In short: The 2026 Red Book: "sufficient resources, insufficient investment" — the uranium "that can be mined at a reasonable cost is actually shrinking," output from existing and committed mines peaks ~2030 and halves by 2040, and at a realistic 85% of nameplate "the shortfall begins in 2030, even under the lowest demand forecast," passing 130M lb/yr by 2040. Spot slipped $90.05 → $89.85 on five deals while term held $96 and utilities sought deliveries to 2035 — "a long-term structural thesis rather than a near-term squeeze."
The weekly "spot" price — what a pound costs for immediate delivery — dipped 20 cents to just under $90 on only five trades. Frostad says not to read much into that: spot is a thin market that goes quiet between bursts. What mattered is that utilities kept asking for long-term supply for 2028 to 2035, and the long-term contract price held at $96.
The heart of the episode is the Red Book, the official uranium "census" published every two years by the OECD's Nuclear Energy Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Its message: there is plenty of uranium in the ground, but not enough mines being built to dig it up in time. The cheap uranium is running down faster than new cheap deposits are found, and more of what is left sits in one country, Kazakhstan. Output from today's mines peaks around 2030 and falls to about half by 2040.
The official headline says existing mines can cover demand until 2032 — but only if every mine runs flat out every year, which never happens. Using the report's own estimate that mines typically run at about 85% of their rated capacity, the shortage starts in 2030, even if demand comes in low, and by 2040 the yearly gap is over 130 million pounds. Since a new discovery takes 15–20 years to become a mine, prices have to rise well before the shortage to get those mines built. It isn't priced yet because utilities are well stocked today and the data is almost two years old — so this is a slow, structural story, not a quick squeeze.
5:09That assumes that every mine runs at full capacity every single year. Yet, the report itself acknowledges that mines typically produce no more than 85% of their nameplate. Apply that realistic rate and the shortfall begins in 2030, even under the lowest demand forecast. It starts small, but it widens quickly through the following decade.
In short: Supply discipline from the largest producer: no incentive price to ramp up, 2027 output flat on 2026, and a new acid plant slipping at least 6 months. On demand, "once everyone starts delivering on their promises to triple nuclear capacity, that's when we're going to see some proper nuclear renaissance."
When the world's largest producer says it won't raise output at any price, holds next year flat and has a key supply plant delayed, the supply side of the market stays tight. Pair that with governments pledging to triple nuclear capacity, and the company's own line is that the real "nuclear renaissance" arrives once those pledges turn into reactors — a supportive backdrop for uranium prices.
6:48I guess everyone is discussing the urgency to implement, from ambition to action essentially, and I think now is the time that is going to intensify, cuz the momentum's been with us for quite a while now and I guess action will follow, it's inevitable, and we as Kazatomprom are very well positioned to take advantage of this whole situation, and all in all it is safe to say that once everyone starts delivering on their promises to triple nuclear capacity,
In short: A global supply deficit of "call it 50 million pounds per year" is "not geographically equal. The East is far better coverage than the West," so Canada has to play an outsized role. His WNA takeaway trade on fuel: "Canada, Canada, Canada." He favors the Athabasca Basin juniors, which have "fallen under the radar," and expects a consolidation wave like the last cycle's.
The world uses roughly 50 million pounds more uranium each year than mines produce. The shortfall hits the West harder, because China and Russia have secured more of their own supply. Canada's Athabasca Basin holds the West's richest deposits, so he expects the small exploration companies there to catch up. He also expects bigger companies to buy them out, as happened last cycle.
8:37The global supply deficit of, call it 50 million pounds per year, is not geographically equal. The East is far better coverage than the West. So, Canada has to play an outsized role in that. And so, I think my sort of takeaway trade from this week on the fuel side is definitely Canada, Canada, Canada. — And are you talking about the larger companies or the smaller ones, the explorcos? — I think there's relatively better value in the smaller names.
In short: Spot $89.65 → $90.05/lb on five thin deals, but the term pipeline kept building with no awards: ~500,000 lb/yr for 2027–2031, deliveries from 2029, three RFIs starting 2030–2031 with one to 2040, and a 7.2M SWU enrichment tender for 2028–2039. "Utilities are not chasing pounds for next quarter. They're quietly assembling coverage for the back half of the next decade." Long-term price $96, spot ~$6 below — "the forward curve, not the daily print, is where the market is actually being priced."
The weekly "spot" price — what a pound costs for immediate delivery — barely moved, rising 40 cents to about $90 on just five trades. Frostad's point is that this number is close to meaningless on a week like that. The real business of uranium happens in long-term supply contracts, and the "term" price for those sat at $96, about $6 above spot.
The more telling news is what utilities are asking for. Nobody signed a new contract last week, but the queue of requests got longer and reached further out: supply for 2027–2031, deliveries starting in 2029, three utilities asking about pounds from 2030–2031 — one all the way to 2040 — and an enrichment tender running to 2039. Utilities are not scrambling for next quarter; they are quietly locking up fuel for reactors a decade from now. That is why he says the forward curve, not the daily print, is where the market is really being priced.
The bigger shift is in the argument itself. At the industry's annual London gathering, nobody debated whether nuclear power will grow any more. The question was whether the chain that turns ore into reactor fuel — mining, conversion, enrichment, fabrication — can expand fast enough, and the people who run that chain did not promise it can. A shortage of deliverable fuel, rather than a shortage of demand, is now the bull case.
2:17That is the detail worth holding on to. Utilities are not chasing pounds for next quarter. They're quietly assembling coverage for the back half of the next decade. And the long-term price, last published at month end, stood at $96 a pound U3O8, while spot sat roughly $6 below it.
In short: Spot has been "basically comatose" with close to zero volatility — "a very healthy market trend" of basing — while "the long-term contract price is now at an all-time high," quietly, because the spot price is the only daily indicator and "can be terribly misleading." The US consumes 45–50M lb a year but produces barely 3M, all contracted; the DOE wants 4M lb/yr of US-origin material from 2030.
Uranium has two prices. The "spot" price is for immediate delivery and is the one quoted daily; the "term" price is what utilities agree to pay under multi-year contracts, and it's where most uranium is actually sold. Sheriff's point is that spot has gone nowhere this year — "comatose" — which disappointed investors, while the term price has quietly climbed to an all-time high. Because producers mostly sell on contract, the dull spot price hides how well the real market is doing.
The supply picture backs him up: the US burns 45–50 million pounds a year but mines barely 3 million, all already sold. Now the Department of Energy is asking who could supply 4 million pounds a year of American-mined uranium from 2030 for defense needs — more than the whole country produces today — which he reads as a signal that governments will have to push new US production through, possibly even using emergency Defense Production Act powers.
17:39I believe we're now looking at, while we've had a flat and totally unremarkable spot market for the first time in five or six years, the long-term contract price is now at an all-time high. And it's done so very quietly because unfortunately pricing in uranium is not terribly transparent. The only daily indicator that most of our investors have is that spot price which can be terribly misleading as it has been on the way up and it has been in its lackluster performance this year because most of us sell on contract one way or another, to one degree or another,
In short: "From an investment standpoint in the commodity and the miners… that's extremely bullish." Spot ~$90, term ~$97; $150–200/lb "is coming" and $150 is already WNA parlance because it sits in contract ceilings. US utilities 60% covered for 2030 and 9% for 2033; "the supply deficit in the early and mid 2030s is affecting today's pricing" and "comes home to roost in the next 24 to 36 months."
Nuclear power plants run on uranium bought years in advance under long-term contracts, so today's price is set by how well utilities are covered for the years they are shopping for now — roughly the early-to-mid 2030s. Huhn's point is that two very different kinds of buyer are shopping for those years. Russia, China and India own their reactors through the state and treat fuel as national security, so they sign large, long contracts on whatever terms producers ask. Western utilities are companies with budgets, so for years they have delayed signing, using tricks that get them a little cheap uranium now instead of committing to expensive supply later.
Those tricks are running out. American utilities have contracts for only 60% of what they will need in 2030 and 9% for 2033, while 2026 contracting worldwide is well under half of what reactors burn in a year. Kazakhstan, which supplies 40% of the world's uranium, is close to its production peak and selling increasingly to the East. New mines need a sustained price of $120–150 a pound before anyone will finance them, and contract ceilings of $140–160 are already being signed. His conclusion: the shortfall is years away on paper but shows up in prices within two to three years, and nothing on the supply side can arrive in time to stop it.
45:06All of these things are potential in the long run. But the final point I want to make here, the supply deficit in the early and mid 2030s is affecting today's pricing. So when we're looking at that long-term price that continues to inch higher, that is happening because of where the utilities are covering now.
In short: Denison bought 2.5M lb in 2021 at "just under $30 US per pound"; 1.1M lb left at end-Q2, of which 350k lb is sold fixed at ~$95 — "a price higher than where we've seen the market trading in recent months" — 250k lb floating market-related and ~500k lb uncommitted for the next 1–2 years. Utilities are "very interested," which is why he can afford to contract slowly.
In 2021, when uranium was cheap, Denison bought 2.5 million pounds of it at under $30 a pound as a store of value it could sell later to pay for building its mine. It is now doing exactly that: part of what remains is already sold for around $95 a pound — more than three times the purchase price and, he notes, above where the market has traded lately.
His read on the market is that the power companies who buy uranium are keen, so a producer does not need to rush. Offering too much future output at once tends to push prices down even before it is sold, so Denison is selling slowly and mostly on contracts tied to whatever the market price is at delivery, rather than locking in today's price.
16:47We acquired that material at a price just under $30 US per pound. So it's done quite well for us. We ended the second quarter with just over a million, 1.1 million pounds in inventory. We do have 600,000 of that already placed for delivery over the next year roughly and about 350,000 of that the price is already fixed and it's fixed at a price around $95 US.
In short: The structural supply deficit remains "the underpinning of the story"; demand models carry "very little anticipated demand" from SMRs, the new US government RFP, China's ~8 reactors a year, India's two large stockpiling deals and western utilities returning with RFPs to replenish inventory. The term price is at all-time highs; spot up ~10% on the year.
Uranium is the fuel for nuclear reactors. His view rests on a "structural supply deficit" — the world's reactors use more than mines produce, year after year — and on demand that is only now showing up: a US government request to buy uranium, small modular reactors reaching their first tests, China building roughly eight reactors a year, India signing two large deals to stockpile, and western utilities returning to buy after running their inventories down.
The long-term contract ("term") price is already at record highs. He argues most demand forecasts include very little of these new sources, so as projects move forward over the next one to two years the market will have to price in more demand.
7:31As we've seen, I've been asked a few times what will the catalyst be to get the market going again and in our experience it's very hard to predict what those catalysts are. The last few years have been catalyst rich in terms of news flow and whatnot. Just a few days ago we saw the US government put out an RFP, they need to buy uranium so you're starting to see a lot of new sources of demand, obviously SMR technology is starting to get to testing criticality, obviously commercial approvals and
In short: "It's evident that uranium price is going higher." Spot has not gone back below $85, which "would be representative of the current producers cost profile" — "there seems to be no supply out there at $85. So, I think we're at a bit of a new floor and the upward pressure on prices is clearly evident." Scarcity of mine supply plus rising sovereign risk around existing supply is this year's key investor takeaway, and he expects the usual northern-hemisphere winter increase in utility spot buying.
His argument for a higher uranium price is about supply, not demand. The spot price has repeatedly declined to go below about $85 a pound, and he reads that level as roughly what it costs today's producers to dig the stuff up — below that, nobody sells. So he treats $85 as a new floor rather than a temporary dip, and notes prices are creeping higher because there is simply no material on offer at that level.
Two other things push the same way. Very few new mines are being built anywhere, and an increasing share of the uranium the world already produces comes from countries investors now see as politically risky — which is why, he says, a project in Canada, Australia or the US carries a premium. And seasonally, utilities tend to step into the spot market over the northern winter when their contract buying falls short, which he expects again this year.
13:02it's supply side focused and I think a lot of the financial institutions are seeing that demand and supply construct and that the fact that you haven't seen the spot price really go down from $85. That would be representative of the current producers cost profile. But also, prices are creeping up.
In short: Spot held "a very hard floor at 85" all summer and is back at 90, driven by the term price at an all-time high of 96–97 on the two price reporters: below 85 "you can just do a carry trade and a finance deal," so utilities, traders and larger producers step in — "when we sit at 90, I see very little downside and we're set up for a rather interesting fall." New demand: a US NNSA tender for 4M lb/yr of US-origin pounds from 2030 for 10 years ("a run rate of eight AP1000s") vs ~2M lb US output year-to-date.
Uranium sells two ways: "spot" for delivery now, and "term" contracts where a utility locks in years of supply. The term price is at an all-time high of $96–97. Jander's key point is that this high term price puts a floor under spot. If spot falls much below $85, a trader can buy the cheap pounds, borrow to pay for them, store them, and sell them forward into the higher term price — a "carry trade" that locks in a profit. Because that trade is available, utilities, traders and even producers step in and buy whenever spot dips there, which is why spot held $85 through a summer with almost no investor buying. With spot at $90 he sees "very little downside."
Two things could push the price up. First, the term market is busier than it looks: the headline 37 million pounds contracted this year leaves out a huge Indian deal, and big contracts are often reported months late. Second, the US government's nuclear-weapons agency (the NNSA) just asked for 4 million pounds a year of American-mined uranium for ten years starting around 2030 — about what eight large reactors burn — when all US mines together have produced only about 2 million pounds so far this year. US mines will have to grow to meet it, and the market has not priced it yet.
1:32And I think to a large extent, that spot market is driven by the term price cuz we're at an all-time high, 96 and 97 on the two price reporters. And we've never seen those levels before and that effectively creates a floor at 85 because as soon as you drop down below that at these levels on term prices, you can just do a carry trade and a finance deal.
In short: The term price — "which is where 90% of the market transacts" — made an all-time nominal high in Q2 at "95.50 a pound," breaking the '08 peak by 50 cents, while uranium equities fell "30-odd percent, on absolutely no news whatsoever." Utilities are "still very under covered in their long-term contract books" and there is "not much in the way of new mine supply to bail the market out." "Just buy it and put it away and enjoy the uptrend."
There are two prices for uranium. The spot price is a thin market where relatively little changes hands, and it is what the headlines and the stock prices react to. The term price is what utilities actually pay when they sign multi-year supply contracts, and "that's where 90% of the market transacts." Earlier this year spot fell hard and uranium equities dropped "30-odd percent, on absolutely no news whatsoever" — while the term price quietly made an all-time high in nominal terms at $95.50 a pound. That divergence is the whole opportunity.
The reason the term price keeps rising is that utilities are "still very under covered in their long-term contract books" — they have committed reactors and not enough contracted fuel — and no meaningful new mine is arriving to fix it. Even the biggest development project in the world, NexGen's Rook I in Canada, "still remains a number of years away."
His practical advice is about temperament rather than analysis. Uranium is "one of the simpler stories," a decade-long uptrend "punctuated by these periods of hedge fund and retail enthusiasm that pushes prices up and then they just pull all their money out." The way to own it is to buy after one of those flushes and stop watching: "just buy it and put it away and enjoy the uptrend."
42:30Uranium, people were really willing to call the uranium rally over earlier this year. There was a big pullback in uranium stocks, 30-odd percent, on absolutely no news whatsoever. The spot uranium price fell sharply. The term contract price, which is where 90% of the market transacts, made an all-time high in the second quarter. It's 95.
In short: August closed spot at $89.90/lb U3O8 (monthly average $87.73, +$3 on the month, five transactions, four prompt), but "the more consequential move came in the term market": the long-term price rose $2 to $96 — first change since June and "now gone 19 months without a single down tick" — with a five-year forward at $111, an indicator escalating toward $98 next year and past $110 by the next decade, floors mid-60s and ceilings mid-120s to $150. "The takeaway is one of value rather than volume. Utilities are signing less paper than they used to, but every page of it is worth considerably more than the page it replaces… and that repricing is happening whether or not the contracting cycle ever arrives on schedule." All of August cleared only ~3.2M lb of spot — "a rounding error against annual reactor consumption, and the price rose on it."
Two prices matter in uranium. "Spot" is what a pound costs for immediate delivery — a thin market where very little actually trades. "Term" is what a utility agrees to pay under a multi-year supply contract, and that is how nearly all uranium really changes hands. August's spot close of $89.90 is the headline; the $2 rise in the term price to $96 is the substance.
Two details make that term move unusual. First, it has now been 19 months without a single down tick — the price only ratchets one way. Second, the forward curve behind it keeps climbing: an indicator escalating toward $98 next year and past $110 by the start of the next decade. That curve, not the weekly spot print, is what a utility is actually negotiating against, so it describes what a contract is worth today.
Frostad's phrase for the pattern is "value rather than volume." Utilities are signing fewer contracts than they used to, but each one prices far above the paper it replaces — so the market is repricing itself whether or not the long-awaited wave of buying ever arrives. And the price is rising on almost no volume: all of August cleared roughly 3.2 million pounds, a rounding error against what reactors burn in a year, because producers are at or below their own working stock and the financial funds sitting on ~137 million pounds are not structured to sell. Rising price on nothing offered is a supply story, not a demand story — which means the demand catalyst is still ahead of investors, not behind them.
1:19Across the month, spot gained more than $3 and the monthly average settled at $87.73 a pound U3O8. The more consequential move came in the term market. The long-term price rose $2 to $96 a pound U3O8, its first change since June, and it's now gone 19 months without a single down tick. The forward curve moved with it, and three-year price reached $14 and the 5-year $111 a pound U3O8.
In short: Three August items. "Nuclear Mega-Resurgence: 5 Charts On the Power Play Behind AI, Policy, and Clean Energy" — "what these five charts signal about nuclear energy opportunities right now" (2026-AUG-19). "☢️ Uranium's European Catalyst" — "outages across the European continent are experiencing tightening supply." And the Scott Melbye conversation, "The Fundamentals Have Never Looked Better," on "why the uranium market is poised for a major second-half breakout" (2026-AUG-18).
Three separate August items point the same way: AI data centres and government policy are creating demand for reliable, always-on electricity that only nuclear supplies at scale, while the fuel side is tightening. The specific new catalyst named is European: reactor and supply outages across the continent are pulling more uranium out of an already tight market.
The industry voice she quotes, Scott Melbye, puts it as "the fundamentals have never looked better" and expects a second-half breakout in the uranium price. The mechanism behind that phrase is covered on the 2026-AUG-18 page: utilities buy fuel years in advance under long-term contracts, and when those contracts price above the spot market, spot tends to get pulled up to meet them.
In short: His answer for the commodity with the most outsized-return potential: "we own some uranium. The US uses about 50 million pounds of uranium a year. We produce somewhere between two and a half and three… you think about a demand supply curve that's out of balance." One example of "numerous things like that" among the critical minerals.
Asked which single commodity could deliver the largest returns, Oakley reaches for a supply-and-demand gap you can state in one line: the United States burns roughly 50 million pounds of uranium a year in its reactors and produces only two and a half to three million of it domestically. Everything else is imported — increasingly from countries that are, in his framing, hoarding their own resources.
He owns "some uranium" without naming the vehicles. The wider point is that uranium is only the clearest example of a pattern: "there's numerous things like that… a lot of the critical minerals are like that." The screen he is really describing is any material where domestic demand is a large multiple of domestic supply.
36:34— And is there a commodity that you think has the most potential for outsized returns from him? — Well, if you look, for example, if you look at uranium, I'm going to use as an example. Now, we own some uranium. The US uses about 50 million pounds of uranium a year. We produce somewhere between two and a half and three.
In short: Melbye: spot "stuck at an $85 level" is "a bit of a coiled spring" — the long-term market at $95 will pull spot up, because utilities' long-term RFPs are drawing "fewer and fewer offers and less quality offers," leaving spot as their only option; he sees >$100/lb in 2H26 and "a very long, sustained bull market." Prins concurs: it "should catch up to the $95–100 level," with a Prinsights $110 target for this year. Policy behind it: the Russian import ban at full force in January 2028, a DPA survey putting US capacity at 6M lb by end-2027 → 35M lb by 2033, and a lobbied-for Strategic Uranium Reserve with FAST-41 permitting.
Uranium trades in two separate markets. The spot price is what a pound costs for immediate delivery — it is thin, easily pushed around, and has been parked around $85 all year. The long-term (term) market is where utilities actually buy: multi-year contracts signed years ahead of the fuel being loaded into a reactor. That market is already at $95. Most people watch the spot price and conclude nothing is happening; Melbye's argument is that the causality runs the other way.
Here's the mechanism. A utility runs a request for proposals asking miners to bid on supplying pounds over the next decade. What Melbye sees is that the bids coming back are fewer and worse — fewer producers willing to commit, at higher prices and with less flexibility on volumes and timing. A utility that doesn't like what it sees has exactly one alternative: buy in the spot market instead. But the spot market is small, so utility-sized buying there moves the price hard. That is why he calls spot "a coiled spring" and expects it above $100 in the back half of 2026. Prins agrees on direction and puts Prinsights' own target at $110 for the year.
Behind the price sits an arithmetic problem. Nuclear generating capacity is set to double in the conservative case, and the US administration's stated goal is to quadruple it. Fuel doesn't scale automatically with reactors — you also need conversion and enrichment capacity to double or triple, and that capacity takes years and hasn't been built. On top of that, the 2024 law banning Russian uranium imports has been softened by waivers until January 2028, when it bites in full and roughly a fifth of the fuel Western utilities have been relying on has to come from somewhere else. Washington has begun preparing: it asked the industry association Melbye chairs to survey how many pounds American miners could produce under favourable conditions — 6 million by the end of 2027, up to 35 million by 2033 — and a Strategic Uranium Reserve is being lobbied for, which would come with fast-tracked federal permitting (FAST-41).
In short: "There's a bid under this market every time it softens." Spot opened at $86.45, bottomed at $85.60 Monday on a single $85.70 deal, and recovered to close Friday at $86.40 — 650,000 lb over six transactions, nearly all prompt, plus a post-close print at $87.01 for November delivery. Term held at $94 with no new awards but a lengthening utility queue (400,000 lb/yr for 2030–2034 + a 300,000 lb/yr option to 2037; another ~500,000 lb/yr from 2027; three more pre-tender). "A market that absorbs every dip within days while utilities quietly line up for delivery stretching into the late 2030s is a market where patience increasingly sits on the side of the seller."
Uranium trades two ways. The "spot" price is what a pound costs for immediate delivery; the "term" price is what a utility agrees to pay under a multi-year supply contract, and that is how nearly all uranium actually changes hands. This week both were quiet — spot ended at $86.40 after dipping to $85.60, term unchanged at $94 — and Frostad's argument is that the quiet is the story.
Look at how the week traded rather than where it ended. Monday's weakness produced exactly one transaction, and that was the low; buyers came back within a day and kept coming. After the close, someone paid $87.01 for November delivery — above the spot price, for pounds that arrive later. When buyers pay a premium for future delivery, they are telling you they expect it to be harder, not easier, to get pounds later.
The term side says the same thing more slowly. No contracts were awarded, but the line of utilities asking for quotes keeps getting longer, and the delivery windows they are asking about stretch to 2037. A market where every dip is absorbed in days while buyers queue up for deliveries a decade out is one where the seller can afford to wait — "patience increasingly sits on the side of the seller." That is the whole bull case in one sentence, and it does not depend on the price doing anything this month.
0:47And IsoEnergy places a bold bet on American uranium. — The summer doldrums are still with us, but last week showed there's a bid under this market every time it softens. The spot price opened this week at $86.45 a pound U3O8, dipped as low as $85.60 on Monday as sellers cut offers to close the gap with buyers, and then recovered steadily, closing Friday at $86.40 a pound U3O8. In total, six spot transactions covering 650,000 lb changed hands, nearly all of it for prompt delivery. The pattern matters more than the headline numbers. Monday's weakness produced exactly one deal at $85.70 a pound, and that dip proved to be the low point of the week. Bids returned on Tuesday, a 100,000-lb trade printed at $86.25 on Thursday, and buying interest firmed further into Friday. After Friday's close, three more transactions were confirmed, including one at $87.01 a pound for November delivery, a premium suggesting that demand further out the calendar is willing to pay. The term market tells a similar story of quiet accumulation.
In short: "That's probably the top of the list for us for what the US needs a lot more of." The US uses ~50 million pounds a year and produces maybe 2.5 million — "we're so far behind on uranium, it's incredible… we could really get in a mess with uranium." Owned ahead of the government's critical-minerals vault.
Uranium is the fuel for nuclear power stations. Oakley calls it "the top of the list for what the US needs a lot more of," and the reason is a supply gap that is hard to argue with: the United States consumes roughly 50 million pounds a year and produces about 2.5 million. Everything else is imported, increasingly from countries the US is competing with.
He points out that Oxbow bought this before Washington did — the federal government has only now started a "vault" to stockpile critical minerals. "We could really get in a mess with uranium" is his summary of the risk, and owning it is his answer. He doesn't name a specific vehicle or miner in this conversation.
28:42For example, we own uranium. And if you look at uranium in the US, we use I think we use 50 million pounds and we produce maybe two and a half. We're so far behind on uranium, it's incredible. Most of it comes from somewhere else. So, we own uranium and we own a lot of critical minerals that are antimony, we own tungsten, we own different things like that that are hard to find in the US, in that period of time.
In short: Spot was flat in June at $85.12/lb (−$0.03), but the term market kept grinding higher: UxC's long-term price +$1.00 to $94.00 and TradeTech's +$2.00 to a record $97.00 — a blended all-time-high LT price of $95.50, with 3-year forwards at $101 and 5-year at $108. "Long-term contracting demand and a continually rising LT U3O8 price are providing a floor for spot prices here"; conversion ($64.00/kgU) and enrichment ($200/SWU spot, $180 LT) sit at or near all-time highs.
Uranium has two prices, and they are telling different stories. The "spot" price is what a pound costs today for immediate delivery — it went nowhere in June, sitting at $85.12. The "long-term" or term price is what utilities agree to pay under multi-year supply contracts, and that is the number that actually matters for miners, because that is how nearly all uranium is really sold. The term price kept climbing: UxC's reading rose to $94 and TradeTech's to a record $97 — the highest ever recorded. Huhn's point is that a rising term price puts a floor under the spot price, because no producer will sell cheaply into the spot market when a utility will sign a contract at $95.
Two details he keeps repeating are worth internalising. First, TradeTech tends to move 30–60 days ahead of UxC, so when the two disagree, the higher TradeTech number is the leading indicator. Second, the forward curve is in the triple digits — UxC's 3-year forward is $101 and its 5-year is $108 — which means the market itself expects uranium meaningfully higher than today's spot.
The rest of the fuel cycle is even tighter. Conversion (turning uranium oxide into the gas that gets enriched) and enrichment (raising the concentration of the fissile isotope) are both at or near all-time-high prices, up 200–285% since the start of 2022 — far more than uranium itself. That is a symptom of a Western fuel supply chain that spent decades depending on Russia and is now rebuilding from scratch.
Full passage: premium transcript (PDF).
In short: For 3–4 years the world produced 20–30% less than it consumed, covered by post-Fukushima inventories and cheap Kazakh supply that pushed price below production cost; as inventories run out, "we are right now in the middle of a structural supply gap." Demand is predictable (a reactor is "a customer for life"), but a new mine takes a decade, so the gap "can't be repaired in the near term… you're going to see the price of uranium go through the roof."
Uranium is the fuel for nuclear reactors. Demand is easy to forecast: once a reactor is switched on it needs a steady, known amount of fuel for decades. The problem is supply. For several years the world has mined 20–30% less uranium than reactors burned, covering the gap with stockpiles built up after Japan shut its reactors following Fukushima. Those stockpiles are running down.
Normally a higher price quickly brings more supply. Not here: finding a deposit takes years, and turning it into a working mine takes years more — about a decade in total. Meanwhile demand is rising, as tech companies sign power deals for their data centers and new small reactors arrive. Frostad's conclusion is that this "structural supply gap" can't be fixed quickly, so prices should rise sharply.
3:52The problem is the supply on the other side. So as you mentioned, I think for the last 3, 4 years or so the world's been producing about 20 to 30% less uranium than we have been consuming and that was possible because of a lot of the uranium inventory stores that were built up right after Fukushima, because at that time we saw Japan shut down about 10% of the world's nuclear fleet.
In short: The deficit shifted from theory to market-clearing reality — ~70-75 reactors under construction, SPUT aggressively back in the market, spot ~$85 with a Hormuz energy-security premium; a structural shift mining restarts alone may not fix.
Uranium fuels nuclear reactors, and the world is building 70-75 of them while a big fund (Sprott's uranium trust) hoovers up physical supply. There simply isn't enough easy uranium left to meet demand, and the war added an energy-security premium. Prices are around $85, and Prins thinks the shortage is structural — not something a few mine restarts can quickly solve.
In short: "We have a robust view on the fundamentals for uranium," so Denison pursues market-related pricing to "capture that potential upside." New supply "rests on the shoulders of the new producers" because incumbents say growth is not a priority. Denison holds 1.85M lb in inventory (1.7M lb purchased + ~150k lb from McClean) to fund the build via near-term and opportunistic sales.
Denison's view is that the big existing uranium miners have said they are not trying to grow, so the extra uranium the world needs has to come from new mines like its own. Because it is confident prices will rise, it prefers "market-related" contracts, where the price is set near delivery, over locking in today's price. It still spreads its bets across different contract lengths, buyers and price terms in case the market turns out differently.
It also owns about 1.85 million pounds of uranium in storage, which it can sell to help fund construction — and which lets it offer power companies deliveries well before its new mine starts.
9:20We have a robust view on the fundamentals for uranium. So, being able to pursue market-related pricing structures and capture that potential upside it certainly an important part of our strategy. But, also, we have to recognize our position in the market. We will be a meaningful producer, especially when you think about who has potential supply available in the next five years, uncommitted and from Western sources, but we won't be the largest producer in the market.
In short: The war's "much more consequential energy question" that has nothing to do with oil — the basis for a new uranium recommendation added to the Founders+ model portfolio (the specific producer is paywalled).
In short: 2025 reactor demand outpaced mine supply (68.9 kt vs 62.2 kt); spot hit $94 in Jan, briefly $101 in futures, ~$87 end-Feb. With India locking up long-term supply and the Jan-2028 Russian-import deadline looming, Prins expects spot and forward prices to rise.
The core thesis: the world's reactors are now burning more uranium than mines produce, and the U.S. imports nearly all of it while depending on Russia for enrichment. New mines are years away, big buyers like India are locking up supply for the next decade, and a 2028 deadline to stop Russian imports is bearing down. Prins expects uranium prices — both today's spot price and the long-term contract prices utilities pay — to climb as this squeeze plays out.
In short: The real structural story — spot ~$88/lb (futures briefly $101.55); the strikes accelerate a deficit already moving faster than priced; her #2 commodity for 2026 with a $110/lb target.
Uranium is the fuel for nuclear power plants. Prins's point is that the US just spent a fortune bombing Iran's uranium-enrichment sites, yet the US still relies on Russia and Russia-friendly Kazakhstan for its own nuclear fuel. That's a glaring weakness, and Washington is now pushing hard (with laws and funding) to build domestic supply. Unlike oil, nuclear fuel doesn't have to sail through the dangerous Strait of Hormuz, so a working reactor keeps producing power no matter what happens in the Gulf. She sees uranium prices heading toward $110 a pound, with the Iran conflict speeding up a shortage that was already coming.
In short: Prinsights's #2 commodity for 2026 ($110/lb target). Spot broke out to $94.28 (highest since Feb 2024; futures briefly touched $100); long-term contracts climbed $80→$86, equities rallied ~40% in 2025, physical funds accumulating. Primary production still falls short of reactor demand.
Uranium is the fuel for nuclear reactors, and Prins ranks it her #2 commodity bet for 2026 with a $110/lb target. After being stuck in a range all of 2025, the price finally broke out to about $94 (and futures briefly hit $100). The reason: the world is building more reactors, the biggest producer (Kazatomprom) is actually cutting output, and there simply isn't enough new supply — so utilities are scrambling to lock in long-term contracts. She sees this as the early stage of a long upcycle.
In short: The clearest supply-scarcity case — US output is a small fraction of reactor needs, restarting idled mines takes years, and re-inclusion on the US critical-minerals list is already changing utility contracting behavior.
In short: Bullish on uranium, enrichment and nuclear-tech firms after the $80B US-Westinghouse partnership; ~40-45% of global enrichment is still controlled by Russia's Rosatom, favoring companies with secured Western fuel chains.
Uranium is the fuel for nuclear power, and the US just committed $80 billion (via Westinghouse, owned by Cameco and Brookfield) to build a new fleet of reactors — the first big US nuclear push in decades, largely to power AI and keep the grid reliable. The problem: Russia's state company Rosatom still controls roughly 40-45% of the world's uranium enrichment (the processing step), which the West is scrambling to replace. Prins is bullish on uranium and on companies that mine, enrich, or build reactors using secure, non-Russian supply chains.
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Verbatim excerpts from the public transcripts (auto-pulled at each mention's timestamp, lightly cleaned). Timestamps link into the video; "source page" opens that commentator's full analysis at this row. Click a mention's header line to expand it (one open at a time). For personal study — not investment advice.