.7bn and a $4.9bn loss; xAI alone burned $7.7bn in Q1 2026 for a $2.5bn operating loss. The maths: 20x sales needs $88bn of revenue, "almost 5x its current revenue… still 6 years away" at 30% growth; 35x earnings needs "around $50 billion in net profit." Morningstar's fair value is $780bn, less than half the market price. Banks earned "over $500 million just in fees." The rule drawn: "In general, you should stay away from IPOs. IPO… It's Probably Overpriced."
SpaceX came to the stock market at $135 a share and was trading at $191 within a week, which valued the whole company at about $2.5 trillion — more than JP Morgan, more than Visa, more than Walmart. The question the article asks is simply what has to happen for that price to make sense.
Two arithmetic checks. Measured against sales, the company was valued at ninety times what it takes in — Nvidia trades at twenty, Tesla at sixteen. To get down to a still-generous twenty times sales it would need revenue of $88 billion, nearly five times today's, which at a very fast 30% growth rate takes about six years. Measured against profits, it would need roughly $50 billion of net profit; it currently makes none — in 2025 it lost $4.9 billion on $18.7 billion of revenue, and the artificial-intelligence arm alone burned through $7.7 billion in three months.
Morningstar's own estimate of what the business is worth is $780 billion, less than half the market price. The banks that arranged the listing earned over $500 million in fees. The general rule drawn from it — the archive's actual position — is that new listings are structurally priced in the seller's favour: "IPO… It's Probably Overpriced."
In short: Mentioned only in passing as a hot tech name: "I think SpaceX is up 7%… before we hopped on it was up 10%" — used to make the point that the tech story is "running out of steam" and every metric says the space is overvalued.
53:01We'll see where, I think SpaceX is up 7%. I don't, we don't need to get into that discussion. — Before we hopped on, it was up 10%. — [laughter] — But the point being is every metric is telling you the tech space is overvalued and it means the S&P is overvalued.
In short: The IPO that "didn't break the markets" — a wave of new issuance / liquidity. He wasn't an early investor; the successful listing crushed its public proxies (Stack Capital) as money chose "the real thing."
22:57It's just that the risk has never been more real. — Yeah. And so call it maybe more background a little bit. I'm more of an allocator. I definitely when I look at the sector style geography first, I kind of leave the last 10% as I do SMA a lot of the capital that we do manage, and so when I'm looking at an individual name I don't have an expertise in that one, so I just avoid — a software as a sector you're — I'd leave that to the smart guys, okay — I'll take the sector play when
In short: The emblem of the mania. "Speculative behavior is now worse than ever before. For most investors, business fundamentals don't matter anymore. Just look at the SpaceX IPO." No figures here — those come two days later in the 18 June Buy-Hold-Sell issue, which prices the same listing at 90x revenue against a $4.9bn 2025 loss. Used to define the behaviour being warned against: herd instinct, ignoring the risk factors in the annual report, and "embracing the greater fool theory."
SpaceX's stock-market listing is used as the single example of what the article calls gambling: buying because the price is rising and other people are buying, without reference to what the business earns. No figures are given here — they arrive two days later, when the same archive works out that the listing valued the company at ninety times its sales while it was losing money.
The point being made is about the buyer rather than the company. The behaviours named — watching the price instead of the business, skipping the risk section of the annual report, and assuming someone else will pay more later — are what the author means by herd instinct, and they are presented as the reason good businesses can stay cheap for a long time.
In short: The IPO of the week, framed as a lottery ticket: "IPOs in general are kind of like playing a lottery ticket. Many will play, few will win… no one forces you to swing." Its going-public is the liquidity-drain trigger that forces index selling of the mega-caps and marks the dilution moment.
SpaceX's stock-market debut is the event of the week, and Smead's advice is simple: you don't have to buy it. He compares IPOs to lottery tickets — lots of people play, very few win — and points out that, unlike an already-listed stock you can study for years, a brand-new IPO gives you almost no time to judge the business. His bigger point is mechanical: for a giant new stock to be bought, money has to be sold somewhere else. Index funds, which must hold the market's biggest names, are forced to sell those very names to make room — so the IPO itself drains cash out of the rest of the market. That, not the rocket company's prospects, is why he's wary of the moment.
0:00It's a It's a fun question. Um, obviously, I think you know the answer, which is we wouldn't. IPOs in general are kind of like playing a lottery ticket. Many will play, few will win. Um, you know, no one forces you to swing at pitches day-to-day as they come to the IPO window versus in the secondary market.
In short: Scottish Mortgage's largest position at 15.3%, and the headline example of the access argument: "you get exposure to companies you could otherwise never own." No view on the business is offered here — consistent with the archive's other SpaceX mentions, which treat it as an IPO-pipeline name rather than an idea.
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Verbatim excerpts from the public transcripts (auto-pulled at each mention's timestamp, lightly cleaned). Timestamps link into the video; "source page" opens that commentator's full analysis at this row. Click a mention's header line to expand it (one open at a time). For personal study — not investment advice.