| Account | Shares | Price | Value | % of acct | Cost/sh | Gain $ | Gain % | Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 401K | 794 | $32.99 | $26,193 | 1.07% | $15.29 | $14,051 | +115.7% | — |
In short: Third name in the low-risk large-cap trio ("the Suncors and the CNQs and soes"); read as Cenovus from context (a large Canadian integrated), identification probable.
29:14So I think we're looking at a lot of opportunities for investors here and you want to have some of those names in your portfolio. So sit down with your investment advisor, discuss how much weighting you have in resources, what is appropriate given your age and risk tolerance, but have some exposure and if your risk tolerance is low then buy the Suncors and the CNQs and soes; if your risk tolerance is a little more then there's a lot of very very attractive
In short: Third of the four named Canadian losers — "most Canadian crude is on the heavy side, including the country's enormous reserves in Alberta's tar sands," so a flooded heavy market "could weigh on profits for companies like Suncor, Cenovus, Imperial Oil and Canadian Natural Resources." The second-order risk is policy: the U.S. tariff exemption Canadian energy still holds rests on being an "important feedstock for U.S. refiners."
Cenovus is another Alberta heavy producer, exposed to the same widening-discount risk. Its partial defence is structure: it owns refining capacity of its own, so some of the margin a Gulf Coast refiner would capture from cheaper heavy crude is recaptured internally. An integrated producer-refiner is naturally hedged against exactly this news, because it sits on both sides of the spread.
The larger, slower risk is the political one the article raises at the end. Canadian energy has been exempted from U.S. tariffs because American refiners need it. If the U.S. cultivates a substitute source of heavy crude, that exemption stops being a fact and becomes a negotiation — and the article's own analyst says the leverage erodes "even before physical production grows." The barrels are a commercial issue; the exemption is an existential one.
In short: Named only as the acquirer in the reserves-versus-production example — MEG Energy "was acquired by Cenovus" — so Christina Lake's 4bn barrels and 100,000 b/d now sit inside CVE. No view offered on the shares in this episode (he backed the Canadian oil sands including Cenovus three weeks earlier).
53:28So again, this is happening. This is going to continue to happen. I think longer term, resources and reserves don't equal production. A very astute observer on FinTwit, Razer Oil made the point in a former AIA portfolio holding, MEG Energy, which had heavy oil assets, has heavy oil assets, was acquired by Cenovus, at Christina Lake, which was this major project, which was 100,000 barrels a day, that they finally got the production up to after many years of investment and tweaking the project, but they have 4 billion
In short: Raised only via CEO Jon McKenzie's public complaint at a June energy conference — that Ottawa wants more production while simultaneously raising the industrial carbon tax and demanding billions of CCS spend. Waterous ("I talk to him all the time") validates the math rather than the stock: the tax rise is real and the offset has to come from the province. Peer/policy reference, not a stance.
22:34In fact, I don't know if you and Jon McKenzie over at Cenovus ever made nice. — Oh, yeah. No, I talk to him all the time. — Okay. So, you know that about a month ago, in June — we're filming this in July. It's coming out August. So I think it was around in June — at a big energy conference. He really came out swinging and it wasn't even really about pipelines.
In short: Off the Aramco supply-shock numbers: "I'm bullish on oil companies… I'm bullish on companies that have refining capability. I've said I'm backing the companies like Cenovus, Suncor. I like the Canadian oil sands." Long-life, integrated barrels in a stable jurisdiction — the insulated-from-geopolitics asset he wants a higher risk premium to reward.
Cenovus is a large Canadian integrated: it produces oil-sands crude and also owns refineries that turn crude into diesel and gasoline. Polomny says he is "backing the companies like Cenovus, Suncor" and likes the Canadian oil sands generally.
Two reasons, both from the Aramco numbers he had just read. First, he's specifically bullish on companies that can refine, because the shortage is showing up in finished fuels, not only in crude. Second — and this is the geographic argument he keeps making — the Persian Gulf now carries a war premium, so barrels that sit safely in Alberta are worth more than the same barrels sitting where a strait can be closed. "You want to own assets in areas that are going to be insulated from that geopolitical conflict."
40:168 billion barrels. To put this into context, if the Strait of Hormuz was to open today, it would take up to 18 months at an average rate of 2.1 million barrels per day to replenish depleted inventories on top of demand. And so, again, I'm bullish on oil companies. I'm bullish on companies that have refining capability. I've said I'm backing the companies like Cenovus, Suncor. I like the Canadian oil sands, okay? I'll mention another one, Athabasca Oil. I recently bought. This is the cash machine. I just recently was at a conference, participated in a conference, and I've owned this company off and on, and the case was made to me that this is a long-term, basically, cash cow, following the same model that I like, repaying debt, excess cash flow now, long-life asset in a
In short: Named first among the big Canadian names, on price alone: "Cenovus, not a great company, but stupidly cheap." Part of the broader claim that "as cheap as our companies are relative to the cash flows as they'll enjoy in 2029, the Canadian companies are cheaper because there's headline political risk."
Cenovus gets one of the bluntest recommendations of the interview: "not a great company, but stupidly cheap." Rick separates the quality question from the price question and is willing to own a mediocre operator when the discount is extreme enough.
The discount is Canadian, not company-specific: "as cheap as our companies are relative to the cash flows as they'll enjoy in 2029, the Canadian companies are cheaper because there's headline political risk." If Ottawa's posture toward hydrocarbons softens — and his read is that Carney is fiscally pragmatic even where he is philosophically opposed — that gap narrows for every Canadian producer at once.
35:38particularly attractive. Are there names? Yeah, that's what I was — are there names? Sure. The big ones: Cenovus, not a great company, but stupidly cheap. Canadian Natural Resources, a better company, big company, covers the length and breadth of the Canadian play. Those are there.
In short: Confirmed as one of the oil-levered names he liked alongside CNQ in April 2025 (MEG Energy has since merged into it). Still sees upside — "oil high for longer" leaves these stocks room to run a fair bit higher.
Cenovus is a large Canadian oil-sands producer and refiner. When the host recapped his April-2025 energy call, she noted he had also liked Cenovus and MEG Energy — and that MEG has since been absorbed into Cenovus. He confirmed it.
The thesis is the same as for CNQ: he bought quality oil-levered businesses when the sector was unloved and oil was priced below trend, and he still sees upside because oil can stay "high for longer." He is, on his own account, more excited about energy today than about the banks.
35:53You said we're going to make a lot of money. The question is, I mean, you also liked I think Cenovus and MEG, now it's just Cenovus. — Yeah. — So, you like energy. You see there's more upside. You said that at the top of the show. Is CNQ still your favorite way to play it? Do you have others? — Yeah, it'd be one of the best ways to play it for us and it commands the biggest weight for us in that sector.
In short: On his (now-diminished) Canadian oil & gas list: "not a particularly good company, but selling at such an insane discount on any financial metric" that it makes the cut.
Cenovus is a Canadian oil producer. Rick is blunt that it's "not a particularly good company," but it makes his list purely on price — it's "selling at such an insane discount on any financial metric" that the cheapness alone is the reason to own it.
45:33that number fell seven weeks ago when Shell decided to take over ARC, which was also my favorite. — I know you loved Arc. Yep. — Yep. But the list of companies up there probably includes Senovas now. not a particularly good company, but selling at such an insane discount on any financial metric.
In short: Owned — largest holding across the book, held since the Husky merger. Trades ~1.6x capital while delivering 20%+ (peak ~35%) returns on capital — "that's too low," which is why they buy back stock. Trimmed only to satisfy the 10%-per-fund regulatory cap after MEG/price gains, not on conviction; still "attractively priced." Should be a supermajor consolidator.
Cenovus is a big Canadian oil-sands producer (it swallowed Husky Energy). It's Smead's single largest holding, and he's owned it since that merger. His core argument is a valuation one: a company is worth more when it earns high returns on the money invested in it. Cenovus earns roughly 20%+ (and near 35% at peak) on its capital, yet the stock trades at only ~1.6 times that capital base — a business that good "never trades at two times capital." In plain terms, the market is pricing it as if returns will collapse to the low teens, but they aren't collapsing. So the shares are simply too cheap, which is why management keeps buying back stock. He trimmed it only because Canadian fund rules cap any single position at 10% (oil stocks ran and MEG got bought out) — not because he soured on it.
7:19The opportunity set is more narrow. So, across our investors, we own Cenovus. That's our largest holding across our book. Secondly would be Strathcona. We also own in that SAGD world, we own International Petroleum, okay? And then we also own Imperial Oil, okay? And as we think those assets together, we think about this mix of heavy oil SAGD, but pretty geographically focused.
In short: The host cites Cenovus CEO John McKenzie ("incentivize us, not penalize us for production"); Ebel later lists Cenovus among his customers. Peer/customer reference.
9:29I think that's a good point. And in fact, the CEO of Cenovus, John McKenzie, made that point about a month ago, saying you need to
9:36incentivize us, not penalize us for increased production. It sounds like in your chats with your customers that
In short: "Would be in my top three" — "has more juice." West White Rose & other expansion capex converting to production (plus the MEG Energy growth) sets up a big free-cash-flow wedge as capex steps down.
Cenovus is a large Canadian oil producer. He says it "would be in my top three" and "has more juice" than PrairieSky.
The reason: it's finishing several big expansion projects (the West White Rose offshore project, plus growth from buying MEG Energy). Once the heavy spending tapers off and those projects start producing, cash should pile up fast — the gap between money coming in and money going out widens sharply, which is exactly the setup he likes.
31:59Does Cenovus have more juice is it time to take some gains? Of course, their growth has exploded after buying MEG Energy. Cenovus would be in my top three, so I think it's has has more juice. Uh I believe that with the uh expansion uh capital that is going to be converting into production, um West White Rose and some of their other expansions, um you're going to see a a pretty significant step up in cash flow alongside a potential step down of CapEx.
In short: Cole — #1 in the X-US book AND the biggest energy holding in the US portfolio. Resilient even as the commodity moved sideways because the old Canadian discount has gone away. "The Canadians have better dinosaurs" (Bill) — the wells last 25+ years. SAGD oil sands with high reserve life.
44:40who missed that episode that in the Canadian energy sector everybody needs a daddy you need and so the sector is going to consolidate — um so let's talk about this sector Now still remember you were on you said novice is your number one in the XUS. — Yep. It's also our biggest energy holding US portfolio. — In the US portfolio also — and in the US portfolio.
In short: Owned — biggest position, >12% of the non-US fund ("by far"). Monday's Venezuela-panic drop was "obscene… makes no sense." What he'd tell management (McKenzie/Cam): "Monday's reaction was utterly ridiculous — sell the refineries and buy back stock, because they think we're a dead duck." Be long the unhedged upstream, not the refineries.
Cenovus is Smead's single biggest holding — over 12% of his non-US fund. When Canadian oil stocks were dumped on the Venezuela news, Cenovus fell hard for no good reason ("obscene… makes no sense"). His message to management is blunt: the market is treating you like a dead duck, so sell the refineries and buy back stock. The refineries are a lower-return, hedged business; the value is in the long-life oil, and buying back cheap shares turns the panic to shareholders' advantage.
1:00:57We didn't get to roll our gains forward. really disappointing. Um, again, I really didn't like how the board treated us as shareholders in the end with that. Um, if you're a Canadian, you didn't have to deal with that. God bless you. You're more special in this life. Um, so I say that because we we've sat on our entire SNOVA position.
In short: Pro pick — owned. Spin the US refineries (priced at zero). Wild theory: Li Ka-shing's standstill ends late 2025 → Cenovus "in play"; Elliott + Suncor could take it out all-stock and spin the US refinery assets into a US listing (~35% odds). Good upstream assets mis-priced by the refinery drag.
Cenovus is Smead's owned Canadian oil-sands major. Two catalysts: first, the market values its US refineries at essentially zero, so spinning them off into a separate US-listed company would surface hidden value. Second — his "wild theory" — Li Ka-shing's Hong Kong entities, big Cenovus holders, have a standstill agreement expiring in late 2025, after which Cenovus could be "in play." He spins a scenario where activist Elliott teams up with Suncor to buy Cenovus in an all-stock deal and spin off the combined US refineries. He puts maybe a 35% chance on it — the point is the good upstream assets are being masked by the refinery drag.
52:32Okay, but this gets me to my new theory. Um I said that you know their daddy Lee Kushing's entities has a standstill that ends later this year. Um I think when that standill ends I think so is in play. But sorry, do you think that leaking will take it out totally or take out? I I'm saying they'll go to a third party and they will the business will be sold um to someone in all stock deal to whom? Uh Suncor really and here's why I say it. Tell me.
In short: Owned (both US and X-US portfolios) — pro pick #3. Long-life asset base at ~1.5x book with mid-teens returns on capital. The US refineries are "priced at zero or negative" — should be spun tax-free into a US listing to let the market value them, then eventually sold to a refiner. Quarterly miss late Feb took it to a 3-year low; still owns it.
Cenovus is a big Canadian oil-sands producer. Smead owns it in both his US and international funds. His argument here is about the refineries Cenovus got in the Husky merger: the market is giving them zero (or negative) value. So Smead wants Cenovus to either sell them or spin them off tax-free into a separate US-listed company, letting the market put a real price on them — pure upside for shareholders who are getting nothing for them today. Under it all he's buying long-life oil assets earning mid-teens returns at roughly 1.5x book value, which he considers cheap.
1:12:22back let's get into your third pick which is sovis bouncing off of a three-year low quarterly results I think like kind of at the end of February were a miss and the stock uh got taken down it's bounced a little bit since then um you sounded like you were getting a little cautious on covas talk to me about um you know why you still have conviction in the name and where you think it can go from here yeah the the asset Basin long life asset basins are what we're most attracted to and that's what covis has okay so when I was
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