| Account | Shares | Price | Value | % of acct | Cost/sh | Gain $ | Gain % | Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 401K | 84 | $162.43 | $13,644 | 0.56% | $120.32 | $3,537 | +35.0% | — |
| RLT | 8 | $162.43 | $1,299 | 0.08% | $118.63 | $350 | +36.9% | — |
| Total | 92 | $14,944 | 0.33% | $3,888 | +35.2% | — |
In short: Passing mention — named with Chevron as a target of Trump's public pressure to drop prices; no view on the company.
32:58can limit yourself and we also saw something that maybe we don't really see here in Canada, but in the US, you're seeing Trump openly call on platforms, I want Chevron or Exxon to drop prices. So sometimes he's pretty conviction and he can be pressurized. So maybe it could have an impact on it. — Okay.
In short: Cited as evidence, not a stance — RPK: "Exxon just brought a diesel refinery down" because refiners are running flat out and skipping turnarounds, "and when you don't maintain a refinery, it blows up."
12:34That's a nonzero probability that could actually end up causing some problems. And in fact, Exxon just brought a diesel refinery down, for other reasons, because we're running these things full out, right? We're not shutting them down, because we have product shortages — we usually do turnarounds on these things to do maintenance, and when you don't maintain a refinery, it blows up.
In short: Held in WEEI: the large-cap integrated example ("since they own everything").
15:21So if we look at the energy platform, we have a broad energy-focused oil and gas ETF called WEEI and that one is, think large cap companies like an Exxon for a producer, or I should say integrated companies since they own everything. But if you look at producers alone, a Diamondback in West Texas is in that portfolio. And then if you think of the midstream part of the industry, the transporters moving the volumes around.
In short: News mention ("Stocks I'm Watching"): close to a preliminary deal to explore investments in several Venezuelan oil fields — a potential return nearly two decades after its exit.
In short: Lebenthal's lead energy name. "Energy stocks are going to make a lot of money for the rest of this year. We're going to be refilling inventories across the globe for months and quarters to come." ExxonMobil "still is not at the peak that it was at back in March. It's attractively priced."
With the Middle East conflict disrupting supply, countries and companies have drawn down their stored oil and fuel. Lebenthal's argument is that once the fighting ends, the world has to buy back months of inventory, which keeps demand and prices firm for a long time. Big integrated producers like Exxon and Chevron benefit, and Exxon's shares are still below their March high even though that story hasn't changed.
In short: On the Kalshi Venezuela-agreement market: "I would probably short Exxon on that one" (the short leg of a long Shell / short Exxon trade). "I've been covering Exxon for 25, 30 years and those guys don't back off their legal position": its arbitration award for the illegal expropriation stands, "they'll just wait for the Democrats." A view on the contract, not on the stock.
The other side of the same Kalshi bet. Venezuela took over Exxon's oil projects years ago, and international arbitration found the seizure illegal and awarded Exxon a multi-billion-dollar payment. Sankey has covered Exxon for 25–30 years and says it never backs off a legal position, even though the president waved the claim away at a White House Venezuela meeting. It would rather "wait for the Democrats." So he expects Exxon not to sign a new Venezuelan deal and would bet against it on that contract. He isn't making a call on Exxon's stock.
22:13But yeah, they might be. I mean, I think the odds are right actually. I think the one I would probably short Exxon on that one basically because Exxon and ConocoPhillips have the major legal cases against Venezuela and Exxon is just not going to, I've been covering Exxon for 25 30 years and those guys don't back off their legal position and their legal position is that the Venezuelans expropriated them illegally.
In short: Exxon, Gulf Oil and Phillips Petroleum found most of the uranium discovered in the '70s; today "Exxon could buy the entire industry and have petty cash left over," and he expects big oil to re-enter uranium "within a couple of years" on BTUs per dollar. A sector-consolidation call, not a view on the stock.
12:20And a whole generation or two of management's come and gone, and board members. So I think they'll have a fresh taste in their mouth when they evaluate the BTUs per dollar and I mean Exxon could buy the entire industry and have petty cash left over. I think it's such a small group and such a small market cap that it invites that sort of entrance into the market from other energy companies.
In short: No stock view. Named twice: as most of what XLE actually is ("mostly just Exxon and Chevron"), and on Venezuela reparations — "I think Exxon, their CEO, commented on this… They asked, 'Hey, are we getting our money back?' And they got smacked by Trump, verbally." Young treats unpaid reparations to expropriated US oil companies as a precondition for any real Venezuelan investment.
38:34And so, I just don't think — I think Exxon, their CEO, commented on this, and I can't remember if it was Exxon or KICO. They asked, "Hey, are we getting our money back?" And they got smacked by Trump, verbally — oh no, that's ridiculous — which is of course obscene because Trump himself personally has made himself billions of dollars on trading these crypto coins and he has been very very personally economically focused but is very worried about oil companies even getting paid back for the
In short: The only name with both an options tell and a desk endorsement. Renick: "Among oil producers, Exxon shows distinctly bullish trading. The most popular contract there today is the 170 strike call expiring Friday, which means a 6% rally into the weekend." Wapner: "ExxonMobil outperformed today, 182 at Bernstein." Belski: "Exxon is just a juggernaut… not only on how they pay out their dividends, but how they're diversifying out their business lines." Lebenthal holds it instead of a pure refiner: "Because I've got it in ExxonMobil. ExxonMobil is the world's third largest refiner, but it's tucked into an integrated oil company… even if oil prices do come down, they're probably not likely to come below $70. And there's a lot of money to be made all along the product pipeline above $70."
ExxonMobil is an integrated oil company: it pumps crude, refines it into fuels, and sells the products. That structure is the whole point of Lebenthal's answer when Belski asks why he owns no pure refiner. He does own one — it is inside Exxon, which is the world's third-largest refiner, wrapped in a business that also produces the oil.
His economics are simple and worth writing down. Even if crude falls, he does not expect it below $70, and above that level there is money to be made at every stage between the wellhead and the pump. That is a bet on the spread between crude and finished fuels, not on the oil price itself.
The options market agreed on the day: the busiest contract was a call — a bet the shares rise — struck 6% above the price and expiring at the end of the week, which is an unusually aggressive way to be bullish.
In short: Last year's pick reviewed: +45%, still held. "I do. I like the energy trade a lot." The reasoning is a deliberate refusal to sell his own speciality: "most of your listeners, like most of the population, aren't prepared to do the work that would allow them to buy smaller, more speculative issues. And there's an argument in a resource bull market that the beta — beta defined as the extent to which that industry outperforms the market as a whole — will be good enough in oil and gas. In other words, by 2030, 2031, you will have made enough buying the beta that you don't need to buy the alpha. And Exxon is the best of the beta." Two supports: "they have a 30-year track record for capital deployment. That's fantastic," and "unlike the industry, they have been making sustaining capital investments" — the same underinvestment gap that drives his 2029-31 structural-shortage call, which Exxon is on the right side of. Plus "a discovery in Guyana that's big enough to move the needle on a company the size of Exxon."
Last year Rule shocked this audience by recommending the largest, dullest oil company on the board, and it returned 45%. He still likes it, and the reasoning is a piece of honest self-limitation: most people watching will not read reserve reports or drill results, and without that work small speculative energy stocks are a coin flip. So he offers the version that does not require the work.
The concept is beta — the return you get simply from being in a sector that outperforms, as opposed to alpha, the extra return from picking the right individual company. His claim is that in a genuine energy bull market the sector-wide return alone is enough: "by 2030, 2031, you will have made enough buying the beta that you don't need to buy the alpha."
Exxon is his choice of beta for two reasons that connect to his broader oil thesis. It has a thirty-year record of allocating capital well, and — unlike most of the industry, which has been starving its fields to fund dividends and buybacks — it has kept spending the money required simply to maintain production. Since Rule's structural shortage call for 2029-31 is built precisely on everyone else failing to spend that money, Exxon is one of the companies that ends up on the right side of the shortage rather than the wrong one. The Guyana discovery is a bonus large enough to matter even at Exxon's scale.
57:46And you did well with it, 45%. Do you still like it as kind of that nice clean, if we can call it, exposure to the energy trade? — I do. I like the energy trade a lot. And I think most of your listeners, like most of the population, aren't prepared to do the work that would allow them to buy smaller, more speculative issues.
In short: Morgan Stanley "sees value in Exxon, Suncor and Chevron" with oil back toward $100, and Lebenthal repeats his standing rule: "I've said this many times, I'll say it again. If you're going to own anything in the energy patch, if you're starting to build your energy portfolio, you've got to start with ExxonMobil. And the reason why is because it does everything — exploration and production, distribution, refining, chemicals, retail — and it makes a lot of money doing all of those things." The record he cites: "a great stock not just this year, but over the last six years. It's outperformed the S&P 500 by twice what the S&P 500 has returned."
Lebenthal's argument is not about the oil price at all — it is about business structure. Exxon is integrated: it finds and produces oil, transports it, refines it into fuels, makes chemicals from it, and sells it at retail. Those pieces do well at different points in the cycle, so when crude falls the refining and chemicals arms cushion the fall.
That is why his rule is "if you're starting to build your energy portfolio, you've got to start with ExxonMobil" — it is the position that requires the fewest correct forecasts. The supporting fact he cites is a six-year record of roughly doubling the S&P 500's return, in a sector most investors treat as a trade.
In short: The template for the 1986–2000 regime, not a stock view: after the crash "the correct strategy was to restructure, to cut cost, to downsize, to be capital disciplined, best exemplified by Lee Raymond's ExxonMobil strategy." Also the scale marker for what he was hired to cover — energy was still ~8% of the S&P 500 in 1999.
Context, not a view. ExxonMobil under Lee Raymond is Murti's illustration of the strategy that was correct for the 1986–2000 world of $15–$20 oil: restructure, cut costs, shrink, and refuse to spend into a low-price market. Chevron under Ken Derr and Mobil under Lucio Noto ran the same playbook.
The reason it matters to the rest of the episode is that this discipline was so successful for so long that by 1999 the whole industry had internalised $15–$20 oil as permanent — CEOs and analysts even competed to publish the lowest long-term oil price forecast. That consensus is exactly what the super spike call had to overturn, and it is the cautionary tale: the strategy that works through a fifteen-year trough becomes the belief that blinds you to the turn.
21:16be capital disciplined, best exemplified by Lee Raymond's ExxonMobil strategy, pursued by Lucio Noto of Mobil and Ken Derr of Chevron and all the major companies. And by the time you got to my joining Goldman Sachs, everybody knew that oil will forever be $15 to $20 a barrel and that the 70s super cycle was just a geopolitical aberration and that it could never go up again.
In short: Named only in the quoted Venezuela report — Exxon has not returned to operating Venezuelan oilfields as PDVSA-led negotiations move slower than Washington expected.
In short: Used as the control case in the governance argument rather than as a pick: "we would contrast the difference between how the government of Guyana has decided to embrace Exxon with how Hugo Chávez has decided to deal with the super majors once they've invested all this capital to get the oil flowing. That's not to say that super major is good, Chávez bad. That's just an agnostic observation." Guyana is the template Venezuela is now being pointed at.
Exxon is the largest US oil and gas company. Here it is not being rated — it is being used as the benchmark in an argument about why identical oil is worth different amounts in different countries.
Guyana, the small South American country next door to Venezuela, welcomed Exxon in and let it help write the rules of a brand-new oil industry. The result was one of the most valuable oil discoveries of the last two decades. Venezuela, sitting on a far larger resource, did the opposite: under Hugo Chávez the government changed the terms on the majors after they had already sunk the capital to get the oil flowing. Doomberg is careful not to make this a morality tale — "that's not to say that super major is good, Chávez bad. That's just an agnostic observation of the difference in approach to the superpower in your backyard."
The practical use of the comparison is as a test you can rerun on any resource country: if a basin is underproducing, ask whether the constraint is the rock or the government. Venezuela fails on governance, not geology — which is exactly why a change in governance can restore four million barrels a day without a single new discovery. Exxon's Guyana position is the reference point for what a well-governed barrel is worth, and it is why Venezuela "getting turned into a Guyana" is the phrase that motivates a competitor to move.
17:32We would contrast the difference between how the government of Guyana has decided to embrace Exxon with how Hugo Chávez has decided to deal with the super majors once they've invested all this capital to get the oil flowing. That's not to say that super major is good, Chávez bad. That's just an agnostic observation of the difference in approach to the superpower in your backyard.
In short: Named with Chevron as roughly #9/#10 on the top-10 earnings-growth list — the non-tech members of a top 10 that supplies two-thirds of 2026 S&P earnings growth.
Exxon is the other oil major she names in the top ten earnings-growth contributors, alongside Chevron. Same role in the argument: proof that the profit growth propping up the index comes from a very short list of companies — and that the list has an energy tail as well as an AI head.
The takeaway she draws is structural. Market-cap concentration (a few enormous companies dominating the index's size) has actually eased; earnings concentration (a few companies supplying nearly all its profit growth) has not. That is the more fragile of the two.
33:14They represent two thirds of S&P earnings growth. So yeah, you have some sort of high-profile miss, not just what that does in terms of the psychology of the market, but mathematically you would see a ratcheting down of estimates. Now there's another somewhat positive side of this and that is that the big surge in earnings and in turn forward expectations that occurred throughout second quarter reporting season 10 out of the 11 sectors have seen an improving earnings profile.
In short: Passing mention — cited as the cautionary precedent, not as a recommendation. Exxon appears only inside the Venezuela debunking, as the example of why the majors "may not hurry back, despite the mammoth upside": "overseas oil companies have a bitter aftertaste from decades of having their assets in Venezuela appropriated and/or nationalized. Years of convoluted litigation ensued, and even when companies like Exxon won judgement via international courts, Venezuela's destitute financial condition made collection nearly impossible." No stance is taken on the shares. (For the record, the published tables carry XOM on the Sells list — exited 03/02/2026 at $160.64 for a +34.93% gain on a $114.30 cost — a prior disposal, not an action this week.)
In short: Guyana is held up as the model of a jurisdictionally safe barrel, and the credit goes to the operator: "that's what actually makes Guyana so valuable, by the way. It's not just the quality of the resource. It's the fact that that jurisdiction was there to be shaped effectively by Exxon" — the explicit contrast being Vaca Muerta, where Milei "is not Lucy holding the football" is a claim investors must take on faith. A read on the durability of the asset, not a price call.
Exxon is the largest US oil and gas company. It appears here not because of earnings or a price target, but because of a single point about where its oil is — and the point is worth more than most stock arguments.
Oil companies keep having to go further afield: the easy barrels in safe countries have already been drilled, so everyone is "in search of the next Guyana." Guyana is Exxon's big South American discovery. Doomberg's claim is that what made it so valuable was not mainly the geology — it was that Guyana had almost no oil industry, so the rules, contracts and tax terms were written essentially from scratch, with Exxon at the table. In other words, Exxon locked in a legal environment, not just a reservoir.
The contrast is Argentina's Vaca Muerta shale, where Milei has passed a law (RIGI) promising foreign investors they can take their profits out of the country quickly. The problem is that no Argentine president can bind the next one, so the promise is only as good as the current government's survival — "he's not Lucy holding the football" is a claim you have to take on trust. Applied to a portfolio, the lesson is that two identical barrels in the ground are not worth the same amount: the one in a jurisdiction that can't change its mind is worth more. On that test, Exxon's Guyana position looks unusually durable — and it is the sort of asset that gets more valuable as the world gets less predictable.
16:23That's what actually makes Guyana so valuable, by the way. It's not just the quality of the resource. It's the fact that that jurisdiction was there to be shaped effectively by Exxon, whereas if you look at Vaca Muerta in Argentina, as much as Milei is trying to convince investors that once again he's not Lucy holding the football.
In short: The other half of the selling JV — equal shareholder in NAM Offshore B.V. with Shell. Same role in the story: "when it's Shell and Exxon there is the highest standard you could get in the world for asset integrity. So these offshore platforms could not in my view be maintained at a better standard than they were at the time that we got the assets." He frames the underinvestment as rational rather than negligent — "logical reasons when you're sitting in the position I think of super majors like Shell and Exxon." No stance on the stock.
Exxon owned the other half of the same joint venture, so it is the other seller. It plays an identical role in the story and no opinion is given on the shares.
Worth taking away as a general pattern rather than a fact about Exxon: assets that are too small to matter inside a very large company can be transformational inside a small one, and they are often handed over in unusually good physical condition because a supermajor's safety and maintenance standards apply regardless of how little the asset earns.
21:44So we had a very very good staff at NOM. The other thing when it's Shell and Exxon there is the highest standard you could get in the world for asset integrity. So these offshore platforms could not in my view be maintained at a better standard than they were at the time that we got the assets. Very lucky in that respect for a variety of reasons.
In short: Named as the deliberate anti-example: "they wouldn't buy Exxon Mobil to play rising oil prices, because it's too diversified in other areas such as chemicals." Not a negative view of the company — a rule about instrument selection. Goehring & Rozencwajg "tend to buy stocks with more concentrated exposure to a macro theme they're pursuing," so a diversified integrated dilutes the very variable they are trying to own.
Exxon appears here only to make a point about how to express a view, and it is the most useful sentence in the article. The managers say they would not buy Exxon to play rising oil prices "because it's too diversified in other areas such as chemicals."
The reasoning: a giant integrated company earns from producing crude, from refining it, and from turning it into chemicals — and those businesses move differently. Refining margins can widen while crude falls; chemicals can be weak while oil is strong. Blended together, the share price responds far less to the oil price than a pure producer's does. If you are right about oil and own Exxon, you are only partly paid.
So this is not a bearish view of Exxon as a business — the archive's earlier pages had it earning record cash flow off exactly that diversification. It is a rule about matching the instrument to the thesis: when the whole argument is one variable, buy the thing that moves most with that variable, and accept the volatility that comes with it.
In short: One of "the few remaining places where the US in particular has a strong position" — the hydrocarbon complex, where "the remnants of the old Standard Oil empire are reconstructing themselves in the form of two companies, Exxon and Chevron, that collectively have a real market cap that is defendable to the tune of hundreds of billions," as against "fantasy trillion-dollar unicorns… or gigacorns" from the Wall Street IPO printing press.
Exxon is the largest US oil and gas company — it finds oil and gas, refines it into fuels and chemicals, and sells it. Doomberg's argument here isn't about next quarter's earnings. It's about which American companies still have a position the rest of the world genuinely can't take away.
Their answer is oil and gas, and they say it with a touch of irony: after decades of everyone else's industries being out-competed by China, the "remnants of the old Standard Oil empire" — Exxon and Chevron, the two big survivors of the 1911 breakup — are the ones left standing. The key word is defendable. These are companies whose hundreds of billions of market value sit on physical reserves, refineries and pipelines that produce cash today, as opposed to the newly minted trillion-dollar private companies whose valuations are set by the next funding round. In a clip that is otherwise about American decline, Exxon is offered as one of the few real assets.
5:38Where the remnants of the old Standard Oil empire are reconstructing themselves in the form of two companies, Exxon and Chevron, that collectively have a real market cap that is defendable to the tune of hundreds of billions, not these fantasy trillion-dollar unicorns, or gigacorns, that we see coming off the Wall Street IPO printing press.
In short: Split down the middle. Wapner has it up 38% year to date; Brown mentions it mainly as a distortion to strip out — Exxon is ~30% of the XLE, which is why he prefers the IEO to judge whether the group is extended. Harrington puts it in the walk-away bucket with the other majors: "the Shell and the Total and the Exxon and the Chevron — they're all up because oil is trading like $86 a barrel right now. They're rich. They're just up on oil prices," and she does not think $86 is sustainable given the workarounds moving oil out of the Straits of Hormuz.
Exxon is up 38% this year and is roughly 30% of the main energy ETF, which is why Josh Brown looks at a producer-only fund instead when he wants to judge whether energy is overheated — one giant company can hide what the other names are doing.
Jenny Harrington's view is the cautionary one. She groups Exxon with Shell, TotalEnergies and Chevron as companies whose share prices rose because crude went from $58 to $86 a barrel, not because anything changed inside the businesses. She calls them rich, and she does not think $86 oil lasts — partly because the US is helping route substantial volumes out through the Strait of Hormuz and workarounds keep appearing.
The net position is a hold rather than an exit: the company is fine, but you are being paid for an oil price rather than for a business, and that is a different risk than most owners think they have taken.
In short: Named alongside Chevron as the large-producer anchor — "we own Chevron, we own Exxon." Held because a $65–85 settling band still leaves the majors highly profitable and the shares priced as though oil returns to $50.
Exxon is the other supermajor in the same slot, named directly alongside Chevron: "we own Chevron, we own Exxon." The two together form the stable, dividend-paying base of the energy allocation.
The thesis is identical and worth restating plainly: the market prices these companies as if oil is on its way back to $50, while Oakley's own work says the settling range is $65–85 — a level at which a supermajor's profits are large and durable. The mismatch between that price expectation and the actual cash generation is the whole opportunity.
42:00They think, well, if the price has gone from 105 back down to 82 or 81, whatever, that just means it's all over. Well, not really. They make a lot of money down at this level, and I think they'll continue to do it, and that just makes the companies cheaper when you get right down to it. — So, you see opportunities in the energy companies like what, the big ones? What are some of the — We own a lot, we own the whole group. On the producing side for example, we own Chevron, we own Exxon, just like
In short: "Major oil companies with refining arms like ExxonMobil are also profiting." A one-clause mention, but it extends the record-crack windfall to the integrateds — and corroborates the Jul 31 call from CEO Darren Woods that the world's fuel deficit persists ("a very robust refining market with very high margins"), which Exxon backed with record diesel output. Diluted versus the pure refiners: Exxon's upstream barrels are the side of the business Hormuz hurts (a disclosed 750k bpd y/y Middle East hit if the strait stays shut through Q3).
Exxon gets one clause here — "major oil companies with refining arms like ExxonMobil are also profiting" — but it matters because it confirms what the company said itself three weeks earlier. On its July earnings call, CEO Darren Woods said the world's fuel deficit would persist and that he expected "a very robust refining market with very high margins," and Exxon backed that by producing more diesel than it ever has.
The difference from a pure refiner is that Exxon sits on both sides of the trade. Its refineries capture the record spread, but its upstream oil production is the part the same war is hurting: the company has said Middle East output would run 750,000 barrels a day below last year if Hormuz stays shut through the third quarter. So it participates in the diesel windfall with a hedge attached — less pure upside than Valero, Marathon or Phillips 66, but also less exposed if the crack spread eventually normalizes.
In short: A named survivor: the largest company in the S&P 500 in December 2005 at $349.49bn, and seventeenth in June 2026 at $579.18bn. Twenty years of survival at the top with a 66% gain in market value — the single most useful data point in the issue about what "still in the top twenty" is actually worth. No view offered.
In short: In Terranova's new 10%-weight energy sleeve, and Lebenthal's worked example of why energy is "analyzable": Exxon explores, produces and refines — "that's where the bottleneck is in the energy industry, it's in the refining sector, which ExxonMobil is a big player in." Asked trade-or-investment: "bellwether for the industry… five years annualized 27% return per annum, the S&P 13%. It's an investment." The point being these are "fundamental forces beyond the price of oil… innate capacity, innate infrastructure."
Exxon is in Terranova's newly enlarged energy sleeve, but Jim Lebenthal supplies the argument. Exxon does three things — finds oil, pumps it, and refines it into fuel — and refining is where the industry's genuine shortage sits (America has barely built a new refinery in decades). That means Exxon's profits depend on physical capacity and infrastructure it already owns, "fundamental forces beyond the price of oil," rather than on guessing whether crude is $70 or $90.
Asked whether it's a trade or an investment, he answers with the record: over five years Exxon has returned 27% a year versus 13% for the S&P 500. "It's an investment."
In short: The face of the water fight: through a joint-venture chemical plant it is Corpus Christi's biggest water user at ~13 million gallons a day, and a resident asked at a June city council meeting, "Do we want to be known as the city sucked dry by Exxon?" The company says it "continuously recycles water and is always looking for additional ways to reduce its water use." Industrial plants take ~60% of the city's water while residents cut usage 19% (2023–25) versus 3% for large-volume users.
Refineries and chemical plants need enormous quantities of water, mostly for cooling. In Corpus Christi, Exxon's joint-venture chemical plant is the single largest water user in a city whose reservoirs are nearly empty — roughly 13 million gallons a day, in a place where households have been banned from watering their lawns since late 2024. Industry as a whole takes about 60% of the city's water, and while residents cut usage 19%, big users cut 3%.
Nothing here says anything about Exxon's earnings. What it flags is a cost and permission risk that does not show up in a financial model: if the drought deepens to a Level 1 emergency, the city manager says industry — not residents — takes the 25% cuts. Water access, not oil prices, becomes the constraint on running the plant. That is the general lesson worth carrying to any water-intensive asset in a drought-exposed region.
In short: One of Baruch's energy positions (with Kinder Morgan and Cheniere): "structurally, crude oil will have a higher floor." Held alongside the midstream names in a sector he says is under-invested relative to coming US power demand.
Exxon is one of Bill Baruch's energy holdings, owned on a simple structural view: the floor under the crude price is higher than it used to be. It sits alongside his preferred exposure — the pipelines — as the integrated producer in a sector he thinks is under-invested relative to the power demand coming from AI data centers.
In short: "The easiest thing to say to an audience as big as yours is buy Exxon. Just relax. A company with a 30-year track record of intelligent deployment of capital and really intelligent management of political risks is making the sustaining capital investments, and they've actually made a discovery in Guyana that's big enough to move the dial on a company the size of Exxon." Then: "if it goes lower, buy a little more, enjoy a decent but by oil company standards stingy dividend" — and wait for 2029–30.
Asked for the single simplest way to own his 2029 thesis in front of a big audience, Rick doesn't hedge: "buy Exxon. Just relax."
The reasoning is about sustaining capital — the money an oil company must spend every year simply to stop its production declining. Most of the industry has been skipping it to fund dividends and buybacks, which quietly liquidates the company. Exxon has kept spending, has a 30-year record of allocating capital well, manages political risk competently, and has made a discovery in Guyana big enough to matter even at its size.
He even frames the dividend as a feature: it is "decent but by oil company standards stingy," and stingy is what lets a capital-intensive business still be paying four or five years from now. The instruction is deliberately boring — "if it goes lower, buy a little more" — and the payoff is dated: 2029 or 2030, when the companies that kept investing are the only ones with barrels to sell.
31:50The easiest thing to say to an audience as big as yours is buy Exxon. Yeah. Just relax. A company with a 30-year track record of intelligent deployment of capital and really intelligent management of political risks is making the sustaining capital investments, and they've actually made a discovery in Guyana that's big enough to move the dial on a company the size of Exxon.
In short: Same best-of-best logic applied to oil: "for many investors, having a one stock portfolio — Exxon — and then doing nothing for 5 years is a highly intelligent strategy." He can't do it himself ("psychologically incapable… always looking for an edge"), but concedes his own path has only beaten it on a time- and risk-adjusted basis. Deemphasize dividend yield; favour companies that kept making sustaining capital investments.
Exxon is Rick's default answer for oil the way Agnico/Franco/Wheaton are for gold: "for many investors, having a one stock portfolio — Exxon — and then doing nothing for 5 years is a highly intelligent strategy."
The reason is sustaining capital — the money an oil company must spend every year just to stop its production declining. The industry has been skipping over a billion dollars a day of it, partly because shareholders demanded dividends instead, so companies have been quietly eating themselves. Rick wants the operators that kept spending, and tells investors to de-emphasise headline dividend yield in favour of that discipline.
He can't follow his own advice — "I'm psychologically incapable" — because he prefers to buy the weaker companies that the disciplined ones will eventually be forced to acquire. But he concedes that edge has only beaten simply owning Exxon after adjusting for the time and risk involved.
27:15you and I is probably true. I think for many investors having a one stock portfolio, Exxon,
27:23and then doing nothing for 5 years is a highly intelligent strategy. I'm incapable
In short: Q2 adjusted EPS $3.52 (vs $3.56 expected, up from $1.64 a year ago) on revenue of $116.02B (vs $109.9B expected) — its highest earnings and revenue since Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The miss came in refining, which ran "elevated" maintenance in H1 (Raymond James' Justin Jenkins); even so it pumped out record diesel volumes into a severe war-driven diesel shortage, and CEO Darren Woods says the world's fuel deficit will persist — "a very robust refining market with very high margins." FCF $17.2B for the quarter (vs ~$16B expected; more than the prior three quarters combined), used partly to whittle down debt; buybacks/dividend hikes/M&A all possible, Guyana projects advancing. Offsets: shares +30% YTD into the print (record high in March), a 750,000 bpd year-over-year Middle East production hit if Hormuz stays closed through Q3 (~20% of volume there shut in, Qatar path unclear), and BofA's Jean Ann Salisbury downgraded to Neutral last week on fading war momentum (target raised to $158). Stock -2.1% to $153.72 midday.
Exxon just had its best quarter in four years — revenue and profit at levels not seen since oil spiked after Russia invaded Ukraine — and the stock went down. The reason is almost entirely about expectations rather than the business: profit came in four cents a share light ($3.52 vs $3.56), and shares had already climbed 30% this year going into the report. When a stock is priced for perfection, a rounding-error miss is enough to knock it.
The miss itself is the least worrying kind. It came from the refining arm, which was doing heavy scheduled maintenance in the first half — plants shut for planned work, not customers walking away. In fact Exxon turned out more diesel than it ever has, because wars in Iran and Ukraine have left the world short of it, and management says less maintenance is scheduled for the rest of the year. CEO Darren Woods told the earnings call the shortage isn't a passing thing: the industry needs time "to climb its way out of that hole," so he expects "a very robust refining market with very high margins" to continue. Cash bears that out — $17.2 billion of free cash flow in one quarter, more than the previous three combined, some of which went to paying down debt.
Two things keep this a watch-and-see rather than a chase. First, the war that's fattening margins is also costing Exxon barrels: the company says Middle East output would run 750,000 barrels a day lower than last year if the Strait of Hormuz stays shut through the third quarter, with roughly a fifth of its volume there already offline and no clear timeline in Qatar. Second, the same war is the reason the stock ran — so a peace deal, whenever it lands, removes the tailwind. That's exactly why BofA's Jean Ann Salisbury downgraded it to Neutral last week even while nudging her target up to $158 (barely above today's ~$153). The next real decision point is what Exxon does with the cash pile: buybacks and dividend increases are what investors want; a big acquisition is what they fear.
In short: Same corroborating role — "one of the senior Exxon executives as well… was saying the same thing" about forced SPR refilling at any price.
16:14know, there was it wasn't just Jeff, it was also Mike Worth, the CEO of Chevron and one of the senior Exxon executives as well that was saying the same thing. It's just a reality. We've been I think the quip that I had which we'll see on the slides was at the end of June was oil going to hit a bottom before the tanks oil storage tanks did and now it's pretty obvious the oil hit the bottom first and the tanks are still going to shrink or the level of in those tanks.
In short: "For most investors who can't stomach volatility and don't want to do the work — buy Exxon. The best of the best." 20–30yr record of intelligent capital allocation; maintained sustaining capex; a 19bn-barrel Ghana find big enough to "move the dial." The de-risked way to play oil's coming beta — sit back, reinvest the dividends.
Exxon is the biggest US integrated oil company, and Rick's pick for anyone who wants oil exposure without the stress. His case is management quality: 20–30 years of disciplined capital allocation, and — unlike peers who cut corners — it kept spending the money needed just to keep production flat ("sustaining capital"), so it isn't heading into the 2029–30 shortage with a depleted asset base. A huge new oil find in Ghana is big enough to matter even at Exxon's scale.
"Beta" here just means: as oil outperforms the broad market, Exxon rises with it — the low-drama way to ride that. Buy it, reinvest the dividends, and "let wonderful things happen to your account over time."
42:15— Buy the best of the best. 20-year track record, 30-year track record in intelligent application of capital. unlike many of their competitors, they maintain sustaining capital investments. They didn't scrimp. They made a discovery in Ghana that amazingly at 19 billion barrels, pardon me, is big enough even to move the dial on Exxon.
In short: A closed Sells-table position — sold 03/02/2026 at $154.22 for +34.93%. The note: the XOM Gain% cell "had an inaccurate figure in last week's edition… and [we] have made the correction." A booked winner; a housekeeping fix, not a new view.
In short: Reference — owns 70% of Imperial (so Imperial "floats Exxon bonds" at a super-low cost of capital and Exxon takes 3.5 of every 5% NCIB). Also fought Chevron over the Hess/Guyana long-life asset — supermajors prize offshore long-life barrels.
24:39And you get super low cost of capital because ExxonMobil owns them, so you're effectively floating Exxon bonds. Lastly, they were buying back stock then, okay? Now, if you think about it, Exxon owns 70% of the stock. So, they are participating in the buyback, which means effectively 3 and 1/2% of that 5% NCIB is going to them.
In short: Jain (now bullish energy): buy the biggest, best-asset majors — Exxon says it can grow EPS double digits for five years at $65 oil, so the case doesn't even need his higher-oil view (Hormuz effectively Iran-controlled, SPR at a 43-year low, no real China demand destruction, shale plateauing at ~30% depletion). Everyone is underinvested in energy; it's also the defensive hedge if rates keep rising.
In short: "My number one customer in every jurisdiction we're in is Exxon" — doesn't always agree with Darren (Woods) but finds solutions to keep the relationship growing. Customer reference.
30:44number one customer in every jurisdiction we're in is Exxon. Do I always get along with everything that
30:50Darren or John would say? No. But I sure find solutions with my number one customer to keep it
In short: His example energy name for a from-scratch portfolio: "they might not be happy in 2026, maybe 2027, they'd probably be ecstatic by 2029 or 2030" — patience for the structural oil under-investment to bite.
Exxon is Rule's example energy holding for a from-scratch portfolio. His framing is about patience: an owner "might not be happy in 2026, maybe 2027, but probably ecstatic by 2029 or 2030." The logic is that the oil industry has under-invested in maintaining production for years, so today's soft prices set up much tighter supply — and higher prices — later in the decade. Exxon is the disciplined, deep-pocketed operator that survives the soft patch and profits when the shortage arrives.
10:30Similarly, if that same investor constructing a natural resource portfolio, bought the biggest of the multi-commodity mining companies, the BHPs, the Rio Tintos, the Glencores, they would over the next 5 to 7 years become very, very happy. And similarly, should they buy as an example Exxon Mobil, well, they might not be happy in 2026, maybe 2027, they'd probably be ecstatic by 2029 or 2030.
In short: The lone disciplined allocator: "it's not occurring except at places like Exxon" — i.e. cutting buybacks/dividends to reinvest free cash flow into future production (3–5 years out) instead of cannibalizing the company to subsidize shareholders today. Also cited (with Shell) as the furthest along in applying AI to its drilling/production data (10,000 West Texas well logs).
Exxon is the giant integrated oil company, and Rule holds it up as the one disciplined manager in the patch. His worry about oil companies is that they "cannibalize" themselves — handing all their spare cash back to shareholders through dividends and buybacks instead of reinvesting to keep production up in three-to-five years. He says almost nobody is reinvesting properly "except at places like Exxon." On top of that, Exxon is one of only two majors he knows of (Shell is the other) using AI to mine its own drilling and production data at scale — the kind of "free efficiency upside" he says isn't priced into oil stocks. So Exxon is both the well-run allocator and an AI-efficiency early mover.
1:00:46So that's happening and that's very very very beneficial. You will know the world's gotten their message when analysts say to companies reduce your share buybacks, reduce the percentage of free cash flow that's going to dividends and increase the amount of your free cash flow that's going to increase your oil production three years from now, four years from now, five years from now.
In short: "Exxon was near 170, today it's trading around 140" — should be "the most stable, highest dividend-paying grandma type of stock," and it's been hammered. Yet with under-investment, robust demand and lost Middle East supply/refining, "the long-term outlook for it is probably never been better." His concrete example of the cheap major he's a buyer of.
Exxon is the biggest US oil major — the kind of large, steady, dividend-paying stock Currie calls "the grandma type of stock." It fell from about $170 to around $140 in the recent oil sell-off, which he thinks is backwards: the war has actually made the oil market tighter (less supply above and below ground, lost Middle East refining), demand is holding up, and the industry has under-invested for a decade. So the price went down while, in his view, "the long-term outlook for it is probably never been better."
The appeal isn't a quick trade — it's that you get paid to wait. Big oil majors are reliable dividend payers, and he calls that dividend "the real yield": real cash in your pocket today, the opposite of a tech stock that's burning cash to chase growth. His advice is simply to get the exposure most investors don't have, because "they're all in on tech."
33:35I mean, the whole materials sector. It's, it was energy was 3% of the index. I think it got up to four at its peak a few months or so ago. We're back down to around three. I mean, like Exxon was near 170, today it's trading around 140. And that should be one of the most stable, highest dividend-paying grandma type of stock, and it's been hammered on this.
In short: His shorthand for the whole energy trade — "I've been talking about Exxon for as long as I've had a voice." Different price 7–8 months ago vs today, so it's a function of your time frame; "my own Exxon, which I hold at a much lower price, is not for sale."
Rule uses Exxon as shorthand for his entire bullish energy view: it's a disciplined, top-tier oil company he's owned for years at much lower prices. His honest caveat is that whether it's a buy today depends on your time horizon — near-term oil could dip to $60 if the Middle East calms down, but a decade of underinvestment (over a billion dollars a day of missing maintenance spending) makes higher prices structural by 2029–30. His own Exxon shares "are not for sale."
51:45So I think it's really a function of the investor and the investor's time frame. As you know, Danny, I'm a big fan of the energy trade. I've been talking on your show as an example about Exxon for as long as I've had a voice. Talking about Exxon at a price that existed 7 or 8 months ago versus Exxon today is a very different exercise.
In short: A name he'd love to own much more of — "I'd be delighted to see Exxon Mobil fall by half." The way to get profoundly richer is to buy undervalued assets and wait; he's hoping IPO-driven illiquidity gives him that entry.
Exxon is the giant integrated oil company, and Rule would love to own much more of it — he says he'd "be delighted to see Exxon Mobil fall by half." His whole method is to buy genuinely undervalued assets cheap and wait for them to recover, which is the only way he's found to get seriously rich. So he's actually hoping for a market drop (he thinks the giant SpaceX/AI IPOs could suck money out of everything else) to hand him a cheaper entry point.
37:32I wonder what these IPOs — SpaceX, Anthropic, OpenAI — will do to liquidity, sucking capital from other names. The beginning of the end? I certainly hope so. There are a lot of names in conventional financial services and natural resources I'd like to own much more of — I'd be delighted to see Exxon Mobil, Agnico Eagle or Franco-Nevada fall by half. The only way I've found to become profoundly materially richer is to buy undervalued assets and wait until they return to value. So my hope is that higher oil prices and IPO-driven illiquidity lead to materially worse equity markets, particularly in financial services and natural resources — the markets I know best.
In short: "Where you start an oil portfolio" — a great-capital-allocating integrated that makes money in refining at low prices and E&P at high. Easy to recommend at $90, less of a no-brainer at $180.
Exxon is the big "integrated" oil company — it does everything from pumping crude to refining it into fuel. That mix is why Rule calls it "where you start an oil portfolio": when oil is cheap it still makes money refining and selling fuel, and when oil is expensive it makes money pumping it. He also rates its management as excellent at deciding where to spend money.
His only hesitation is price: it was an easy call when the stock was cheap, much less obvious after it roughly doubled — especially if the Gulf conflict resolves and oil falls back.
15:22Exxon is one sizefits-all. Uh it's a very large company. It's an integrated company. So during periods of low oil prices, they make money in refining and marketing. During periods of high oil prices, they make money in exploration and production. They're great capital allocators. Um it's where you start an oil portfolio.
In short: Cited as authority — Exxon's senior management flags "unheard-of" inventory draws that will "persist regardless of diplomatic progress."
10:38there really wasn't much of a supply cut off at all uh the 1990s and even 1970s. So 1990 was when Kuwait was invaded by Saddam Hussein. Uh okay so let's forget what you know people like me are saying how about the real pros like the senior management at Exxon we're approaching unheard of inventory levels unheard of and the draw this is I think a very key point the draw down will persist in the weeks ahead regardless of diplomatic progress just because there now is such a shortage that's been built up over these last three months over three
In short: Cites a senior Exxon executive: if inventories stay deeply depressed, oil could climb to $150–160/bbl in the next few weeks — supports his oil-higher view.
Exxon is the giant US oil company. Woo isn't recommending the stock — he's quoting a senior Exxon executive as evidence for his oil view. That executive warned that if oil inventories stay this depleted, crude could spike to $150–160 a barrel within weeks.
With the Strait of Hormuz (the world's busiest oil shipping chokepoint) shut and Iran walking away from talks, Woo thinks oil is more likely to keep rising than fall — and the Exxon comment is one of his supporting data points.
4:19Gasoline inventories picked up slightly, but remain at extremely low levels for this time of the year. A senior ExxonMobil executive said last week that if inventories remain at deeply depressed levels, oil prices could climb to 150 to 160 dollars per barrel over the next few weeks. Meanwhile, the Strait of Hormuz remains closed.
In short: Hasn't sold a share; "cheap at $90 was a no-brainer," cheaper-relative-to-the-outlook at $180-185 but takes more courage. If you own a boatload you needn't add — only a Hormuz reopening would drop crude.
Exxon is the giant integrated oil company — it pumps oil, refines it, and sells fuel. Rule has owned it for years and hasn't sold a share. His logic: the world has spent 20 years assuming we'd stop using oil, so the industry hasn't spent enough money just to keep existing wells producing (he cites roughly a billion dollars a day of "deferred sustaining capital" — maintenance spending that got skipped). Skipped maintenance shows up later as less oil, so he expects tight supply and fat profits around 2029–2030.
His caveat is about timing, not the company: it was an obvious buy when the stock was cheap at $90, but at $180 it takes more nerve. If the Strait of Hormuz reopens and Gulf oil flows freely again, crude could drop sharply in the short run. So if you already own a lot, you don't need to add; if you own none, that's a different decision.
6:06In fact, I haven't sold very many of my oil stocks. A couple of them have been taken over uh which were in effect involuntary sales. But I, you know, saying that Exxon was cheap at $90 was a no-brainer. Saying that Exxon is cheap at 180 or 185 requires a bit more courage. If we did resolve the circumstance in the straits of Hormuse, uh, and the caros north of the straight were able to flow through the straight uh, and the impact of demand destruction that we've had from higher prices, I I think you'd see sharply lower crude prices. Uh notice I
In short: Cited as evidence, not a stance: a producer/merchant "commercial" — Exxon's Bernstein-conference comments are offered as proof that physical players are buying what Wall Street "synthetics" sell, mirroring the CoT shift to commercials net long.
In short: His current recommendation among the majors — more downstream/refining gives a lower beta and a defensive tilt, and refining margins expand as oil falls (products lag). The "buy Exxon and forget it" default for a generalist; well-run (mid-teens ROCE, untouchable ~3% dividend + buybacks).
Exxon is the giant oil company that does everything — pumps oil out of the ground, ships it through pipelines, refines it into gasoline and diesel, and sells it. Because it also owns a lot of refineries, it's steadier than a pure oil driller: when oil prices fall, the price of gasoline and diesel falls more slowly, so the refining side actually earns wider profit margins and cushions the drop.
It's his top pick among the big oil companies right now — the "buy it and forget it" default for an ordinary investor. It's superbly managed (it earns a solid return on the money it invests and reliably hands back roughly 3% a year in dividends plus stock buybacks), and at $60 oil — below the long-run average of about $75 — the odds favor the price drifting back up over time. As he puts it, "park in Exxon, I've got time to make money."
1:07:49— Which of the majors and the E&P companies do you like? So currently, I've been recommending ExxonMobil. If you compare them to a Chevron or a ConocoPhillips, they're along the same vein. ExxonMobil just has more of the downstream, more of that refining. Through the cycle, it'll give you a lower beta, a little more defensive. The reason it's good now is normally, when oil price falls, the price of the refined products falls slower, and therefore the refining margins expand.
In short: Non-OPEC "big oil" beneficiary (Permian Basin) — increasingly "selling security," and the market is paying a premium for it.
ExxonMobil pumps a lot of oil in the U.S. Permian Basin, far from the Middle East. With Hormuz blocked and prices high, its oil is both more valuable and more "secure" — buyers will pay extra for supply that isn't at risk of being cut off. Prins names it as a clear winner of the realignment.
In short: Named alongside Chevron as a destination for capital rotating out of tech into oil & gas.
Exxon is the other oil-and-gas supermajor he names alongside Chevron.
Same logic: it's a big, cash-generating owner of energy assets, exactly the kind of name catching the money rotating out of tech and into hard assets.
15:47Now it's about 30 trillion. So 4 trillion left. Wow. And went into your Chevrons, your Exxons, your all kinds of oil and gas plays, all kinds of copper, hard asset companies. So the bottom line is the point we make in the book is what we call the great migration. And I think we're in only the third inning of this where industrials, materials, and energy — those three groups in the 1968 to '81 period, they were like 50% of the S&P's composition, 50.
In short: Trim / no-longer-a-value — a formerly value-type name "no longer an actual value," on its spendy 5-yr P/S and P/E charts. "When even the long-despised energy sector contains fully- to over-priced names," the contrarian Haymaker worries — reinforcing the call to raise cash. Take profits, not a fresh buy.
In short: Bill — reference. Exxon and Chevron told President Trump it's hard to justify investing in a country (Venezuela) that "fleeced us out of tens of billions." At ~$70 oil there'll be "a lot of consolidation" among the US majors.
57:17business in a country that fleeced us out of tens of billions of dollars, right? They Venezuela, they confiscated their their So, so anyway, so it it it wouldn't take that much of if you stay around $70 a barrel, there's going to be a lot of consolidation. — Yeah. — Um I just want a point of clarification because you kept mentioning United Health.
In short: Historical reference, not a stance: cited for the 2008 "super contango" when Exxon and others self-funded massive floating-storage/carry trades as banks pulled credit lines — the backdrop analog to today's dislocated positioning.
In short: Fine energy, but he'd "rather own Schlumberger than Exxon or Chevron" — prefers the services over the majors.
Exxon is a major integrated oil company. He's fine on it but would "rather own Schlumberger than Exxon or Chevron" this cycle — he prefers the oil-services firms doing the drilling work over the giant producers.
35:49Oil majors or shale independents? Well, Trump wants an extra million barrels a day offshore. The Schlumbergers of the world — I would rather own Schlumberger than Exxon or Chevron. You can buy Schlumberger right now below that 250-week moving average. The oil service companies are what's going to service all those wells in the Gulf. That's why the Trump team renamed it the Gulf of America — they want offshore drilling in a big way. So Schlumberger and Weatherford are your big winners.
In short: Framework reference. The ~70% controlling owner of Imperial. Displacement would come only through a Canadian-politics route (nationalization pressure / a Canadian acquirer) — the through-line of Taylor's Imperial Standard history.
4:39I think I can see where it's not. And if I use your book as my key to understand how that could come to pass, it will only transpire through Canadian politics. That's it. That's the only way it happens. And I could see where a you know a very charismatic politician comes about and says you know in the scale business of oil like if we get down to fewer players like we will continually I think we'll do they will say why does it make sense to have an American business so ownorously controlling such a Canadian history and Canadian industry
In short: Reference — Imperial's "daddy": provides its capital structure/credit rating, participates in the buyback, but hasn't bought anything "in 100 years," so Imperial will never be a consolidator. Nationalization fear is why Exxon never fully consolidates it.
40:17that the Canadian government would would maybe nationalize their business some point. I don't think that would ever happen. I'm not saying a carney government would ever do that or any conservative government would either, but I just say because that's always been the fear and it's always kind of the precedent they've had.
In short: Reference — the 70% "uncle" behind Imperial, lending its credit rating and taking its pro-rata share of Imperial's buyback. Also bought Pioneer; ex-CEO Sheffield's CERAWeek comments (only ~4 yrs of tier-1 US inventory) frame the North-American supply squeeze.
43:13alongside it's a family business let's just say my theoretical town so let's say we are in Regina Saskatchewan we own a family business and it happens to be that we have this large Uncle who owns 70% of the business now because the uncle owns owns the business um all the banks in Regina are like dude your uncle he's totally creditworthy we'll give him great rates because we know he's good for the money and that's what Exxon provides to the minority shareholders of Imperial oil is this incredible super attractive financing rate from a
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