| Account | Shares | Price | Value | % of acct | Cost/sh | Gain $ | Gain % | Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROTH | 120 | $47.30 | $5,676 | 2.21% | $53.70 | $-768 | -11.9% | — |
In short: The losing side of the GLP-1 race (32:44, 38:43). Shares fall after long-term goals "failed to ease some concerns about its ability to compete"; Terranova: "clearly there's challenges for Novo Nordisk" while Lilly takes ~7 in 10 new Medicare patients.
Novo makes Ozempic and Wegovy, the rivals to Lilly's weight-loss drugs. Its shares fell after its long-term targets failed to convince investors it can keep up. Terranova says the challenges are clear while Lilly wins most new patients.
In short: Named only as the losing side of the GLP-1 duopoly, and deliberately: Terranova, making the Lilly case, asks the control room for the chart — "if you could show a chart of Novo Nordisk, you'll see the significant outperformance for Lilly." No thesis on the company was offered; it appears as the visual proof that Lilly's diversification of the product line, not the GLP-1 category itself, is what has been rewarded.
Novo Nordisk is the Danish maker of the other leading obesity and diabetes drugs — Lilly's only real competitor in the GLP-1 category. It appears here purely as a contrast: Terranova asks for its chart on air to show Lilly's "significant outperformance."
No case was made for or against the company. But the comparison carries an argument: two companies selling into the same booming category have produced very different returns, which means the boom itself is not what the market is paying for. What it is paying for, on Terranova's account, is Lilly's reinvestment of the proceeds into a broader pipeline.
In short: TO BE REDUCED, and the weakest set of numbers in the portfolio. The lowest EPS CAGR at 7%, and the owner's-earnings sheet is worse still: EPS falling from 23.03 (2025) to 22.98 (2028) — −0.22% total, −0.07% a year — leaving a modelled three-year return of 3.43%, almost all of it the 3.5% dividend. ~3.5% of the book, 1,410 shares yielding $3,002.40; −18% YTD, −24% over twelve months. Consistent with the BUY → HOLD downgrade "due to increasing competition" nine days earlier, and it settles that issue's contradiction in favour of the downgrade.
Novo Nordisk is the second name marked for reduction, and its numbers here are the weakest in the portfolio by some distance. Analysts expect earnings per share to be essentially flat between 2025 and 2028 — 23.03 falling to 22.98 — which after adding a 3.5% dividend leaves a modelled return of about 3.4% a year. Expected growth over three to five years is 7%, the lowest of the 21 holdings.
This settles a contradiction from nine days earlier. The Buy-Hold-Sell issue cut Novo from buy to hold "due to increasing competition", while its own spreadsheet still showed the shares 54% below fair value and rated them BUY. Here the direction is unambiguous: the position gets smaller.
The general lesson is the useful part. A stock can be genuinely cheap — Novo trades at 12 times earnings against a five-year average of 28 — and still be the wrong place for money, if the earnings it is cheap against are not going to grow. That is exactly the mistake the letter says it has learned to stop making.
In short: DOWNGRADED BUY → HOLD "due to increasing competition" — "Pharmaceutical company focused on insulin and GLP-1 drugs." The downgrade is made against the models, which are emphatic: fair value DKK 647.5 vs 294.7 (54.5% undervalued), forward PE 12.3 against a 27.8 five-year average (55.8% under), expected return 18.9% — the highest in the portfolio. Judgement is overriding the spreadsheet here, which is the more interesting fact. Same inconsistency as Dino Polska: still BUY on the portfolio sheet, still on the list of nineteen.
Novo Nordisk makes insulin and the GLP-1 weight-loss drugs. It is downgraded from buy to hold for the same stated reason as Dino Polska: increasing competition.
What makes this the most interesting decision in the issue is that every number the letter publishes screams the opposite. The shares are shown 54.5% below the letter's own fair value, at 12 times forward earnings against a five-year average of 28, with the highest expected return of any holding at 18.9%. The downgrade overrules all of that on a judgement about rivals — which is either the framework working as intended (a cheap price cannot fix a shrinking moat) or the framework being abandoned at the worst moment. Both readings are live, and the issue offers no argument to settle it.
The same bookkeeping caveat applies: the portfolio sheet still says BUY.
In short: Pill holds up. Q2 sales +2% Y/Y (+3% cc) to DKK 78.5B (~$12.1B) with adjusted sales +7% and underlying operating profit +11% excluding impairments and last year's DKK 340B distortion. Oral Wegovy generated DKK 3.2B (~$500M), +40% sequentially and past 5 million prescriptions since launch — an impressive ramp, though slightly below consensus. The rest is harder: injectable Wegovy grew just 1% cc to DKK 19.5B and Ozempic 5%, and Novo still expects US sales to decline this year on lower realized prices, reduced Medicaid obesity coverage and intensifying Lilly competition; CagriSema showed strong absolute efficacy but failed its head-to-head obesity endpoint against tirzepatide earlier this year. Novo nevertheless raised FY26 adjusted sales and operating-profit guidance dramatically to flat to −6% cc, from −4% to −12%, on stronger US GLP-1 demand and international launches. "Oral Wegovy is giving Novo exactly the boost it needed. But Lilly still has the stronger growth profile and next-generation pipeline, leaving Novo increasingly dependent on the pill and higher-dose Wegovy to close the gap."
Novo Nordisk is Lilly's main rival in weight-loss drugs, with Wegovy and Ozempic. Its quarter was much quieter: sales up 2%, or 3% stripping out currency moves.
The bright spot is the pill version of Wegovy, which brought in about $500 million — up 40% in three months and past five million prescriptions since launch. That is the product Novo needed, because a tablet is far easier to distribute and take than a weekly injection.
Everything else is harder. The injectable version of Wegovy grew just 1%, Ozempic 5%, and Novo still expects its US sales to fall this year — squeezed by lower realised prices, reduced Medicaid coverage for obesity, and Lilly taking share. Its next-generation candidate, CagriSema, works well in absolute terms but lost a head-to-head trial against Lilly's tirzepatide earlier this year, which is why the pipeline comparison favours Lilly.
Novo did raise its full-year outlook substantially — from a 4–12% decline to somewhere between flat and −6% — so the trajectory is improving. But the read is balanced rather than positive: the company is now leaning heavily on one product, the pill, to close a gap against a competitor with both the faster growth and the deeper pipeline.
In short: BUY, but the internal contradiction of the issue. Bought 26 May 2025; $49.5 against a $97.1 fair value — +96.2% — and forward PE 12.3 against a 27.8 five-year average, the widest multiple gap in the book. Yet its own owner's-earnings line is the only negative one: EPS 23.03 (2025) → 22.98 (2028), i.e. -0.07% a year, giving a three-year expected return of just 3.43% carried almost entirely by the 3.5% dividend. Progress is real — "Novo Nordisk now has Oral Wegovy and the higher dose Wegovy injection approved throughout the EU. The company plans to launch the pill in more and more countries throughout 2026" (16 July) — and it is the name he said he was "more comfortable" with than Eli Lilly nine days earlier. Results due 5 August.
Novo Nordisk makes Ozempic and Wegovy, and shares the obesity and diabetes drug market with Eli Lilly. Nine days before this update, Slegers passed on Lilly and said he was "more comfortable with Novo Nordisk" — this post shows why on price and, unintentionally, why the choice is not free.
On price the case is the strongest in the portfolio. The shares change hands at about 12 times next year's earnings against a five-year norm near 28 — the widest gap of any holding — and the fair-value calculation says they are worth roughly double the current price. The news is good too: oral Wegovy and a higher-dose injection are now approved across the EU, with the pill rolling out through more countries during 2026.
The uncomfortable number sits in the owner's-earnings table. Novo is the only holding whose profits are forecast to go nowhere: earnings per share of 23.03 in 2025 against 22.98 in 2028. Strip out the 3.5% dividend and the expected three-year return is 3.4% — the lowest in the book. So this is not a growth position at all; it is a bet that a company whose earnings are flat for three years is priced as if they were about to fall, and that the multiple recovers. Worth holding that tension in mind when reading the Lilly comparison, where the objection to Lilly was that its price assumed 18.9% growth.
In short: The preferred way to own the same theme — and the post's last sentence. Named twice: as the co-owner of the market ("they dominate the entire market for diabetic and obesity care together with Novo Nordisk") and as the competitive risk to Lilly ("Eli Lilly faces strong competition from Novo Nordisk, the maker of Ozempic and Wegovy. The race to dominate the obesity and diabetes market is becoming more intense"). The conclusion inverts that: "We feel more comfortable with Novo Nordisk." No valuation work is shown here — the preference is stated, not argued, and rests on the price comparison rather than on business quality.
Novo Nordisk is the other half of the GLP-1 duopoly — the maker of Ozempic and Wegovy, and the company Lilly is racing. It appears twice in this piece: once as the partner in dominance ("they dominate the entire market for diabetic and obesity care together with Novo Nordisk") and once as the principal competitive risk to the stock being analysed.
Then the final sentence flips the framing: "We feel more comfortable with Novo Nordisk." No workings are shown for that preference here — it is an expression of relative price, not a claim that Novo is the better business. The whole Lilly analysis is a demonstration that quality and price are separate questions, and this closing line is the practical consequence: when you want exposure to a theme but the best-quality name is priced for perfection, the cheaper participant in the same duopoly is the position.
Novo is a portfolio holding elsewhere in this archive, where the August update notes its Oral Wegovy and higher-dose injection approvals across the EU — and also shows it as the one holding whose earnings are forecast to go sideways to 2028, which is worth reading alongside this endorsement.
In short: STRONG BUY on valuation, Medium conviction on quality — the split unchanged from June. FV 683.3 vs 332.0 = 51.4% under; ER 18.4%; fwd PE 12.3 against 27.8 (55.8% under); and the reverse DCF has flipped positive: 7.5% required against 8.6% expected, where June's read −1.4pp. Now flat on the year (+0.5%).
In short: STRONG BUY on valuation but only Medium conviction on quality — the sharpest split in the book, and the same one that made it a named mistake in "Why We Are Partners." FV 632.3 vs 283.9 = 55.1% under; ER 19.0%, the highest of the eighteen; fwd PE 12.3 against 27.8 (55.8% under); but RDCF requires 10.0% against 8.6% expected — the one model that says no.
Novo Nordisk carries the widest split in the portfolio: the highest possible valuation rating — Strong Buy, with the best expected return of any holding at 19% a year — and one of the lowest quality convictions, Medium. That combination is unusual and it is a warning, not a bargain signal.
The numbers behind it: the shares are at 12 times expected profits against a five-year average of 28, so more than half the multiple has gone. But the third model, which works backwards from the price, says the market is implying 10% growth while the firm only expects 8.6% — the one test that says the price is not cheap enough. Reading the two together: the market has stopped believing the growth story, and the archive is not fully sure the market is wrong.
In short: Named as a process mistake rather than a broken thesis: "Buying Novo Nordisk because I thought the stock was cheap. Up until now, the stock only became cheaper." Note the precise wording — the error identified is the reason for buying (cheapness), not the company. That is consistent with the position being defended at length two days earlier on business grounds (the Wegovy pill launch, 1 million patients treated, better efficacy than Lilly's) and rated STRONG BUY on 7 May. It is the same objection first recorded on 28 April. Nothing is sold.
In short: Highlighted as a steal, with both sides stated. "Novo Nordisk now trades at the same price than before (!) it launched Ozempic." The three market fears are listed in full: a US government agreement cutting Wegovy and Ozempic from over $1,000 to as low as $149 for some doses; loss of semaglutide data exclusivity in Canada and India; and messy, expensive manufacturing scale-up pressuring margins. Against them, the launch data: the Wegovy pill reached over 170,000 patients in four weeks and more than 1 million treated by the end of Q1 — "the biggest, most successful drug launch ever" — while Eli Lilly's oral Foundayo "is selling at much lower volumes", and "new data shows that people taking Novo's pill lose more weight and have fewer side effects". The framing: "investors are punishing Novo for pricing their pills so low… The company is winning the race for the obesity pill market."
Novo Nordisk makes the diabetes and weight-loss drugs Ozempic and Wegovy. Its shares now cost the same as they did before Ozempic launched — the entire boom has been given back.
Three things frightened the market. The US government negotiated the price down from over $1,000 a month to as little as $149 for some doses. The patent protection on the underlying drug ran out in Canada and India, so copies can be made there. And building enough manufacturing capacity has been expensive and messy, which squeezed profit margins.
What the share price ignores is the launch of the pill version of Wegovy, described here as possibly the most successful drug launch ever. It reached 170,000 patients in four weeks and over a million by the end of the first quarter. Eli Lilly's competing pill is selling far less, and new trial data shows Novo's version produces more weight loss with fewer side effects.
So the argument is that investors are punishing the company for cutting the price, while missing that a cheap pill nobody has to inject reaches a vastly larger number of people than an expensive injection ever could. Volume, not price, is where the value is.
In short: STRONG BUY in the portfolio table (Medium conviction) — a sharp turn from being named a cheapness-driven mistake nine days earlier. Five positive developments listed: "net profit, revenue, and operating profit all came in ahead of expectations, and management raised 2026 guidance"; "the Wegovy pill was the most successful drug launch ever"; total prescriptions over 2 million; "Wegovy brand now holds 65% of all new prescriptions in the U.S."; and a "strategic partnership with OpenAI: enhancing drug discovery". Model: EPS growth 8.6%, dividend 4.3%, FWD PE 12.3 against a fair exit 20.0, expected return 19.2%, fair value 636.7 against 278.0 = 56.3% undervalued. "Currently, the stock is trading at it's lowest valuation levels."
Nine days after being listed among the purchases made "because it was cheap" and given a "not sure" on whether it was worth owning for a decade, Novo Nordisk is rated a Strong Buy here — and the reason is that the news changed.
Profit, revenue and operating profit all came in ahead of forecasts and management raised its guidance for the year. The pill version of Wegovy is described as the most successful drug launch ever, with more than two million prescriptions written and the Wegovy brand now taking 65% of all new weight-loss prescriptions in America — which is the number that answers the "losing to Eli Lilly" worry. It has also signed a partnership with OpenAI to speed up drug discovery.
The shares are at their lowest valuation ever: about 12 times next year's earnings with a 4.3% dividend, against a model fair value roughly double the market price, giving an expected return of 19.2% a year.
The two views are not contradictory, and it is worth understanding why. The archive rates every holding twice — once on the quality of the business, once on the price. Novo remains a Medium conviction on quality. It is simply very cheap.
In short: Third-best performer at +17.9% — a notable turn for a name called a cheapness-driven "mistake" five days earlier. Performance table only; the substantive update comes on 7 May.
In short: Answered "Not sure" on the ten-year test, and named in the same breath as Text SA and OTC Markets as a cheapness-driven purchase that "ended up being a mistake (so far)" — a notably harsher framing than the Medium-conviction write-up nine days earlier. But not for sale: "I don't think we'll sell Novo Nordisk or Evolution AB in the near future."
Novo Nordisk gets a harsher treatment here than in the portfolio review nine days earlier. It appears twice, and both are unflattering.
First, in a list of past mistakes. The author observes a pattern in his own record: "every single time I bought a company not because I thought it was the highest quality, but because it was cheap, it ended up being a mistake" — and names Text SA, OTC Markets and Novo Nordisk as the examples. That is a statement about why it was bought, not about what it is worth today.
Second, in the ten-year test. Asked whether he would be content to own it if the market shut for a decade, the answer is "not sure" — one of only three holdings out of eighteen to get anything other than a yes.
It is not being sold, though: "I don't think we'll sell Novo Nordisk or Evolution AB in the near future." A week later the shares are rated a Strong Buy on the valuation, which is a fair illustration of how differently the two questions — is it cheap, and do I want to own it — can be answered about the same company.
In short: Medium conviction. Terry Smith's verdict is quoted in full: Novo has "moved from a triumph to a tragedy… they managed to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory in the core US market by playing it very badly against their competition, Eli Lilly." The pipeline case is still made — a GLP-1 market "expected to hit ~$200B by 2034", oral Wegovy launched in 2026, Cagrisema ~2027, and ~$40bn of a ~$175bn addressable market by 2031 — plus a renewed Hims & Hers distribution deal under which Hims stops advertising compounded GLP-1s. Valuation on Smith's own rule: earnings yield 8.0% + EPS growth 6% = 14% expected return, with Arne Ulland's published working arguing the diabetes segment alone (DKK ~200bn revenue, ~42% EBIT margin, 8-12x EV/EBIT = DKK 150-230/share against a DKK ~235 price) means "you're getting the entire GLP-1 obesity franchise for free." The counterweight: "there is a lot of uncertainty… Is Novo Nordisk a company I want to own for the next 10 years? If the answer is no, we might need to look for other, better opportunities."
Novo Nordisk makes diabetes and obesity drugs — Ozempic and Wegovy — and shares that market with Eli Lilly. It invented the category and then lost control of the American end of it, which is why a holding that was once obviously right is now openly questioned.
Terry Smith, who has owned it since 2016, puts it bluntly: the company went "from a triumph to a tragedy" and "managed to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory" in the US by handling the competition badly, both against Lilly and against the compounding pharmacies selling copies.
The bull case has not disappeared. The pill version of Wegovy launched this year, a stronger drug is due around 2027, and the same class of medicine is showing promise in heart failure, liver disease and sleep apnea. Two separate calculations say the shares are cheap: a simple one (an 8% earnings yield plus 6% growth gives roughly 14% a year) and a more detailed one from another investor, who works out that the diabetes business alone is worth about the entire current share price — meaning the buyer gets the whole weight-loss franchise thrown in for nothing.
The reason it is still only a Medium conviction is the test applied at the end, which has nothing to do with valuation: would you want to own this for the next ten years? If the answer is no, cheapness is not a reason to stay.
In short: STRONG BUY, and the most undervalued name on the forward-PE screen. "A quality company that has been around since 1923 (!)… currently going through a very tough time. Competition is rising and Eli Lilly's clinical trials are superior to the ones of Novo Nordisk. It results in slower growth ahead and a falling stock price. The current drawdown could provide opportunities… Today, you can buy Novo Nordisk at one of its cheapest valuation levels ever." 11.8x forward against a 27.8x five-year average (57.6% under), the sheet's highest expected return at 20.3%, but a reverse-DCF deficit of −1.4pp — the price already requires 10.0% growth against 8.6% expected.
This is a Strong Buy that publishes its own bear case. Novo Nordisk makes diabetes and obesity drugs, and the problem is stated plainly: Eli Lilly's trial results are better, competition is increasing, and growth will therefore be slower. Nothing here disputes that.
The argument is entirely about price. The shares trade at under 12 times expected earnings against a five-year average of nearly 28 — the widest gap on the whole sheet — with a 4.7% dividend yield on top, which is what produces a modelled 20.3% annual return, the highest of the 45 names. The honest caveat is in the third screen: work backwards from today's price and it already implies 10% annual growth against the 8.6% actually expected. That is the one test the position fails, and it is the same holding that was the portfolio's worst performer a week earlier at −39.5%.
In short: Worst holding: −39.5% (written as $NOVO-B). Doubles as the sentiment indicator — a quoted reader comment on Novo prompts the contrarian read: "When your barber starts to give you investment advice, it's time to run away. When people are becoming desperate, it's usually a great time to buy more." A week later it is a Strong Buy on the Buy-Hold-Sell sheet.
In short: Disclosed holding, category "Basic Human Needs & Desires": diabetes and obesity drugs, chosen because "Novo Nordisk addresses growing, chronic health conditions." No valuation work in this issue — that arrives eleven days later on the Buy-Hold-Sell sheet.
In short: Tax-loss-package recap (cautionary) — Haymaker "whiffed" by not suggesting a gain after NVO ran ~30% in <60 days; it then "flipped from a 30% gain into a 23% loss," "a costly reversal of fortune." The package's one self-criticized miss — a lesson in taking partial profits, not a fresh view on NVO.
In short: A Strong Buy — upgraded from Buy since the 5 February sheet. A ~5.15% weight and roughly −$20,000 unrealised, on the widest multiple discount in the watchlist (12.5x forward against a 27.8x five-year average).
In short: BUY, a portfolio holding, and third on the forward-PE screen. 12.5x forward against a 27.8x five-year average — a 55.0% gap, the widest multiple discount in the watchlist — for the highest expected return of any portfolio name at 17.6%, and a DKK 729.1 fair value against DKK 382.8. Also the best YTD performer among the portfolio holdings at +15.9%.
In short: STRONG BUY. Weight 5.7%, performance −7.0%. "The market seemed to agree that Eli Lilly will dominate the industry while Novo Nordisk will keep struggling. As a result, Novo Nordisk is more than twice as cheap as Eli Lilly (!). I don't think this will last." Five supports, four of them about the pill: the obesity market "is big enough for both companies"; "Novo Nordisk is ahead of Eli Lilly with GLP-1 pills"; Novo's pill "is approved and on sale now (Lilly has only submitted for approval)"; Lilly's approval "looks like it's going to be delayed by at least another quarter"; and Novo's pill "led to higher weight loss than Lilly's." Already +15% year to date. Valuation: 17.4x forward against a 28.3x five-year average ✅, Earnings Growth Model 14.3% ✅, and the one dissent — a reverse DCF requiring 11.4% against a long-term estimate of 8.6% and a ten-year FCF CAGR of 10.3%. "The low valuation level seems to offer a high margin of safety." Argued in full in the 15 January deep dive.
Novo Nordisk makes Ozempic and Wegovy and shares the weight-loss drug market with Eli Lilly.
The market has decided Lilly wins, and priced the two accordingly: Novo now costs less than half what Lilly does for each unit of profit. Slegers thinks that gap closes, and — unlike the January deep dive, which argued mostly that the market is big enough for both — the case here is specific and about the next product.
The next battleground is a daily pill rather than a weekly injection, because plenty of people will not inject themselves. Novo's pill is approved and on sale; Lilly's has only been submitted and looks delayed by at least a quarter; and Novo's produced more weight loss in trials. Being first and better in the format that opens the market to everyone who refuses needles is a concrete advantage, not a hope.
The shares are at 17.4 times earnings against a five-year average of 28.3. The one dissenting signal is that the price still needs earnings to grow 11.4% a year while analysts expect 8.6% — so this is a bet on the multiple recovering, not on the growth arriving.
In short: "A quality stock facing problems right now" — a STRONG BUY in the same month's portfolio sheet, argued here in full. Classified as a Duopoly, at DKK 378 and a DKK 1.3trn market cap; world leader in diabetes with "over 50% of the world's insulin supply." The market: 934m people with obesity, 2.2m on branded medication, 97% untapped, demand growing "more than 100% (!) per year." The damage is conceded — GLP-1 share 59% → 50%, obesity share 74% → 53% in a year — and then reframed: "None of this matters as much as you might think. The market is growing so fast that even with less market share, Novo's revenue is still hitting record highs." Valuation: 16.9x next year's earnings against Lilly's 34.1x; since 2020 the forward PE fell 20.9x → 12.9x (−38%) while EPS rose DKK 9 → 23.5 (+161%). Reverse DCF (on EPS, because of high CAPEX): 2.9% annual EPS growth for a 10% return — "the market doesn't seem to have a lot of expectations from Novo Nordisk right now." Pipeline: CagriSema, oral semaglutide, amylin-based drugs and a licensed GLP-1/GIP/glucagon triple agonist at 24% weight loss at 48 weeks. Optionality beyond weight: "semaglutide is showing promise for heart failure, kidney disease, and even alcohol addiction."
Novo Nordisk is the Danish company behind Ozempic and Wegovy. It makes more than half the world's insulin, but the reason anyone talks about it now is the weight-loss injections.
The past two years went badly in a very specific way. Demand was so far ahead of what Novo could manufacture that pharmacies were allowed, under American law, to mix their own copies — and up to 30% of patients took those instead. While the shelves were empty, Eli Lilly ramped up its own drug, which happens to work better: about 20% of body weight lost against Wegovy's 14%. The result is that Novo's share of the obesity market fell from 74% to 53% in a single year.
Slegers' argument is not that this is untrue. It is that share of a market and size of a market are different things. About 934 million people are obese and only 2.2 million are on a branded medicine — so 97% of the customers have not been reached yet, and demand is more than doubling annually. In a market growing that fast, losing share and still setting revenue records is arithmetically ordinary. His phrase is "the market is big enough for both to win."
The price is what makes it a position rather than an observation. Since 2020 Novo's earnings per share have risen 161% while the multiple people will pay for them has fallen 38%. It now costs about 17 times next year's profits against Eli Lilly's 34 — you can buy two shares of one for a share of the other. And working backwards from today's price, the company only has to grow earnings 2.9% a year for the next decade to hand an owner 10% a year. That is a very low bar for a business in a category doubling annually.
The honest counter, which the piece does not press, is that everything here rests on the category rather than on Novo winning. If Lilly's better drug keeps taking new patients, Novo grows into a shrinking share of an expanding pool — which is exactly the reasoning that eventually downgrades the name in August 2026, on competition rather than on price.
In short: #2 pick. "Novo Nordisk is also in a perfect storm right now. The market is very negative… Investors worry about more competition from Eli Lilly and a lower market share going forward. Novo Nordisk is currently twice as cheap as Eli Lilly." The turn is already visible: "The U.S. Food and Drug Administration recently approved its Wegovy pill. The stock is up +20.2% since then." Table: 32.9% net margin, 25.7% ROIC, 15.4x forward, 8.6% expected EPS growth. Argued in full four days later in the deep dive.
In short: STRONG BUY — bought 26 May 2025, 4.6% of the portfolio, and the second-worst position by dollars (about −$22,000). Rated at the top of the scale while sitting near the bottom of the P&L.
Novo Nordisk makes the diabetes and weight-loss injections Ozempic and Wegovy, and shares that market with Eli Lilly.
Bought in May 2025, it is already down about $22,000 — and it is rated STRONG BUY, the highest rating on the sheet. A position that has gone against you and is being marked as the best available price is an unusually clean commitment, and it is testable: the deep dive two weeks later (15 January) sets out the whole argument, and the case is still running in August.
Nothing matches this filter.
Verbatim excerpts from the public transcripts (auto-pulled at each mention's timestamp, lightly cleaned). Timestamps link into the video; "source page" opens that commentator's full analysis at this row. Click a mention's header line to expand it (one open at a time). For personal study — not investment advice.