In short: Noble is short ("we shorted the stock publicly" — a May report with ~2M views on X, before the IPO; "still down meaningfully from where I shorted it"): "It's built to fail." Beyond "90 times revenues," the new point is the lock-up: the float went "from 5% of shares… to 20 or 25%," with "every few weeks 7% more" unlocking, and "if nothing changes fundamentally… stock's going to go down." It is "really an AI play… with a rocket thing attached" ($22T of the $29T TAM is AI) — "a third tier AI company." Sum of the parts: Starlink $200–300B, the AI arm "a fraction" of the $200–250B paid, rockets "cool" — "300 billion, 400 billion, 500 billion" vs a $1.7T cap; fair value $30–60/share vs ~$140. Eisman on data centers in space: "whether you're in the sun, it's really really hot."
George Noble is betting SpaceX's stock falls. At about $140 a share the company is valued near $1.7 trillion. Adding up the parts, he gets far less: the Starlink satellite-internet business is perhaps $200–300 billion, the AI business it bought (xAI/Grok) is worth a fraction of what was paid, and rockets are impressive but don't close the gap. His estimate is $30–60 a share.
His near-term reason is supply of stock. At the IPO only about 5% of shares could be traded, so a little buying pushed the price up. Early investors are now being allowed to sell in steps (about 7% more every few weeks), and many need to, because the holding has become too big for them. More shares for sale with nothing else changing usually means a lower price. He also says the story mostly rests on AI and long-range promises (asteroid mining, data centers in space) that can't be checked.
40:02Okay. All right. That's the mindboggling part. — Starting with SpaceX. It's built to fail. And the point I'd like to make to people, forget about the 90 times revenues. Leave that out. We all know that already, but it's important. But what's incremental to the story and that is the lockup. It's already started.
In short: The mega-IPO-as-top marker. The SpaceX IPO on June 2 coincided with the Nasdaq's high that day (30,666); it trades at 28,845 today. The pitch was "data centers in space" with a "$30 trillion" TAM, "the entire universe." Deluard adds that the pulled and delayed AI IPOs "suggest we're closer to the end."
Huge, hyped IPOs have historically marked market tops (1999–2000, 2021). SpaceX went public on June 2, the same day the Nasdaq hit 30,666, and the index is lower now. The sales pitch, data centers in space and a "$30 trillion" market, is the kind of story that shows up at peaks. This is a view on the timing signal, not on SpaceX's rockets.
37:10Oh, there's even a devil number in there, I didn't realize that. That was the high for the day. And today we are trading at 28,845. So far your theory of big IPOs signaling the market top — and especially when that IPO, what was the pitch, data centers in space, the $30 trillion — the TAM was the entire universe. That's certainly the same thing. Have you read the Anthropic one? Same thing, $30 trillion TAM. And also, before their expenses, they're
In short: The rating the market doesn't believe: SpaceX's bonds "widened out to levels about three notches lower in credit quality" than their BBB- rating, which he suspects "was encouraged by some persuasion of the rating agencies." And its claim of an addressable market of a quarter of global GDP "just doesn't work."
Rating agencies graded SpaceX's debt BBB-, the lowest "investment grade." But bond buyers priced it as if it were about three steps lower, and Gundlach suspects the agencies were "persuaded." He also scoffs at SpaceX's claim that its potential market is a quarter of world GDP. His point: when market prices and official ratings disagree this much, trust the market.
6:30And that hasn't bled to the single B category so far. So that's what we're kind of waiting to see. We're starting to see that the market doesn't believe the ratings of some of these companies. It's like when SpaceX borrowed a bunch of money, the bonds widened out to levels about three notches lower in credit quality. Interestingly, they got rated triple B minus, the lowest rating of investment grade.
In short: Avoid on cash burn, not on Musk: "I think Elon Musk is the Leonardo da Vinci of our generation," but "if you think about everything I just talked about in terms of being focused on valuation, cash flow, I don't like long-term forecasts… it's very hard for me to say, 'Hey, I want to be in SpaceX.'" "Because they are spending so much money to try to catch up in AI, I just hate the cash flow part of it." Elon "always seems to get there, but… in a longer time frame than what we all expect."
SpaceX has just gone public (priced at $135, trading near $150). Niles is a big admirer of Elon Musk — "the Leonardo da Vinci of our generation" — and believes space is the next frontier, even data centers in space. But he invests by valuation and cash flow, not by admiration.
SpaceX is spending heavily to catch up in AI, so it burns cash, and its story leans on long-term forecasts, which he distrusts — Musk usually hits his goals, but later than promised. For those reasons he wouldn't buy the dip, and prefers Tesla on a relative basis.
56:13I think they have a good play on robotics. Obviously cash flow, some of those other things you still have to be concerned about. But with SpaceX, because they are spending so much money to try to catch up in AI, — I just hate the cash flow part of it. Even though I'm a big fanboy of Elon Musk and do believe space is the next frontier and we are going to have data centers in space.
In short: Collins: "just like SpaceX, it's bad for the market… it's supply… new stock of supply… that's what usually has killed markets… in 2000, in 1929." "Look at SpaceX. Where's the re[turn] when everyone who made all this money finally sells?" Eisman ribs the S-1's asteroid-mining section (the For All Mankind theme); Collins: full self-driving "is about a decade behind" — Musk "makes a lot of good comments that don't quite come true."
The worry about SpaceX is supply, not rockets. A giant listing means billions of dollars of new shares hitting the market, and early insiders eventually sell. Collins notes that floods of new stock helped end the 1929 and 2000 booms, because buyers' money has to stretch across far more shares. He also doubts Musk's promises: full self-driving is years late, and the company's filing lists mining asteroids as a goal.
17:29They're going to let anthropic come public because they need to. My contention always is that just like SpaceX, it's bad for the market — because — it's supply, right? It's you — new stock — new stock of supply, right? And that's what usually has killed markets, right? That's in 2000 in 1929.
In short: Critical of how the listing was engineered: fast-track Nasdaq-100 inclusion plus a ~3:1 float magnification made the index bid the exit for insiders, while retail — "the patsy at the poker table" — was locked up. Ran to over $3T on levered-ETF and front-running demand, then fell to ~$1.25T as net selling began. A view on the structure, not the rockets.
Green is not judging SpaceX's rockets or Starlink. His criticism is of how the stock was brought to market. Index funds that track the Nasdaq-100 must buy a company once it is added — no matter the price. SpaceX was put on a "fast track" into that index, and the tradable supply of shares (the float) was structured to be about three times larger for index purposes than it otherwise would be. That guaranteed a big, price-insensitive buyer.
Who sells to that buyer? Insiders and early investors who want out. Meanwhile ordinary retail buyers, drawn in by the men-on-Mars story, were restricted from selling for 30 days or more. In poker terms, he says retail "didn't know that they were the patsy at the poker table."
The price path fits his flow theory: hedge funds and leveraged ETFs front-ran the index buying in thin private-share trading and pushed the value past $3 trillion; once net selling began it fell to about $1.25 trillion. Note: it was the host, not Green, who said he owns SpaceX.
12:03So you saw the same underlying phenomenon. The real key with SpaceX was twofold. One, it was heavily marketed to retail investors under a buy and hold approach. if you want to be part of Elon Musk's vision of men on Mars that drew in retail who didn't know that they were the psy at the poker table and they have actually proved remarkably resilient locked up under exclusion components and platforms where they are limited from selling for an extended period of time where they will be barred from future IPOs — something like a 15 days hold period
In short: Passing, as evidence that tech takes science fiction "very seriously": "In the SpaceX prospectus, if you recall, it says that one of the goals of the company is to mine asteroids." No new view on the stock.
7:39— Now, I will be the first to admit I am no expert, but this story expresses a theme I've noticed about people in the tech world. They grew up reading a lot of science fiction, and they take it very seriously. In the SpaceX prospectus, if you recall, it says that one of the goals of the company is to mine asteroids.
In short: Named as a borrower the banks are bending over to serve: "they're trying to appease SpaceX, they're trying to appease OpenAI, they're trying to appease the Mag 7" — the style drift that put speculative credit on bank balance sheets. A credit-exposure reference, not a stance on the equity.
Here SpaceX appears as a borrower, not as a stock view. His argument is that banks have quietly changed what they do — "style drift" — by lending aggressively to the biggest names in AI and space to keep their business.
Why a bank finds it tempting: these companies carry gold-plated (double-A) credit ratings on the cash flow they are expected to produce, so a loan secured against that future cash looks safe. The danger is that the cash is still in the future, and the loans are already on the books today.
So this is a comment on bank risk-taking, not a judgement on SpaceX's business.
10:21They're trying to appease SpaceX, they're trying to appease OpenAI, they're trying to appease the Mag 7. And so yeah, they've drifted what we call style drift. They've drifted into areas that are fairly speculative for them because it's very attractive for a bank because think of like the Mag 7 companies, they have double A rated free cash flow.
In short: Openly unconvinced, in four words. "JP Morgan reiterated its overweight rating on SpaceX with a 240 target. I don't know how." The bank's case is the AI pivot — the completed Cursor acquisition (~$4B of ARR, ~75% business) feeding Grok's training data and go-to-market. The compute ambition is genuine and early: SpaceX "outlined plans to deploy Nvidia-powered Vera Rubin NVL72 architectures in orbit via its first-generation Starmind AI satellite, which is much earlier than anticipated," with Vera CPUs on the ground for agentic workloads and Grok scaling toward gigawatts. It is also the comparison Anthropic is marketing against: a $30 trillion TAM topping SpaceX's $28 trillion, and an IPO "trying to raise more than SpaceX." Among the ten most active options names both Tuesday and Wednesday.
Singh's entire verdict on the sell side's enthusiasm here is four words: JPMorgan "reiterated its overweight rating on SpaceX with a 240 target. I don't know how."
The bank's case is that the company is becoming an AI business as well as a rocket business — it completed the acquisition of Cursor, the AI coding tool, which brings roughly $4 billion of annual recurring revenue, about three-quarters of it from businesses, and whose data is already improving the Grok models.
The genuinely striking item is the compute plan: SpaceX intends to put Nvidia's newest rack-scale systems into orbit aboard a first-generation satellite, adapting them for the power, cooling, bandwidth and reliability constraints of space. Singh notes this is "much earlier than anticipated" — the idea being that orbit offers free cooling and uninterrupted solar power, which are precisely the two constraints throttling data centres on the ground.
SpaceX also functions as the yardstick everyone else markets against: Anthropic's pitch to IPO investors is a $30 trillion addressable market topping SpaceX's $28 trillion, and it is trying to raise more money than SpaceX did. When two private companies are competing on the size of the claim rather than the size of the revenue, that is itself information.
Full passage: premium transcript (PDF).
In short: At a ~$1.84T cap with only a couple of public quarters, it is "very unpredictable in terms of trying to model out what it's actually worth" — no stable P/E or P/S. Starlink ($4.3B quarterly connectivity revenue, $1.7B operating income) is real; the bear case is Starlink funding AI compute ($15.8B of $18.4B capex) and Starship before full reusability. Fine as a small "buy into Elon's vision" bet balanced by predictable compounders; he wants to watch the financials develop.
SpaceX makes most of its money from Starlink satellite internet; its rockets mainly exist to launch and replace those satellites cheaply, and it is adding AI data-center hosting and other long-shot businesses. Starlink is profitable and growing fast, but the company is pouring most of its spending into AI computers and the Starship rocket.
At about $1.84 trillion with only a couple of public quarters, Carlson says there is no reliable way to value it — you are buying a belief in Elon Musk's ability to make money from many bets. He has no problem with a small position like that, as long as it is balanced by companies whose growth can actually be modelled.
In short: Optically the biggest new position of the quarter — and explicitly discounted. "SpaceX made its 13F debut. SPCX appeared among the top new positions of five funds, but this is a special case. Several were already private-market investors before the June IPO, so the filings largely reveal existing SpaceX exposure becoming publicly reportable, rather than necessarily new Q2 buying." Also one of the two "New IPOs" (with CBRS) inside the top-holdings cluster. The cleanest example in the piece of a 13F artefact masquerading as a signal.
SpaceX went public in June 2026, so this quarter is the first in which funds holding it had to disclose the position publicly. On the surface that produced a dramatic result: it appeared among the top new positions at five of the 20 funds.
App Economy immediately defuses it. "Several were already private-market investors before the June IPO, so the filings largely reveal existing SpaceX exposure becoming publicly reportable, rather than necessarily new Q2 buying."
This is the single most useful trap in the whole article to internalise. A 13F reports what a fund holds at quarter end, not what it did during the quarter. When a big private company lists, everyone who already owned it suddenly appears as a "new buyer" — an artefact of disclosure rules, not a stampede.
In short: One line, but it is the competitive one: "SpaceX has already started selling access to its Colossus cluster" — a non-cloud owner of large-scale compute monetizing spare capacity, which is exactly the "temporary relief valve" scenario for dedicated neoclouds. Named alongside Meta as evidence that the compute shortage is pulling non-cloud giants into supplying compute themselves. Referenced; not a stance call.
In short: Le Shrub — the exemplar of "peak passive," a mechanism critique rather than a company call: the mega-IPO addendum to pacification is that issuers are "effectively gaming the system" — "you want to mark up in the private market with a view that you're going to put it in the index at a stupid valuation and the passive flows will maintain that stupid valuation." "Now we have like peak passive where we're getting trillion dollar companies added to the index on IPOs, right? Like SpaceX."
SpaceX is the listed rocket and satellite company — here it is the worked example of a mechanism Le Shrub thinks is broken, not a judgement on rockets.
The mechanism, in plain terms: index funds must own a company once it is big enough to enter the index, regardless of price. So the play is to run the valuation up while the company is still private, float it at that very high price, get it into the index, and let the automatic index buying hold the price there. As Le Shrub puts it, you list "at a stupid valuation and the passive flows will maintain that stupid valuation." He calls the result "peak passive" — "trillion dollar companies added to the index on IPOs, right? Like SpaceX."
The negative view is therefore about the support underneath the price: it is mechanical rather than a judgement by anyone who thinks the company is worth it, which is exactly the kind of support that disappears when flows reverse. Note this sits alongside Paulo's longer-running view of SPCX as the supply shock that drains the equity market.
In short: Down ~40-50% from the IPO and still dragging the space complex. Q2 missed — revenue $7.8B (+92%), EPS −$0.09 vs −$0.024 expected — even with EBITDA +191% and Starlink subscribers doubling to 12M, backlog $47B and ~$100B of cash/securities. "The issue is that SpaceX needs to invest so much… it needs to raise a lot of debt to fund its mega AI data center," with Musk targeting 2 GW by year end and up to 10 GW — "he'll have to raise so much debt in order to do that." Its mark-down is also what claws back Alphabet's paper gains. "Raymond James is sticking with a strong buy rating on SpaceX, which I'm surprised by."
SpaceX has fallen 40-50% since its listing and taken the rest of the space sector down with it. The quarter missed: revenue of $7.8 billion, up 92%, but a loss per share worse than expected, even as Starlink subscribers doubled to 12 million and the order backlog reached $47 billion.
The structural issue is funding. Musk wants to grow computing capacity from 2 gigawatts to as much as 10 gigawatts by the end of 2027, all built on Nvidia hardware — "he'll have to raise so much debt in order to do that."
There is a second-order consequence that runs through this whole call: Alphabet owns a stake in SpaceX and booked its rise to a $1.77 trillion listing valuation as profit. Now that it has fallen back, Alphabet has to unwind part of that paper gain — which is exactly the 2027 earnings problem Singh spends the middle of the call on.
Full passage: premium transcript (PDF).
In short: The showcase of Texas' governance model: its securities filings acknowledge bylaws forcing disputes into the Texas Business Court, which the company says "may discourage lawsuits against us and our directors, officers, other managerial officials, and other employees." It was dual-listed on Nasdaq's New York and Texas exchanges — and around its listing Nasdaq created a 15-trading-day "fast track" into the Nasdaq-100, which critics say hands average investors "inordinate risks." Also the state's southern-tip emblem, launching rockets from a beach miles from the Mexico border.
SpaceX is the clearest example of the new Texas playbook operating end to end. Its own bylaws force any shareholder dispute into the Texas Business Court, and its filings openly concede that this "may discourage lawsuits" against the company and its officers — a defensive perimeter around management that would be much harder to build in Delaware. It listed on both Nasdaq's New York and Texas exchanges, giving the state's venue its marquee name.
The contested bit is index membership. Being added to the Nasdaq-100 forces every fund tracking that index to buy the stock, so the entry rules matter enormously. Around SpaceX's listing, Nasdaq created a "fast track" letting very large new stocks in after only 15 trading days instead of the usual seasoning — critics say that pushes a barely-traded, hard-to-value company into ordinary investors' index funds before anyone knows what it is worth. Nasdaq says the change predates SpaceX and simply keeps the index representative. Either way it is the mechanism worth watching: governance chosen by the company, and index access shortened by the venue.
In short: The title story — growth meets the bill. SpaceX's first earnings report as a public company showed both why investors are excited and why the valuation is hard to digest. Q2 revenue nearly doubled to $7.8B (~$1B ahead of expectations); GAAP EPS −$0.09 beat by $0.20; gross margin expanded 11 points to 55% and operating margin improved 22 points to −2%. By segment: Space revenue +29% to roughly $1B while losing $542M as SpaceX kept pouring money into Starship — the rocket central to everything next, from launching larger Starlink satellites to eventually putting compute infrastructure in orbit. Connectivity revenue +66% to $4.3B as subscribers doubled to 12 million, with enterprise and government revenue more than doubling on airline and mobile partnerships plus more than $6B of multi-year Starshield contracts; it earned $1.7B of operating profit at a 39% margin and is "the only one of SpaceX's three businesses currently profitable" — Starlink "remains the product that funds Musk's ambition." AI revenue surged 247% to $2.6B on new cloud-compute agreements but still lost $1.3B from operations. The bill: CapEx of $18.4B in Q2, up from $10.1B in Q1 and $2.8B a year ago, of which AI was $15.8B — 86% of the total. The infrastructure is already being monetized through cloud agreements with customers including Google and Anthropic, "but it is spending several dollars today for every dollar of AI revenue." It can afford it for now — roughly $100B of cash and marketable securities post-IPO — and the open question is what return investors eventually get on that capital. Shares fell ~6% after hours despite the beat, and SPCX now trades more than 10% below its IPO price; the newsletter repeats its IPO-day view: "it's usually best to wait it out." (Analysis, not a stance call.)
This was SpaceX's first set of results as a publicly traded company, and it split cleanly into a great business and an enormously expensive ambition. Sales nearly doubled to $7.8 billion, about $1 billion more than analysts expected, and the company kept a much bigger slice of each dollar of sales than a year ago (gross margin rose from 44% to 55%).
Underneath, there are three businesses. Connectivity is Starlink — internet beamed from satellites — and it is the one that actually makes money: sales up 66% to $4.3 billion, subscribers doubled to 12 million, plus more than $6 billion of multi-year government contracts (Starshield, the defence version). It earned $1.7 billion of operating profit, a 39% margin. Space is the rocket business: about $1 billion of sales but a $542 million loss, because SpaceX keeps pouring money into Starship, the giant rocket everything else depends on. AI is the new one — renting out computing power — and it grew fastest of all, up 247% to $2.6 billion, with Google and Anthropic already as customers. It also lost $1.3 billion.
The reason for the article's title is the spending. In three months SpaceX spent $18.4 billion building things — up from $10.1 billion the previous quarter and $2.8 billion a year earlier — and $15.8 billion of that, 86%, went into AI computing. Put simply, it is laying out several dollars today for every dollar of AI revenue it collects. That is affordable for now: the IPO left it with roughly $100 billion of cash. The question is whether shareholders ever earn a decent return on money spent at that rate.
The market's answer so far is cautious: the shares fell about 6% even though the results beat expectations, and they now sit more than 10% below the price at which the company floated. The newsletter's advice at the IPO was to let the stock settle before buying, and it repeats that here. Referenced analysis, not a recommendation.
In short: The exhibit for "rampant speculative behavior." At $225/share — up ~70% from the $135 IPO price — the valuation was "nearly $2½ trillion… almost 70 times sales." And then: "showing how quickly bubble-like valuations can reverse, its market cap is down to $1.4 trillion." Cited to rebut the idea that today lacks the 1999 precondition of extreme valuation plus speculation — the setup that let a rate spike deliver the "coup de grâce." Cautionary, not a short call.
Hay uses SpaceX as the poster child for how stretched this market got. After its IPO at $135 the stock ran to $225 — almost 70% higher — which valued the whole company at about $2.5 trillion. To put that in perspective, that was roughly 70 times its annual sales: you were paying seventy years of revenue (not profit — revenue) for the business. Then it fell apart fast; the company is now worth about $1.4 trillion, roughly a 45% haircut in weeks.
The point isn't really about rockets. Hay is answering people who say today's market can't crash like 2000 because things are different. His argument: the 1999-2000 bust needed two ingredients — sky-high valuations and wild speculation — and the sharp rise in long-term interest rates was just the match that lit them. SpaceX is his evidence that both ingredients are present again, and that when this kind of valuation unwinds it does so violently. Treat it as a warning about the whole speculative end of the market rather than a bet against the company.
In short: Baron (Global Opportunity Strategy): the longest write-up in the compilation, published now that the NDA has lapsed and "the largest initial public offering in history, raising more than $85 billion," has closed. The frame: "SpaceX stands at the intersection of two of the most consequential secular growth trends of our time: AI and Space Economy… This is THE company with N=1." The unit economics: boosters reused "up to 35 times" so "SpaceX needs only 3 boosters for 100 launches, compared with 100 for the industry," with launch cost taken "from the industry standard of nearly $20,000 per kilogram… to an order of magnitude lower with Falcon 9, while Starship targets… below $100." Starlink: 12 million subscribers against a "$1.5 trillion connectivity market," where "each 10 percentage points of share represents roughly $150 billion of revenue." The new leg is AI hosting — first terrestrial data-centre agreements with Anthropic and Google totalling $26 billion of annualised revenue, a 100,000-GPU cluster built in 122 days versus an industry norm near two years, and a scaled 10GW opportunity of "$200 billion to $400 billion." Then orbital data centres: 1GW of AI satellites at launch costs "below $2.23 billion" versus "$10 billion to $15 billion per gigawatt" for five-year terrestrial TCO. Plus the Cursor acquisition, Starshield, and optionality (TeraFab, point-to-point, space mining, Mars) to which they "are NOT assigning any value."
Baron held SpaceX privately for years under a confidentiality agreement and can finally explain the position now that it has completed the largest stock-market listing ever, raising more than $85 billion. They describe it as a company with no comparison — "N=1".
The foundation is reuse. Where the rest of the industry throws a rocket booster away after one flight, SpaceX flies one up to 35 times, so it needs three boosters for a hundred launches instead of a hundred. That has cut the cost of putting a kilogram into orbit roughly tenfold from the industry standard, with the next vehicle, Starship, aimed at another huge reduction.
Cheap launch built Starlink, the satellite internet service with more than 12 million subscribers, attacking a $1.5 trillion global connectivity market where each ten percentage points of share is worth roughly $150 billion of revenue at very high margins.
The newest and least understood part is artificial intelligence. SpaceX has signed its first agreements to host computing for Anthropic and Google, together worth about $26 billion a year, and built a 100,000-chip cluster in 122 days against an industry norm of about two years. The longer-term idea is to put data centres in orbit, where sunlight and space are free: Baron's arithmetic suggests the launch cost for a gigawatt of orbital computing could be under $2.3 billion against $10-15 billion to build and run the equivalent on the ground. Everything beyond that — chip manufacturing, point-to-point transport, mining, the Moon, Mars — they explicitly value at zero.
Full passage: premium transcript (PDF).
In short: A standing overhang for the rest of 2026: relaying Tom Lee, "SpaceX will continue to have that unlock throughout the rest of the year. That'll put downward pressure on the stock market this year as SpaceX continues to sell off more and more shares." The clearing of that unlock is one of the two clouds Lee expects to lift by 2027.
24:25— So he mentions a couple factors here that SpaceX will continue to have that unlock throughout the rest of the year. That'll put downward pressure on the stock market this year as SpaceX continues to sell off more and more shares. But he's saying we'll get that behind us this year as well as we're going to get behind us the new Fed and the dynamic of that this year.
In short: The AI-hedge short is working: the SpaceX 6.65% bonds due 2056, shorted around 98-99, "are all the way down at 86" ahead of Tuesday's after-hours earnings. (Hard to short unless institutional.) The equity is down 50% from the IPO price — the reason a Tesla combination is even plausible — though a proposed FAA rule waiving some environmental reviews for launch sites would help.
Rather than betting against SpaceX's stock, Singh is short its longest-dated bonds — the 6.65% notes maturing in 2056. Very long bonds swing hard on small changes in perceived credit risk, so they're an efficient hedge against the whole AI-infrastructure boom souring. The trade is working: shorted around 98-99, they now trade at 86.
Two related notes: the equity is down 50% from its IPO price, which is why a Tesla merger is even being discussed; and a proposed FAA rule waiving some environmental reviews for launch sites would be a genuine positive for the operating business.
Full passage: premium transcript (PDF).
In short: Named as a founding member of NVIDIA's Open Secure AI Alliance, with Microsoft and IBM — an early public alignment of the Musk-adjacent infrastructure complex with the open-weight/AI-cyberdefence camp. (Referenced; not a stance call.)
In short: A bubble already punctured. Offered as the proof that parts of the US market genuinely were bubbles and have begun deflating: "SpaceX (SPCX) is a vivid example. Its initial post-IPO rocket launch has come crashing down to earth, with its shares having been cut in half from the late-June peak." No target or re-entry level; it is the opening exhibit for the "bigger the bubble, bigger the bust" thesis.
In short: The post-IPO wreck that vindicates his mega-IPO warning: "look what's happened to SpaceX" — the bond it issued has been "the space shuttle crashing back down to Earth… a disaster," and the average weighted price paid in the secondary market after the IPO was "something like 170 per share" against ~$116 as they recorded: "those people… are seriously underwater. That's a lot of money." It IPO'd near ~100× sales.
SpaceX went public in the wave of giant IPOs Hay had warned about, and it is now his exhibit A for what happens when a company lists at an extreme valuation — roughly 100 times its annual sales at the peak, a level that historically was considered absurd.
The damage is on both sides of the balance sheet. The bond it issued has been "the space shuttle crashing back down to Earth… a disaster" — meaning lenders are demanding a much higher yield, so the price of the debt has collapsed. And on the equity side, ordinary investors who couldn't get shares at the offering had to buy in the open market afterwards, paying an average of about $170 a share; the stock was around $116 while they recorded. "Those people are seriously underwater. That's a lot of money."
The lesson he draws is behavioural as much as financial: it is the clearest example of investors adding to a winner right up to the point the story changes.
24:46They're — for sure. Yeah. Spreads have widened out drastically and it's bringing up SpaceX that bond that they issued that's been taking the space shuttle crashing back down to Earth. It's been a disaster. And of course the equity now is to it is the bad in fact I think I saw that the average weighted price that people paid after the IPO because of course you couldn't buy it on the IPO.
In short: The short leg is being covered. SpaceX fell more than EchoStar, so the pair spread compressed as intended — "take your short-covering profits on SpaceX" and close the whole position. Still the source of Alphabet's markup ($94B stake, $80B sale-restricted), but no longer an active house short.
The short leg of that same pair trade, now being closed. Because SpaceX fell more than EchoStar, the short made money — "take your short-covering profits on SpaceX" and exit both sides. Worth noting SpaceX's other appearance this week: Alphabet's $94 billion stake in it (of which $80 billion can't be sold yet) generated most of Google's paper profit. After covering, Singh has no active position either way.
Full passage: premium transcript (PDF).
In short: The reason Tesla's bottom line looked better than its operations: net profit of $1.1B "looked healthier, but included a $1.0 billion unrealized gain on Tesla's SpaceX stake" — a non-operating mark, not earnings from selling cars, and the same strip-the-investment-gain read the newsletter applies across Big Tech. (Referenced; not a stance call.)
In short: "SpaceX is now well below its IPO price. I'm not sure what this means yet, but it does not bode well for the IPO market." The marquee AI-adjacent IPO he was "not a fan" of has now broken issue.
SpaceX was the marquee IPO of this cycle and Eisman was never a fan — his objection was that its value increasingly rests on an AI story while its spending on satellites and launch capacity ballooned. It has now fallen below the price at which it was sold to public investors.
He doesn't over-claim: "I'm not sure what this means yet, but it does not bode well for the IPO market." A broken high-profile deal tends to close the window for the ones behind it, since bankers need the last IPO to have worked in order to price the next.
3:10Moonshot claimed that Kimi K3 is as good as any LLM out there, but for a fraction of the cost. Prior to last week, we were worried about AI capital intensity and the lack of moats. Now, the possibility of a price war looms closer. Moving on. SpaceX is now well below its IPO price. I'm not sure what this means yet, but it does not bode well for the IPO market.
In short: The post-IPO unwind he flagged: SPCX "continues to fall down the stairs (only ~80x sales now or something)" — the other of "these two disasters" (with TSLA) Elon may "merge together." Consistent with his supply-wall top thesis: the melt-up name now bleeding lower.
SpaceX went public as SPCX and Paulo had flagged its IPO as the top of a giant "supply wall" of new stock hitting a market with tightening funding. Here he's just marking the tape: it "continues to fall down the stairs," now trading at "only about 80 times sales" — an extreme valuation (investors paying 80 dollars for every dollar of annual revenue) that is grinding lower. It's the other half of the "two disasters" quip with Tesla — a once-hyped melt-up name now bleeding, consistent with his view that this IPO marked the blow-off top of the cycle.
In short: The short leg of a paired trade into the August unlock — short SPCX vs long SATS ("now ECHO"); SpaceX fell more than SATS last week so the spread should compress. A hedge, not an outright bear call.
The short side of a paired trade. With SpaceX's insider share "unlock" coming in August (which can pressure the price), Singh is short the public SpaceX vehicle while being long the cheaper proxy, EchoStar (SATS). It's a relative bet — he expects the gap between the two to narrow — not an outright call that SpaceX collapses.
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In short: The contrast case — the article frames SpaceX's raise as CapEx-hungry ($10B negative free cash flow in Q1 alone) "from need," versus SK Hynix raising "from a position of strength" with $24B net cash and an order book sold out through 2028. Illustrates the two opposite reasons a company taps public markets. (Recap, not a stance call.)
In short: The newest "hyperscaler" (leasing data centers to Anthropic/Google; a huge Tennessee site) — but its $20B debt raise (~$89B peak demand) has faded, and the ultra-long 2056 bonds are "an interesting short" / AI hedge: with 30+ duration, a 100 bps spread widening ≈ a 30-point bond drop.
SpaceX has become a new "hyperscaler," renting out data centers (to Anthropic and Google) and raising $20 billion of debt. Singh isn't shorting the stock — he's eyeing its longest-dated bonds (maturing 2056) as a cheap hedge against the whole AI boom: because very long bonds are extremely sensitive to interest-rate moves, even a small rise in its borrowing cost could knock ~30% off those bonds' price.
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In short: "Going to be a very volatile stock" — +19% IPO day, +20%/+5% the next sessions, then straight down (−5%, −4%, −16%), leaving it only 14.5% above the IPO price. The −16% Monday came on a $20B bond sale (upsized to $25B) "which supports our thesis that SpaceX has become a very capital-intensive business."
SpaceX recently went public and has been wildly volatile: a 19% pop on day one, more gains, then a string of sharp drops — leaving it only 14.5% above its IPO price. The tell Eisman fixes on is a $20 billion bond sale (raised to $25 billion) the company announced as the stock fell. Needing to borrow that much confirms his thesis that "SpaceX has become a very capital-intensive business" — one that constantly needs to raise outside money rather than funding itself.
That's the heart of his AI-era worry: capital intensity without a durable competitive advantage. A business that keeps having to sell stock and bonds to fund its growth puts the bill on investors, and the volatility shows the market hasn't decided what it's worth.
5:43GEV remains, in my view, one of the better AI power stories. Moving on, it looks like SpaceX is going to be a very volatile stock. On its opening day, Friday, June 12th, it climbed 19% from the IPO price. On Monday of last week, it increased another 20% and on Tuesday of last week, another 5%.
In short: The acquirer buying the workflow — acquiring Cursor parent Anysphere for $60B all-stock, four days after its Nasdaq debut, paying with possibly-inflated IPO stock (~2.5% dilution on ~$2.4T). Gets workflow, interaction data, distribution, compute leverage (Colossus) and model pull-through to xAI — a catch-up move (Musk acknowledged xAI lagged in coding).
In short: Used as the hedge short leg against SATS (worked Friday — SpaceX fell more than SATS). Peaked ~$2.8T at the IPO on a ~4% float; ATM put-buying by allocation holders keeps the arb >40% into the August unlock to 11.8% (→30%+ by November; Musk's 46% unlocks June 2027, full unlock Sept 2027 — ~40% of shares unlock by year-end, ~9× the float).
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In short: The framing IPO — priced at a fixed $135 (June 12), surged 50%+ in three days, briefly ~$2.6T. Tried to be fairer (skipped book-building, reserved 30% for individuals) but ran up so fast it left "less room for error." Framed watch-list, not impulse-buy.
SpaceX just had the biggest stock-market debut ever. Unlike a typical IPO — where banks quietly hand cheap shares to favored clients who flip them for an instant profit ("book-building") — SpaceX tried to play fair: it set one fixed price ($135) and set aside an unusual 30% of shares for ordinary investors. Good intentions, but the stock still jumped more than 50% in three days.
The article's caution: even a "fairer" IPO that runs up that fast leaves very little margin for error — you're paying a price that already assumes years of flawless execution. So rather than chase it on day three, the author would put SpaceX on a watch list and wait for it to report a few quarters as a public company before deciding. It's not a sell call; it's "don't buy the fireworks."
In short: Day-four IPO up 50%, now worth more than Amazon at ~$2T — the late-cycle hubris (AOL/RJR Nabisco) moment. If its bankers' $1.3T five-year revenue is real, it raids Mag-7 cash flow already committed to $5T of on-Earth data centers; with $800B of off-balance-sheet financing, "SpaceX could create a credit crisis." A funding-window close is the catalyst.
SpaceX came public at roughly $2 trillion — worth more than Amazon by day four — which he sees as the classic late-cycle hubris moment (like the AOL–Time Warner or RJR Nabisco deals). The danger isn't just the price: bankers project $1.3 trillion of revenue over five years, and if that's real it would have to come out of the same Mag-7 tech giants who've already committed $5 trillion to building data centers on Earth. With $800 billion of off-balance-sheet financing propping up those data centers, a sudden close of the "funding window" — people simply running out of money for the next raise — could, he says, "create a credit crisis."
12:45I like the grok a lot, or a Claude, and you say, okay, where is this 1.3 trillion of revenue for SpaceX going to come from? And lo and behold, it's the Mag 7. So there's something going on in the market that once in a while you have this disconnect with Wall Street analysts. So on one hand, they're saying that SpaceX, you can justify a $2 trillion valuation because over the next five years, they're going to have 1.3 trillion of revenue.
In short: IPO jumped 19% day one ("not particularly impressive"), +20% Monday, +5% Tuesday — now a ~$2.5T market cap at "well over 100 times trailing annual revenue." Anthropic and OpenAI IPOs up next in the fall.
SpaceX just went public. The first-day pop of 19% Eisman calls "not particularly impressive," and after a few more up days the stock now carries a roughly $2.5 trillion market value — "well over 100 times trailing annual revenue." In plain terms, you're paying more than 100 years' worth of current sales for the company, a valuation that assumes spectacular future growth.
It's the lead example in his worry about a wave of giant, richly-priced IPOs (Anthropic and OpenAI are next this fall) that the market has to absorb.
2:45On Friday of last week, SpaceX went public. I've spoken about SpaceX many times now. I'm sure there will be a lot more to say. The IPO jumped 19% on its first day of trading. Frankly, that's not particularly impressive, but it did go up another 20% on Monday and another 5% on Tuesday. The stock now has a market cap of 2.5 trillion and is now valued at well over a 100 times trailing annual revenue.
In short: "Sucking the oxygen out of the equity room." Options listing + Russell inclusion (days away) + Nasdaq (early July) and the "narrowing in" that final tops show set up "something truly acrobatic" — a Volkswagen-2008 squeeze ×10-20 that "doesn't end until SpaceX is the world's largest company." Also hears SPCX coming to the IG bond market with $20-25bn of debt, ~25bps tighter than ORCL. The supply-wall blow-off top that ends the cycle — near-term violent, structurally Negative.
SpaceX is Elon Musk's rocket-and-Starlink company, now trading under the ticker SPCX. Paulo thinks it is about to go vertical in a violent "short squeeze" — a melt-up forced when people who bet against a stock (or who simply don't own it) are made to buy it back at any price. The fuel: options on the stock have just started trading, it is about to be force-bought by every fund that tracks the Russell index (within days) and the Nasdaq (early July), and the price action is "narrowing in" the way it does right before a final blow-off top. His comparison is Volkswagen in 2008 — briefly the world's most valuable company on a squeeze — "times 10 to 20." Half-joke: "this doesn't end until SpaceX is the world's largest company."
So why is the stance Negative rather than bullish? Because to Paulo this is the top — the giant new supply of stock that finally "sucks the oxygen out of the equity room" and ends the whole cycle. The melt-up may be real and fast, but it is the last gasp, not a thing to chase. He also hears SpaceX will soon borrow $20-25 billion in the high-quality ("investment grade") bond market at a rate about 0.25% cheaper than Oracle's — astonishing for a young company, and a sign of just how frothy credit has become ("I would rather lend to SPCX than Larry Ellison").
In short: The framing event — pulled off the largest IPO in history (~$75B raised, ~$1.8T valuation), surged 40%+ in two days, cap past $2.5T. Sets up the question of who else (Anthropic, OpenAI) will ask public markets for tens of billions.
In short: "$30 billion in 2019 and now it's two trillion" — twice Berkshire's valuation, 14× Facebook's IPO size, ~4% float on a very aggressive unlock schedule, being dumped into the S&P/Nasdaq/Russell over the next year. "Everyone's 401k is financing billionaires and the little guy is holding the bag"; the Facebook precedent was a 50–60% drawdown. Its space data centers also threaten the financing of on-Earth ones.
SpaceX was worth $30 billion in 2019 and came public at about $2 trillion — twice Berkshire Hathaway, and fourteen times the size Facebook was at its IPO. Only ~4% of the shares actually trade; the other 96% is locked up on what the host calls one of the most aggressive unlock schedules ever, and it is being added to the S&P, Nasdaq and Russell far faster than a new listing normally would be.
That combination is his complaint. Index funds have to buy it at any price; venture-capital insiders become forced sellers the moment their shares free up (a fund with 40% of its book in one name legally must rebalance); and the precedent is Facebook, which fell 50–60% after listing. "Everyone's 401k is financing billionaires and the little guy is holding the bag."
There's a second, sharper risk: Musk is "promising a rail system to space" with data centers in orbit. If that takes market share from data centers already being built on Earth — which carry NIMBY opposition and enormous financing commitments — the loans behind them go bad.
12:25Much later at much higher valuations. It's getting dumped into the indexes. Everyone's 401k's financing billionaires, a lot of them. I mean, it's nice stories of the welder, but there's a lot of venture capital billionaires that are dumping stock into passive indexes over the next year and you're talking about valuations that are going from 30 billion in 2019 to two trillion and all of a sudden that stock's getting dumped onto the market.
In short: SpaceX IPO'd Friday with a +19.22% pop on its debut — "a key milestone for the Space Sector." Thomas reads the listing as "the birthing of a new and important sector": US space went from ~0.2% to ~3% of total market cap on the day. "The SpaceX listing will probably be longer-term bullish for Space Stocks as a whole" (more attention/awareness, more active & passive fund flows over time).
SpaceX — Elon Musk's rocket company, long the most valuable private startup in the world — finally went public on Friday under the ticker SPCX, and the stock jumped about 19% on its first day. Thomas's point isn't really a call on the stock's price; it's about what the listing does to the market. Because SpaceX is so big, adding it to the public market single-handedly took the entire "space sector" from a rounding error (~0.2% of all US stock value) to a real, investable chunk (~3%) overnight — making space bigger than the old aerospace-and-defense group. He calls this "the birthing of a new sector": once a sector is that visible, index funds, ETFs and active managers are forced to pay attention and allocate money to it over time, which he expects to lift space stocks as a group over the long run.
In short: Listed Friday; closed ~$161 (~$167 after hours) for a ~$2.1T cap on a 7% float — ~300× fwd EBITDA, ~120× sales, "running hot." He won't buy it at sticker; owns the story ~half-price via SATS and notes the tiny float could push it higher into the 6-month unlock.
SpaceX is now public, closing around $161 for a roughly $2.1 trillion value — but only ~7% of the company actually trades, so a few buyers can swing the price. On normal yardsticks it's extremely expensive (about 300× a forward profit measure and 120× sales).
Singh won't pay that. Instead he owns the same story at roughly half price through EchoStar, and notes the tiny float could still push SpaceX higher into the six-month "unlock" when insiders can finally sell — the real test of the price.
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In short: "This is not investing… I would never buy" — IPO popped 25–30%; not a real long-term business. Lockups will dump insider stock (the ~$10B of series-raise insiders cashing out); index-inclusion rules being changed to offload it into retail 401ks. Starlink TAM is "fixed," a "melting ice cube"; the launch/AI fantasy burns cash.
Polomny isn't shorting SpaceX — he's saying don't buy it, and beware that you may already own it without choosing to. When a giant company gets added to the index, every index/target-date fund (i.e. most 401ks) is forced to buy it, which conveniently lets the early insiders sell their newly-public stock to ordinary savers. He calls that strip-mining retail.
On the business: Starlink looks profitable but its market is capped — a satellite passing over a city can only serve so many users before it chokes, and ground broadband/cellular (5G→6G) keeps eating its niche — so he calls it "a melting ice cube." Strip out Starlink's maybe-$75B and the rest of a ~$2-trillion valuation is paying for a dream (Mars, launch, AI in space) that currently burns cash. After lockups expire, a wave of insider shares hits the market. His verdict: "this is not investing."
1:30Get as many assets under management and then cream off as much fees and money as possible. And this is another example. I don't really need to go into it too much. I didn't read the whole S1. I read articles of some other people that have went through it completely. This is something I would never buy. I'm not going to criticize you.
In short: Touting a ~$1.8T valuation, ~4× oversubscribed; "really AI too mostly." The mega-IPO wave is a classic top signal — when the largest IPOs in history print, you're in the vicinity of a market top. That mega-cap privates choose now to sell "is not suggestive that these stocks are cheap" — a hype cycle on steroids like the year 2000.
Gundlach doesn't rate SpaceX as a buy or sell — he uses its giant IPO as a timing signal. Historically, when the largest IPOs in history come to market, you're usually near a stock-market top, because that's when euphoria lets companies raise the most money. SpaceX touting a ~$1.8 trillion valuation, four-times oversubscribed (and "really an AI company mostly"), alongside OpenAI and Anthropic deciding to sell at the same time, tells him the opposite of "these are cheap" — it's a hype cycle as frothy as the year 2000.
35:27SpaceX is really AI too mostly, but they also have other business ventures. IPOs like when you get the largest IPOs in history that usually goes around, not necessarily to the day, to the month or the quarter, but the vicinity of a stock market top and certainly the valuation here is supportive of that. We've got SpaceX coming out, I guess they're touting a $1.8 trillion dollar valuation and I heard today that it's something like four times oversubscribed and some are suggesting that stock market weakness might be due to investors making room in their portfolio to take down the SpaceX IPO and perhaps Anthropic and OpenAI as well. I find it very interesting that these private companies, that are mega mega caps, have decided that now is a good moment to be selling.
In short: $75B to be raised — part of the ~$360B equity-supply wave he says the market must absorb. Index funds may be selling leaders to make room for its eventual index inclusion (the herding tell), "regardless of the underlying merits."
SpaceX's ~$75 billion raise is one piece of roughly $360 billion of new stock the market has to swallow this year (alongside Google, OpenAI, and Anthropic). Eisman's bigger point here is about herding: index funds may have to buy SpaceX once it's added to the indices, so active managers pre-position for that "regardless of the underlying merits."
That forced, benchmark-driven buying is what he means by "required uniformity" — everyone owning the same things for fear of underperforming, which quietly raises the risk that they all fall together.
19:38Coincidentally, this week I was asked a question from someone I bumped into who asked if the market decline last Friday was caused by index funds selling stocks to make room to buy SpaceX. Although SpaceX is not yet required to be included into the indices, it's only a matter of time. The question got me thinking that active managers feel obligated to restructure their portfolios to reflect the eventual need to include SpaceX and soon Anthropic and OpenAI regardless of the underlying merits of the investment decisions. Like
In short: "Not for the fainthearted": $18.7B revenue but a ~$17B loss run-rate (Q1-26 alone −$4.28B), ~95–100× sales / 260× fwd EBITDA, $20B of the raise repays a bridge loan, Musk holds ~82–85% votes. Yet the ~4% float + 2× oversubscription + Nasdaq-100 fast-track could squeeze it "marginally higher" — he won't play the IPO directly, holding SATS instead.
SpaceX lists Friday at $135 a share — the biggest IPO ever, valuing it at $1.75 trillion, more than every listed aerospace and defense giant combined. The catch: it brought in $18.7 billion of revenue but is on pace to lose about $17 billion a year, mostly because Musk folded his AI company xAI into it — so IPO buyers are largely funding a giant AI data-center buildout, and $20 billion of the money raised immediately repays a loan. Musk keeps ~82–85% of the votes, more control than any public-company founder ever.
So why isn't Singh short? Because only about 4% of the company will actually trade, the order book is twice oversubscribed, 30% is reserved for eager retail buyers, and Nasdaq fast-tracked it into the Nasdaq-100 index (forcing index funds to buy within weeks). A tiny float plus forced buying can squeeze the price higher regardless of fundamentals. His answer: don't play the IPO at sticker price — he owns it indirectly through EchoStar at a steep discount, and he'd watch the six-month "unlock" (when insiders can finally sell) as the real test.
16:42is really not for the fainthearted., the company generated about 18.7 billion in revenue according to the prospectus in 2025, but it's deeply lossmaking., it lost, 5 billion in 2025 and losses accelerated wildly in the first quarter of 26, which is probably why it needs to raise money.
In short: A ~$2T IPO ≈ 6% of US GDP (Facebook 2012 was <1%) with an $80B raise and a lockup "much more aggressive than previous IPOs." Coming public this late in the maturity cycle makes the IPO "very, very unattractive" — "you're going to probably be able to buy SpaceX 50% off sometime in the first year."
SpaceX is coming public at roughly $2 trillion — about 6% of US GDP, versus less than 1% for Facebook's then-record 2012 IPO. Worse, its lockup (the period insiders must wait before selling) is "much more aggressive than previous IPOs," and Facebook fell 40–50% in its first year once insiders could sell. Companies used to go public early (Tesla at $2B, Microsoft under $1B) and let public investors ride the growth; SpaceX arrives fully ripened, so the IPO is "very, very unattractive" — he thinks you'll get to buy it ~50% cheaper within a year.
9:47essentially 11, 12 times the size of Facebook. So these companies are coming public much far later in the maturity cycle which means that the IPOs are very very unattractive and you're much better off waiting if you have to buy a little bit of the IPO but you're going to probably be able to buy SpaceX IPO 50% off sometime in the first year.
In short: The first slug of the $200B supply wall (really $800B with the year-end unlocks) hitting a market with tightening funding costs — "I can't help but wonder if SPCX will close the ECM window for good all by itself."
SpaceX is Elon Musk's rocket-and-Starlink company, about to list on the stock market under the ticker SPCX. Paulo's worry isn't the company itself — it's the sheer size of the sale. When a giant IPO hits, investors have to come up with that cash, usually by selling other stocks or borrowing ("leverage"). Borrowing costs for equity bets are already rising, and SpaceX is just the first of roughly $200 billion of new stock that wants to come to market this year — closer to $800 billion once you count "unlocks" (the dates when insiders from these IPOs become free to sell their own shares).
His question: does this one deal soak up so much money that the "ECM window" (the equity-capital-markets window — the periods when conditions are good enough for companies to sell new shares) slams shut behind it? If so, SpaceX gets out and everyone queued behind it doesn't.
In short: "An excellent company," but he won't buy the June-12 IPO — the valuation is too extreme with too many assumptions; "I'd rather own Amazon, a company I understand." Pass.
SpaceX is Elon Musk's private rocket-and-satellite company, set to go public (IPO) on June 12. Carlson freely calls it "an excellent company" — this isn't a knock on the business.
His problem is the price. He says the valuation is too extreme and rests on too many assumptions and unknowns for him to get comfortable. Given the choice, he'd "rather just own Amazon, a company I understand a lot better" — which is why he's passing on the IPO.
25:09Even though I realize SpaceX is an excellent company, but I have no way to wrap my head around the valuation. it. It's so extreme and there's so many assumptions. There's so many moving parts that I'd rather just own Amazon, a company that I understand a lot better. Now, moving on, we get to a movie trailer.
In short: Referenced as a private comparable around a ~$75B IPO valuation in the broader "how is AI/infra being funded" framing.
In short: Private — S&P rejected its attempt to fast-track index inclusion at its valuation with no stock in the float; he applauds that ("would have been the end of indexation"). Also cited as a near-term IPO Bloomberg's index could admit quickly.
23:02Now, to their credit, the S&P actually pushed back on SpaceX's attempt to fast track their inclusion into the index, which I applaud them for because that would have just been I think that would have been the end of indexation, which has just been this huge kind of ramp over the past two decades. But to just allow a company at that valuation to fast track when they're not putting any stock in the float, clearly looking to get an upward you know, price impulse on the stock.
In short: The ~$75B / $1.75T (~100× revenue) IPO — "I have no thoughts… I don't understand how to value the prospect of settling space," and doubts the sell-side does either ("pretend experts"). A liquidity drain (with OpenAI/Anthropic) he'd welcome if it cheapens his names.
SpaceX's stock-market debut would be the largest ever — aiming to raise ~$75 billion at a ~$1.75 trillion valuation, roughly 100 times its revenue. Rule flatly says "I have no thoughts" — he can't value "the prospect of settling space," and suspects the Wall Street bankers selling it can't either (he calls them "pretend experts" chasing fees).
What interests him is the side effect: huge IPOs like SpaceX (and Anthropic and OpenAI) could pull cash out of everything else. He'd welcome that, because cheaper prices on the resource and financial stocks he likes would let him buy more.
4:43Before we do a deeper dive on resources, I want your view on SpaceX going public this week — hoping to raise $75 billion at a $1.75 trillion valuation. The largest IPO in history, surpassing Aramco. Trading at ~100 times revenues. Your thoughts, and comparisons to the late-1990s tech bubble? I have no thoughts, honestly. I don't understand how you value the prospect of settling space. That person's name is not Rick Rule. With Aramco I knew enough about oil and gas to form an opinion. With SpaceX I have no feasible way to understand its valuation.
In short: Its massive ~$75B IPO is "a lot to ask the public to fund"; some analysts think investors are pulling capital from other names to free up cash for it, adding to last week's wobble.
4:29And then there's other factors playing into this. For example, some analysts believe that investors are pulling capital out of other companies to free up capital for the SpaceX IPO. The SpaceX IPO is massive. It's like $75 billion and that is going to have an impact on other companies.
In short: "Not a fan." The business turned wildly capital-intensive — capex went from 42% of revenue (FY23) to 215% last quarter — because it's now an AI bet: 85% of the $28.5T TAM is AI ("reads like a science-fiction novel"). AI is commoditized with no moats; it's "more than baked in." He won't short it — "just not playing."
Eisman doesn't want to buy SpaceX's coming stock-market debut. His big clue is in SpaceX's own IPO filing: the company is suddenly spending enormous amounts on equipment. "Capex" (capital spending on physical gear) went from 42% of its revenue two years ago to 215% last quarter — i.e., it's now spending more than twice what it takes in, because it pivoted into AI, which is incredibly expensive to build.
And he thinks that AI bet is the whole story: the filing says 85% of its claimed $28.5 trillion market (nearly the size of the entire US economy) is AI — a number he says "reads like a science-fiction novel." Since AI products are interchangeable with "no moats" (nothing stopping customers from switching), all that spending just makes a commodity. He won't bet against it (shorting Elon Musk has burned people), but he's "just not playing."
1:06BUT I THINK WHAT IS PROBABLY MOST IMPORTANT IN THE PROSPECTUS IS HOW CAPITAL INTENSIVE SPACEX HAS BECOME. SO IF YOU GO BACK TO FISCAL YEAR 2023 AND YOU LOOK YOU COMPARE REVENUE TO CAPEX. CAPEX WAS ONLY 42% OF REVENUE. AND IN THE MOST RECENT FIRST QUARTER, IT WAS 215% OF REVENUE. AND THAT'S BECAUSE BACK IN FISCAL YEAR 2023, SPACEX WAS NOT IN AI.
In short: A tiny IPO "flip" — ~20 bps, PT >$150 after the $84B offer resize (~$1.8T cap, ~260× fwd EBITDA — "very excessive"; Damodaran DCF ~$97). Expect a retail pop, but likely sold into the 6-month unlock; OpenAI (~Sept) and Anthropic (~Dec) IPOs compete for demand. Pre-IPO perps (~$170 on Hyperliquid) sit above the $130 offer.
SpaceX is Elon Musk's rocket and Starlink-satellite company, which is about to sell shares to the public for the first time (an IPO). The plan here is just a small, quick "flip" — buy a tiny amount expecting a first-day pop from eager retail buyers, then sell.
The catch is the price tag is enormous relative to the company's actual earnings ("very excessive"), and big IPOs from OpenAI and Anthropic are coming soon to compete for the same investor cash. Shares are also likely to be dumped once early insiders are allowed to sell in six months, so it's a trade, not a long-term hold.
Full passage: premium transcript (PDF).
In short: ~100× earnings, buyers are "exit liquidity for the VCs"; space stocks are "probably decades" from meaningful profit — part of the ~$4.5T mega-IPO supply wave.
SpaceX is Elon Musk's private rocket company, one of the giant IPOs expected this summer. Hay's worry is the price: a reported ~100× earnings, which he calls "ridiculous." And when you buy a hyped IPO, you're often "exit liquidity for the VCs" — the early venture-capital backers are selling their shares to you and cashing out, so you're late, not early.
He adds that "space stocks" are probably a decade or more away from meaningful profits. Combined with the ~$4.5T wave of IPO stock about to hit the market — far more than all US IPOs in history combined — he sees these as a major source of downside risk.
5:27If you buy this IPO, you're exit liquidity for the venture capitalists who already got in. So, you're not early. And these valuations of some of these companies, SpaceX, for example, 100 times earnings, I think, something like that. Um, very, very ridiculous for some of the comments. But then I think to myself, okay, when Tesla IPOed, they were pre-revenue.
In short: A ~15%-growth company pricing at ~100× revenue; "they changed the rules to get it listed" and rebadged space→AI. Likely lists ~$2T and could halve to ~$1T within 12 months. If it's priced off an AI multiple, "AI is a commodity" (≈zero switching cost).
Dowd thinks the coming SpaceX stock-market debut is wildly overpriced. By his numbers it's growing revenue ~15% a year but being valued at ~100× its sales — a price that only makes sense for a hyper-growth company, which he says it isn't.
He argues they "changed the rules" to get it listed and rebranded it from a space company into an "AI" company (by folding in xAI) to justify the rich price. His call: it could list around $2 trillion and lose half its value within a year — especially since, in his view, "AI is a commodity" where customers can switch providers for free, so there's no durable moat.
10:47He's he asked the question, do you think this thing could be a trillion market cap inside of 12 months? I said, easily. Meaning a 50% loss. It's it's uh it it's it's over it's overvalued and there's no growth there. And look, if if they're if they're pricing it off an AI multiple, AI, I believe, is a commodity.
In short: A ~$2T IPO would be ~6% of US GDP — ~20x Facebook's IPO. "This is a disaster" — force-feeding richly-valued AI/space names into the indices via passive inclusion is "the worst setup."
SpaceX is Elon Musk's private rocket company, expected to go public at a roughly $2 trillion value — about 6% of the entire U.S. economy, and around 20 times the size of Facebook's IPO. He calls it "a disaster": stuffing such richly-valued names into the stock indexes means index funds (and the everyday savers who own them) are force-fed expensive shares. To him it's "the worst setup."
32:19That's why this SpaceX IPO to have it be 6% coming I want you just think about this relative to China. the SpaceX IPO 6% of GDP uh at a $2 billion valuation when Facebook came public it was only a hundred billion right so it's 20 times the size u of and these are two hot two high two hot IPOs I mean the Facebook IPO was the hottest one um in the 2010 to 2020 period it was a hundred billion dollar valuation uh the SpaceX IPO is going to be uh two trillion and 6% of GDP.
In short: The subject — IPO pitched at $1.5–2T (~90x 2025 rev / 265x adj EBITDA). Sum-of-the-parts $1.0–1.9T: Connectivity $500–700B, Space $100–200B, AI $200–500B, moonshots $200–500B. Starlink is the cash floor, AI/Starship/Mars the upside. "IPO = It's Probably Overpriced." Verdict: belongs on every serious investor's watchlist — "I'd rather watch this one trade for a few quarters than chase it on day one."
SpaceX builds and launches rockets, runs Starlink (the satellite-internet service), and — after a February 2026 merger — now also owns xAI, the Grok chatbot, and X (formerly Twitter). It's filing to go public at a $1.5–2 trillion price tag, which would be the biggest IPO ever. The cleanest way to think about it is the "railroad to space" flywheel: cheap reusable rockets lower the cost of getting things to orbit, Starlink turns that into steady cash, and that cash funds the moonshots (Starship, AI, eventually Mars).
To judge whether $1.5–2 trillion is fair, App Economy values the three pieces separately ("sum-of-the-parts") instead of trusting one big headline number. Starlink — the connectivity business — is the real cash engine: $11.4 billion of revenue at a 63% EBITDA margin (EBITDA is roughly the cash a business throws off before interest, taxes, and accounting depreciation). The Space business looks like it loses money, but that "loss" is really $3 billion of research spending on Starship; strip that out and launching rockets is profitable. The AI business is the opposite — it brings in $3.2 billion but loses $6.4 billion running the computers, and almost all of the value above $1 trillion is being assigned to it on faith.
Add the parts up and you get roughly $1.0–1.9 trillion — below or at the low end of the $1.5–2 trillion pitch. The other wrinkle is the "Musk premium": investors give Musk-run companies credit for things that don't exist yet (a Mars colony, humanoid robots, data centers in orbit), while the same speculative bets barely move the price of an Amazon or a Google. App Economy's blunt shorthand is "IPO = It's Probably Overpriced," and the verdict is to put it on your watchlist and watch it trade for a few quarters rather than buy on day one.
In short: Private — a coming "$2T IPO" pitching solar-powered data centers in space; used to underline silver demand (solar is silver's biggest industrial use), not as a stock view.
SpaceX is private — he points to its expected "$2 trillion IPO" and its pitch of solar-powered data centers in space. He raises it only to underline silver demand, since solar panels are silver's single biggest industrial use, not as a view on the stock.
51:06What do you do with um silver stocks? Tremendous volatility. Huge run up in 2025 and it's it's pulled back. Well, we're going to have a $2 trillion IPO SpaceX where they're going to be, you know, telling a narrative. — Well, they're going to be telling a narrative. They're going to be launching these data centers in space powered by, you know, these gigantic solar panels.
In short: ~$2T IPO this summer — must be force-fed into passive (≈$250B of equity) before any decline; "tech has to crash to make room."
SpaceX is Elon Musk's rocket company, expected to go public this summer at a roughly $2 trillion valuation. His concern isn't the business — it's the mechanics of the IPO.
When a huge company joins the index, the index funds everyone owns must buy its shares. He argues that around $250 billion of this expensive new stock will be "force-fed" into passive funds — and that the insiders need to do it before any market decline, because once the window closes they'd be stuck. To make room, he says, today's tech has to crash.
4:37There are many who are worried about some type of market collapse where, you know, a halt in a way of trading because of liquidity issues. So later this year, maybe in the summertime, we've got SpaceX expecting to have an IPO. And it's the valuation is somewhere close to $2 trillion. Then Anthropic and OpenAI are racing each other to be the first to IPO as a large language model company and many are projecting fourth quarter to somewhere around first quarter of next year and somewhere in the trillion dollar, maybe even higher, neighborhood
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Verbatim excerpts from the public transcripts (auto-pulled at each mention's timestamp, lightly cleaned). Timestamps link into the video; "source page" opens that commentator's full analysis at this row. Click a mention's header line to expand it (one open at a time). For personal study — not investment advice.