In short: Referenced only — held, no new view. Weight ~4.3%. Sheet: EPS 4.26 → 5.23 + 0.96% = 8.04%/yr.
In short: STRONG BUY (portfolio). Fair value $76.3 vs $65.75 — only 13.9% under; ER 11.9%; fwd PE 14.6 vs 24.7 (40.9% under). The sheet's reverse DCF now dissents sharply: 42.1% required vs 7.2% expected (−34.9pp) — in August the same model showed 5.1% required. The Strong Buy rests on the multiple alone.
In short: ~4.4% of the book. 15x NTM P/E on a 13% EPS CAGR; 1,120 shares yielding $4,905.60; modelled three-year return 8.04% including a 0.96% dividend. One of the three holdings up over twelve months (+2%), −5% YTD. A STRONG BUY the week before.
In short: STRONG BUY (portfolio). Fair value $106.9 vs $69.5 — 35.0% undervalued; ER 14.8%; fwd PE 14.6 against a 24.7 average (40.9% under); RDCF 5.1% required vs 10.2% expected. The Accession-acquisition demotion of April has not stopped it being promoted to the top rating on price.
In short: BUY. Bought 27 Nov 2023; $67.1 against a $90.5 fair value (+34.8%). Forward PE 14.6 against a 24.7 five-year average — a 40.9% gap, the third-widest in the book. EPS 4.26 → 5.23 by 2028 with a 0.96% yield, giving 8.04% expected a year; the Earnings Growth Model's 14.8% depends on the multiple re-rating from 14.6 to 20.0. Down 9.8% YTD.
In short: STRONG BUY, Strong(+) conviction — and up 26.9% in the month. YTD improves from −24.2% to −9.8%. FV $107.7 vs $70.0 = 35.0% under; ER 14.8%; fwd PE 14.6 against 24.7 (40.9% under); RDCF 4.1% vs 10.2% expected.
In short: STRONG BUY, Strong(+) conviction. FV $93.8 vs $58.9 = 37.2% under; ER 15.0%; fwd PE 14.6 against 24.7 (40.9% under); RDCF 5.8% vs 10.2% expected. YTD −24.2% despite a 12.5% ten-year CAGR — the Accession-deal de-rating has not changed the rating.
In short: Cited as evidence of the rotation the issue expects to continue: while "the Nasdaq was down 4.4% this week", Brown & Brown was +4.8%. "I expect more and more moves like this to happen going forward." A portfolio holding, so excluded from the ranked list.
In short: STRONG BUY, Strong+ conviction, bought a week earlier at a $63 limit. EPS growth 10.2%, dividend 1.1%, FWD PE 14.6 against a fair exit 20.0, expected return 15.0%, fair value 90.5 against 57.5 = 36.5% undervalued.
In short: Fourth-worst performer at -7.7% — during the same month it was bought for $15,000 at a $63 limit. Performance table only; no fresh view.
In short: BOUGHT — $15,000, 160 shares, limit $63. Bought into a soft market on purpose: "the majority of insurance markets Brown & Brown is involved in are currently softening and slowing. While this does slow down organic growth in the short-term, it gives us an opportunity to buy more at an attractive price." Four supporting points: E&S CAT property rates down 15-35%, but "an inverse correlation where lower rates often lead to higher contingent commissions, keeping margins from falling too far"; live AI agents automating over 25% of end-to-end submission processes in programs and wholesale; management expecting organic growth to improve through 2026 as Accession enters the organic comparison; and Accession contributing $445m of Q1 revenue. Q1 EPS +8% to $1.39. "To my knowledge, this is the cheapest valuation level they have ever traded at", with 38.5% EBITDAC margins. The diagnosis: "Mr. Market is focused on short-term headwinds and missing the massive earnings power of the integrated Accession business."
Brown & Brown is an insurance broker. It does not take on insurance risk itself — it finds cover for customers and earns a commission from the insurer, plus bonus payments when the business it places turns out to be profitable for that insurer.
Insurance pricing runs in cycles, and right now it is falling. Premiums for catastrophe-exposed commercial property are down 15-35%, and since brokers earn a percentage, lower premiums mean lower revenue. That is why the shares are weak, and why the shares are being bought.
Two things soften the blow. When premiums fall, insurers usually make more money on the policies, and Brown & Brown gets a share of that through those bonus commissions — so the two move in opposite directions and partly cancel out. And the company now has software agents handling more than a quarter of the paperwork on new submissions automatically, which lowers its own costs.
The bigger point is Accession, the large brokerage it bought last year, which added $445 million of revenue in the first quarter. Because the acquisition has not been owned for a full year yet, its contribution does not count as "organic" growth, which makes the headline growth number look poor. That reverses through 2026. Meanwhile profits per share still rose 8% to $1.39, and the shares are at what is described as the cheapest valuation in the company's history. The purchase: $15,000, 160 shares, at a limit of $63.
In short: Strong+ conviction. An insurance broker acting "as a middleman to find the right coverage" — "recurring revenue, strong free cash flow, and very low capital needs. Since 2001, Brown & Brown increased by +1,550% (CAGR: +12.1%)." One tier down only because of deal size: the $9.83bn Accession Risk Management acquisition (13.3% dilution, 5.7x revenue) — "We prefer Serial Acquirers to execute a lot of small acquisitions." Verdict on price: "Brown & Brown now trades at the cheapest valuation level of the past 10 years… And it's not even close!"
Brown & Brown is an insurance broker, not an insurer: it finds the right cover for businesses and individuals and takes a commission, without ever carrying the risk itself. That makes it a capital-light business with recurring revenue, strong free cash flow and very little need to reinvest — and it has returned about 1,550% since 2001, roughly 12% a year.
It sits one tier below his favourites for a reason worth borrowing. Brown & Brown grows by acquisition, and Slegers has no objection to that — his objection is to size. The $9.83 billion purchase of Accession Risk Management is far larger than the small bolt-ons a serial acquirer normally digests, and big deals concentrate the risk of overpaying into a single decision. "We prefer Serial Acquirers to execute a lot of small acquisitions."
On price he is unambiguous — the shares are at the cheapest valuation of the past ten years, "and it's not even close."
In short: Second of the three forward-P/E charts. Again no text — the chart is the whole argument. It is also one of the seven Strong Buys on the 19 March portfolio sheet (15.3x forward against a 24.7x five-year average, 38.1% under) and a category holding under "Where Rules and Humans Still Win" in the Portfolio Update.
Brown & Brown is an insurance broker: it finds the right cover for businesses and takes a commission, without carrying the risk itself. Revenue recurs because policies renew, and it needs very little capital to grow.
Like Constellation, it appears in this article as a chart rather than a paragraph — its shares are at one of the lowest earnings multiples in their history at a moment when the index is at one of its highest. Twelve days earlier the same publication rated it one of only seven Strong Buys in its own portfolio, at about 15 times forward earnings against a five-year average near 25.
In short: STRONG BUY. 15.3x forward against a 24.7x five-year average (38.1% under), expected return 14.2%, reverse-DCF margin +4.4pp on 10.2% expected growth. Fair value $100.4 against $68.33. One of the seven Strong Buys in the portfolio.
In short: Disclosed holding, category "Where Rules and Humans Still Win": an independent brokerage placing cover it does not underwrite, because "finding the right insurance coverage takes experience and relationships."
In short: One of the seven Strong Buys. A ~4.85% weight and one of the book's larger unrealised losses (roughly −$17,500), which is precisely the setup the 5 February sheet described: intrinsic value up 13.6% in 2025 against a 21.9% price fall, making the stock "35% (!) cheaper."
In short: STRONG BUY in the portfolio — and the issue's worked example of value diverging from price. "Increase intrinsic value in 2025: +13.6%. Stock price in 2025: -21.9%. As a result, the stock became 35% (!) cheaper. This is great news for long-term quality investors like ourselves." 17.2x forward against a 24.7x average (30.4% under), a 12.6% expected return and a $103.4 fair value against $80.01.
Brown & Brown is the issue's demonstration of what a "cheap" stock actually is. Slegers' estimate of what the business is worth rose 13.6% during 2025. The share price fell 21.9% over the same year. Put the two together and you are paying about 35% less for each dollar of value than you were twelve months ago — without anything having gone wrong.
The business itself is an insurance broker: it arranges cover and takes a commission, but never carries the risk of a claim, so it needs very little capital and earns fee income that renews every year. On the sheet it trades at 17.2 times forward earnings against a 24.7 average, with a fair value of $103.4 against an $80 price. It is one of six Strong Buys in the portfolio.
In short: STRONG BUY. Weight 5.1% (the largest in Part I), performance −10.9%. The position history is disclosed: "an amazing family business that we didn't initially buy a full position in due to valuation concerns. We fixed that in October of last year when the stock price declined by 1/3 from its peak in April." The three characteristics: recurring revenue, strong free cash flow, very low capital needs. Cause of the fall named as industry pricing — "the market is currently more competitive in the insurance industry." Valuation: 17.3x forward against a 24.5x five-year average ✅, Earnings Growth Model 11.8% ✅, reverse DCF needing just 5.9% against 10.0% expected ✅.
Brown & Brown arranges insurance for businesses and individuals and takes a commission, never carrying the risk itself — so it needs almost no capital, the revenue repeats, and the cash conversion is excellent.
The useful disclosure here is not about the company but about how the position was built. Slegers wanted it for years and only bought a partial stake because it was expensive. When the shares fell by a third from their April peak, he completed the position in October. That is why a name he rates as strongly as anything he owns is showing a loss: the average was built on the way down, deliberately.
Working backwards from today's price, the company needs to grow cash flow just 5.9% a year to deliver 10% annually to an owner, against roughly 10% expected. That is the widest margin of safety anywhere in this half of the portfolio.
In short: STRONG BUY — bought 27 November 2023, 5.3% of the portfolio and one of the five positions showing a loss (about −$6,000). The highest rating on a name that is under water is the clearest signal in the sheet that the ratings are forward-looking, not a scoreboard.
Brown & Brown is an insurance broker: it finds the right cover for businesses and takes a commission without ever carrying the risk itself. Capital-light, recurring, and family-run.
Like Novo Nordisk, it is rated STRONG BUY while sitting on a loss — about $6,000. The January update explains why: the position was deliberately built out during the autumn's one-third drawdown, so the rating reflects the price on offer rather than the entry already made.
In short: #2. An insurance brokerage placing property, casualty and employee-benefits cover for businesses and individuals. "Everyone needs insurance." Around since 1939, and management "thinks in decades instead of quarters."
Brown & Brown is an insurance broker, not an insurer. It does not take on the risk of your building burning down; it arranges the policy and takes a commission. That is a much lighter business — little capital tied up, fees that recur every renewal, and no exposure to a bad hurricane season.
The 50-year argument is simply that insurance is compulsory in commercial life and never stops being bought: "Everyone needs insurance." The company has been placing it since 1939, and Slegers singles out a management team that "thinks in decades instead of quarters" — the temperament a coffee-can holding requires.
Nothing matches this filter.
Verbatim excerpts from the public transcripts (auto-pulled at each mention's timestamp, lightly cleaned). Timestamps link into the video; "source page" opens that commentator's full analysis at this row. Click a mention's header line to expand it (one open at a time). For personal study — not investment advice.