| Account | Shares | Price | Value | % of acct | Cost/sh | Gain $ | Gain % | Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| HSA | 2 | $378.40 | $757 | 0.70% | $297.50 | $162 | +27.2% | — |
In short: Referenced only — held, no new view. Weight ~6.05%. Sheet: EPS 11.47 → 16.85 + 0.7% yield = 14.38%/yr.
In short: Resilient alongside Mastercard: a payment network "you have to use," not a friction remover. Its agentic-commerce plan is tokenization, authentication and spend controls — the trust layer that more machine-to-machine transactions need. Grouped with MA as likely to "do much better in this new agentic commercial world" (he owns MA, not V).
Visa gets the same argument as Mastercard: a card network is something merchants and shoppers must use, not a convenience an agent can skip. Its plan for agent shopping — tokens, identity checks and spending limits — makes it part of the trust layer that more automated purchases need. He owns Mastercard rather than Visa but groups them as likely winners.
35:48Was the agent authorized? Was the amount within the user's limit? Which merchant received the credential? Can the payment be traced, disputed or revoked? How does the merchant distinguish a trusted agent from an automated fraud? Visa's position is Agentic Commerce works around tokenization, authentication, spend controls, payment, and infrastructure.
In short: Passing mention — used only as the throughput comparison against Bitcoin: Bitcoin does ~750,000 trades a day, "Visa does that much every minute." No view on the stock.
45:04Visa does that much every minute. So, Bitcoin as a transactional tool is kind of worthless. Now, what you're describing is using a USD stablecoin. I think it's a grand idea because it will be a demand for Treasury securities which is a good thing considering that the Japanese have been selling recently. So I'm in favor of that.
In short: BUY (portfolio). ER 14.88%; fair value $680.5 vs $369.42 (45.7% under); fwd PE 23.4 vs 28.3 (17.3% under); the price implies 0.0% growth against 13.5% expected. YTD +6.6%.
In short: ~6.1% of the book, and the highest EPS CAGR estimate among the mega-caps at 16% on a 23x NTM P/E. A painful year — −21% YTD and −33% over twelve months, the second-worst twelve-month figure in the portfolio after 3i and LVMH — with no comment offered. 300 shares yielding $3,279; modelled three-year return 14.38%. Cited as the breadth of the "Financials" label.
In short: BUY (portfolio). Fair value $666.4 against $361.8 — 45.7% under, the third-largest gap in the book; ER 14.88%; fwd PE 23.4 against a 28.3 average (17.3% under). The reverse DCF is the lone dissenter at 14.1% required vs 13.5% expected (−0.6pp).
In short: Bought alongside Mastercard in the same recent-additions list — payments as fundamentally-grounded, non-hyperscaler exposure inside the diversified equity sleeve.
Visa is the other half of the card-network duopoly, with the same economics as Mastercard: a toll on the value of payments moving across its rails, with none of the credit risk that sits on the banks' balance sheets.
It was bought alongside Mastercard and Booking in the recent-additions batch. In a book that is 45–50% short-term Treasuries and heavy in metals and energy, these are the names that provide equity exposure without buying into the crowded mega-cap technology trade he is actively selling.
25:29We've recently added Bookings, a company we like, Mastercard, Visa, but we think people need a component of hard assets in their portfolio because we really feel like the next 10 years is going to be a period where you have more inflation and just look at these governments, our government and what goes on there, and I think you have to have more hard assets to offset that because we're probably going back into more of a commodity period.
In short: One of Pershing Square's six new Q2 positions (NFLX, V, MA, SPGI, ICE, ALC) — "Ackman went shopping," in "its biggest portfolio overhaul in years." Four of the six are toll-booth financial franchises; Visa is the archetype. A disclosed author holding.
In short: Owned by all three managers, deliberately not by Carlson — his risk-factor argument is that Visa and Mastercard "are very much similar to each other and they're also sensitive to all these same factors," so he holds only MA. Hohn "continues to build conviction in Visa," Ackman bought it with MA as one ~11% payments position, and Kantesaria cut it 22% right before the run. Relayed, not endorsed.
Visa is owned by every manager reviewed here and, deliberately, not by Carlson. His objection isn't to the business — it's that Visa and Mastercard "are very much similar to each other and they're also sensitive to all these same factors," so owning both concentrates one risk under two names.
That's the general principle he's arguing all episode: a portfolio can be concentrated in the number of holdings while still spreading exposure across unrelated risk factors. Hohn added to Visa, Ackman bought it alongside Mastercard as one payments trade, and Kantesaria cut it 22% just before it rallied. Carlson relays all of that without taking a side on the stock.
14:58Whether or not you're flipping the coin between Microsoft and Google, they're both great. I own both of the companies. I'm bullish on both of them. So, I don't necessarily have a problem with them trading one for the other. He also has continued to hold GE Aerospace. Very minor changes to that position. He continues to build conviction in Visa and S&P Global.
In short: "The payment space is notoriously difficult to disrupt because Visa and Mastercard dominate. Visa and Mastercard link billions of consumers with hundreds of millions of merchants. Go recreate that." Challengers have shown up "every few years… and they fail every time." Crucially they are the anti-Blockbuster: "they are not going to get complacent like the incumbent entertainment companies."
Visa is Eisman's example of what a real moat looks like, and it is the exact opposite of the Blockbuster story. Its advantage is a network: billions of cardholders on one side, hundreds of millions of merchants on the other, each side worth more because the other exists. "Go recreate that."
The historical record backs it — challengers claiming to be cheaper "show up every few years… and they fail every time." And the behavioural half matters as much as the structural half: unlike the studios, Visa "is not going to get complacent." A moat plus management that defends it is the combination that survives disruption.
23:07Visa and Mastercard link billions of consumers with hundreds of millions of merchants. Go recreate that. Since Visa and Mastercard went public in the early 2000s, every few years, Upstart show up claiming they are cheaper and will disintermediate Visa and Mastercard. And they fail every time. Visa and Mastercard are just well-run companies.
In short: Bought by Ackman as a collective payments trade with Mastercard — "two businesses we have long admired, which provide a dominant global network for consumers and commercial payments." Carlson: "I like the thesis into Mastercard and Visa." The agentic-commerce argument covers both: agents "remove friction, enable more frequent purchases, and accelerate digital commerce" and "should adopt, not replace, consumers' existing payment preferences," so AI shopping agents expand the ecosystem rather than erode the moat.
Ackman bought Visa and Mastercard together as a single payments position — "two businesses we have long admired, which provide a dominant global network for consumers and commercial payments" — and Carlson says plainly, "I like the thesis into Mastercard and Visa."
Everything in the Mastercard case applies here: stablecoins grow where cards were never the incumbent, and AI shopping agents should expand transaction volume rather than bypass the network, because agents "adopt, not replace, consumers' existing payment preferences." Note that in his own book Carlson has consistently been more bullish on Mastercard than Visa — this is an endorsement of Ackman's payments trade, not a change in which of the two he prefers.
17:09We believe stablecoins represent an opportunity for card networks rather than a threat. They are in fact most relevant where cards are not the incumbent. Cross-border business-to-business payments, high-cost remittance corridors, and dollar savings in countries with volatile currencies. Adoption in these areas should grow in parallel with, not at the expense of, card volumes.
In short: #1, and the only name that is also a disclosed portfolio holding. "Visa is the world leader in digital payment processing… Processing hundreds of billions of transactions a year across more than 200 countries, Visa has one of the strongest moats out there." The three durability claims: "The global shift away from cash is permanent; they run an irreplaceable global toll road; massive network effects block out new competitors." Summary line: "The digital tollbooth on global payments that nobody can replace." It is also ranked #1 here and held at Very Strong conviction in the portfolio update eleven days earlier — the strongest cross-issue agreement in the batch.
Visa does not lend money or issue cards. It owns the wires between the shop, the shopper's bank and the card issuer, and takes a very small fee every time money moves along them. Because the network already exists, each extra transaction costs almost nothing to carry, so growth in payment volume drops almost entirely into profit.
The twenty-year argument is that cash keeps disappearing, that a rival would have to sign up every shop and every cardholder simultaneously before its network was worth anything to either, and that the tollbooth position is therefore effectively permanent. It is ranked first here and is also one of the largest positions in the real portfolio, held at the firm's highest conviction level — the strongest agreement between a thought-experiment list and actual money in this batch.
In short: "It's starting to look great again for Visa, MasterCard" — payments named as one of the off-consensus places to put money away from the crowded megacap tech trade.
Visa doesn't lend money or take credit risk — it runs the network that moves card payments between banks and merchants and takes a small fee on every transaction. That makes it a toll booth on consumer spending, with revenue that rises automatically with inflation.
His comment is short but pointed: after a period out of favour, "it's starting to look great again for Visa, MasterCard." In a portfolio built around inflation protection, a business whose fee is a percentage of a rising price level is a natural fit.
39:17We own Bristol Myers on the drug side. We own If you look, it's starting to look great again for Visa, MasterCard. There's a number of things you can own in here that are a little different from the rest, but I do think you need a commodity You need a portion of your portfolio in commodities. I think you're making a mistake if you don't because we feel like the next 10 years you're going to be in more of a commodity cycle, hard asset.
In short: Eisman: "Visa and Mastercard are not dumb… of all the companies that you cover, I cover and the whole financial services world, they're among the smartest. I can't imagine that Visa and Mastercard are going to let some new company like Circle conquer the world with stablecoins" — and they already answered, launching a consortium stablecoin. The moat, stated plainly: "Visa connects billions of consumers with hundreds of millions of businesses. It's hard to recreate that. Very hard." Worthington agrees on quality — "some of the best managed companies in the world… they're not asleep. They're very active in crypto technology."
Visa operates the rails that connect card issuers to merchants. Eisman's framing here is about management quality under attack, not this quarter's numbers: of every company across financial services, "they're among the smartest," and crucially they are "not asleep" — they have already answered the stablecoin threat by launching their own consortium coin rather than dismissing it.
The defensive asset is the two-sided network — "billions of consumers with hundreds of millions of businesses." A challenger has to sign up both sides simultaneously to be useful to either, which is why Eisman calls breaking into payments "brutal." Worthington, who is more sympathetic to the crypto entrants, agrees on the incumbents: "some of the best managed companies in the world… very active in crypto technology."
41:25Visa and Mastercard are not dumb. They of all the companies that you cover, I cover and the whole financial services world, they're among the smartest. I can't imagine that Visa and Mastercard are going to let some new company like Circle conquer the world with stablecoins.
In short: Deiya. The archetype of a payments compounder ("think about if you got into a Visa or Mastercard early"), and the rails almost every fintech ends up riding — 90%+ of Remitly's transactions move across them, which is why the recurring fintech-disruption bear case has kept failing. The one genuine threat he names is Wise, which built its own infrastructure instead: "Wise is bad for Visa and Mastercard."
1:02:46Wise is bad for Visa and Mastercard. Wise isn't bad for Remitty because 90% plus of transactions of Remitty move through the Visa or Mastercard platform, they move across visa rails, as opposed to Wise where Wise has built out their own infrastructure to move, where it's more like a global system. So banks are a competitor. You have a lot of regional players that focus on certain corridors, focus on moving money let's
In short: Brown's "best stocks in the market" spotlight: "one of the greatest growth stocks of all time — up 3,250% since its IPO, a 33× return. You can count the number of stocks that have done that on one or two hands… basically one of the best businesses in the world. The consumer trusts them, the merchant trusts them, and they are finding new ways to win regardless of what happens with the economy." Last quarter: revenue +11%, earnings +11%. Technically there's a golden cross (50-day crossing the 200-day) and the May 2025 high at 375 has not been revisited until now — "I think we're going to make an assault on that old resistance level, and when it gets through there really are no natural sellers here. The path to 400 is clear and wide open," helped by travel, the global economy and employment. Ethridge owns it: "why do we always talk about Apple's massive installed base but never the largest processor in the world?" — ~300 billion transactions a year, "literally in everybody's pocket the same way the iPhone is," not easily disruptible by AI, and holder of the third-largest number of blockchain patents (behind Bank of America and Mastercard). "One that you continue to own forever rather than trading in and out of it."
Visa doesn't lend money or issue cards; it runs the network that carries a payment from your card to the merchant, taking a tiny fee from roughly 300 billion transactions a year. Josh Brown calls it "one of the greatest growth stocks of all time" — up 3,250% since its IPO, a 33-fold return — with revenue and earnings both growing 11% last quarter.
His case here is technical: the chart has produced a "golden cross" (the 50-day average crossing above the 200-day, usually read as a trend change), and the stock is finally approaching the $375 peak it set in May 2025. Above an old high there is nobody sitting on a loss waiting to sell, so "the path to 400 is clear and wide open."
Malcolm Ethridge owns it for a different reason — durability. "Why do we always talk about Apple's massive installed base, but we never talk about the largest processor in the world?" Visa is in everyone's pocket the same way an iPhone is, is hard for AI to disintermediate, and holds the third-largest pile of blockchain patents (behind Bank of America and Mastercard), so it isn't likely to be designed out of the next payments technology either. "One that you continue to own forever."
In short: The analogy that carries his Uber thesis: nobody argues Visa fails because Mastercard, Amex, PayPal, Venmo and Cash App exist — "there's lots of different ways to move money around, but Visa is still really big and makes a lot of money." Used to argue a dominant network doesn't need 100% share; not a call on Visa itself.
16:48The thing that I would compare it to is it's a bit like looking at Visa and saying that Visa is not going to be a successful company because there's Mastercard and because there's American Express and because there's PayPal and because there's transfers and all different ways to move money and Venmo and the Cash App, right? There's lots of different ways to move money around, but Visa is still really big and makes a lot of money.
In short: BUY. Bought 21 Oct 2024; $357.4 against a $614.0 fair value — +71.8%. The steadiest line in the table: EPS 11.47 → 16.85 by 2028 (13.68% a year), expected return 14.38%, forward PE 23.4 against a 28.3 five-year average, and one of only four holdings positive year to date (+4.4%).
In short: Volume accelerates. Q3 net revenue (June quarter) +14% Y/Y to $11.6B ($200M beat), adjusted EPS +11% to $3.32 ($0.09 beat), and total payment volume cleared $4 trillion in a quarter for the first time. Every volume metric sped up from Q2: payments volume 9%→10%, cross-border 12%→13%, processed transactions 9%→10%. CEO Ryan McInerney is leaning into an AI-and-stablecoin pivot — a new Visa Stablecoin Platform and an OpenAI agentic-commerce partnership — while cutting ~2,600 jobs (~7% of headcount, mostly tech and product) the same day. The cost of the volume shows in client incentives, the contra-revenue Visa pays partners: +18% to $4.7B, outpacing revenue. Visa trimmed full-year net revenue growth to the low end of low teens and moved several metrics to the bottom of their ranges; Q4 guided to high-end-of-low-double-digit revenue growth and low-end-of-mid-teens EPS, with management pinning the softer guide on currency volatility it expects to persist. (Recap, not a stance call.)
Visa doesn't lend money; it runs the rails that card payments travel on and takes a small cut of everything that passes through. So the numbers that matter are volumes, and every one of them sped up: total payment volume passed $4 trillion in a single quarter for the first time, cross-border spending (the most profitable kind) grew 13%, and transaction counts accelerated. Two things to notice. Visa pays partner banks "incentives" to win their business, and those payments grew 18% — faster than revenue — which is the price of the volume growth. And on the same day it announced a stablecoin platform and an AI-shopping partnership with OpenAI, it cut about 2,600 jobs, 7% of staff, mostly in technology and product. Management trimmed the full-year outlook to the low end, blaming currency swings it expects to persist. A recap, not a call.
In short: "First up is Visa, the stock I've owned for years. Visa reported a powerful quarter." EPS 331 +20% vs 323 expected; net revenue $11.6B +14%, also a beat; total payment volume +10%. "So, no signs here that the consumer is slowing down."
Visa runs the rails that card payments travel over, taking a small fee on each transaction. Eisman has owned it for years as one of only two "impregnable franchises" in payments.
The quarter was "powerful": profit per share up 20% and ahead of forecasts, revenue up 14% and also a beat. The number he actually reads it for is total payment volume — the dollar value of everything spent on Visa cards — which rose 10%. That is a direct measure of consumer spending, unfiltered by any one retailer's problems: "no signs here that the consumer is slowing down." Paired with Procter & Gamble's flat organic sales in the same episode, it is his K-shaped economy in two data points.
10:18And now let's turn to earnings. So many companies reported this week is exhausting and I won't be able to come close to covering them all. So, I've chosen the ones I think are the most important. First up is Visa, the stock I've owned for years. Visa reported a powerful quarter. Earnings per share of 331 was up 20% versus last year and versus 323 expected.
In short: Akre's #5 at 8.1%, and a shared holding. "Visa generates revenue from transaction and processing fees on its global payment network… Visa has a dominant market share, high margins, and resilient, asset-light business model." Held since 2010: "the stock is up 1700+% since then." Both card networks appear in the same five-name book, which is a deliberate concentration rather than a hedge.
Visa is the other half of the card duopoly, and it does the same thing as Mastercard: it moves the authorisation message, not the credit risk, and takes a sliver of each transaction. Akre bought it in 2010, at the same time as Mastercard, and it has risen more than 1,700% since.
The description offered is deliberately plain — "dominant market share, high margins, and resilient, asset-light business model." Asset-light is the operative phrase for Akre's framework: a business that needs almost no physical investment to grow can turn nearly all its profit into either reinvestment or returns to owners.
The detail worth noticing is that both card networks sit inside a five-name portfolio. In a book that concentrated, holding Visa and Mastercard is not diversification — it is doubling down on one structure with two instruments, which tells you how much confidence he places in it.
In short: Named as the other half of the card duopoly that protects Mastercard — "it operates in a functional duopoly alongside Visa." A portfolio holding elsewhere in this archive; here it is context for the #3 pick rather than a fresh view. (The value-added-services paragraph opens "Visa is no longer just a payment network" but then describes Mastercard's revenue — an apparent slip in the original text.)
In short: "The importance of having Visa and Mastercard as part of this consortium cannot be overstated." Their inclusion in the Stripe/Coinbase/BlackRock stablecoin consortium is what makes the new entrant a genuine threat to Circle — the payment rails weighing in on their own terms.
Visa operates one of the two dominant card networks. Instead of being disrupted by stablecoins, it joined the consortium building one — so it gets a seat at the table in whatever the new payment system becomes. Eisman treats its participation (with Mastercard) as the decisive factor that makes the new venture credible and Circle vulnerable.
It fits his long-standing view that Visa and Mastercard are the only two "impregnable franchises" in an otherwise brutal payments business — durable enough to co-opt the disruption rather than lose to it.
3:12Circle was down 17.5% that day because a consortion of companies including Stripe, Visa, Mastercard, Coinbase, and Black Rockck unveiled their own stable coin and stable coin ecosystem. The importance of having Visa and Mastercard as part of this consortium cannot be overstated. For a deeper dive, take a look at our episode on January 26, 2026 with Ken Sahausski, the payments analyst at Autonomous Research.
In short: BUY, Very Strong conviction — and now positive on the year (+4.4%) after the 28 June purchase. FV $666.1 vs $361.6 = 45.7% under; ER 14.9%; fwd PE 23.4 against 28.3; RDCF 7.5% vs 13.5% expected.
In short: Hohn's #2 at 18.2% — and a Compounding Quality holding added to two days earlier. "Every time you swipe a card, Visa takes a cut. They don't take credit risk, they just own the network." Three properties: massive network effects ("merchants need Visa because consumers have Visa cards"), zero marginal cost ("adding one more transaction costs almost nothing") and pricing power above inflation. "Chris believes payment networks are essential infrastructure for the modern economy." Named in the closing endorsement.
Visa is the reference tollkeeper: it owns the road that card payments travel down and charges a fraction of a cent every time one passes. It lends nobody money, so it carries no risk of borrowers defaulting; it simply operates the network.
Three things make that position hard to attack. Shops must accept Visa because their customers carry Visa cards, and customers carry the cards because every shop accepts them — a loop no newcomer can start from either end. Handling one more payment costs Visa essentially nothing, so growth is nearly free. And because the fee is trivial relative to the value of the transaction, Visa can nudge it up faster than inflation without anyone leaving.
It is the one name in this profile that Slegers also owns himself — he had added $20,000 to it two days earlier — which is why the piece reads less as a profile of somebody else's portfolio and more as a defence of a shared method.
In short: Adding $20,000 — 60 shares at a limit price of $337. "Visa is the definition of Buffett's 'Great' business. It requires virtually zero extra capital to process an extra million transactions. It's a capital-light compounder with a very strong network effect. Merchants are forced to accept it, and consumers demand to use it." Because it needs little capital and runs high margins, "they generate a lot of Free Cash Flow that it uses to consistently buy back its own shares."
Visa does not lend money or issue cards. It owns the wires that carry a card payment from the shopper's bank to the shop's bank, and takes a sliver of each transaction. The reason Slegers is buying more is a very specific property: handling another million payments costs Visa essentially nothing extra. There is no factory to build, no inventory to stock, no extra staff to hire. That is exactly what Buffett meant by a "great" business as opposed to a merely good one — profit grows without the owner having to put fresh money in.
The protection around it is that a payment network is only useful if both shops and shoppers are already on it, and each side joins because the other is there. Slegers puts it bluntly from both sides: merchants are forced to accept Visa, and consumers demand to use it. Because the cash the business throws off has nowhere better to go, Visa spends it buying back its own shares, so each remaining share owns a larger slice of the same tollbooth.
The action here is a purchase, not an opinion: $20,000, sixty shares, and he will not pay more than $337 for them.
In short: The worked example of network effects: "Consumers use Visa because every merchant accepts it. Merchants accept Visa because every consumer carries it." A holding and a Buy elsewhere; no fresh view here.
In short: BUY, Very Strong conviction. FV $606.5 vs $323.6 = 46.6% under; ER 15.0%; fwd PE 23.4 against 28.3 (17.3% under); RDCF 10.0% vs 13.5% expected. YTD −6.7%. Bought with $50,000 ten days later.
In short: Payments is "a brutal space where competition is intense" — Visa (with Mastercard) is one of the only two "impregnable franchises." Full disclosure: he owns it.
Visa runs the rails that move card payments between banks and merchants. Eisman calls payments "a brutal space" where most players get ground down by competition — but Visa (with Mastercard) is one of only two "impregnable franchises," because once the whole world runs on your network, it's almost impossible to dislodge. That durability — a real "moat" — is exactly what's missing from the AI names he's wary of.
Full disclosure: he owns the stock.
13:32It's a brutal space where competition is intense and the only impregnable franchises are Visa and Mastercard. Full disclosure, I own Visa. In other news, Fox is buying Roku, the streaming company, in a large deal that values Roku at 22 billion. Fox has little streaming presence. So, this is a way for Fox to jumpstart its business in streaming.
In short: Ranked #3, and a portfolio holding. The two-sided network stated in one line — "people want a Visa card because every shop takes it. And every shop takes Visa because everyone carries one." Two properties beyond the moat: fees are "a small slice of each payment," so revenue rises with inflation and nominal GDP at no extra cost — a built-in inflation hedge; and the marginal payment costs almost nothing, "that's why Visa keeps profit margins above 60%, year after year."
Visa is a toll road for money. It does not lend, it does not carry credit risk; it takes a small percentage of the value of each payment that runs across its network. Shops accept it because everyone carries the card, and everyone carries the card because every shop accepts it — a loop that a new entrant cannot start from a standing position.
Two consequences follow. Because the fee is a percentage rather than a fixed amount, revenue rises automatically with prices and with the size of the economy: inflation is a tailwind rather than a cost. And because the network is already built, an extra payment costs almost nothing to process, which is why more than 60% of revenue drops through as profit year after year.
In short: Passing reference — cited alongside Coca-Cola and Adidas as a tiered World Cup sponsor in the sponsorship revenue stream.
In short: BUY, Very Strong conviction — and back on the published list after being absent from the 19 April conviction slide. EPS growth 13.5%, FWD PE 23.4 against a fair exit 25.0, expected return 15.0%, fair value 614.0 against 327.6 = 46.7% undervalued.
In short: "Gives as good a read on the consumer as any company in the world" — net revenue +17% (biggest since 2022), EPS 3.31 vs 3.10 est (+20% y/y), payment volume +9%. The consumer is still spending, but the middle/low end are struggling (hence Domino's). Full disclosure: he owns it.
Visa runs the network that moves card payments between banks and merchants, taking a small cut of every transaction. Because nearly all consumer spending flows across it, Eisman calls it "as good a read on the consumer as any company in the world." This quarter was strong — revenue +17% (its best since 2022), earnings +20%, and the dollar value of payments up 9%.
The nuance fits his K-shaped theme: overall spending is still healthy, but the strength is top-heavy — the middle and lower-income consumer is struggling, which is exactly why a value brand like Domino's is weak. He's owned Visa for years.
16:43Now, let's talk about Visa. Yes, it is a K-shaped economy, but overall consumer spending is still strong. At least that is what Visa's results indicate. Visa's net revenue was up 17% versus last year, and that is the biggest percentage increase since 2022. Earnings per share of 331 was a beat and versus an expectation of 310 and up an impressive 20% versus last year.
In short: Used as the valuation benchmark for Mastercard rather than as a fresh view: the duopoly partner, trading at a 23.5x forward PE against Mastercard's 26.0x. Already a Very Strong holding per Part I.
In short: Very Strong conviction. "Visa is one of the most boring, high quality companies we own. It's a (Free) Cash Flow machine. It's virtually impossible to take away the oligopoly of Visa and Mastercard." The tailwind is "less and less cash being used in the world… I see no reason to believe the growth will slow down. Visa can now be bought at one of its cheapest valuation levels of the past 10 years."
Visa does not lend anyone money and does not issue cards. It owns the network that moves the transaction between your bank and the shop's bank, and takes a small fee on each one. Because the fee is tiny and the volume is astronomical, almost all of the revenue falls through to cash — Slegers calls it "a (Free) Cash Flow machine."
The moat is that a payment network is only useful if merchants and cardholders are already on it, and both sides only join because the other is already there. That chicken-and-egg problem is why he says it is "virtually impossible to take away the oligopoly of Visa and Mastercard" — a new entrant cannot bootstrap either side. The growth engine is simply the world using less physical cash each year, and he sees nothing to suggest that is slowing. The reason it appears in this update at all is price: one of the cheapest valuations Visa has carried in ten years, for what he describes as one of the most boring, highest-quality things he owns.
In short: BUY. 23.4x forward against a 28.3x five-year average (17.3% under) — a modest discount by this sheet's standards — with fair value $489.3 against $308.46, a 14.0% expected return and +2.5pp of reverse-DCF margin.
In short: Disclosed holding, category "Assets that last forever": the payments network across 200+ countries, where "the network becomes more valuable with every new user, and rebuilding it from scratch would take decades and trillions of dollars."
In short: #4 on both aggregate Top Buys tables. A disclosed Compounding Quality holding elsewhere in the archive, but reported here purely as a superinvestor data point.
In short: A ~5.6% weight and roughly +$3,500 unrealised, two weeks after the 1 February $20,000 add at a $325 limit. Disclosed by weight; not individually rated here.
In short: BUY, and a portfolio holding. 25.9x forward against a 28.3x average (only 8.5% under), a 12.7% expected return from 12.2% growth plus a 0.8% yield, and a $452.7 fair value against $328.3 (27.5% under). Bought four days earlier on 1 February at a $325 limit — the sheet's price of $328.30 shows how close the fill was.
In short: ADDED $20,000 — order Q 60, limit $325. The "stock Buffett says you should always buy when its down": "I should have bought Visa and Mastercard. These stocks don't dip often, but when they do... Take notice." Down with Mastercard on Trump's proposed 10% credit-card interest-rate cap — "I think Trump will never be able to push this through in court." "Visa is a pure cash machine. They translate more than 50% (!) of its sales in pure cash." A 0.8% dividend plus a 2.3% annual buyback is a 3.1% shareholder yield; with 12% expected earnings growth "you could expect the stock to double every 5 years." Expected return in the model: 15.9% a year.
Visa runs the wires that carry card payments between your bank and the shop's bank, and takes a sliver of every transaction. It lends nobody money and carries no credit risk — it is a toll on activity that happens anyway. More than half of every dollar of revenue converts to cash.
The shares fell because President Trump floated capping credit-card interest rates at 10%. That would hurt the banks that issue the cards, not Visa, and Slegers expects it to die in court anyway. The attraction is that the return does not require the market to re-rate the stock: the dividend (0.8%) plus the shares Visa retires each year (2.3%) already hands you 3.1%, and earnings are expected to grow around 12% a year on top — enough to double your money in five years. His model puts the expected return at 15.9% a year. He added $20,000 with a limit of $325.
In short: A disclosed long-term holding and his own worked example of blocking out headline noise. "I've been a long-term shareholder of Visa and Mastercard. I've owned them both for a long time. I think they're probably two of the most brilliant businesses ever created." Against recent negative news about a potential interchange cap he sets two metrics: combined total transaction volume "at the 27 to I think combined 30 trillion scale across those two companies", and total cards in force. "If anything is threatening those two metrics for these three companies, then I'll pay attention… But until then, I'm just holding them for decades potentially." He adds that he thinks the price paid is reasonable and that the unit economics are what make it work. Visa is also the walk-through name on the platform demo — $16.7tn of transaction volume in the segments view, and a September-25 quarter net revenue that came in at exactly $40,000,000,000.
Visa does not lend money and does not issue cards. It runs the network that moves a payment from your bank to a shop's bank, and takes a tiny slice of every transaction that crosses it. That means its economics scale with two simple things: how much money flows across the network, and how many cards exist that can put money onto it.
Dennis has owned it for years and expects to keep owning it "for decades potentially" — he calls Visa and Mastercard "probably two of the most brilliant businesses ever created". What makes his version of the thesis useful is that he has written down, in advance, the only evidence that would change his mind: combined total transaction volume across the networks (he tracks it at the $27–30 trillion scale) and total cards in force. Everything else is noise to him.
That includes the recent headlines about a possible cap on card interchange — the fee merchants pay on each swipe, which is shared with the bank that issued the card. He does not argue the news is wrong; he argues it does not touch his two numbers, and that the pain would mostly land on the banks administering the cards and on consumers. He also says the price he is paying looks reasonable. So the position is not "ignore regulation" — it is "here is the specific measurement that would tell me the regulation actually mattered, and it hasn't moved."
48:36Like for instance, I've been a long-term shareholder of Visa and Mastercard. I've owned them both for a long time. I think they're probably two of the most brilliant businesses ever created. Of course, none of this is investment advice. I've been a shareholder a long time. Just recently, there had a lot of negative news about a potential cap on interest rates.
In short: BUY. Weight 4.0%, performance +12.3%. Operating detail: "In Q4, Visa grew U.S. payment volume by 8%, and International payment volume by 10%." The return is built from disclosed parts: "a pure cash machine that translates more than 50% (!) of its sales in pure cash," a 0.8% dividend yield plus ~2.3% of shares retired a year = a 3.1% shareholder yield, "combine this with an expect earnings growth of 12% per year [and] you could expect the stock to double every 5 years." The live political risk is named and dismissed: "Visa and Mastercard are both down after Trump proposed a 10% credit card interest rate cap. The good news? I think Trump will never be able to push this through in court." Valuation: 25.4x forward against a 28.2x average ✅, Earnings Growth Model 12.7% ✅, reverse DCF needing 13.7% against 12.9% expected — the one dissenting model.
Visa owns the network that moves a card payment between your bank and the shop's bank and takes a sliver of each transaction. It lends nobody money and issues no cards.
The return here is assembled from four disclosed pieces rather than asserted: a 0.8% dividend, about 2.3% of the company bought back each year, and roughly 12% earnings growth — which together should double the share price in about five years. More than half of every dollar of revenue arrives as pure cash, which is what funds the first two.
The one live threat is political: a proposed American cap of 10% on credit-card interest rates, which knocked both Visa and Mastercard. Slegers dismisses it on the view that it would not survive a court challenge. Worth noting that this is a legal prediction rather than a business judgment — and the least evidenced sentence in an otherwise very numerate write-up.
In short: ROS candidate: "everyone loves the Visa and Mastercard payment-rail 'moat,' but that 200dma has finally flattened out. Beware one last rally and the 'kiss goodnight' from below."
In short: BUY — bought 21 October 2024, 4.35% of the portfolio, about +$11,000 of profit. Used as the worked example of the post's cash-flow arithmetic: "we own 180 shares of Visa… expected to generate a Free Cash Flow Per Share of $11.1 in 2026… Visa generates $1,998 in pure cash for us every single year."
In short: The relative underweight — "I'm more bullish on Mastercard than I am on Visa." Visa "is doubling down on their core rail," the payment network the government "will continue to be like a python and squeeze," whereas Mastercard has pivoted its growth into Value-Added Services and the multi-rail trust layer. Same chicken-and-egg network and merchant-fee/rewards dynamic, but a less-favored strategic posture.
Visa runs the same kind of business as Mastercard — the identical chicken-and-egg card network and merchant-fee/rewards machine — and Carlson holds it in the same mental bucket. But he is explicitly more bullish on Mastercard than on Visa, and the reason is strategy, not quality. He expects governments to keep "squeezing like a python" on the traditional card rail (the fees they can charge) through regulation over the next decade. Visa, he says, is "doubling down" on exactly that core rail — the part being squeezed — whereas Mastercard has pushed its growth into Value-Added Services and a "sell trust on any rail" strategy that regulators and merchants actually like. So this is a relative-preference call: a good business he'd simply rather own through Mastercard.
38:31I think they'll squeeze them and they're doing that with different laws. The credit card act or whatever it is, the debit card ones that restrict how much they can charge. So the government's going to squeeze down the margins of the traditional rail and you're going to see that with lots of legislation over the next 10 years.
Nothing matches this filter.
Verbatim excerpts from the public transcripts (auto-pulled at each mention's timestamp, lightly cleaned). Timestamps link into the video; "source page" opens that commentator's full analysis at this row. Click a mention's header line to expand it (one open at a time). For personal study — not investment advice.